Linking an Agent's DNS Name to its OAuth Client
draft-shankarlingam-oauth-agent-dns-link-02
This document is an Internet-Draft (I-D).
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Sriram Shankarlingam | ||
| Last updated | 2026-11-15 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources |
HexaEight Agent implementation
|
||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-shankarlingam-oauth-agent-dns-link-02
Network Working Group S. Shankarlingam
Internet-Draft HexaEight
Intended status: Standards Track 16 November 2026
Expires: 20 May 2027
Linking an Agent's DNS Name to its OAuth Client
draft-shankarlingam-oauth-agent-dns-link-02
Abstract
Software agents increasingly call agents and services operated by
other organizations. A receiving organization often wants to know
two things about any such caller: that it is the agent it claims to
be, and that the organization operating it still authorizes it.
Existing approaches to the second question require a trust
relationship between the two organizations' authorization servers.
This document defines a DNS record by which the owner of a domain
links an agent's DNS name to the OAuth client that the agent uses at
the owner's own authorization server. The sending agent presents a
fresh access token for that client; the receiver verifies the token
against the record and against the issuer's published keys. No trust
relationship, registration or federation between the two
organizations is needed, and disabling the client at the sending
organization's authorization server stops the agent being accepted by
every receiver.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Non-goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Establishing the Sender's Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Channel Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Sender-Constrained Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. The Link Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. The Link Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. The Agent-Link-Name Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Sender Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Receiver Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Once Linked, Always Linked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Freshness and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2.1. Revocation Delay Depends on Configuration . . . . . . 11
8.3. Authorization Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Token Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Misuse by the Receiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.3. DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.4. Authorization Server Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.5. Clock Skew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.6. Configuration Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.1. HexaEight Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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13. Relationship to Other Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
14. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
15. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
An agent operated by organization A (for example agent01.a.example)
calls an agent or service operated by organization B. Before
answering, B wants assurance that:
1. the caller is agent01.a.example, and
2. organization A still authorizes agent01.a.example to act.
Question 1 is answered by whatever mechanism authenticates the
caller: an authenticated channel, a client certificate, a sender-
constrained token, or an agent identity system. Question 2 is
usually answered inside one organization by its authorization server:
when an administrator disables a client, that client can no longer
obtain tokens.
Across organizations, question 2 is harder. OAuth Identity and
Authorization Chaining Across Domains
[I-D.ietf-oauth-identity-chaining], OpenID Federation
[OpenID.Federation] and cloud workload identity federation all work,
but each requires the receiving side's authorization server or trust
anchor to be configured to trust the sending side's, pair by pair or
through a shared anchor. For agents that call many partners, this
setup does not scale, and in practice organizations fall back to
long-lived API keys that are not disabled when the agent is.
This document takes a narrower approach. The sending organization
publishes, in DNS under the agent's name, which issuer and client
identifier the agent uses. With every call the agent presents a
short-lived access token issued to that client. Any receiver can
check the token using only public information: the DNS record and the
issuer's published signing keys. The receiver does not need to trust
the sender's authorization server for anything beyond a signed
statement that it recently issued a token to the named client.
The token grants nothing. It is issued for a dedicated audience that
no resource server accepts, and serves only as evidence that the
client is still active. The receiver continues to make its own
access decisions.
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1.1. Goals
* Link an agent's DNS name to an existing OAuth client with no
change at any authorization server and no per-partner
configuration.
* Give the operating organization a single control (disabling the
client) that takes effect at every receiver.
* Let any receiver verify the link without prior contact with the
sender.
* Prevent a linked agent from evading the check by omitting the
token.
1.2. Non-goals
* Authenticating the agent's name. That is the job of the channel
or of a sender-constrained token (Section 3).
* Granting access. The token carries no permissions; the receiver
applies its own authorization policy.
* Conveying the identity of users on whose behalf the agent acts.
1.3. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.4. Terminology
Agent name: A DNS name identifying an agent, for example
agent01.a.example.
Sender: The agent that makes a call and presents a link token.
Receiver: The agent or service that receives the call and verifies
the link.
Link record: The DNS TXT record defined in Section 4.
Link token: An access token as described in Section 5.
Linked agent: An agent name for which a valid link record exists.
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Authenticated sender name: The agent name of the sender as
established by the receiver through a mechanism outside this
document (Section 3).
2. Overview
Organization A Organization B
+---------------+ (1) client credentials
| Authorization |<------------+
| Server (iss) |-----------+ |
+---------------+ (2) token | |
^ v |
| +------------+ (3) call + token +----------+
| | Sender |----------------->| Receiver |
| | agent01... | +----------+
| +------------+ | |
| (5) issuer metadata + JWKS (public) | |
+---------------------------------------------+ |
|
DNS: _agent-oauth.agent01.a.example TXT (4) lookup <------+
"v=agent-oauth1; iss=...; client_id=...; aud=..."
