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KYAPay Token
draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-02

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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
Authors Ankit Agarwal , Michael B. Jones
Last updated 2026-10-01 (Latest revision 2026-07-19)
Replaces draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile
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draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-02
Web Authorization Protocol                                    A. Agarwal
Internet-Draft                                      Skyfire Systems Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                                M. Jones
Expires: 5 April 2027                             Self-Issued Consulting
                                                          2 October 2026

                              KYAPay Token
                  draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-02

Abstract

   This document defines a token format for agent identity and payment
   tokens in JSON Web Token (JWT) format.  Authorization servers and
   resource servers from different vendors can leverage this token
   format to consume identity and payment tokens in an interoperable
   manner.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://skyfire-
   xyz.github.io/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token/draft-skyfire-oauth-
   kyapay-token.html.  Status information for this document may be found
   at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-
   token/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/skyfire-xyz/draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 April 2027.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Use Cases for the KYAPay Token  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.1.  Initiator Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.2.  Target Roles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.3.  Ecosystem Infrastructure Roles  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  KYAPay Token Schemas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Common Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Issuer Key Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.3.  KYA Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.3.1.  hid - Human Identity Sub-Claims . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.3.2.  Agent Platform Identity apd Sub-Claims  . . . . . . .  13
       3.3.3.  Agent Identity aid Sub-Claims . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.4.  PAY Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       3.4.1.  Settlement Information sti Sub-Claims . . . . . . . .  15
       3.4.2.  Scope of Card Settlement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.4.3.  PAY Token Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.5.  KYA-PAY Token Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   4.  Token Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     4.1.  Validating KYA and PAY Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       4.1.1.  JWT Header Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       4.1.2.  JWT Payload Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       4.1.3.  Clock Skew  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     4.2.  Validating PAY Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.1.  General JWT Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.2.  Confidentiality of Token Contents . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.3.  Settlement Credential Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.4.  Token Lifetime  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.5.  Bearer Semantics and Proof of Possession  . . . . . . . .  22
   6.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23

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   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     7.1.  JSON Web Token Claims Registration  . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       7.1.1.  "tdm" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       7.1.2.  "tsi" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       7.1.3.  "ori" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       7.1.4.  "env" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       7.1.5.  "itg" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       7.1.6.  "hid" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       7.1.7.  "apd" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       7.1.8.  "aid" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       7.1.9.  "tpr" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       7.1.10. "tps" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       7.1.11. "amt" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       7.1.12. "cur" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       7.1.13. "val" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       7.1.14. "mnr" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       7.1.15. "stp" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       7.1.16. "sti" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     7.2.  Media Types Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       7.2.1.  application/kya+jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       7.2.2.  application/pay+jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       7.2.3.  application/kya-pay+jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     7.3.  Well-Known URI Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   Appendix A.  Related Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   Document History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35

1.  Introduction

   As software agents evolve from pre-orchestrated workflow automations
   to truly autonomous or semi-autonomous assistants, they require the
   ability to identify themselves -- and more importantly, identify
   their human principals -- to external systems.  Agents acting on
   behalf of users to discover services, create accounts, or execute
   actions currently face significant operational barriers.

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   The KYAPay token addresses these challenges by providing a standard
   envelope to carry verified identity and payment information.  By
   utilizing "kya" (Agent Identity) and "pay" (Payment) tokens, agents
   can identify their human principals to services, sites, bot managers,
   customer identity and access management (CIAM) systems, and fraud
   detectors.  This enables agents to bypass common blocking mechanisms
   and access services that were previously restricted to manual human
   interaction.

   KYAPay does not aim to define agentic identity in its entirety.
   Rather, it specifies a standard and extensible JSON Web Token (JWT)
   [RFC7519] that can be used to securely share human principal and
   agent identity information with websites and APIs.  KYAPay tokens
   provide a strong signal of human presence behind agentic requests
   that are otherwise indistinguishable from programmatic and
   potentially malicious bot requests.

   Note that, in the future, the payment token functionality could be
   split into a separate specification, if desired by a working group
   adopting the specification.  It is retained here at present for ease
   of reviewing.

1.1.  Use Cases for the KYAPay Token

   Enabling agents to access websites and APIs on behalf of the human
   principals they represent is a design goal of KYAPay tokens.  Today’s
   internet is designed primarily for humans, meaning that automated
   systems are often classified as malicious and blocked by web security
   infrastructure.  However, the rise of AI agents has introduced a new
   paradigm where programmatic clients legitimately access websites and
   APIs on behalf of human principals.  Because these agents can be hard
   to distinguish from traditional bots, they are often inadvertently
   blocked, creating a need for the web security ecosystem to
   distinguish between legitimate agentic traffic and potentially
   malicious activity.  KYAPay tokens are designed to address this
   challenge by enabling agents to convey verified identity and payment
   credentials.  These tokens can provide web security systems and
   merchants with a strong signal that the requests are authorized by a
   human, allowing them to safely permit legitimate programmatic
   transactions while aggressively blocking undesired traffic.

   Enabling agents to create accounts and/or log in to accounts on
   behalf of their human principals is a related design goal.  To
   achieve this, systems can utilize a token exchange workflow
   [RFC8693].  In this process, a Security Token Service (STS), Identity
   Provider (IdP), or OAuth Authorization Server verifies incoming KYA
   tokens and extracts claims associated with the human principal, such
   as email addresses.  The authorization server then performs a token

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   exchange, swapping the KYA token for a standard OAuth Access Token,
   which the agent subsequently uses to interact with the target
   service.  Crucially, this architecture allows the service to know
   that the agent is acting on behalf of the user, making it possible to
   differentiate between direct, human-present sessions and human-
   initiated, agentic sessions for authorization, auditing, and security
   purposes.

