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Refusal Transparency: Signed, Replay-Resistant Evidence of Refused Agent-System Transitions
draft-sabey-refusal-transparency-02

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Jaryn Mervin Sabey
Last updated 2026-07-21
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draft-sabey-refusal-transparency-02
Individual Submission                                           J. Sabey
Internet-Draft                                   Continuity Laboratories
Intended status: Informational                              21 July 2026
Expires: 22 January 2027

   Refusal Transparency: Signed, Replay-Resistant Evidence of Refused
                        Agent-System Transitions
                  draft-sabey-refusal-transparency-02

Abstract

   A governance system for autonomous agents is defined as much by what
   it refuses as by what it permits, yet refusals are the one behavior
   vendors only ever assert.  A Refusal Digest is a portable, signed
   JSON document recording one adversarial probe run against a live
   agent-governance system: for every attack attempted, the system's
   verbatim refusal ground, the event types the attack would have
   recorded had it succeeded, and the complete signed event ledger of
   the attempt — in which the refused transition is provably absent.
   Digests verify offline, by parties who do not operate the probed
   system, using only the issuer's public key.  From version 0.2, every
   quantity that varies between runs derives deterministically from a
   per-run seed carried in the digest, so a relying party can recompute
   the derivations and a replayed or pre-recorded ledger cannot match a
   fresh digest.  This document specifies the digest wire format, its
   canonicalization and signature scheme, the seeded-variation
   derivations, and the verification algorithm.  Where succession
   receipts prove that an agent legitimately became the holder of an
   authority, refusal digests prove what the governing system declined
   to let happen.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 January 2027.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  The Digest Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Seeded Variation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Canonicalization and Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Operating Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Versioning and Stability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   Any vendor of agent-governance infrastructure claims that its guards
   hold: that the illegal transition is blocked, that the unauthorized
   actor is refused, that the forbidden state change cannot be recorded.
   The claim is load-bearing — buyers adopt such systems precisely for
   what they will not do — and it is almost never checkable.  Audit logs
   show what happened; nothing shows, verifiably, what was _prevented_
   from happening.

   A *Refusal Digest* makes the claim checkable.  It is a self-contained
   JSON document, produced by running a published suite of adversarial
   probes against the governing system, carrying for each probe:

   *  the attack attempted and the guard expected to refuse it, in plain
      language;

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   *  the outcome — refused, or unexpected_pass when a guard did not
      fire (recorded and published, never hidden);

   *  the system's *verbatim refusal ground* — the actual error the
      guard returned, not a summary of it;

   *  the *forbidden event types*: the records the attack would have
      produced had it succeeded; and

   *  the *complete signed event ledger of the attempt*, embedded
      verbatim, in which every forbidden event type is provably absent.

   A relying party verifies a digest *offline* with only the issuer's
   Ed25519 public key: the proof over the whole document, every embedded
   event's hash and signature, the absence of every forbidden
   transition, and the summary counts.  Refusal-before-recording is the
   probed system's discipline — an illegal transition is refused
   _before_ anything is appended — so a successful refusal leaves
   exactly the shape the digest records: a ledger carrying the attempt's
   setup and no completion.

   One objection survives that verification: a dishonest operator could
   replay a single recorded probe run forever.  Version 0.2 of the
   format answers it with *seeded variation* (Section 4): every quantity
   that varies between runs — the staged identifiers of each probe's
   setup, the ordering of causally independent steps — derives
   deterministically from a fresh per-run seed carried in the digest.  A
   verifier recomputes the derivations from the seed; a ledger recorded
   under any other seed cannot match.  A sequence of runs MAY
   additionally chain seeds, making the sequence itself tamper-evident.

