Using GOST ciphers in ESP and IKEv2
draft-smyslov-esp-gost-05
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Valery Smyslov
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Network Working Group V. Smyslov
Internet-Draft ELVIS-PLUS
Intended status: Informational April 27, 2021
Expires: October 29, 2021
Using GOST ciphers in ESP and IKEv2
draft-smyslov-esp-gost-05
Abstract
This document defines a set of encryption transforms for use in the
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and in the Internet Key Exchange
version 2 (IKEv2) protocols. The transforms are based on Russian
cryptographic standard algorithms (GOST) in a Multilinear Galois Mode
(MGM).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 29, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Transforms Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Tree-based External Re-Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Initialization Vector Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. Nonce Format for MGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3.1. MGM Nonce Format for "Kuznyechik" based Transforms . 6
4.3.2. MGM Nonce Format for "Magma" based Transforms . . . . 6
4.4. Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.5. Integrity Check Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.6. Plaintext Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.7. AAD Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.7.1. ESP AAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.7.2. IKEv2 AAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.8. Using Transforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
This document defines four transforms for the Encapsulating Security
Payload protocol (ESP) [RFC4303] and for the Internet Key Exchange
protocol version 2 (IKEv2) [RFC7296]. These document is based on
Russian Standard [GOST-ESP], which describes how Russian
cryptographic standard algorithms are used in ESP and IKEv2.
Transforms defined in this document are based on two block ciphers
from Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (often called "GOST"
algorithms) - "Kuznyechik" [GOST3412-2015][RFC7801] and "Magma"
[GOST3412-2015][RFC8891] in Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM)
[GOST-MGM][I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm]. These transforms provide
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). An external
re-keying mechanism, described in [RFC8645] is also used in these
transforms to limit load on session keys.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
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14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Overview
Russian cryptographic standard algorithms, often referred as "GOST"
algorithms, constitute a set of cryptographic algorithms of different
types - ciphers, hash functions, digital signatures etc. In
particular, Russian cryptographic standard [GOST3412-2015] defines
two block ciphers - "Kuznyechik" (also defined in [RFC7801]) and
"Magma" (also defined in [RFC8891]). Both ciphers use 256-bit key.
"Kuznyechik" has a block size of 128 bits, while "Magma" has a 64-bit
block.
Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) is an AEAD mode defined in
[GOST-MGM][I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm]. It is claimed to provide defense
against some attacks on well-known AEAD modes, like Galois Counter
Mode (GCM).
[RFC8645] defines mechanisms that can be used to limit the number of
times any particular session key is used. One of these mechanisms,
called external re-keying with tree-based construction (defined in
Section 5.2.3 of [RFC8645]), is used in the defined transforms. For
the purpose of deriving subordinate keys a Key Derivation Function
(KDF) KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 defined in Section 4.5 of [RFC7836], is
used. This KDF is based on an HMAC [RFC2104] in a combination with a
Russian GOST hash function defined in Russian cryptographic standard
[GOST3411-2012] (also defined in [RFC6986]).
4. Transforms Description
This document defines four transforms for use in ESP and IKEv2. All
of them use MGM mode of operation with tree-based external re-keying.
The transforms differ in underlying ciphers and in cryptographic
services they provide.
o ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE (Transform ID 32) is an AEAD transform
based on "Kuznyechik" algorithm; it provides confidentiality and
message authentication and thus can be used both in ESP and IKEv2
o ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE (Transform ID 33) is an AEAD transform based
on "Magma" algorithm; it provides confidentiality and message
authentication and thus can be used both in ESP and IKEv2
o ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE (Transform ID 34) is a MAC-only
transform based on "Kuznyechik" algorithm; it provides no
confidentiality and thus can only be used in ESP, but not in IKEv2
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o ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE (Transform ID 35) is a MAC-only transform
based on "Magma" algorithm; it provides no confidentiality and
thus can only be used in ESP, but not in IKEv2
4.1. Tree-based External Re-Keying
All four transforms use the same tree-based external re-keying
mechanism. The idea is that the key that is provided for the
transform (Child SA key derived from KEYMAT in case of ESP or SK_ei/
SK_er in case of IKEv2) is not directly used to protect messages.