   Enabling agents to have ubiquity of access across the Internet just
   like their human principals is a related design goal.  Automation
   typically scales as it achieves higher reliability and lower cost-to-
   entry.  Unlike the structured logic required by cron jobs or low-code
   / no-code platforms, agentic automation leverages LLMs to execute
   tasks via natural language, effectively removing the software-skill
   barrier.  As model reasoning improves and infrastructure scales,
   these agents become increasingly dependable and affordable for the
   human principal.  To maximize utility, agents require ubiquitous
   Internet access, a feat made possible by KYAPay Token Issuers.  By
   providing a client-side verification framework analogous to the
   server-side role of Certificate Authorities (CAs), KYAPay builds a
   standardized network of acceptance across the web security ecosystem.
   This allows for the seamless attestation of both the agent’s and the
   human principal’s identity, ensuring secure, cross-domain task
   execution without the friction of fragmented authentication silos.

   Enabling the ecosystem of web security vendors to engage in finer-
   grained and deliberate bad-actor mitigation is a related design goal.
   KYA tokens provide a layered, verified, and extensible identity stack
   specifically engineered for autonomous agents.  This framework allows
   the web security ecosystem to distinguish among individual agent
   instances, the platforms they run on, and the human principals behind
   them.  By establishing this level of granular visibility, security
   systems can transition from broad defensive measures to specific
   mitigation; rather than being forced to block an entire platform,
   administrators can now isolate and neutralize a single malicious
   human user or a malfunctioning software instance without disrupting
   legitimate traffic.

   Note that the protocols using these tokens to achieve these goals are
   not defined by this specification.  The interoperable use of them for
   these purposes will require further specification.

   Early production deployments of KYAPay tokens are described at
   https://kyapay.org.

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2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   The claims iss, iat, exp, aud, and jti are defined by [RFC7519].  The
   header parameters alg, kid, and typ are defined by [RFC7515].

   The alg value ES256 is a digital signature algorithm defined in
   Section 3.4 of [RFC7518].

2.1.  Roles

   Agent:
      An application, service, or specific software process, executing
      on behalf of a Principal.

   Agent Identity:
      A unique identifier and a set of claims describing an agent.
      Grouped into the aid claim for convenience.  Because an agent can
      be public or confidential (as described in Section 2.1 of
      [RFC6749]), the level of assurance for these claims varies
      dramatically.  Agents also vary in terms of longevity -- they can
      have stable long-running identities (such as those of a server-
      side confidential client), or they can be transient and ephemeral,
      and correspond to individual API calls or compute workloads.

   Agent Platform:
      The service provider and runtime environment hosting the Agent,
      such as a cloud compute provider or AI operator service.
      Assertions about the agent platform are grouped into the apd
      claim, and are primarily used to identify the Principal entity
      operating the platform, allowing consumers of the token to apply
      reputation-based logic or offer platform-specific services.

   Principal:
      A legal entity (human or organization) on whose behalf / in whose
      authority an agent or service is operating.

2.1.1.  Initiator Roles

   Initiator Agent:
      An Agent performing tasks on behalf of an Initiator Principal,
      that has its own Agent Identity, grouped into the aid claim.

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   Initiator Agent Platform:
      The Agent Platform hosting the Initiator Agent.  Some use cases
      require the Platform to have its own verified identity assertions,
      grouped into the apd claim.

   Initiator Principal:
      A legal entity (human or organization) behind the purchase /
      consumption of a product or service.  In buyer/seller
      transactions, the Initiator is the buyer.  The Principal typically
      interacts with the target via an Initiator Agent.  Many targets
      are required to be able to determine the Initiator Identity in
      order to comply with KYC/AML regulations, accounting standards,
      and to maintain a direct customer relationships.  The initiator
      principal's identity is grouped into the hid claim.

   Initiator Identity:
      The aggregate verified identity assertions of the initiator
      entities, typically encompassing the Initiator Principal, the
      Initiator Agent Platform, and the Initiator Agent itself.  This
      composite identity is conveyed via the KYA token, allowing the
      target to verify the entire chain of responsibility behind a
      request.  The initiator identity utilizes the hid, apd, and aid
      claims.

2.1.2.  Target Roles

   Target Agent:
      An Agent performing tasks on behalf of a Target Principal,
      directly interacting with Initiator Agents to facilitate discovery
      and purchase.  Typically runs on Internet-connected
      infrastructure, and discoverable via service directories.  Target
      agent identity claims are also grouped into the aid claim if KYA
      tokens are generated for the targets.

   Target Agent Platform:
      The Agent Platform that hosts Target Agents.  Some use cases
      require the Platform to have its own verified identity assertions,
      grouped into the apd claim.

   Target Principal:
      A human principal (individual or organization) that owns the
      product, service, API, website, or content being consumed or sold,
      and serves as the ultimate beneficiary of a transaction.  In
      buyer/seller transactions, the Target is the seller.  The target
      principal's identity is grouped into the hid claim.

   Target Identity:

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      The aggregate verified identity assertions of the target entities,
      typically encompassing the Target Principal, the Target Agent
      Platform, as well as the Target Agent Identity.  These various
      aspects of Target Identity allow Initiators and Initiator Agents
      to perform reputation-based logic, to verify that they are
      interacting with the authorized (and expected) counter-party, and
      to fulfill KYC/AML regulation requirements.  The target identity
      utilizes the hid, apd, and aid claims.

2.1.3.  Ecosystem Infrastructure Roles

   KYA Token Issuer:
      A trusted neutral entity that conducts Know Your Customer (KYC)
      and Know Your Business (KYB) (for organizations) verifications.
      It is responsible for issuing cryptographically signed Know Your
      Agent (KYA) tokens that attest to the identity of the Principal,
      Agent, and Agent Platform, for both Initiators and Targets.

   Payment Token Issuer:
      A trusted entity responsible for facilitating the exchange of
      payments and credentials between the Initiator and Target.  It
      issues signed pay tokens that enable settlement via various
      schemes (Cards, Banks, Cryptocurrency), without exposing raw
      credentials or secrets.

   Verifier:
      The party used by the KYA Token Issuer to verify the identity of
      the human, organization, or agent or the party used by the Payment
      Token Issuer to verify the payment method.

3.  KYAPay Token Schemas

3.1.  Common Token Claims

   The following are claims in common, used within the KYA (Know Your
   Agent), PAY (Payment), and KYA-PAY (combined Know Your Agent and
   Payment) Tokens.

   iss:
      REQUIRED - URL of the token's issuer.  The value MUST be an origin
      as defined in Section 4 of [RFC6454]: a scheme, a host, and an
      optional port, with no path, query or fragment component.  Used
      for locating the JWK Set for token signature verification, as
      described in Section 3.2.

   sub:
      REQUIRED - Subject Identifier.  MUST be pairwise unique within a
      given issuer.