1. The sender authenticates to its own authorization server as an
OAuth client (for example with the client credentials grant,
Section 4.4 of [RFC6749]).
2. It receives a link token for a dedicated audience.
3. It presents the token with each call to a receiver.
4. The receiver looks up the link record for the sender's agent
name.
5. The receiver verifies the token's signature using the issuer's
published keys, and checks that issuer, client identifier and
audience match the record.
3. Establishing the Sender's Name
This document links an agent name to an OAuth client. It relies on
the receiver already knowing, or being able to establish, the
sender's agent name. Two modes are defined.
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3.1. Channel Mode
The receiver obtains the authenticated sender name from the channel
over which the call arrives. Examples include an end-to-end
authenticated and encrypted channel provided by an agent identity
system, or mutual TLS with a certificate whose subject alternative
name is the agent name.
In channel mode, the link token MUST be carried inside the protected
channel so that it is not exposed to intermediaries, and the channel
MUST bind the token to the authenticated sender name (that is, an
intermediary cannot move a token from one sender's messages to
another's).
3.2. Sender-Constrained Mode
The sender states its agent name in the Agent-Link-Name HTTP request
header field (Section 6), and presents a link token that is sender-
constrained, for example with DPoP [RFC9449] or mutual-TLS
certificate-bound tokens [RFC8705]. The receiver verifies the
sender-constraint as specified for that mechanism, then verifies the
link as described in Section 8, using the stated agent name. A
request in this mode without exactly one Agent-Link-Name field MUST
be refused.
The field is not signed and does not need to be: a sender that states
another agent's name fails the link check, because its token was
issued to a client other than the one published for that name.
In this mode the agent name is established by the link itself: the
receiver learns that the caller holds the key bound to a token issued
to the client that the domain owner has published for that name. The
strength of the name binding is therefore that of the DNS lookup
(Section 9.3). Because a forged DNS answer would let an attacker
impersonate the agent entirely, sender-constrained mode SHOULD NOT be
used unless the receiver validates the link record with DNSSEC.
A receiver MUST NOT accept a link token that is neither carried in
channel mode nor sender-constrained, because a bearer token could be
replayed by anyone who obtains it.
4. The Link Record
4.1. Location
The link record is a DNS TXT record [RFC1035] at the underscored name
_agent-oauth beneath the agent name [RFC8552]:
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_agent-oauth.agent01.a.example. IN TXT (
"v=agent-oauth1; iss=https://login.a.example/; "
"client_id=7f3c2a90-1b4e-4c55-9d1a-2e6f8b0c4d11; "
"aud=api://agent-proof" )
4.2. Syntax
link-record = version *( ";" *SP field ) [";"]
version = "v=agent-oauth1"
field = key "=" value
key = "iss" / "client_id" / "aud" / ext-key
ext-key = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" / "-" )
value = 1*( %x21-3A / %x3C-7E ) ; printable, no ";" or space
A TXT record consisting of several character-strings is concatenated
before parsing. Fields:
iss (REQUIRED): The issuer identifier of the authorization server,
exactly as it appears in the iss claim of tokens it issues.
client_id (REQUIRED): The client identifier of the agent's OAuth
client at that issuer.
aud (REQUIRED): The audience value for which link tokens are issued
(Section 5).
Receivers MUST ignore unknown keys. TXT records at the same name
that do not begin with v=agent-oauth1 MUST be ignored.
4.3. Validity
The record is valid if exactly one TXT record at the name begins with
v=agent-oauth1 and it contains each required field exactly once. If
more than one such record exists, or a required field is missing or
repeated, the agent name MUST be treated as linked with an invalid
record, and calls from it MUST be refused (Section 8). Publishing an
invalid record therefore fails closed.
The domain owner SHOULD sign the zone with DNSSEC [RFC4033].
Receivers SHOULD validate DNSSEC when it is available.
5. The Link Token
A link token is a JWT access token [RFC9068] issued by the
authorization server named in iss to the client named in client_id.
In addition to the requirements of [RFC9068]:
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* The aud claim MUST contain the value published in the record.
That audience MUST be dedicated to this purpose: it MUST NOT be an
audience accepted by any resource server.
* The token MUST NOT grant anything. It MUST NOT carry roles,
permissions or entitlements, and MUST NOT carry scopes other than
at most one scope that the issuer defines for this purpose and
that no resource server accepts.
