Refusal Transparency: Signed, Replay-Resistant Evidence of Refused Agent-System Transitions
draft-sabey-refusal-transparency-02
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Jaryn Mervin Sabey | ||
| Last updated | 2026-07-21 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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| Additional resources |
In-browser verifier
Specifications, conformance corpus, and draft sources |
||
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draft-sabey-refusal-transparency-02
Individual Submission J. Sabey
Internet-Draft Continuity Laboratories
Intended status: Informational 21 July 2026
Expires: 22 January 2027
Refusal Transparency: Signed, Replay-Resistant Evidence of Refused
Agent-System Transitions
draft-sabey-refusal-transparency-02
Abstract
A governance system for autonomous agents is defined as much by what
it refuses as by what it permits, yet refusals are the one behavior
vendors only ever assert. A Refusal Digest is a portable, signed
JSON document recording one adversarial probe run against a live
agent-governance system: for every attack attempted, the system's
verbatim refusal ground, the event types the attack would have
recorded had it succeeded, and the complete signed event ledger of
the attempt — in which the refused transition is provably absent.
Digests verify offline, by parties who do not operate the probed
system, using only the issuer's public key. From version 0.2, every
quantity that varies between runs derives deterministically from a
per-run seed carried in the digest, so a relying party can recompute
the derivations and a replayed or pre-recorded ledger cannot match a
fresh digest. This document specifies the digest wire format, its
canonicalization and signature scheme, the seeded-variation
derivations, and the verification algorithm. Where succession
receipts prove that an agent legitimately became the holder of an
authority, refusal digests prove what the governing system declined
to let happen.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 January 2027.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. The Digest Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Seeded Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Canonicalization and Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Operating Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Versioning and Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
Any vendor of agent-governance infrastructure claims that its guards
hold: that the illegal transition is blocked, that the unauthorized
actor is refused, that the forbidden state change cannot be recorded.
The claim is load-bearing — buyers adopt such systems precisely for
what they will not do — and it is almost never checkable. Audit logs
show what happened; nothing shows, verifiably, what was _prevented_
from happening.
A *Refusal Digest* makes the claim checkable. It is a self-contained
JSON document, produced by running a published suite of adversarial
probes against the governing system, carrying for each probe:
* the attack attempted and the guard expected to refuse it, in plain
language;
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* the outcome — refused, or unexpected_pass when a guard did not
fire (recorded and published, never hidden);
* the system's *verbatim refusal ground* — the actual error the
guard returned, not a summary of it;
* the *forbidden event types*: the records the attack would have
produced had it succeeded; and
* the *complete signed event ledger of the attempt*, embedded
verbatim, in which every forbidden event type is provably absent.
A relying party verifies a digest *offline* with only the issuer's
Ed25519 public key: the proof over the whole document, every embedded
event's hash and signature, the absence of every forbidden
transition, and the summary counts. Refusal-before-recording is the
probed system's discipline — an illegal transition is refused
_before_ anything is appended — so a successful refusal leaves
exactly the shape the digest records: a ledger carrying the attempt's
setup and no completion.
One objection survives that verification: a dishonest operator could
replay a single recorded probe run forever. Version 0.2 of the
format answers it with *seeded variation* (Section 4): every quantity
that varies between runs — the staged identifiers of each probe's
setup, the ordering of causally independent steps — derives
deterministically from a fresh per-run seed carried in the digest. A
verifier recomputes the derivations from the seed; a ledger recorded
under any other seed cannot match. A sequence of runs MAY
additionally chain seeds, making the sequence itself tamper-evident.
This document is a companion to Succession Receipts [SR-ID], with
which it shares its canonicalization and signature discipline
(Section 5) and its conformance-corpus discipline: the format is
published with golden vectors and tamper cases that MUST fail at
named checks [SR-REPO], against which independent verifier
implementations validate. Succession receipts attest that an agent
legitimately became the holder of an authority; refusal digests
attest the transitions the same class of system refused to perform.
Pre-execution authorization of individual material actions — a named
human approving the exact action before it runs, as in
[I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-receipts] — is a third, complementary
evidence class: what was authorized, what transferred, and what was
refused compose without overlap. The transfer leg of that
composition is realized at the receipt layer, where the succession-
receipt format binds a pre-execution authorization receipt to the
transfer through an optional claim [SR-ID]; a refusal digest attests
the same class of system's refusals and requires no such binding of
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its own. In the transparency-log sense, a digest is a signed
statement suitable for registration with transparency services (in
the style of [RFC9162] and SCITT [RFC9943]); anchoring is discussed
in Section 9.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Probe: One adversarial attack attempted against a freshly
constructed, isolated instance of the governed system, together
with the staged setup it requires.