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   aud:
      REQUIRED - Audience (used for audience binding and replay attack
      mitigation), uniquely identifying the target agent.  A single
      string value.

   iat:
      REQUIRED - as defined in Section 4.1.6 of [RFC7519].  Identifies
      the time at which the JWT was issued.  This claim must have a
      value in the past and can be used to determine the age of the JWT.

   jti:
      REQUIRED - Unique ID of this JWT as defined in Section 4.1.7 of
      [RFC7519].  This claim can be used to detect replay attempts.

   exp:
      REQUIRED - as defined in Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519].  Identifies
      the expiration time on or after which the JWT MUST NOT be accepted
      for processing.

   tdm:
      OPTIONAL - Target domain, associated with the audience claim, the
      token is intended for.

   ori:
      OPTIONAL - URL of the token's originator.

   env:
      OPTIONAL - Issuer environment (such as "production" or "sandbox").
      Additional values may be defined and used.

   tsi:
      OPTIONAL - Target Service ID that this token was created for.

   itg:
      OPTIONAL - Initiator tag - an opaque reference ID internal to the
      initiator.

   cnf:

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      OPTIONAL - Confirmation claim, as defined in [RFC7800], binding
      the token to a key held by the agent identified in the aid claim.
      When present, it MUST contain the jwk member: the agent's public
      key represented as a JWK [RFC7517].  The JWK MUST contain only
      public key material; a cnf containing private key material MUST be
      rejected.  Other confirmation members MAY additionally be present,
      but a recipient MUST NOT be required to obtain the key by any
      means other than reading cnf.jwk.  A token carrying cnf is sender-
      constrained rather than bearer: the presenter is required to
      demonstrate possession of the confirmation key.  Recipient
      processing is specified in
      [I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens].

   Additional claims MAY be defined and used in these tokens.  The
   recipient MUST ignore any unrecognized claims.

3.2.  Issuer Key Discovery

   The JWK Set used to verify a token signature is located at the well-
   known URI [RFC8615] formed from the iss claim with the URI suffix
   jwks.json.  Because iss is an origin, this is the well-known URI
   construction described in Section 3 of [RFC8615] applied to that
   origin.  For example, an iss value of https://issuer.example.com
   yields https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json.

   The jwks.json URI suffix is registered in Section 7.3.

   JWK Sets SHOULD be cached and refreshed according to standard JWK Set
   practice.  Retrieval per request is neither required nor expected;
   because KYAPay tokens are self-contained, signature verification is
   intended to be performed locally.

   A future revision of this specification may additionally define an
   issuer metadata document, giving an issuer somewhere to advertise
   capabilities beyond the location of its keys, such as the identity
   verification methods it supports.  Such a document would supplement
   the mechanism described here rather than replace it.

3.3.  KYA Token

   The following identity related claims are used within KYA and KYA-PAY
   tokens:

   hid:
      REQUIRED (Required for human identity use cases) - A map of human
      identity claims (individual or organization).

   apd:

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      OPTIONAL - Agent Platform identity claims.

   aid:
      REQUIRED - Agent identity claims.

   scope
      OPTIONAL - String with space-separated scope values, per [RFC8693]

   The following informative example displays a decoded KYA type token.

{
  "kid": "YjFdJgFNWj9AkUmtoXILwoeb37PsBuGWVK6_QvFLwJw", // JWK Key ID
  "alg": "ES256",
  "typ": "kya+jwt"
}.{
  "iss": "https://issuer.example.com", // Issuer URL
  "iat": 1742245254,
  "exp": 1742245554,
  "jti": "b9821893-7699-4d24-af06-803a6a16476b",
  "sub": "bb713104-c14e-460f-9b7c-f8140fa9bea4", // Initiator Agent Account ID
  "aud": "7434230d-0861-46f2-9c2c-a6ee33d07f17", // Target Agent Account ID

  "env": "production",
  "tsi": "bc3ff89f-069b-4383-82a9-8cfe53c55fc3", // Target Service ID
  "itg": "4f6cbd39-215c-4516-bf33-cab22862ee60", // Initiator Tag (Internal Reference ID)

  "hid": {
    "email": "initiator@initiator.com"
  },
  "apd": {
    "id": "d3306fc0-602b-47e6-9fe2-3d55d028fbd2",
    "name": "Acme Shopping Agents", // Agent platform name
    "email": "platform@acme.com", // Email address for the agent platform
    "phone_number": "+12345677890", // Phone number for the agent platform
    "organization_name": "Acme Shopping Inc.", // Legal name of the agent platform
    "verifier": "https://www.verifier.com/", // URL of the KYA verifier
    "verified": true, // Outcome of the verifier's KYA verification
    "verification_id": "a23c1fe4-a4b7-442d-8bca-3c8fad5ec3a6" // Verifier's ID for the KYA verification performed
  },
  "aid": {
    "name": "Acme Agent Extraordinaire",
    "creation_ip": "54.86.50.139", // IP Address where token was created
    "source_ips": ["54.86.50.139-54.86.50.141", "1.1.1.0/24",
      "2001:db8:abcd:0012::/64", "acme.com"]
      // IP addresses from which the initiator agent will make requests to the target
  }
}

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                      Figure 1: A KYA type token

3.3.1.  hid - Human Identity Sub-Claims

   The Human Identity (hid) claim contains sub-claims identifying the
   human principal (individual or organization) as follows.

   email:
      REQUIRED - Email address associated with the human individual or
      organization

   given_name:
      OPTIONAL - Given name(s) or first name(s) of the human principal
      if they are an individual.

   middle_name:
      OPTIONAL - Middle name(s) of the human principal if they are an
      individual.

   family_name:
      OPTIONAL - Surname(s) or last name(s) of the human principal if
      they are an individual.

   phone_number:
      OPTIONAL - Phone number associated with the human individual or
      organization.

   organization_name:
      OPTIONAL - Name of the organization.

   verifier:
      OPTIONAL - URL of the party that performed the identity
      verification

   verified:
      OPTIONAL - Boolean Verification status.  True if identity
      verified, otherwise false.

   verification_id:
      OPTIONAL - Verification identifier.  This is the verifier's
      identifier for the identity verification performed.  This could be
      used during auditing and dispute resolution.