   This document is a companion to Succession Receipts [SR-ID], with
   which it shares its canonicalization and signature discipline
   (Section 5) and its conformance-corpus discipline: the format is
   published with golden vectors and tamper cases that MUST fail at
   named checks [SR-REPO], against which independent verifier
   implementations validate.  Succession receipts attest that an agent
   legitimately became the holder of an authority; refusal digests
   attest the transitions the same class of system refused to perform.
   Pre-execution authorization of individual material actions — a named
   human approving the exact action before it runs, as in
   [I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-receipts] — is a third, complementary
   evidence class: what was authorized, what transferred, and what was
   refused compose without overlap.  The transfer leg of that
   composition is realized at the receipt layer, where the succession-
   receipt format binds a pre-execution authorization receipt to the
   transfer through an optional claim [SR-ID]; a refusal digest attests
   the same class of system's refusals and requires no such binding of

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   its own.  In the transparency-log sense, a digest is a signed
   statement suitable for registration with transparency services (in
   the style of [RFC9162] and SCITT [RFC9943]); anchoring is discussed
   in Section 9.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Probe:  One adversarial attack attempted against a freshly
      constructed, isolated instance of the governed system, together
      with the staged setup it requires.

   Refusal ground:  The verbatim error with which the governed system
      refused the probe's attack — the same string an ordinary caller
      would receive.

   Forbidden event types:  The event types the probe's attack would have
      appended to the ledger had it succeeded.  Their absence from the
      probe's embedded ledger is what verification checks.

   Run seed:  A 32-byte value, carried as 64 lowercase hexadecimal
      characters in a version 0.2 digest, from which every run-varying
      quantity derives (Section 4).

   Issuer:  The operator that ran the probe suite and signs the digest.
      At the versions specified here the issuer attests its own run
      (run.attestation is "self"); see Section 9.

   Relying party:  Any holder of the digest verifying it against the
      issuer's public keys.

3.  The Digest Document

   A Refusal Digest is a UTF-8 JSON [RFC8259] object.  The complete
   normative member catalog, with types and constraints, is the
   published digest specification [SR-REFUSAL], which publishes version
   0.1 (frozen) and version 0.2 (current); this section summarizes the
   structure a verifier depends on and shows a version 0.2 digest.

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   {
     "spec":         "css-refusal-digest",
     "spec_version": "0.2",
     "issuer":       { "id": "urn:css:registry" },
     "run": {
       "started_at":   "<RFC 3339 timestamp>",
       "completed_at": "<RFC 3339 timestamp>",
       "attestation":  "self",
       "seed":         "<64 lowercase hex characters>"
     },
     "probes": [
       {
         "id":              "illegal-amendment",
         "name":            "Illegal Amendment Attempt",
         "attack":          "<the attack, in plain language>",
         "guard":           "<the rule expected to refuse it>",
         "outcome":         "refused" | "unexpected_pass",
         "refusal_ground":  "<the system's verbatim refusal error>",
         "engine_summary":  "<one-line explanation>",
         "forbidden_event_types": [ "AmendmentRatified", ... ],
         "events":          [ <event envelope>, ... ]
       },
       ...
     ],
     "summary": { "attempted": <count>, "refused": <count> },
     "proof": {
       "type":                "CSSEd25519Signature",
       "created":             "<RFC 3339 timestamp>",
       "verification_method": "<key_id>",
       "digest_hash":         "<hex SHA-256 of the canonical bytes>",
       "signature":           "ed25519:<key_id>:<base64url(signature)>"
     }
   }

   run.seed is *REQUIRED at version 0.2 and absent at version 0.1*. A
   version 0.1 digest sets spec_version to 0.1 and carries no seed; a
   conforming verifier accepts either version, each under its own rules
   (Section 6).

   Timestamps throughout are [RFC3339] UTC instants.  Each probe runs on
   an isolated, freshly constructed instance of the governed system, so
   its events member is the _complete_ ledger of that attempt and probes
   cannot contaminate one another.  Event envelopes carry the same
   members, integrity rules, and optional signatures as succession
   receipt evidence ([SR-ID]; the event-hash rule is identical) and are
   embedded exactly as recorded.

