Mitigating IPv6 Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack Using Stateless Neighbor Presence Discovery
draft-smith-6man-mitigate-nd-cache-dos-slnd-06

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2013-08-24 (latest revision 2013-02-20)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-smith-6man-mitigate-nd-cache-dos-slnd-06.txt

Abstract

One of the functions of IPv6 Neighbor Discovery is to discover whether a specified neighbor is present. During the neighbor presence discovery process state is created. A node's capacity for this state can be intentionally exhausted to perform a denial of service attack, known as the "Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack". This memo proposes a stateless form of neighbor presence discovery to prevent this Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack.

Authors

Mark Smith (markzzzsmith@yahoo.com.au)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)