Instead a tree of keys is derived using this key as a root. This
tree may have several levels. The leaf keys are used for messages
protection, while intermediate nodes keys are used to derive lower
level keys (including leaf keys). See Section 5.2.3 of [RFC8645] for
more details. This construction allows to protect a large amount of
data, at the same time providing a bound on a number of times any
particular key in the tree is used, thus defending from some side
channel attacks.
The transforms defined in this document use three-level tree. The
leaf key that protects a message is computed as follows:
K_msg = KDF (KDF (KDF (K, l1, i1), l2, i2), l3, i3)
where:
KDF (k, l, s) Key Derivation Function KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256
defined in Section 4.5 of [RFC7836], which accepts
three input parameters - a key (k), a label (l) and a
seed (s) and provides a new key as an output;
K the key for the transform (ESP SA key derived from
KEYMAT or SK_ei/SK_er in case of IKEv2);
l1, l2, l3 labels defined as 6 octet ASCII strings without null
termination:
l1 = "level1"
l2 = "level2"
l3 = "level3"
i1, i2, i3 parameters that determine which keys out of the tree
are used on each level, altogether they determine a
leaf key that is used for message protection; these
parameters are two octet integers in network byte
order;
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This construction allows to generate up to 2^16 keys on each level,
but due to IV construction (see Section 4.2) the number of possible
keys on the level 1 is limited to 2^8. So, the total number of
possible leaf keys generated from one SA key is 2^40.
This specifications doesn't impose any requirements on the frequency
the external re-keying takes place. It is expected that sending
application will follow its own policy dictating how many times the
keys on each level must be used.
4.2. Initialization Vector Format
Each message protected by the defined transforms must contain
Initialization Vector (IV). The IV has a size of 64 bits and
consists of the four fields, three of which are i1, i2 and i3
parameters that determine the particular leaf key this message was
protected with (see Section 4.1), and the fourh is a counter,
representing the message number for this key.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| i1 | i2 | i3 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| i3 (cont) | pnum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: IV Format
where:
o i1 (1 octet), i2 (2 octets), i3 (2 octets) - parameters,
determining the particular key used to protect this message;
2-octets parameters are integers in network byte order
o pnum (3 octets) - message counter in network byte order for the
leaf key protecting this message; up to 2^24 messages may be
protected using a single leaf key
For any given SA the IV MUST NOT repeat, but there is no requirement
that IV is unpredictable.
4.3. Nonce Format for MGM
MGM requires a per-message nonce (called Initial Counter Nonce, ICN,
in the [I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm]) that must be unique in the context of
any leaf key. The size of the ICN is n-1 bits, where n is the block
size of the underlying cipher. The two ciphers used in the
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transforms defined in this document have different block sizes, so
two different formats for the ICN are defined.
MGM specification requires that the nonce be n-1 bits in size, where
n is a block size of underlying cipher. This document defines MGM
nonces that are n bits in size, because that makes them having a
whole number of bytes. When used inside MGM the most significant bit
of the first octet of the nonce (represented as an octet string) is
dropped, making an effective size of the nonce equal to n-1 bits.
Note, that the dropped bit is a part of zero field (see Figure 2 and
Figure 3) which is always set to 0, so no information is lost when it
is dropped.
4.3.1. MGM Nonce Format for "Kuznyechik" based Transforms
For transforms based on "Kuznyechik" cipher
(ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the ICN
consists of a zero octet, a 24-bit message counter and a 96-bit
secret salt, that is fixed for SA and is not transmitted.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| zero | pnum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| salt |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Nonce format for "Kuznyechik" based transforms
where:
o zero (1 octet) - set to 0
o pnum (3 octets) - the counter for the messages protected by the
given leaf key; this field MUST be equal to the pnum field in the
IV
o salt (12 octets) - secret salt
4.3.2. MGM Nonce Format for "Magma" based Transforms
For transforms based on "Magma" cipher (ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and
ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the ICN consists of a zero octet, a 24-bit
message counter and a 32-bit secret salt, that is fixed for SA and is
not transmitted.
