TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-04
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Network Working Group Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft Intuit
Intended status: Standards Track D. Migault
Expires: October 4, 2017 Ericsson
April 02, 2017
TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets
draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-04
Abstract
Misissued public-key certificates can prevent TLS clients from
appropriately authenticating the TLS server. Several alternatives
have been proposed to detect this situation and prevent a client from
establishing a TLS session with a TLS end point authenticated with an
illegitimate public-key certificate, but none is currently in wide
use.
This document proposes to extend TLS with opaque pinning tickets as a
way to pin the server's identity. During an initial TLS session, the
server provides an original encrypted pinning ticket. In subsequent
TLS session establishment, upon receipt of the pinning ticket, the
server proves its ability to decrypt the pinning ticket and thus the
ownership if the pinning protection key. The client can now safely
conclude that the TLS session is established with the same TLS server
as the original TLS session. One of the important properties of this
proposal is that no manual management actions are required.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 4, 2017.
Sheffer & Migault Expires October 4, 2017 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Pinning Tickets April 2017
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Initial Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Subsequent Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. Indexing the Pins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Message Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Cryptographic Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Pinning Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Pinning Ticket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Pinning Protection Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4. Pinning Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. Protection Key Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. Ticket Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. Certificate Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4. Certificate Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5. Disabling Pinning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.6. Server Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.7. Disaster Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Previous Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Comparison: HPKP Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. Comparison: TACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. Mint Fork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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