BGPsec Validation State Signaling
draft-sidrops-bgpsec-validation-signaling-00

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Last updated 2019-10-10
Replaces draft-borchert-sidrops-bgpsec-validation-signaling
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       O. Borchert
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Intended status: Standards Track                                USA NIST
Expires: April 12, 2020                                 October 10, 2019

                   BGPsec Validation State Signaling
              draft-sidrops-bgpsec-validation-signaling-00

Abstract

   This document defines a new BGP non-transitive extended community to
   carry the BGPsec path validation state inside an autonomous system.
   Internal BGP (IBGP) speakers that receive this community string can
   use the embedded BGPsec validation state and configure local policies
   that allow it being used to influence their decision process.  This
   is especially helpful because Section 5 of RFC 8205 specifically
   allows putting BGPsec path validation temporarily on hold.  This
   allows reducing the load of validation particularly from IBGP learned
   routes.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document. Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Suggested Reading  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  BGPsec Validation State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . .  3
   4. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   6.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     6.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8

 

Borchert & Montgomery    Expires April 12, 2020                 [Page 2]
Internet Draft    RPKI ROV Validation State Unverified  October 10, 2019

1.  Introduction

   This document defines a new BGP non-transitive extended community to
   carry the BGPsec path validation state inside an autonomous system.
   Internal BGP (IBGP) speakers that receive this community string can
   use the embedded BGPsec validation state and configure local policies
   that allow it being used to influence their decision process.  This
   is especially helpful because Section 5 of RFC 8205 specifically
   allows putting BGPsec path validation temporarily on hold.  This
   allows reducing the load of validation particularly from IBGP learned
   routes.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Suggested Reading

   It is assumed that the reader understands BGPsec [RFC8205].

3.  BGPsec Validation State Extended Community

   The origin validation state extended community is a non-transitive
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