Security for Low-Latency Group Communication

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Abhinav Somaraju  , Sandeep Kumar  , Hannes Tschofenig  , Walter Werner 
Last updated 2017-05-04 (latest revision 2016-10-31)
Replaced by draft-tschofenig-ace-group-communication-security
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Expired & archived
pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Replaced by draft-tschofenig-ace-group-communication-security
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at


Some Internet of Things application domains require secure group communication. This draft describes procedures for authorization, key management, and securing group messages. We specify the usage of object security at the application layer for group communication and assume that CoAP is used as the application layer protocol. The architecture allows the usage of symmetric and asymmetric keys to secure the group messages. The asymmetric key solution provides the ability to uniquely authenticate the source of all group messages and this is the recommended architecture for most applications. However, some applications have strict requirements on latency for group communication (e.g. in non-emergency lighting applications) and it may not always be feasible to use the secure source authenticated architecture. In such applications we recommend the use of dynamically generated symmetric group keys to secure group communications.


Abhinav Somaraju (
Sandeep Kumar (
Hannes Tschofenig (
Walter Werner (

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)