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1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| zero | pnum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| salt |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Nonce format for "Magma" based transforms
where:
o zero (1 octet) - set to 0
o pnum (3 octets) - the counter for the messages protected by the
given leaf key; this field MUST be equal to the pnum field in the
IV
o salt (4 octets) - secret salt
4.4. Keying Material
The key for ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and
ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE transforms consists of 352 bits, of
which the first 256 bits is a root key for the tree (denoted as K in
Section 4.1) and the remaining 96 bits is a secret salt (see
Section 4.3.1).
The key for ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE
transforms consists of 288 bits, of which the first 256 bits is a
root key for the tree (denoted as K in Section 4.1) and the remaining
32 bits is a secret salt (see Section 4.3.2).
The keys in case ESP are extracted from the KEYMAT, and in case IKEv2
they are SK_ei/SK_er keys. Note, that since these transforms provide
authenticated encryption, no additional keys are needed for
authentication. It means that in case of IKEv2 the keys SK_ai/SK_ar
are not used.
4.5. Integrity Check Value
The MGM computes authentication tag equal to the block size of the
underlying cipher. For "Kuznyechik" based transforms
(ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the
resulting Integrity Check Value (ICV) is truncated to 96 bits by
dropping the last 4 octets of the produced authentication tag. For
"Magma" based transforms (ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and
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ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the full 64-bit authentication tag is used
as ICV.
4.6. Plaintext Padding
Transforms defined in this document don't require any plaintext
padding, as specified in [I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm]. It means, that only
those padding requirements that are imposed by the protocol are
applied (4 bytes for ESP, no padding for IKEv2).
4.7. AAD Construction
4.7.1. ESP AAD
Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) in ESP is constructed differently
depending on the transform being used and whether Extended Sequence
Number (ESN) is in use or not. The ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and
ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE provide confidentiality, so the content of the
ESP body is encrypted and AAD consists of the ESP SPI and (E)SN. The
AAD is constructed similarly to the one in [RFC4106].
On the other hand the ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE and
ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE don't provide confidentiality, they provide
only message authentication. For this purpose the IV and the part of
ESP packet that is normally encrypted are included in the AAD. For
these transforms encryption capability provided by MGM is not used.
The AAD is constructed similarly to the one in [RFC4543].
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 32-bit Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: AAD for AEAD transforms with 32-bit SN
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 64-bit Extended Sequence Number |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: AAD for AEAD transforms with 64-bit ESN
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1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 32-bit Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IV |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Payload Data (variable) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Padding (0-255 bytes) |
+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Pad Length | Next Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: AAD for authentication only transforms with 32-bit SN
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 64-bit Extended Sequence Number |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IV |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Payload Data (variable) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Padding (0-255 bytes) |
+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Pad Length | Next Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: AAD for authentication only transforms with 64-bit ESN
4.7.2. IKEv2 AAD
For IKEv2 the AAD consists of the IKEv2 Header, any unencrypted
payloads followed it (if they are present) and the Encrypted (or the
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Encrypted Fragment) payload header. The AAD is constructed similar
to one in [RFC5282].
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ IKEv2 Header ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Unencrypted IKE Payloads ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 8: AAD for IKEv2
4.8. Using Transforms
When SA is established the i1, i2 and i3 parameters are set to 0 by
the sender and a leaf key is calculated. The pnum parameter starts
from 0 and is incremented with each message protected by the same
leaf key. When sender decides that the leaf should be changed, it
increments i3 parameter and generates a new leaf key. The pnum
parameter for the new leaf key is reset to 0 and the process
continues. If the sender decides, that 3-rd level key corresponding
to i3 is used enough times, it increments i2, resets i3 to 0 and
calculates a new leaf key. The pnum is reset to 0 (as with every new
leaf key) and the process continues. Similar procedure is used when
2-nd level key needs to be changed.