   Additional sub-claims MAY be defined and used.  The recipient MUST
   ignore any unrecognized sub-claims.

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3.3.2.  Agent Platform Identity apd Sub-Claims

   The apd claim is OPTIONAL.  If present, it contains the following
   sub-claims.

   id:
      REQUIRED - Agent Platform identifier.

   name:
      REQUIRED - Agent Platform name.

   email:
      OPTIONAL - Email associated with agent platform.

   phone_number:
      OPTIONAL - Phone number associated with agent platform.

   organization_name:
      OPTIONAL - Legal name associated with agent platform.

   verifier:
      OPTIONAL - URL of the party that verified the agent identity (KYA)

   verified:
      OPTIONAL - Boolean Verification status.  True if KYA verified,
      otherwise false.

   verification_id:
      OPTIONAL - Verification identifier.  This is the verifier's
      identifier for the KYA verification performed.  This could be used
      during auditing and dispute resolution.

   Additional sub-claims MAY be defined and used.  The recipient MUST
   ignore any unrecognized sub-claims.

3.3.3.  Agent Identity aid Sub-Claims

   The aid claim is REQUIRED.  It contains the following sub-claims.

   name:
      REQUIRED - Agent name.  The name should reflect the business
      purpose of the agent.

   creation_ip:
      REQUIRED - The public IP address of the system / agent that
      requested the token.  Its value is a string containing the public
      IPv4 or IPv6 address from where the token request originated.  It
      MUST be captured directly from the token request.

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   source_ips:
      OPTIONAL - Valid public IP address, or range of public IP
      addresses, from where the system / agent's requests to merchants /
      services will originate.  A JSON array of IPv4 addresses or
      ranges, IPv6 addresses or ranges, or domain names resolvable to an
      IP address via DNS.  IPv4 and IPv6 addresses can be a single IPv4
      or IPv6 address or a range of IPv4 or IPv6 addresses in CIDR
      notation or start-and-end IP pairs.

   Additional sub-claims MAY be defined and used.  The recipient MUST
   ignore any unrecognized sub-claims.

3.4.  PAY Token

   The following payment related claims are used within PAY and KYA-PAY
   type tokens:

   tpr:
      OPTIONAL - JSON string representing target service price in
      currency units.

   tps:
      OPTIONAL - Target pricing scheme, which represents a way for the
      target list how it charges for its service or content.  One of
      pay_per_use, subscription, pay_per_mb, or custom.  Additional
      values may be defined and used.

   amt:
      REQUIRED - JSON string representing token amount in currency
      units.

   cur:
      REQUIRED - Currency unit, represented as an ISO 4217 three letter
      code, such as "EUR".

   val:
      REQUIRED - JSON string representing token amount in settlement
      network's units.

   mnr:
      OPTIONAL - JSON number representing maximum number of requests
      when tps is pay_per_use.

   stp:
      REQUIRED - Settlement type (one of coin or card).  Additional
      values may be defined and used.

   sti:

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      REQUIRED - Meta information for payment settlement, depending on
      the stp value.

3.4.1.  Settlement Information sti Sub-Claims

   The sti claim is REQUIRED in Pay Tokens.  It contains the following
   sub-claims, with the requirement levels marked below.

   The sti claim carries the settlement instrument, and its contents
   depend on the value of stp.

   When the stp value is card, the settlement instrument is an agentic
   payment credential issued by a payment network under an agentic-
   commerce programme -- for example Visa Intelligent Commerce
   (visa_vic) or Mastercard Agent Pay, using Secure Card on File
   (mastercard_scof).  Such a credential is provisioned for a single
   transaction and is scoped to one initiator, one target, and one
   amount.  It is not a Primary Account Number (PAN), and it cannot be
   used to derive the underlying PAN or the network's agentic token.

   type:
      REQUIRED - "type" is dependent on the "stp" value; for "coin" -
      "usdc"; for "card" - "visa_vic" or "mastercard_scof".  Additional
      values may be defined and used.

   payment_token:
      REQUIRED when the stp value is card; otherwise OPTIONAL - String
      containing the network-issued agentic payment credential,
      formatted per ISO/IEC 7812, 12-19 characters.  This value MUST be
      a payment-network-issued agentic or tokenized credential.  It MUST
      NOT be a Primary Account Number (PAN).

   token_expiration_month:
      REQUIRED when payment_token is present - String containing two-
      digit Expiration Month Number.

   token_expiration_year:
      REQUIRED when payment_token is present - String containing four-
      digit Expiration Year.

   token_security_code:

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      REQUIRED when payment_token is present - String containing the
      single-use token cryptogram accompanying the credential in
      payment_token -- a Dynamic Token Verification Value (DTVV) or
      Token Authentication Verification Value (TAVV), depending on the
      network. 3 or 4 digits.  This value is generated per transaction
      and is short-lived; its validity period is determined and enforced
      by the payment network.  It MUST NOT be a static Card Verification
      Value (CVV, CVC2 or CVV2).

   verifier:
      OPTIONAL - URL of the party that performed the payment method
      verification

   verified:
      OPTIONAL - Boolean Verification status.  True if verified,
      otherwise false.

   verification_id:
      OPTIONAL - Verification identifier.  This is the verifier's
      identifier for the payment method verification performed.  This
      could be used during auditing and dispute resolution.

   Additional sub-claims MAY be defined and used.  The recipient MUST
   ignore any unrecognized sub-claims.

3.4.2.  Scope of Card Settlement

   This specification supports card settlement only through payment-
   network agentic-commerce programmes that issue transaction-scoped,
   PCI-exempt credentials.

   A PAY or KYA-PAY token MUST NOT carry a Primary Account Number, or
   the static verification value associated with one.