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   The probe suite is expected to grow.  Adding a probe is additive
   within a spec version: verification is per-probe, and the summary is
   recounted, never trusted.

4.  Seeded Variation

   Version 0.2 exists to defeat the replayed-ledger objection.  Its
   rule: *every quantity that varies between runs derives
   deterministically from run.seed*, so any relying party can recompute
   the variation, and no pre-recorded ledger can satisfy a digest
   carrying a different seed.

   The standing derivations, over the seed's lowercase-hex string form
   and its 32 raw bytes:

   *  *Run namespace.* NS = UUIDv5(NameSpaceURL, "css-refusal-digest/
      v0.2|" + seed), where UUIDv5 and the URL namespace are as defined
      in [RFC9562].

   *  *Derived identifiers.* Each staged identifier of a probe's setup
      is UUIDv5(NS, "<probe-id>|<quantity-label>").  The identifier
      labels each probe MUST derive — and the ledger positions where
      they MUST appear — are pinned per probe by the published
      specification and its conformance corpus [SR-REFUSAL] [SR-CORPUS].

   *  *Derived orderings.* Where a probe contains causally independent
      steps (or attack routes) whose order is real run-to-run variation,
      the candidates are sorted by the lowercase-hex SHA-256 digest of
      the concatenation of the seed's raw bytes and "<probe-
      id>|<candidate-label>".

   *What never varies* is the line the transparency claim lives on: the
   probe set, each probe's id, the guard under test, the attack's
   semantics, and the forbidden_event_types.  If those varied, a run
   would stop being independently recomputable — a reader could no
   longer say _what_ was attacked, only that something was — and the
   claim would collapse to trust in the operator.  Variation exists to
   make replay detectable, never to make the attack a moving target.

   Seed choice is deliberately unconstrained: because nothing seed-
   derived affects what is attacked or what must be refused, grinding
   seeds buys an issuer nothing — any seed's run must refuse.  For a
   sequence of runs it is RECOMMENDED to chain seeds as the lowercase-
   hex SHA-256 of the ASCII bytes of the previous digest's digest_hash
   (first run: issuer's choice).  A chained sequence is self-linking:
   the claim "N consecutive runs, all refused" then inherits the same
   tamper evidence as the digests themselves.

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5.  Canonicalization and Signatures

   The digest reuses the Succession Receipts discipline ([SR-ID])
   unchanged:

   *  *Canonical bytes*: the JSON serialization with the proof member
      absent, member names sorted lexicographically, no insignificant
      whitespace, no HTML escaping — coinciding with the JSON
      Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785] for the format's value domain
      (no floating-point numbers).

   *  *Hash-then-sign*: the proof signs the lowercase hexadecimal
      SHA-256 digest of the canonical bytes (the digest _string_ is the
      signed message); digest_hash records it; signature is the
      canonical <alg>:<key_id>:base64url(signature-bytes) string, with
      ed25519 ([RFC8032]) the sole algorithm registered at versions 0.1
      and 0.2.

   *  *Event integrity*: each embedded event's event_hash recomputes
      under the same event-hash rule as receipt evidence, and a present
      event signature verifies over it.

   proof.created is outside the signed content: re-signing identical
   content yields the same digest_hash.

6.  Verification

   A verifier is given the digest document and the issuer's public keys,
   pinned out of band.  Verification MUST perform, in order:

   1.  *Structure.* spec and spec_version match; run.attestation is
       "self"; at least one probe is present; every probe carries an id,
       a non-empty forbidden_event_types, and an outcome of refused or
       unexpected_pass; a refused probe carries a non-empty
       refusal_ground.  At version 0.2, run.seed is present and is
       exactly 64 lowercase hexadecimal characters; at version 0.1 it is
       absent.  Unknown versions MUST be rejected.