* The token MUST identify the client. [RFC9068] uses the client_id
claim, and receivers MUST use it when it is present. As a
compatibility allowance for widely deployed issuers that do not
follow [RFC9068] in this respect, a receiver MAY instead use
another claim that the issuer documents as identifying the client
(for example azp, appid or cid), but only when client_id is absent
and only one such claim is present. Receivers that differ in
which claims they allow may reach different results for the same
token; issuers that conform to [RFC9068] avoid this.
The sender MUST inspect each link token before using it and MUST NOT
present a token that fails these requirements. This protects the
sender's organization if its client is misconfigured: a token that
granted access to the sender's own resources would otherwise be
handed to every receiver.
6. The Agent-Link-Name Field
In sender-constrained mode the sender states its agent name in the
Agent-Link-Name HTTP request header field. Its value is a String
Structured Field Item (Section 3.3.3 of [RFC9651]) containing the
agent name in its ASCII form (A-labels), without a trailing dot:
Agent-Link-Name: "agent01.a.example"
Receivers compare agent names case-insensitively. The field is not
used in channel mode, where the channel establishes the name.
7. Sender Procedure
1. Obtain a link token from the issuer for the configured audience.
2. Inspect it as described in Section 5; if it grants anything, do
not use it and report the misconfiguration to the operator.
3. Cache the token and present it with every call to a receiver,
renewing it before it reaches the receiver's maximum age
(Section 8.2).
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4. A linked agent that cannot obtain a valid link token is in a
failed state, and SHOULD report it to its operator. Calling
without a link token is not a fallback: receivers that perform
the checks in this document refuse such calls. A sender MAY
still attempt a call, for example for diagnostics, but it MUST
NOT treat calling without a token as an alternative way to
operate.
A sender MAY be configured not to present link tokens to particular
receivers. Receivers that perform the checks in this document will
refuse such calls.
8. Receiver Procedure
For each incoming call:
1. Establish the sender's agent name (Section 3).
2. Look up the link record for that name.
* No record: the sender is not linked. The receiver proceeds
with its normal policy, except as described in Section 8.1.
* Invalid record: refuse.
* Valid record: a link token is REQUIRED; continue.
3. If no link token is present, refuse.
4. Obtain the issuer's metadata using [RFC8414] or [OIDC.Discovery]
at the iss value from the record, and its JSON Web Key Set
[RFC7517]. Metadata and keys MAY be cached according to HTTP
caching rules.
5. Verify the token's signature with those keys, and verify that:
* iss equals the record's iss;
* the client identifier equals the record's client_id;
* aud contains the record's aud;
* the token has not expired, and iat is not older than the
receiver's maximum age (Section 8.2);
* the token grants nothing (Section 5).
6. In sender-constrained mode, verify the sender-constraint.
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7. Remove the link token from the request before passing it to any
other component, log or model.
8. Apply the receiver's authorization policy (Section 8.3).
Any failure MUST result in refusal. A receiver SHOULD record each
verification result, including the agent name and client identifier,
in its audit log.
8.1. Once Linked, Always Linked
If an attacker can cause a receiver's DNS lookup to fail, an agent
that is normally linked could appear unlinked, and a call without a
token could be accepted. A receiver that has once seen a valid link
record for an agent name SHOULD continue to require a link token from
that name until it observes, through a successful (and, where
available, DNSSEC-validated) lookup, that the record has been
removed.
8.2. Freshness and Revocation
When the operator disables the client at its authorization server, no
new link tokens are issued, but tokens already issued remain valid
until they expire. Receivers bound this window with a maximum age
measured from iat. The effective revocation delay is at most the
smaller of the token lifetime and the receiver's maximum age, plus
the DNS and key caching periods and the receiver's clock skew
tolerance.
A maximum age of 120 minutes or less is RECOMMENDED as a general
default. Deployments in which an agent's actions take effect
quickly, such as payments, trading or automated changes to production
systems, SHOULD use a much shorter maximum age (for example 5 to 15
minutes) chosen from their own threat model; senders then renew
correspondingly more often, subject to the issuer's rate limits. A
receiver MAY apply different maximum ages to different senders or
operations.
Removing the link record does not revoke the agent at receivers that
apply Section 8.1; it only stops new receivers from requiring a
token. Disabling the client is the revocation mechanism.
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8.2.1. Revocation Delay Depends on Configuration
The revocation delay is a property of the receiver's configuration,
not of the token alone. A receiver that changes its maximum age, its
DNS caching, its caching of issuer metadata and keys, or its clock
skew tolerance changes its revocation delay, and SHOULD recompute the
bound before the change takes effect. Increasing any of these values
lengthens the time during which a disabled client is still accepted,
while every signature, issuer, client, audience and DNS check
continues to pass. Those checks establish that a token is authentic;
they do not establish that the client is still enabled.