The receiver always uses i1, i2 and i3 from the received message. If
they differ from the values in previously received packets, a new
leaf key is calculated. The pnum parameter is always used from the
received packet. To improve performance implementations may cache
recently used leaf key. When new leaf key is calculated (based on
the values from received message) the old key may be kept for some
time to improve performance in case of possible packet reordering
(when packets protected by the old leaf key are delayed and arrive
later).
5. Security Considerations
The most important security consideration for MGM is that the nonce
MUST NOT repeat for a given key. For this reason the transforms
defined in this document MUST NOT be used with manual keying.
Security properties of MGM are discussed in [MGM-SECURITY].
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6. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned four Transform IDs in the "Transform Type 1 -
Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" registry (where RFCXXXX is this
document):
Number Name ESP Reference IKEv2 Reference
---------------------------------------------------------------------
32 ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE [RFCXXXX] [RFCXXXX]
33 ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE [RFCXXXX] [RFCXXXX]
34 ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE [RFCXXXX] Not allowed
35 ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE [RFCXXXX] Not allowed
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012:
Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>.
[RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher
"Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>.
[RFC8891] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and D. Baryshkov, "GOST R 34.12-2015:
Block Cipher "Magma"", RFC 8891, DOI 10.17487/RFC8891,
September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8891>.
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[I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm]
Smyshlyaev, S., Nozdrunov, V., Shishkin, V., and E.
Griboedova, "Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM)", draft-
smyshlyaev-mgm-19 (work in progress), January 2021.
[RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V.,
Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines
on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of
Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012",
RFC 7836, DOI 10.17487/RFC7836, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7836>.
7.2. Informative References
[GOST3411-2012]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Hashing function", GOST R 34.11-2012, 2012.
(In Russian)
[GOST3412-2015]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
Block ciphers", GOST R 34.12-2015, 2015.
(In Russian)
[GOST-MGM]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
Authenticated encryption block cipher operation modes",
R 1323565.1.026-2019, 2019.
(In Russian)
[GOST-ESP]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
Using Russian cryptographic algorithms in data security
protocol ESP", R 1323565.1.035-2021, 2021.
(In Russian)
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
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[RFC4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4106, DOI 10.17487/RFC4106, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4106>.
[RFC4543] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message
Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4543, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4543>.
[RFC5282] Black, D. and D. McGrew, "Using Authenticated Encryption
Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key
Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 5282,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5282, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5282>.
[RFC8645] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., "Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric
Keys", RFC 8645, DOI 10.17487/RFC8645, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8645>.
[MGM-SECURITY]
Akhmetzyanova, L., Alekseev, E., Karpunin, G., and V.
Nozdrunov, "Security of Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM)",
2019, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/123.pdf>.
