Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) in EAP-AKA prime
draft-ra-emu-pqc-eapaka-05
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(emu WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K , Aritra Banerjee | ||
| Last updated | 2025-07-09 (Latest revision 2025-05-28) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Adopted by a WG | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eapaka | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' FS) is specified in [RFC9678], providing updates to [RFC9048] with an optional extension that offers ephemeral key exchange using the traditional Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) key agreement algorithm for achieving perfect forward secrecy (PFS). However, it is susceptible to future threats from Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers, which could potentially compromise a traditional ephemeral public key. If the adversary has also obtained knowledge of the long-term key and ephemeral public key, it could compromise session keys generated as part of the authentication run in EAP-AKA'. This draft aims to enhance the security of EAP-AKA' FS protocol by making it quantum-safe using Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ-KEMs).
Authors
Tirumaleswar Reddy.K
Aritra Banerjee
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)