Refusal ground: The verbatim error with which the governed system
refused the probe's attack — the same string an ordinary caller
would receive.
Forbidden event types: The event types the probe's attack would have
appended to the ledger had it succeeded. Their absence from the
probe's embedded ledger is what verification checks.
Run seed: A 32-byte value, carried as 64 lowercase hexadecimal
characters in a version 0.2 digest, from which every run-varying
quantity derives (Section 4).
Issuer: The operator that ran the probe suite and signs the digest.
At the versions specified here the issuer attests its own run
(run.attestation is "self"); see Section 9.
Relying party: Any holder of the digest verifying it against the
issuer's public keys.
3. The Digest Document
A Refusal Digest is a UTF-8 JSON [RFC8259] object. The complete
normative member catalog, with types and constraints, is the
published digest specification [SR-REFUSAL], which publishes version
0.1 (frozen) and version 0.2 (current); this section summarizes the
structure a verifier depends on and shows a version 0.2 digest.
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{
"spec": "css-refusal-digest",
"spec_version": "0.2",
"issuer": { "id": "urn:css:registry" },
"run": {
"started_at": "<RFC 3339 timestamp>",
"completed_at": "<RFC 3339 timestamp>",
"attestation": "self",
"seed": "<64 lowercase hex characters>"
},
"probes": [
{
"id": "illegal-amendment",
"name": "Illegal Amendment Attempt",
"attack": "<the attack, in plain language>",
"guard": "<the rule expected to refuse it>",
"outcome": "refused" | "unexpected_pass",
"refusal_ground": "<the system's verbatim refusal error>",
"engine_summary": "<one-line explanation>",
"forbidden_event_types": [ "AmendmentRatified", ... ],
"events": [ <event envelope>, ... ]
},
...
],
"summary": { "attempted": <count>, "refused": <count> },
"proof": {
"type": "CSSEd25519Signature",
"created": "<RFC 3339 timestamp>",
"verification_method": "<key_id>",
"digest_hash": "<hex SHA-256 of the canonical bytes>",
"signature": "ed25519:<key_id>:<base64url(signature)>"
}
}
run.seed is *REQUIRED at version 0.2 and absent at version 0.1*. A
version 0.1 digest sets spec_version to 0.1 and carries no seed; a
conforming verifier accepts either version, each under its own rules
(Section 6).
Timestamps throughout are [RFC3339] UTC instants. Each probe runs on
an isolated, freshly constructed instance of the governed system, so
its events member is the _complete_ ledger of that attempt and probes
cannot contaminate one another. Event envelopes carry the same
members, integrity rules, and optional signatures as succession
receipt evidence ([SR-ID]; the event-hash rule is identical) and are
embedded exactly as recorded.
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The probe suite is expected to grow. Adding a probe is additive
within a spec version: verification is per-probe, and the summary is
recounted, never trusted.
4. Seeded Variation
Version 0.2 exists to defeat the replayed-ledger objection. Its
rule: *every quantity that varies between runs derives
deterministically from run.seed*, so any relying party can recompute
the variation, and no pre-recorded ledger can satisfy a digest
carrying a different seed.
The standing derivations, over the seed's lowercase-hex string form
and its 32 raw bytes:
* *Run namespace.* NS = UUIDv5(NameSpaceURL, "css-refusal-digest/
v0.2|" + seed), where UUIDv5 and the URL namespace are as defined
in [RFC9562].
* *Derived identifiers.* Each staged identifier of a probe's setup
is UUIDv5(NS, "<probe-id>|<quantity-label>"). The identifier
labels each probe MUST derive — and the ledger positions where
they MUST appear — are pinned per probe by the published
specification and its conformance corpus [SR-REFUSAL] [SR-CORPUS].
* *Derived orderings.* Where a probe contains causally independent
steps (or attack routes) whose order is real run-to-run variation,
the candidates are sorted by the lowercase-hex SHA-256 digest of
the concatenation of the seed's raw bytes and "<probe-
id>|<candidate-label>".
*What never varies* is the line the transparency claim lives on: the
probe set, each probe's id, the guard under test, the attack's
semantics, and the forbidden_event_types. If those varied, a run
would stop being independently recomputable — a reader could no
longer say _what_ was attacked, only that something was — and the
claim would collapse to trust in the operator. Variation exists to
make replay detectable, never to make the attack a moving target.