Appendix A. Test Vectors
1. ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, example 1:
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K:
b6 18 0c 14 5c 51 2d bd 69 d9 ce a9 2c ac 1b 5c
e1 bc fa 73 79 2d 61 af 0b 44 0d 84 b5 22 cc 38
i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0000, pnum = 000000
K_msg:
2f f1 c9 0e de 78 6e 06 1e 17 b3 74 d7 82 af 7b
d8 80 bd 52 7c 66 a2 ba dc 3e 56 9a ab 27 1d a4
salt [12]:
7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
nonce [16]:
00 00 00 00 7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
IV [8]:
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AAD [8]:
51 46 53 6b 00 00 00 01
plaintext [64]:
45 00 00 3c 23 35 00 00 7f 01 ee cc 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 f3 5b 02 00 58 00 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
ciphertext [64]:
18 9d 12 88 b7 18 f9 ea be 55 4b 23 9b ee 65 96
c6 d4 ea fd 31 64 96 ef 90 1c ac 31 60 05 aa 07
62 97 b2 24 bf 6d 2b e3 5f d6 f6 7e 7b 9d eb 31
85 ff e9 17 9c a9 bf 0b db af c2 3e ae 4d a5 6f
ESP ICV [12]:
50 b0 70 a1 5a 2b d9 73 86 89 f8 ed
ESP packet [112]:
45 00 00 70 00 4d 00 00 ff 32 91 4f 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 51 46 53 6b 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 18 9d 12 88 b7 18 f9 ea be 55 4b 23
9b ee 65 96 c6 d4 ea fd 31 64 96 ef 90 1c ac 31
60 05 aa 07 62 97 b2 24 bf 6d 2b e3 5f d6 f6 7e
7b 9d eb 31 85 ff e9 17 9c a9 bf 0b db af c2 3e
ae 4d a5 6f 50 b0 70 a1 5a 2b d9 73 86 89 f8 ed
2. ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, example 2:
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K:
b6 18 0c 14 5c 51 2d bd 69 d9 ce a9 2c ac 1b 5c
e1 bc fa 73 79 2d 61 af 0b 44 0d 84 b5 22 cc 38
i1 = 00, i2 = 0001, i3 = 0001, pnum = 000000
K_msg:
9a ba c6 57 78 18 0e 6f 2a f6 1f b8 d5 71 62 36
66 c2 f5 13 0d 54 e2 11 6c 7d 53 0e 6e 7d 48 bc
salt [12]:
7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
nonce [16]:
00 00 00 00 7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
IV [8]:
00 00 01 00 01 00 00 00
AAD [8]:
51 46 53 6b 00 00 00 10
plaintext [64]:
45 00 00 3c 23 48 00 00 7f 01 ee b9 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 e4 5b 02 00 67 00 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
ciphertext [64]:
78 0a 2c 62 62 32 15 7b fe 01 76 32 f3 2d b4 d0
a4 fa 61 2f 66 c2 bf 79 d5 e2 14 9b ac 1d fc 4b
15 4b 69 03 4d c2 1d ef 20 90 6d 59 62 81 12 7c
ff 72 56 ab f0 0b a1 22 bb 5e 6c 71 a4 d4 9a 4d
ESP ICV [12]:
c2 2f 87 40 83 8e 3d fa ce 91 cc b8
ESP packet [112]:
45 00 00 70 00 5c 00 00 ff 32 91 40 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 51 46 53 6b 00 00 00 10 00 00 01 00
01 00 00 00 78 0a 2c 62 62 32 15 7b fe 01 76 32
f3 2d b4 d0 a4 fa 61 2f 66 c2 bf 79 d5 e2 14 9b
ac 1d fc 4b 15 4b 69 03 4d c2 1d ef 20 90 6d 59
62 81 12 7c ff 72 56 ab f0 0b a1 22 bb 5e 6c 71
a4 d4 9a 4d c2 2f 87 40 83 8e 3d fa ce 91 cc b8
3. ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, example 1:
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K:
5b 50 bf 33 78 87 02 38 f3 ca 74 0f d1 24 ba 6c
22 83 ef 58 9b e6 f4 6a 89 4a a3 5d 5f 06 b2 03
i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0000, pnum = 000000
K_msg:
25 65 21 e2 70 b7 4a 16 4d fc 26 e6 bf 0c ca 76
5e 9d 41 02 7d 4b 7b 19 76 2b 1c c9 01 dc de 7f
salt [4]:
cf 36 63 12
nonce [8]:
00 00 00 00 cf 36 63 12
IV [8]:
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AAD [8]:
c8 c2 b2 8d 00 00 00 01
plaintext [64]:
45 00 00 3c 24 2d 00 00 7f 01 ed d4 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 de 5b 02 00 6d 00 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