   Settlement instruments that fall within PCI DSS scope require
   mechanisms this specification does not define -- including
   confidentiality protection of the token contents and a defined
   cardholder-data-environment boundary.  Support for such instruments
   is left to future work, and implementers requiring it should not
   attempt to carry them in the claims defined here.

3.4.3.  PAY Token Example

   The following informative example displays a decoded PAY type token.

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{
  "kid": "FgT4q8c5IqbBCCjcho5JdeGQvuK1keMDFc9IwCm8J7Y", // JWK Key ID
  "alg": "ES256",
  "typ": "pay+jwt"
}.{
  "iss": "https://pay-issuer.example.net", // Issuer URL
  "iat": 1742245254,
  "exp": 1742245554,
  "jti": "b9821893-7699-4d24-af06-803a6a16476b",
  "sub": "8b810549-7443-494f-b4ad-5bc65871e32b", // Initiator Agent Account ID
  "aud": "37888095-2721-48d9-a2df-bfe4075f223a", // Target Agent Account ID

  "env": "sandbox",
  "tsi": "274efc47-024e-466f-b278-152d2ee73955", // Target Service ID
  "itg": "16c135ce-a99a-453d-a7b5-4958fd91de5f", // Initiator Tag (Internal Reference ID)

  "tpr": "0.01",
  "tps": "pay_per_use",
  "amt": "15",
  "cur": "USD",
  "val": "15000000",
  "mnr": 1600,
  "stp": "card",
  "sti": {
    "type": "visa_vic",
    "payment_token": "1234567890123456",
    "token_expiration_month": "03",
    "token_expiration_year": "2030",
    "token_security_code": "123",
    "verifier": "https://verifier.example.info", // URL of payment method verifier
    "verified": true, // Outcome of the verifier's payment method verification
    "verification_id": "3a6e1b76-8f78-4c24-b1bd-dc78a8cc3711" // Verifier's ID for the payment method verification performed
  }
}

                      Figure 2: A PAY type token

3.5.  KYA-PAY Token Example

   The following informative example displays a decoded KYA-PAY type
   token.

{
  "kid": "YjFdJgFNWj9AkUmtoXILwoeb37PsBuGWVK6_QvFLwJw", // JWK Key ID
  "alg": "ES256",
  "typ": "kya-pay+jwt"
}.{
  "iss": "https://kya-pay.example.org", // Issuer URL

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  "iat": 1742245254,
  "exp": 1742245554,
  "jti": "b9821893-7699-4d24-af06-803a6a16476b",
  "sub": "f24a431d-108c-46e6-9357-b428c528210e", // Initiator Agent Account ID
  "aud": "5e00177d-ff7f-424b-8c83-2756e15efbed", // Target Agent Account ID

  "env": "production",
  "tsi": "3e6d33a1-438e-482e-bba5-6aa69544727d", // Target Service ID
  "itg": "c52e0ef2-e27d-4e95-862e-475a904ae7b2", // Initiator Tag (Internal Reference ID)

  "hid": {
    "email": "maryjane@initiator.example.com",
    "given_name": "Mary",
    "middle_name": "Jane",
    "family_name": "Doe",
    "phone_number": "+1-425-555-1212",
    "verified": false
  },
  "apd": {
    "id": "4b087db2-b6e5-48b8-8737-1aa8ddf4c4fe", // Agent platform ID
    "name": "Acme Shopping Agents", // Agent platform name
    "email": "platform@acme.com", // Email address for the agent platform
    "phone_number": "+12345677890", // Phone number for the agent platform
    "organization_name": "Acme Shopping Inc.", // Legal name of the agent platform
    "verifier": "https://www.verifier.com/", // URL of the KYA verifier
    "verified": true, // Outcome of the verifier's KYA verification
    "verification_id": "a23c1fe4-a4b7-442d-8bca-3c8fad5ec3a6" // Verifier's ID for the KYA verification performed
  },
  "aid": {
    "name": "Agentic Excellence Я Us",
    "creation_ip": "128.2.42.95", // IP Address where token was created
    "source_ips": ["54.86.50.139-54.86.50.141", "1.1.1.0/24",
      "2001:db8:abcd:0012::/64", "agentic-excellence.example.com"]
      // IP addresses from which the initiator agent will make requests to the target
  },

  "tpr": "0.01",
  "tps": "pay_per_use",
  "amt": "15",
  "cur": "USD",
  "val": "15000000",
  "mnr": 1600,
  "stp": "card",
  "sti": {
    "type": "visa_vic",
    "payment_token": "1234567890123456",
    "token_expiration_month": "03",
    "token_expiration_year": "2030",

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    "token_security_code": "123"
  }
}

                    Figure 3: A KYA-PAY type token

4.  Token Validation

4.1.  Validating KYA and PAY Tokens

4.1.1.  JWT Header Validation

   1.  alg - The alg header parameter MUST be present and, to enable
       interoperability, it is RECOMMENDED that its value be ES256
       [RFC7518].  Recipients MUST reject any token whose alg value is
       not supported by both parties, including none [RFC7515].

       Recipients MUST use the signature algorithm in the token.  The
       key is obtained from the issuer's JWK Set (item 2); a token is
       verified with that algorithm and that key, or rejected.  In
       particular, a recipient MUST NOT accept a token that would
       require interpreting an Elliptic Curve public key as a symmetric
       key.

       Where the key retrieved from the issuer's JWK Set carries an alg
       or use parameter, the recipient MUST confirm it is consistent
       with the parameters of the issued token, and reject the token
       otherwise.

   2.  kid - The kid claim MUST be present, and set to a valid Key ID
       present in the issuer's JWK Set, located as described in
       Section 3.2.

   3.  typ - The typ header parameter value MUST be one of: kya+jwt,
       pay+jwt, or kya-pay+jwt.

4.1.2.  JWT Payload Validation

   1.  *Verify JWT Signature* - Valid JWTs MUST be signed with a valid
       key belonging to the token's issuer (iss claim)

   2.  *Validate iss Claim* - Ensure that the token is signed by the
       expected valid issuer.

   3.  *Validate the exp Claim* - The recipient MUST validate that the
       token has not expired, within the clock skew tolerance described
       in Section 4.1.3.

