TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-06

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2018-09-19 (latest revision 2018-03-18)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-06.txt

Abstract

Misissued public-key certificates can prevent TLS clients from appropriately authenticating the TLS server. Several alternatives have been proposed to detect this situation and prevent a client from establishing a TLS session with a TLS end point authenticated with an illegitimate public-key certificate, but none is currently in wide use. This document proposes to extend TLS with opaque pinning tickets as a way to pin the server's identity. During an initial TLS session, the server provides an original encrypted pinning ticket. In subsequent TLS session establishment, upon receipt of the pinning ticket, the server proves its ability to decrypt the pinning ticket and thus the ownership if the pinning protection key. The client can now safely conclude that the TLS session is established with the same TLS server as the original TLS session. One of the important properties of this proposal is that no manual management actions are required.

Authors

Yaron Sheffer (yaronf.ietf@gmail.com)
Daniel Migault (daniel.migault@ericsson.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)