Seed choice is deliberately unconstrained: because nothing seed-
derived affects what is attacked or what must be refused, grinding
seeds buys an issuer nothing — any seed's run must refuse. For a
sequence of runs it is RECOMMENDED to chain seeds as the lowercase-
hex SHA-256 of the ASCII bytes of the previous digest's digest_hash
(first run: issuer's choice). A chained sequence is self-linking:
the claim "N consecutive runs, all refused" then inherits the same
tamper evidence as the digests themselves.
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5. Canonicalization and Signatures
The digest reuses the Succession Receipts discipline ([SR-ID])
unchanged:
* *Canonical bytes*: the JSON serialization with the proof member
absent, member names sorted lexicographically, no insignificant
whitespace, no HTML escaping — coinciding with the JSON
Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785] for the format's value domain
(no floating-point numbers).
* *Hash-then-sign*: the proof signs the lowercase hexadecimal
SHA-256 digest of the canonical bytes (the digest _string_ is the
signed message); digest_hash records it; signature is the
canonical <alg>:<key_id>:base64url(signature-bytes) string, with
ed25519 ([RFC8032]) the sole algorithm registered at versions 0.1
and 0.2.
* *Event integrity*: each embedded event's event_hash recomputes
under the same event-hash rule as receipt evidence, and a present
event signature verifies over it.
proof.created is outside the signed content: re-signing identical
content yields the same digest_hash.
6. Verification
A verifier is given the digest document and the issuer's public keys,
pinned out of band. Verification MUST perform, in order:
1. *Structure.* spec and spec_version match; run.attestation is
"self"; at least one probe is present; every probe carries an id,
a non-empty forbidden_event_types, and an outcome of refused or
unexpected_pass; a refused probe carries a non-empty
refusal_ground. At version 0.2, run.seed is present and is
exactly 64 lowercase hexadecimal characters; at version 0.1 it is
absent. Unknown versions MUST be rejected.
2. *Proof.* Recompute the canonical hash (Section 5). It MUST equal
proof.digest_hash, and proof.signature MUST verify against it
under the key named by its key_id. A missing proof, an unknown
key_id, a hash mismatch, or a failed signature check is fatal.
3. *Probe evidence.* For every event of every probe: the event hash
MUST recompute to its stored value, and a _present_ event
signature MUST verify (absent signatures are reported, not fatal;
a present-but-invalid signature is fatal).
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4. *Refused-transition absence.* For every probe with outcome
refused: no embedded event's type appears in that probe's
forbidden_event_types. A digest claiming a refusal while
carrying the completed transition is invalid.
5. *Summary integrity.* summary.attempted MUST equal the probe count
and summary.refused the count of refused outcomes.
6. *Seed derivation (version 0.2).* For every probe whose derivation
table the verifier implements (the standing suite, pinned by the
published corpus), recompute the derived identifiers and
orderings of Section 4 from run.seed and require the probe's
ledger to have used them. For probes it does not know, a
verifier MUST still enforce steps 1–5 in full.
*"Valid" and "all refused" are separate statements.* A digest
recording an unexpected_pass can verify — it is an honest record of a
failed run, published rather than hidden — and a relying party whose
standing question is "were all attacks refused?" MUST additionally
check that summary.refused equals summary.attempted. Reference
tooling distinguishes the two outcomes deliberately.
A conforming verifier MUST accept every golden vector and MUST reject
every tamper case of the published conformance corpus (trees refusal-
v0.1 and refusal-v0.2) at the named check [SR-CORPUS].
7. Operating Model
Cadence is the operator's dial, not the format's: a digest attests
one probe run, and nothing in it changes with how often runs happen.
An issuer publishing on a cadence SHOULD publish the cadence
alongside the digests; a digest says nothing about attacks it does
not contain, and nothing about intervals it does not cover.
A guard that does not fire is a *published fact, never a silent gap*:
the unexpected_pass outcome is recorded in the digest, the digest
still signs and still verifies, and the operational response happens
outside the format. Continuous operation naturally combines with
seed chaining (Section 4): a long-running issuer emits a self-linking
sequence in which each run's seed commits to the previous run's
content.
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8. Versioning and Stability
spec_version identifies the wire format. Published versions are
never mutated: format changes only ever add a new version with new
golden vectors, and verifiers SHOULD continue to verify every
published version. Version 0.1 (frozen) carries no seed and verifies
under steps 1–5 forever; version 0.2 (current) adds run.seed and the
derivation checks additively [SR-REFUSAL].
9. Security Considerations
*Self-attestation is the stated trust model, not a hidden one.* A
digest proves its content is intact, its embedded ledgers are genuine
output of the probed system's signing keys, and the refused
transitions are absent. It does not prove _who operated_ the probes:
at the versions specified here the issuer attests its own run.