ciphertext [64]:
fa 08 40 33 2c 4f 3f c9 64 4d 8c 2c 4a 91 7e 0c
d8 6f 8e 61 04 03 87 64 6b b9 df bd 91 50 3f 4a
f5 d2 42 69 49 d3 5a 22 9e 1e 0e fc 99 ac ee 9e
32 43 e2 3b a4 d1 1e 84 5c 91 a7 19 15 52 cc e8
ESP ICV [8]:
5f 4a fa 8b 02 94 0f 5c
ESP packet [108]:
45 00 00 6c 00 62 00 00 ff 32 91 3e 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d c8 c2 b2 8d 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 fa 08 40 33 2c 4f 3f c9 64 4d 8c 2c
4a 91 7e 0c d8 6f 8e 61 04 03 87 64 6b b9 df bd
91 50 3f 4a f5 d2 42 69 49 d3 5a 22 9e 1e 0e fc
99 ac ee 9e 32 43 e2 3b a4 d1 1e 84 5c 91 a7 19
15 52 cc e8 5f 4a fa 8b 02 94 0f 5c
4. ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, example 2:
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K:
5b 50 bf 33 78 87 02 38 f3 ca 74 0f d1 24 ba 6c
22 83 ef 58 9b e6 f4 6a 89 4a a3 5d 5f 06 b2 03
i1 = 00, i2 = 0001, i3 = 0001, pnum = 000000
K_msg:
20 e0 46 d4 09 83 9b 23 f0 66 a5 0a 7a 06 5b 4a
39 24 4f 0e 29 ef 1e 6f 2e 5d 2e 13 55 f5 da 08
salt [4]:
cf 36 63 12
nonce [8]:
00 00 00 00 cf 36 63 12
IV [8]:
00 00 01 00 01 00 00 00
AAD [8]:
c8 c2 b2 8d 00 00 00 10
plaintext [64]:
45 00 00 3c 24 40 00 00 7f 01 ed c1 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 cf 5b 02 00 7c 00 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
ciphertext [64]:
7a 71 48 41 a5 34 b7 58 93 6a 8e ab 26 91 40 a8
25 a7 f3 5d b9 e4 37 1f e7 6c 99 9c 9b 88 db 72
1d c7 59 f6 56 b5 b3 ea b6 b1 4d 6b d7 7a 07 1d
4b 93 78 bd 08 97 6c 33 ed 9a 01 91 bf fe a1 dd
ESP ICV [8]:
dd 5d 50 9a fd b8 09 98
ESP packet [108]:
45 00 00 6c 00 71 00 00 ff 32 91 2f 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d c8 c2 b2 8d 00 00 00 10 00 00 01 00
01 00 00 00 7a 71 48 41 a5 34 b7 58 93 6a 8e ab
26 91 40 a8 25 a7 f3 5d b9 e4 37 1f e7 6c 99 9c
9b 88 db 72 1d c7 59 f6 56 b5 b3 ea b6 b1 4d 6b
d7 7a 07 1d 4b 93 78 bd 08 97 6c 33 ed 9a 01 91
bf fe a1 dd dd 5d 50 9a fd b8 09 98
5. ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE, example 1:
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K:
98 bd 34 ce 3b e1 9a 34 65 e4 87 c0 06 48 83 f4
88 cc 23 92 63 dc 32 04 91 9b 64 3f e7 57 b2 be
i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0000, pnum = 000000
K_msg:
98 f1 03 01 81 0a 04 1c da dd e1 bd 85 a0 8f 21
8b ac b5 7e 00 35 e2 22 c8 31 e3 e4 f0 a2 0c 8f
salt [12]:
6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
nonce [16]:
00 00 00 00 6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
IV [8]:
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AAD [80]:
3d ac 92 6a 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
45 00 00 3c 0c f1 00 00 7f 01 05 11 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 48 5c 02 00 03 00 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
plaintext [0]:
ciphertext [0]:
ESP ICV [12]:
ca c5 8c e5 e8 8b 4b f3 2d 6c f0 4d
ESP packet [112]:
45 00 00 70 00 01 00 00 ff 32 91 9b 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 3d ac 92 6a 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c 0c f1 00 00 7f 01 05 11
0a 6f 0a c5 0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 48 5c 02 00 03 00
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
01 02 02 04 ca c5 8c e5 e8 8b 4b f3 2d 6c f0 4d
6. ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE, example 2:
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K:
98 bd 34 ce 3b e1 9a 34 65 e4 87 c0 06 48 83 f4
88 cc 23 92 63 dc 32 04 91 9b 64 3f e7 57 b2 be
i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0001, pnum = 000000
K_msg:
02 c5 41 87 7c c6 23 f3 f1 35 91 9a 75 13 b6 f8