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   4.  *Validate the iat Claim* - The recipient MUST validate that the
       token was issued in the past, within the clock skew tolerance
       described in Section 4.1.3.

   5.  *Validate the jti Claim* - Ensure that the jti claim is present,
       and is a UUID.

   6.  *Validate the aud Claim* - Ensure that the aud identifies the
       recipient as the intended audience.

   7.  *Validate the env Claim* - Ensure that the Environment claim is
       set to an expected and use case appropriate value (such as
       production or sandbox)

4.1.3.  Clock Skew

   The iat and exp claims are set from the issuer's clock and evaluated
   against the recipient's.  These are never precisely synchronized, so
   a recipient applies a tolerance when evaluating them.

   A recipient MUST accept a token whose iat is up to the tolerance in
   the future, and MUST accept a token up to the tolerance beyond its
   exp.

   A recipient MUST support a tolerance of at least 5 seconds.  A
   recipient SHOULD NOT apply a tolerance greater than 60 seconds; 30
   seconds is RECOMMENDED.  A tolerance approaching the token's own
   lifetime defeats the purpose of exp: the effective window in which a
   captured token is accepted is its lifetime plus twice the tolerance.

   Where a party generating these timestamps can observe the Date header
   field (Section 6.6.1 of [RFC9110]) of a response from the intended
   recipient, it SHOULD use that value to correct subsequent timestamps
   rather than relying on the recipient's tolerance.  Correcting at the
   sender resolves skew at the only party positioned to detect it.

4.2.  Validating PAY Tokens

   For tokens of type pay+jwt or kya-pay+jwt, perform the steps
   described in the Validating KYA and PAY Tokens section.

   In addition, perform the following steps.

   1.  The val claim is greater than 0.

   2.  The amt claim is greater than 0.

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   3.  The cur claim is set to a currency the target supports (such as
       USD)

   4.  The tps claim, if present, matches the pricing scheme that you
       configured in the target's service

   5.  The tpr claim, if present, matches the price that you configured
       in the target's service

5.  Security Considerations

5.1.  General JWT Practices

   When validating the JWTs described in this specification,
   implementers SHOULD follow the best practices and guidelines
   described in [RFC8725].

5.2.  Confidentiality of Token Contents

   The tokens defined in this specification are signed using JWS Compact
   Serialization.  Signing provides integrity protection, not
   confidentiality.  The claims in a token are encoded, not encrypted,
   and are readable by any party that obtains the token.

   Tokens defined in this specification carry identity claims about a
   human principal and, in the case of PAY and KYA-PAY tokens, payment
   settlement information.  Accordingly:

   *  Tokens MUST be transmitted over a channel providing
      confidentiality, integrity and server authentication, such as TLS
      [RFC8446].

   *  Tokens MUST NOT be written to logs, analytics pipelines, or other
      persistent stores that are not required to process the
      transaction.

   *  Tokens MUST NOT be forwarded to parties other than those necessary
      to complete the interaction for which they were issued.

   *  Issuers SHOULD include only those claims necessary for the
      interaction for which the token is issued.  Confidentiality risk
      is reduced most reliably by not carrying a claim at all.

   This specification does not define encryption of the token itself.
   Tokens are intended to be read by multiple independent parties along
   a single request path -- bot management and fraud systems at the
   edge, identity providers, and the target service -- none of which is
   known to the issuer at the time the token is minted, and between

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   which no key-distribution relationship is assumed.  Encrypting the
   token to a single recipient would both require pre-established key
   exchange with that recipient and withhold the token's contents from
   the intermediaries that are its intended consumers.  Confidentiality
   is therefore provided at the transport layer and by minimising token
   contents, not at the token layer.

   The settlement information carried in a PAY or KYA-PAY token is
   additionally protected by its own construction rather than by
   encryption: the credential is transaction-scoped and its accompanying
   cryptogram is single-use, so a captured token yields no reusable
   payment instrument.

5.3.  Settlement Credential Handling

   The sti claim of a PAY or KYA-PAY token carries a settlement
   instrument.  When stp is card, that instrument is a network-issued
   agentic payment credential provisioned for a single transaction,
   accompanied by a single-use dynamic cryptogram.  Such credentials are
   issued outside the scope of PCI DSS and cannot be used to derive the
   underlying account number.

   Implementations MUST NOT place a Primary Account Number, or a static
   Card Verification Value, in the sti claim.  Doing so would place the
   token, and every system that processes it, within PCI DSS scope, for
   which this specification provides no confidentiality mechanism.

5.4.  Token Lifetime

   The exp claim of a token carrying a settlement instrument SHOULD NOT
   extend beyond the validity period of that instrument.  Agentic
   payment credentials and their associated token cryptograms are
   single-use and short-lived; their validity period is determined and
   enforced by the payment network.  Issuing a long-lived token around a
   short-lived credential provides no benefit and widens the window in
   which a captured token can be replayed.

   More generally, issuers SHOULD set exp to the shortest value
   compatible with the intended interaction.

5.5.  Bearer Semantics and Proof of Possession

   Tokens defined in this specification are bearer tokens unless they
   carry a confirmation method: any party in possession of such a token
   can present it.  For bearer tokens, the protections above --
   transport confidentiality, restricted forwarding, short lifetimes,
   and audience restriction via the aud claim -- are the primary
   defences against capture and replay.

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   A token MAY carry a cnf claim [RFC7800] binding it to a public key
   held by the agent.  A token carrying cnf is sender-constrained rather
   than bearer: possession of the token alone is insufficient, and a
   recipient requires the presenter to demonstrate possession of the
   confirmation key on each request.

   Recipient behaviour for tokens carrying cnf -- including the
   requirement to verify an HTTP Message Signature [RFC9421] over the
   confirmation key, and to reject requests where that signature is
   absent or invalid -- is specified in
   [I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens].

   Issuers SHOULD include cnf where the agent holds a suitable key and
   the target is expected to enforce it.  Issuers MUST NOT rely on cnf
   as a substitute for the bearer-token protections above, since a token
   carrying cnf may still be presented to a recipient that does not
   enforce it.