Probes run by an independent operator and countersigned — the proof
becoming a set — are the format's recorded evolution and change who
signs, not the format. Relying parties weighing operator honesty get
exactly the leverage the seed provides (Section 4): whatever else a
dishonest operator can do, it cannot serve yesterday's ledger under
today's seed.
*A digest is a positive record with stated scope.* It attests the
probes it contains, on the cadence its issuer publishes — not the
absence of other vulnerabilities, and not behavior between runs.
Consumers SHOULD treat the probe suite's composition (pinned, public,
versioned) as part of what they are trusting.
*Binding to the artifact under test is a recorded evolution.* A
digest names what was attacked and what was refused; the versions
specified here do not bind _which build_ of the governed system was
probed, so the claim that the probes ran against the deployed
production artifact rests on the operator, exactly as the self-
attestation model states. The recorded strengthening path is a
probe-suite digest and a deployed-artifact digest or build
attestation carried in the run metadata, with the independent
challenger or witness of the countersignature evolution above
checking them.
*Seed grinding is neutralized by construction.* Nothing seed-derived
affects what is attacked or what must be refused, so an issuer gains
nothing by choosing seeds adversarially; the seed exists to bind the
ledger bytes to the run, not to randomize the test.
*Key pinning is the trust root*, exactly as for succession receipts:
relying parties MUST obtain issuer keys through a channel they trust.
The digest additionally embeds the probed system's event signatures,
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so a relying party that pins the system's event-signing keys
separately from the digest-signing key narrows the forgery surface
further.
*Existence time composes with transparency infrastructure.* A
digest's digest_hash is a natural registrant for transparency and
timestamping services — a SCITT transparency service [RFC9943] or
comparable append-only witness — giving each published digest an
existence proof independent of its issuer. Issuers operating on a
cadence SHOULD anchor digests so that backdating a "clean" digest
after an incident is detectable.
*Deterministic serialization is load-bearing.* Implementations MUST
reproduce the canonical form and the event payloads' document-order
serialization exactly; the conformance corpus exists to make
divergence detectable, and its version 0.2 trees include re-signed
derivation forgeries that only the seed checks refuse.
10. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions. The signature-algorithm registry
is internal to the format's spec-version ladder (Section 5), shared
with Succession Receipts [SR-ID].
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3339>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
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[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
[RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785>.
[RFC9562] Davis, K., Peabody, B., and P. Leach, "Universally Unique
IDentifiers (UUIDs)", RFC 9562, DOI 10.17487/RFC9562, May
2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9562>.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-receipts]
Schrock, I., "Authorization Receipts for High-Risk Agent
Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-schrock-
ep-authorization-receipts-07, 19 July 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-schrock-ep-
authorization-receipts-07>.
[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9162>.
[RFC9943] Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande,
Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and
Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9943, June 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9943>.
[SR-CORPUS]
"Succession Receipts conformance corpus", 2026,
<https://github.com/jsabes24/css-succession-
receipts/tree/main/corpus>.
[SR-ID] "Succession Receipts: Portable Signed Evidence of
Authority Succession Between Autonomous Agents", 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sabey-succession-
receipts/>.
[SR-REFUSAL]
"CSS Refusal Digest", 2026, <https://github.com/jsabes24/
css-succession-receipts/blob/main/spec/refusal-
transparency.md>.
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[SR-REPO] "Succession Receipts: specifications and conformance
corpus", 2026,
<https://github.com/jsabes24/css-succession-receipts>.
Acknowledgments
The format was extracted from a production authority-succession
system of record, where the probe suite runs on a standing cadence
against the system's own constitutional guards; the conformance
corpus packages the resulting attack classes — including fully re-
signed derivation forgeries — as executable verification cases.
Iman Schrock provided detailed external review of the -00 document
family; this revision incorporates it.
Change Log
-02: Updated the composition framing to note that the transfer leg of
the authorized/transferred/refused composition is now realized at the
receipt layer, where the succession-receipt format normatively
defines an optional binding to pre-execution authorization receipts
[SR-ID]. The refusal digest's own wire format, verification, and
seeded-variation rules are unchanged.
-01: Added the pre-execution authorization composition note and the
[I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-receipts] reference; added the
artifact-binding security consideration (probe-suite digest and
deployed-artifact attestation as the recorded strengthening path).
No wire-format change.
Author's Address
Jaryn Mervin Sabey
Continuity Laboratories
Email: hello@continuitylaboratories.com
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