BGPsec Validation State Signaling
draft-sidrops-bgpsec-validation-signaling-00
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) O. Borchert
Internet-Draft D. Montgomery
Intended status: Standards Track USA NIST
Expires: April 12, 2020 October 10, 2019
BGPsec Validation State Signaling
draft-sidrops-bgpsec-validation-signaling-00
Abstract
This document defines a new BGP non-transitive extended community to
carry the BGPsec path validation state inside an autonomous system.
Internal BGP (IBGP) speakers that receive this community string can
use the embedded BGPsec validation state and configure local policies
that allow it being used to influence their decision process. This
is especially helpful because Section 5 of RFC 8205 specifically
allows putting BGPsec path validation temporarily on hold. This
allows reducing the load of validation particularly from IBGP learned
routes.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as
Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
Borchert & Montgomery Expires April 12, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet Draft RPKI ROV Validation State Unverified October 10, 2019
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. BGPsec Validation State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Borchert & Montgomery Expires April 12, 2020 [Page 2]
Internet Draft RPKI ROV Validation State Unverified October 10, 2019
1. Introduction
This document defines a new BGP non-transitive extended community to
carry the BGPsec path validation state inside an autonomous system.
Internal BGP (IBGP) speakers that receive this community string can
use the embedded BGPsec validation state and configure local policies
that allow it being used to influence their decision process. This
is especially helpful because Section 5 of RFC 8205 specifically
allows putting BGPsec path validation temporarily on hold. This
allows reducing the load of validation particularly from IBGP learned
routes.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGPsec [RFC8205].
3. BGPsec Validation State Extended Community
The origin validation state extended community is a non-transitive
Show full document text