   2.  *Proof.* Recompute the canonical hash (Section 5).  It MUST equal
       proof.digest_hash, and proof.signature MUST verify against it
       under the key named by its key_id.  A missing proof, an unknown
       key_id, a hash mismatch, or a failed signature check is fatal.

   3.  *Probe evidence.* For every event of every probe: the event hash
       MUST recompute to its stored value, and a _present_ event
       signature MUST verify (absent signatures are reported, not fatal;
       a present-but-invalid signature is fatal).

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   4.  *Refused-transition absence.* For every probe with outcome
       refused: no embedded event's type appears in that probe's
       forbidden_event_types.  A digest claiming a refusal while
       carrying the completed transition is invalid.

   5.  *Summary integrity.* summary.attempted MUST equal the probe count
       and summary.refused the count of refused outcomes.

   6.  *Seed derivation (version 0.2).* For every probe whose derivation
       table the verifier implements (the standing suite, pinned by the
       published corpus), recompute the derived identifiers and
       orderings of Section 4 from run.seed and require the probe's
       ledger to have used them.  For probes it does not know, a
       verifier MUST still enforce steps 1–5 in full.

   *"Valid" and "all refused" are separate statements.* A digest
   recording an unexpected_pass can verify — it is an honest record of a
   failed run, published rather than hidden — and a relying party whose
   standing question is "were all attacks refused?"  MUST additionally
   check that summary.refused equals summary.attempted.  Reference
   tooling distinguishes the two outcomes deliberately.

   A conforming verifier MUST accept every golden vector and MUST reject
   every tamper case of the published conformance corpus (trees refusal-
   v0.1 and refusal-v0.2) at the named check [SR-CORPUS].

7.  Operating Model

   Cadence is the operator's dial, not the format's: a digest attests
   one probe run, and nothing in it changes with how often runs happen.
   An issuer publishing on a cadence SHOULD publish the cadence
   alongside the digests; a digest says nothing about attacks it does
   not contain, and nothing about intervals it does not cover.

   A guard that does not fire is a *published fact, never a silent gap*:
   the unexpected_pass outcome is recorded in the digest, the digest
   still signs and still verifies, and the operational response happens
   outside the format.  Continuous operation naturally combines with
   seed chaining (Section 4): a long-running issuer emits a self-linking
   sequence in which each run's seed commits to the previous run's
   content.

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8.  Versioning and Stability

   spec_version identifies the wire format.  Published versions are
   never mutated: format changes only ever add a new version with new
   golden vectors, and verifiers SHOULD continue to verify every
   published version.  Version 0.1 (frozen) carries no seed and verifies
   under steps 1–5 forever; version 0.2 (current) adds run.seed and the
   derivation checks additively [SR-REFUSAL].

9.  Security Considerations

   *Self-attestation is the stated trust model, not a hidden one.* A
   digest proves its content is intact, its embedded ledgers are genuine
   output of the probed system's signing keys, and the refused
   transitions are absent.  It does not prove _who operated_ the probes:
   at the versions specified here the issuer attests its own run.
   Probes run by an independent operator and countersigned — the proof
   becoming a set — are the format's recorded evolution and change who
   signs, not the format.  Relying parties weighing operator honesty get
   exactly the leverage the seed provides (Section 4): whatever else a
   dishonest operator can do, it cannot serve yesterday's ledger under
   today's seed.

   *A digest is a positive record with stated scope.* It attests the
   probes it contains, on the cadence its issuer publishes — not the
   absence of other vulnerabilities, and not behavior between runs.
   Consumers SHOULD treat the probe suite's composition (pinned, public,
   versioned) as part of what they are trusting.

   *Binding to the artifact under test is a recorded evolution.* A
   digest names what was attacked and what was refused; the versions
   specified here do not bind _which build_ of the governed system was
   probed, so the claim that the probes ran against the deployed
   production artifact rests on the operator, exactly as the self-
   attestation model states.  The recorded strengthening path is a
   probe-suite digest and a deployed-artifact digest or build
   attestation carried in the run metadata, with the independent
   challenger or witness of the countersignature evolution above
   checking them.