6.  Privacy Considerations

   KYAPay tokens are designed to convey the information that an agent is
   acting on behalf of a principal - a person or organization.  To do
   this, they will necessarily contain information about that principal
   that can be verified and utilized by participants in the system.
   Participants should therefore only share these tokens with other
   legitimate participants and not make their contents public or
   disclose them to unknown or untrustworthy parties.

   Consent of the principal represented to participate in the
   interactions is vital.  If I authorize an agent to shop for a widget
   at given price, it's legitimate for the agent to carry enough
   information about me to the merchant to be able to do this for me.
   Whereas, if an agent claims to be shopping for me but does not have
   my authorization to do so, my privacy and possibly also my financial
   integrity are being violated.

   The principle of minimal disclosure should be employed.  Only the
   information needed to facilitate the intended interactions should be
   placed in the tokens and conveyed to participants.

7.  IANA Considerations

7.1.  JSON Web Token Claims Registration

   This specification registers the following Claims in the IANA "JSON
   Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] established by
   [RFC7519].

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7.1.1.  "tdm" Claim

   *  Claim Name: tdm

   *  Claim Description: Target domain the token is intended for

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.1 of this specification

7.1.2.  "tsi" Claim

   *  Claim Name: tsi

   *  Claim Description: Target Service ID that this token was created
      for

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.1 of this specification

7.1.3.  "ori" Claim

   *  Claim Name: ori

   *  Claim Description: URL of the token's originator

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.1 of this specification

7.1.4.  "env" Claim

   *  Claim Name: env

   *  Claim Description: Issuer environment (such as "production" or
      "sandbox")

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.1 of this specification

7.1.5.  "itg" Claim

   *  Claim Name: itg

   *  Claim Description: Initiator tag, an opaque reference ID internal
      to the initiator

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   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.1 of this specification

7.1.6.  "hid" Claim

   *  Claim Name: hid

   *  Claim Description: JSON structure containing human identity claims

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.3 of this specification

7.1.7.  "apd" Claim

   *  Claim Name: apd

   *  Claim Description: JSON structure containing agent platform
      identity claims

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.3 of this specification

7.1.8.  "aid" Claim

   *  Claim Name: aid

   *  Claim Description: JSON structure containing agent identity claims

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.3 of this specification

7.1.9.  "tpr" Claim

   *  Claim Name: tpr

   *  Claim Description: JSON string representing target service price
      in currency units

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.4 of this specification

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7.1.10.  "tps" Claim

   *  Claim Name: tps

   *  Claim Description: Target pricing scheme, which represents a way
      for the target list how it charges for its service or content

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.4 of this specification

7.1.11.  "amt" Claim

   *  Claim Name: amt

   *  Claim Description: JSON string representing token amount in
      currency units

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.4 of this specification

7.1.12.  "cur" Claim

   *  Claim Name: cur

   *  Claim Description: Currency unit, represented as an ISO 4217 three
      letter code, such as "EUR"

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.4 of this specification

7.1.13.  "val" Claim

   *  Claim Name: val

   *  Claim Description: JSON string representing token amount in
      settlement network's units

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.4 of this specification

7.1.14.  "mnr" Claim

   *  Claim Name: mnr

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   *  Claim Description: JSON number representing maximum number of
      requests

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.4 of this specification

7.1.15.  "stp" Claim

   *  Claim Name: stp

   *  Claim Description: Settlement type

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.4 of this specification

7.1.16.  "sti" Claim

   *  Claim Name: sti

   *  Claim Description: Meta information for payment settlement,
      depending on settlement

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Reference: Section 3.4 of this specification

7.2.  Media Types Registration

   This section registers the following media types [RFC2046] in the
   IANA "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the manner described
   in [RFC6838].

7.2.1.  application/kya+jwt

   *  Type name: application

   *  Subtype name: kya+jwt

   *  Required parameters: n/a

   *  Optional parameters: n/a

   *  Encoding considerations: Uses JWS Compact Serialization as defined
      in [RFC7515]

   *  Security considerations: See Security Considerations in [RFC7519]

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   *  Interoperability considerations: n/a

   *  Published specification: Section 3.3 of this specification

   *  Applications that use this media type: Applications using Know
      Your Agent tokens

   *  Additional information:

      -  Magic number(s): n/a

      -  File extension(s): n/a

      -  Macintosh file type code(s): n/a

   *  Person & email address to contact for further information: TBD

   *  Intended usage: COMMON

   *  Restrictions on usage: none

   *  Author: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

7.2.2.  application/pay+jwt

   *  Type name: application

   *  Subtype name: pay+jwt

   *  Required parameters: n/a

   *  Optional parameters: n/a

   *  Encoding considerations: Uses JWS Compact Serialization as defined
      in [RFC7515]

   *  Security considerations: See Security Considerations in [RFC7519]

   *  Interoperability considerations: n/a

   *  Published specification: Section 3.4 of this specification

   *  Applications that use this media type: Applications using Pay
      tokens

   *  Additional information:

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      -  Magic number(s): n/a

      -  File extension(s): n/a

      -  Macintosh file type code(s): n/a

   *  Person & email address to contact for further information: TBD

   *  Intended usage: COMMON

   *  Restrictions on usage: none

   *  Author: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

7.2.3.  application/kya-pay+jwt

   *  Type name: application

   *  Subtype name: kya-pay+jwt

   *  Required parameters: n/a

   *  Optional parameters: n/a

   *  Encoding considerations: Uses JWS Compact Serialization as defined
      in [RFC7515]

   *  Security considerations: See Security Considerations in [RFC7519]

   *  Interoperability considerations: n/a

   *  Published specification: Section 3.5 of this specification

   *  Applications that use this media type: Applications using KYA-Pay
      tokens

   *  Additional information:

      -  Magic number(s): n/a

      -  File extension(s): n/a

      -  Macintosh file type code(s): n/a

   *  Person & email address to contact for further information: TBD

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   *  Intended usage: COMMON

   *  Restrictions on usage: none

   *  Author: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

7.3.  Well-Known URI Registration

   This specification registers the following URI suffix in the IANA
   "Well-Known URIs" registry [IANA.WellKnownURIs] established by
   [RFC8615].

