TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-08

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Network Working Group                                         Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft                                                    Intuit
Intended status: Experimental                                 D. Migault
Expires: July 21, 2019                                          Ericsson
                                                        January 17, 2019

                TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
                  draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-08

Abstract

   Misissued public-key certificates can prevent TLS clients from
   appropriately authenticating the TLS server.  Several alternatives
   have been proposed to detect this situation and prevent a client from
   establishing a TLS session with a TLS end point authenticated with an
   illegitimate public-key certificate, but none is currently in wide
   use.

   This document proposes to extend TLS with opaque pinning tickets as a
   way to pin the server's identity.  During an initial TLS session, the
   server provides an original encrypted pinning ticket.  In subsequent
   TLS session establishment, upon receipt of the pinning ticket, the
   server proves its ability to decrypt the pinning ticket and thus the
   ownership of the pinning protection key.  The client can now safely
   conclude that the TLS session is established with the same TLS server
   as the original TLS session.  One of the important properties of this
   proposal is that no manual management actions are required.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 21, 2019.

Sheffer & Migault         Expires July 21, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               Pinning Tickets                January 2019

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Initial Connection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Subsequent Connections  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.3.  Indexing the Pins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   3.  Message Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Cryptographic Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Pinning Secret  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Pinning Ticket  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Pinning Protection Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.4.  Pinning Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  Protection Key Synchronization  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  Ticket Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.3.  Certificate Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.4.  Certificate Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.5.  Disabling Pinning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.6.  Server Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.7.  Disaster Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Previous Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.1.  Comparison: HPKP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.2.  Comparison: TACK  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.1.  Mint Fork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       7.1.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       7.1.2.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19