Security for Low-Latency Group Communication
draft-somaraju-ace-multicast-02

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2016-10-31
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text xml pdf html bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
ace                                                          A. Somaraju
Internet-Draft                                     Tridonic GmbH & Co KG
Intended status: Standards Track                                S. Kumar
Expires: May 4, 2017                                    Philips Research
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                                ARM Ltd.
                                                               W. Werner
                                         Werner Management Services e.U.
                                                        October 31, 2016

              Security for Low-Latency Group Communication
                  draft-somaraju-ace-multicast-02.txt

Abstract

   Some Internet of Things application domains require secure group
   communication.  This draft describes procedures for authorization,
   key management, and securing group messages.  We specify the usage of
   object security at the application layer for group communication and
   assume that CoAP is used as the application layer protocol.  The
   architecture allows the usage of symmetric and asymmetric keys to
   secure the group messages.  The asymmetric key solution provides the
   ability to uniquely authenticate the source of all group messages and
   this is the recommended architecture for most applications.  However,
   some applications have strict requirements on latency for group
   communication (e.g. in non-emergency lighting applications) and it
   may not always be feasible to use the secure source authenticated
   architecture.  In such applications we recommend the use of
   dynamically generated symmetric group keys to secure group
   communications.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.

Somaraju, et al.           Expires May 4, 2017                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft      IoT Group Communication Security        October 2016

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Architecture - Group Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  AT-KDC Access Tokens  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  AT-R Access Tokens  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.4.  Multicast Message Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.5.  Receiver Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.6.  Sender Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Architecture - source authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.1.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.2.  AT-R Access Tokens  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.3.  Multicast Message Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.4.  Receiver Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.5.  Sender Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.1.  Applicability statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.2.  Token Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.3.  Token Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     5.4.  Time  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   6.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
Show full document text