   *  URI Suffix: jwks.json

   *  Change Controller: Michael B.  Jones - michael_b_jones@hotmail.com

   *  Specification Document: Section 3.2 of this specification

   *  Status: permanent

   *  Related Information: The resource is a JWK Set [RFC7517]
      containing the keys with which the origin signs KYAPay tokens.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6454]  Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6454>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.

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   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7518]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7518>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7800]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
              Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
              RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7800>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8615]  Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
              (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8615>.

   [RFC8693]  Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
              and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693>.

   [RFC8725]  Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
              Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, February 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8725>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods]
              Agarwal, A., Jones, M. B., and N. Ali, "Anti-Money
              Laundering Methods Values", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-skyfire-oauth-aml-methods-01, 1 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-skyfire-
              oauth-aml-methods-01>.

   [I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values]
              Agarwal, A., Jones, M. B., Ali, N., and Srinivasa,
              "Additional Authentication Method Reference Values", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-skyfire-oauth-amr-

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              values-02, 1 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-skyfire-
              oauth-amr-values-02>.

   [I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification]
              Agarwal, A., Jones, M. B., Ali, N., and Srinivasa,
              "Identity Verification Methods Values", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-skyfire-oauth-id-verification-02, 1
              October 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-skyfire-oauth-id-verification-02>.

   [I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange]
              Agarwal, A., Jones, M. B., Hingnikar, A., and J. Hickman,
              "KYAPay Token Exchange", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange-01, 19 July
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange-01>.

   [I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens]
              Agarwal, A., Jones, M. B., and Srinivasa, "Using KYAPay
              Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-skyfire-
              oauth-using-kyapay-tokens-01, 1 October 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-skyfire-
              oauth-using-kyapay-tokens-01>.

   [IANA.JWT.Claims]
              IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.

   [IANA.MediaTypes]
              IANA, "Media Types",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.

   [IANA.WellKnownURIs]
              IANA, "Well-Known URIs",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris>.

   [RFC2046]  Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
              Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2046>.

   [RFC6838]  Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
              Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
              RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.

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   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

   [RFC9110]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.

   [RFC9421]  Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP
              Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421,
              February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421>.

Appendix A.  Related Specifications

   The following specifications are related to and designed to be used
   with this specification:

   *  [I-D.skyfire-oauth-using-kyapay-tokens] describes how security
      intermediaries -- bot managers, fraud managers, account-takeover
      (ATO) protection systems, and customer identity and access
      management (CIAM) systems -- consume KYAPay tokens to answer a
      question that traditional bot detection cannot: "Did a verified
      human authorize this agent?".

   *  [I-D.skyfire-oauth-kyapay-token-exchange] describes how KYAPay
      tokens can be exchanged for OAuth access tokens to dynamically
      grant agents access to resources they need to accomplish their
      mission.

   *  [I-D.skyfire-oauth-amr-values] defines additional "amr"
      (Authentication Method Reference) values to represent additional
      authentication methods in use today.

   *  [I-D.skyfire-oauth-id-verification] defines the "ivm" (Identity
      Verification Methods) claim and values for declaring how the
      person's identity was verified.

   *  [I-D.skyfire-oauth-aml-methods] defines the "aml" (Anti-Money
      Laundering Methods) claim and values for declaring what AML/CFT
      methods were employed.

Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank Jean Diaconu for his contributions to the
   specification.

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Document History

   [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]

   -02

   *  Corrected the sti sub-claim names in the PAY and KYA-PAY examples
      to match the normative names in the Settlement Information section
      (payment_token, token_expiration_month, token_expiration_year,
      token_security_code).  The examples had retained the pre-rename
      camelCase forms.

   *  Clarified that the card settlement instrument is a network-issued
      agentic payment credential and that token_security_code carries a
      single-use token cryptogram, not a static CVV.

   *  Made the aid and sti claims REQUIRED, and marked the sti sub-claim
      requirement levels individually.

   *  Added the cnf (confirmation) claim, binding a token to a key held
      by the agent, and described the resulting sender-constrained
      semantics.

   *  Added a Scope of Card Settlement section prohibiting Primary
      Account Numbers and static card verification values.

   *  Expanded Security Considerations to cover confidentiality of token
      contents, settlement credential handling, token lifetime, and
      bearer versus sender-constrained semantics.

   *  Tightened JWT header validation: an alg value of none and
      algorithm substitution are rejected.

   *  Corrected a missing comma in the KYA token example, and shortened
      the example token lifetimes, which had exceeded a year.

   *  Added {:vspace} syntax to definition list entries.

   *  Required the iss claim to be an origin, with no path, query or
      fragment component, and corrected the example iss values
      accordingly; one had lacked a scheme.

   *  Added an Issuer Key Discovery section specifying that the issuer's
      JWK Set is located at the jwks.json well-known URI formed from
      iss, and registered that URI suffix with IANA.

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   *  Added a Clock Skew section bounding the tolerance applied to the
      "iat" and "exp" claims, and requiring senders to correct skew they
      can observe.

   *  Addressed review comments by Jean Diaconu.

   *  Clarified the meaning of Verifier and differentiated from
      Recipient.

   -01

   *  Added appendix referencing related specifications.

   -00

   *  Renamed draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile to draft-skyfire-oauth-kyapay-
      token.

   draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile-02

   *  Changed terms buyer and seller to initiator and target to
      generalize applicability.  These claim names were changed: "sdm"
      to "tdm", "ssi" to "tsi", "btg" to "itg", "spr" to "tpr", and
      "sps" to "tps".

   *  Updated Settlement Information sti Sub-Claims.

   *  Changed specification type from Informative to Proposed Standard.

   draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile-01

   *  Removed "srl" (Seller Resource Locator) claim.

   draft-skyfire-kyapayprofile-00

   *  Initial Internet Draft.

Contributors

   Andrew Stitt

   Dmitri Zagidulin

Authors' Addresses

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   Ankit Agarwal
   Skyfire Systems Inc.
   Email: ankit_agarwal@yahoo.com
   URI:   https://skyfire.xyz

   Michael B. Jones
   Self-Issued Consulting
   Email: michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
   URI:   https://self-issued.info/

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