a8 a1 8c b2 63 99 86 2f 50 81 4f 52 91 01 67 84
salt [12]:
6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
nonce [16]:
00 00 00 00 6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
IV [8]:
00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
AAD [80]:
3d ac 92 6a 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
45 00 00 3c 0c fb 00 00 7f 01 05 07 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 43 5c 02 00 08 00 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
plaintext [0]:
ciphertext [0]:
ESP ICV [12]:
ba bc 67 ec 72 a8 c3 1a 89 b4 0e 91
ESP packet [112]:
45 00 00 70 00 06 00 00 ff 32 91 96 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 3d ac 92 6a 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00
01 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c 0c fb 00 00 7f 01 05 07
0a 6f 0a c5 0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 43 5c 02 00 08 00
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
01 02 02 04 ba bc 67 ec 72 a8 c3 1a 89 b4 0e 91
7. ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE, example 1:
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K:
d0 65 b5 30 fa 20 b8 24 c7 57 0c 1d 86 2a e3 39
2c 1c 07 6d fa da 69 75 74 4a 07 a8 85 7d bd 30
i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0000, pnum = 000000
K_msg:
4c 61 45 99 a0 a0 67 f1 94 87 24 0a e1 00 e1 b7
ea f2 3e da f8 7e 38 73 50 86 1c 68 3b a4 04 46
salt [4]:
88 79 8f 29
nonce [8]:
00 00 00 00 88 79 8f 29
IV [8]:
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AAD [80]:
3e 40 69 9c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
45 00 00 3c 0e 08 00 00 7f 01 03 fa 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 36 5c 02 00 15 00 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
plaintext [0]:
ciphertext [0]:
ESP ICV [8]:
4d d4 25 8a 25 35 95 df
ESP packet [108]:
45 00 00 6c 00 13 00 00 ff 32 91 8d 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 3e 40 69 9c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c 0e 08 00 00 7f 01 03 fa
0a 6f 0a c5 0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 36 5c 02 00 15 00
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
01 02 02 04 4d d4 25 8a 25 35 95 df
8. ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE, example 2:
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K:
d0 65 b5 30 fa 20 b8 24 c7 57 0c 1d 86 2a e3 39
2c 1c 07 6d fa da 69 75 74 4a 07 a8 85 7d bd 30
i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0001, pnum = 000000
K_msg:
b4 f3 f9 0d c4 87 fa b8 c4 af d0 eb 45 49 f2 f0
e4 36 32 b6 79 19 37 2e 1e 96 09 ea f0 b8 e2 28
salt [4]:
88 79 8f 29
nonce [8]:
00 00 00 00 88 79 8f 29
IV [8]:
00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
AAD [80]:
3e 40 69 9c 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
45 00 00 3c 0e 13 00 00 7f 01 03 ef 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 31 5c 02 00 1a 00 61 62 63 64
65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
plaintext [0]:
ciphertext [0]:
ESP ICV [8]:
84 84 a9 23 30 a0 b1 96
ESP packet [108]:
45 00 00 6c 00 18 00 00 ff 32 91 88 0a 6f 0a c5
0a 6f 0a 1d 3e 40 69 9c 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00
01 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c 0e 13 00 00 7f 01 03 ef
0a 6f 0a c5 0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 31 5c 02 00 1a 00
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
01 02 02 04 84 84 a9 23 30 a0 b1 96
Author's Address
Valery Smyslov
ELVIS-PLUS
PO Box 81
Moscow (Zelenograd) 124460
RU
Phone: +7 495 276 0211
Email: svan@elvis.ru
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