Further Mitigating Router ND Cache Exhaustion DoS Attacks Using Solicited-Node Group Membership
draft-smith-v6ops-mitigate-rtr-dos-mld-slctd-node-02
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Mark Smith | ||
| Last updated | 2016-08-30 (Latest revision 2016-02-27) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
For each of their IPv6 unicast or anycast addresses, nodes join a Solicited-Node multicast group, formed using the lower 24 bits of the address. This Solicited-Node group membership could be used by routers to further mitigate a Neighbor Discovery cache Denial of Service attack.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)