Passing those checks therefore does not show that a disabled client
is refused within the bound. A receiver SHOULD test this directly,
and again after any change to the values above:
1. Obtain link tokens for a test client and present them to the
receiver.
2. Disable the client at its authorization server, at a time not
known to the party observing the receiver.
3. Continue to present tokens that were issued before the client was
disabled.
4. Record the last time the receiver accepted one of them, and
compare it with the time at which the authorization server
records disabling the client.
The receiver meets its bound if the difference does not exceed the
computed revocation delay. Using the authorization server's own
record of the disable time keeps the measurement independent of the
receiver under test.
A receiver SHOULD record, with each verification result in its audit
log (Section 8), the maximum age in effect at the time. An earlier
acceptance can then be related to the configuration under which it
was made, and a reviewer can tell which earlier results a later
configuration change affects.
8.3. Authorization Policy
Verifying the link establishes that the operator still authorizes the
agent. It does not decide what the agent may do. Receivers SHOULD
express policy for linked agents in terms of both the agent name and
the client identifier, and a policy entry that matches any agent name
(a bare wildcard) SHOULD NOT by itself admit a linked agent.
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9. Security Considerations
9.1. Token Replay
A link token is evidence, not a credential, but a stolen token could
be replayed to another receiver by an attacker claiming the sender's
name. Channel mode prevents this by keeping the token inside a
channel bound to the authenticated sender; sender-constrained mode
prevents it by binding the token to a key. Bearer link tokens
outside either mode MUST NOT be accepted (Section 3).
9.2. Misuse by the Receiver
Every receiver sees the sender's link tokens. If the token's
audience were a real resource server, each receiver would hold a
working credential for it. The requirements that the audience be
dedicated and that the token grant nothing (Section 5), and the
sender's duty to refuse such tokens, address this. A receiver that
forwards a link token to a third party claiming to be the sender
fails at the third party: in channel mode the channel authenticates
the receiver, not the sender; in sender-constrained mode the receiver
lacks the sender's key.
9.3. DNS
The link record is only as trustworthy as the DNS answer. Without
DNSSEC, an on-path attacker could forge or suppress the record.
Forging it lets the attacker name a client it controls; this matters
most in sender-constrained mode, where the record also establishes
the name. Suppressing it can downgrade a linked agent to unlinked;
Section 8.1 limits this. Receivers SHOULD use a validating resolver
and short cache lifetimes.
9.4. Authorization Server Compromise
A compromised issuer can mint link tokens for its clients. This
affects only agents linked to that issuer, which are operated by the
same organization that operates the issuer.
9.5. Clock Skew
Receivers SHOULD allow a small tolerance on exp and iat. The
tolerance adds to the revocation delay (Section 8.2).
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9.6. Configuration Changes
A change to a receiver's maximum age, caching or clock skew tolerance
can lengthen the time a disabled agent is still accepted without
causing any verification step to fail. Receivers SHOULD treat such
changes as security relevant, recompute the revocation delay, and
repeat the test described in Section 8.2.1.
10. Privacy Considerations
The link record discloses the issuer and client identifier used by an
agent. Neither is secret, but together they reveal which
authorization server an organization uses. Link tokens may contain
other claims about the client; senders SHOULD use clients whose
tokens carry no information beyond what this document requires. The
mechanism conveys no information about end users.
11. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "Underscored and
Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry [RFC8552]:
+=========+==============+=================+
| RR Type | _NODE NAME | Reference |
+=========+==============+=================+
| TXT | _agent-oauth | (this document) |
+---------+--------------+-----------------+
Table 1
IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" (Section 16.3.1 of
[RFC9110]):
Field Name: Agent-Link-Name
Status: permanent
Structured Type: Item
Reference: Section 6 of this document
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12. Implementation Status
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist.
According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
12.1. HexaEight Agent
Organization: HexaEight
Description: An agent runtime that implements the link in channel
mode. The sender's name is established by the HexaEight agent
identity channel, which authenticates and encrypts each message
end to end; the link token travels inside the encrypted message.
Implements the sender's inspection of tokens that grant anything,
the receiver checks, once-linked-always-linked, a configurable
maximum age (default 120 minutes), removal of the token before
logging, and policy rules naming agent and client identifier.
Differences from this document: The deployed record uses the prefix
hexaeight-oauth=v1 at the agent name itself rather than v=agent-
oauth1 at _agent-oauth. Sender-constrained mode is not
implemented.