   *Seed grinding is neutralized by construction.* Nothing seed-derived
   affects what is attacked or what must be refused, so an issuer gains
   nothing by choosing seeds adversarially; the seed exists to bind the
   ledger bytes to the run, not to randomize the test.

   *Key pinning is the trust root*, exactly as for succession receipts:
   relying parties MUST obtain issuer keys through a channel they trust.
   The digest additionally embeds the probed system's event signatures,

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   so a relying party that pins the system's event-signing keys
   separately from the digest-signing key narrows the forgery surface
   further.

   *Existence time composes with transparency infrastructure.* A
   digest's digest_hash is a natural registrant for transparency and
   timestamping services — a SCITT transparency service [RFC9943] or
   comparable append-only witness — giving each published digest an
   existence proof independent of its issuer.  Issuers operating on a
   cadence SHOULD anchor digests so that backdating a "clean" digest
   after an incident is detectable.

   *Deterministic serialization is load-bearing.* Implementations MUST
   reproduce the canonical form and the event payloads' document-order
   serialization exactly; the conformance corpus exists to make
   divergence detectable, and its version 0.2 trees include re-signed
   derivation forgeries that only the seed checks refuse.

10.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.  The signature-algorithm registry
   is internal to the format's spec-version ladder (Section 5), shared
   with Succession Receipts [SR-ID].

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3339]  Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
              Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3339>.

   [RFC8032]  Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
              Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

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   [RFC8259]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.

   [RFC8785]  Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
              Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8785>.

   [RFC9562]  Davis, K., Peabody, B., and P. Leach, "Universally Unique
              IDentifiers (UUIDs)", RFC 9562, DOI 10.17487/RFC9562, May
              2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9562>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-receipts]
              Schrock, I., "Authorization Receipts for High-Risk Agent
              Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-schrock-
              ep-authorization-receipts-07, 19 July 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-schrock-ep-
              authorization-receipts-07>.

   [RFC9162]  Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
              Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
              December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9162>.

   [RFC9943]  Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande,
              Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and
              Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9943, June 2026,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9943>.

   [SR-CORPUS]
              "Succession Receipts conformance corpus", 2026,
              <https://github.com/jsabes24/css-succession-
              receipts/tree/main/corpus>.

   [SR-ID]    "Succession Receipts: Portable Signed Evidence of
              Authority Succession Between Autonomous Agents", 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sabey-succession-
              receipts/>.

   [SR-REFUSAL]
              "CSS Refusal Digest", 2026, <https://github.com/jsabes24/
              css-succession-receipts/blob/main/spec/refusal-
              transparency.md>.

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   [SR-REPO]  "Succession Receipts: specifications and conformance
              corpus", 2026,
              <https://github.com/jsabes24/css-succession-receipts>.

Acknowledgments

   The format was extracted from a production authority-succession
   system of record, where the probe suite runs on a standing cadence
   against the system's own constitutional guards; the conformance
   corpus packages the resulting attack classes — including fully re-
   signed derivation forgeries — as executable verification cases.

   Iman Schrock provided detailed external review of the -00 document
   family; this revision incorporates it.

Change Log

   -02: Updated the composition framing to note that the transfer leg of
   the authorized/transferred/refused composition is now realized at the
   receipt layer, where the succession-receipt format normatively
   defines an optional binding to pre-execution authorization receipts
   [SR-ID].  The refusal digest's own wire format, verification, and
   seeded-variation rules are unchanged.

   -01: Added the pre-execution authorization composition note and the
   [I-D.schrock-ep-authorization-receipts] reference; added the
   artifact-binding security consideration (probe-suite digest and
   deployed-artifact attestation as the recorded strengthening path).
   No wire-format change.

Author's Address

   Jaryn Mervin Sabey
   Continuity Laboratories
   Email: hello@continuitylaboratories.com

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