Maturity: Implemented. Interoperability testing between
independently operated organizations is in progress.
Licensing: Commercial.
Documentation: https://www.hexaeight.com/docs/concepts/oauth/
(https://www.hexaeight.com/docs/concepts/oauth/)
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13. Relationship to Other Work
OAuth Identity and Authorization Chaining
[I-D.ietf-oauth-identity-chaining] and OpenID Federation
[OpenID.Federation] let a receiving domain issue or accept tokens
based on a configured trust relationship with the sending domain.
This document needs no such relationship; in exchange, the token it
conveys grants nothing and the receiver keeps all access decisions.
The OAuth Client ID Metadata Document
[I-D.ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document] identifies a client by a
URL. The two are complementary: this document links an agent name to
a client at the agent operator's own issuer.
HTTP Message Signatures [RFC9421] and the work built on them for
automated clients identify the operator of a client by a key
published under its domain. They do not convey whether the
operator's own authorization server still authorizes the client.
The Workload Authorization Grant [I-D.carleton-workload-authz-grant]
lets a workload obtain access tokens at a third party's authorization
server without per-workload registration, once the platform's issuer
has been registered there. A link record could serve as one way for
a receiver to discover the issuer responsible for an agent name
instead of registering it, and names the operating organization's own
issuer even when a platform hosts agents for many organizations.
DNS-Anchored Durable Identity for AI Agents [I-D.ihsanullah-dnsid]
binds an agent's DNS name to the accountable entity that controls its
domain, with a lifecycle history that outlives the agent's keys. The
two are complementary: DNSid anchors the agent's durable identity and
accountable entity, while the link record ties the same name to a
live signal, from the operator's existing OAuth client, that the
operator still authorizes the agent.
The WIMSE working group's guidance on authenticating AI agents
[I-D.ietf-wimse-aims] describes building agent authentication on
existing OAuth specifications; this document is offered as one such
building block for calls across organizations.
14. Normative References
[OIDC.Discovery]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0", 2014.
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[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8414>.
[RFC8552] Crocker, D., "Scoped Interpretation of DNS Resource
Records through "Underscored" Naming of Attribute Leaves",
BCP 222, RFC 8552, DOI 10.17487/RFC8552, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8552>.
[RFC9068] Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0
Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, October
2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9068>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9449>.
[RFC9651] Nottingham, M. and P. Kamp, "Structured Field Values for
HTTP", RFC 9651, DOI 10.17487/RFC9651, September 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9651>.
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15. Informative References
[I-D.carleton-workload-authz-grant]
Carleton, P., Steele, N., Parecki, A., Schwenkschuster,
A., and B. Campbell, "Workload Authorization Grant", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-carleton-workload-
authz-grant-02, 2 November 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-carleton-
workload-authz-grant-02>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document]
Parecki, A. and E. Smith, "OAuth Client ID Metadata
Document", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
oauth-client-id-metadata-document-03, 2 November 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
client-id-metadata-document-03>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-identity-chaining]
Schwenkschuster, A., Kasselman, P., Burgin, K., Jenkins,
M. J., Campbell, B., and A. Parecki, "OAuth Identity and
Authorization Chaining Across Domains", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17, 19
July 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-oauth-identity-chaining-17>.
[I-D.ietf-wimse-aims]
Kasselman, P., Lombardo, J., Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B.,
Steele, N., and A. Parecki, "AI Identity Management
System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
wimse-aims-01, 2 November 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-wimse-
aims-01>.
[I-D.ihsanullah-dnsid]
Ihsanullah, N., "DNS-Anchored Durable Identity for AI
Agents (DNSid)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ihsanullah-dnsid-01, 28 June 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ihsanullah-
dnsid-01>.
[OpenID.Federation]
OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Federation 1.0", 2026.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033>.
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[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.
[RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.
Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication
and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8705>.
[RFC9421] Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP
Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421,
February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421>.
Document History
RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication.
-02:
* Freshness and Revocation: the revocation delay depends on the
receiver's configuration and must be recomputed when it changes; a
test procedure for refusal of a disabled client; the maximum age
in effect is recorded with each verification result
(Section 8.2.1). Clock skew tolerance added to the revocation
delay.
* Security Considerations: Configuration Changes.
-01:
* Sender-constrained mode: the sender states its agent name in the
new Agent-Link-Name HTTP field (Section 6); IANA registration
added.
* Relationship to Other Work: the Workload Authorization Grant and
DNSid.
-00:
* Initial version.
Author's Address
Sriram Shankarlingam
HexaEight
India
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Email: sriram.s@hexaeight.com
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