A Default Validation Policy for the use of RPKI Manifests in the global Internet Routing System.
draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-manifest-validation-01

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Network Working Group                                        J. Snijders
Internet-Draft                                                       NTT
Intended status: Informational                               May 4, 2020
Expires: November 5, 2020

A Default Validation Policy for the use of RPKI Manifests in the global
                        Internet Routing System.
          draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-manifest-validation-01

Abstract

   Manifests are a critical cornerstone to the global Resource Public
   Key Infrastructure (RPKI).

   RFC 6486 describes a validation decision tree which introduced the
   notion of 'local policy', creating space for ambiguity.  This
   ambiguity has led to various RPKI implementations producing different
   output when presented with the same input, but also leads to severe
   operational security implications.

   This document updates RFC 6486 and introduces the notion of a default
   policy for Manifest validation to encourage harmony between
   implementations.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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Snijders                Expires November 5, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        RPKI Default Manifest Policy              May 2020

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 5, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Examples of Problematic Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     4.1.  AS0 and Delegation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Update to RFC 6486  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.1.  Tests for Determining Manifest State  . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  What to do when the CA's Publication Point is Distrusted  . .   5
   7.  TODO  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   Manifests [RFC8416] are a critical cornerstone to the global Resource
   Public Key Infrastructure RPKI [RFC6480].

   RFC 6486 describes a validation decision tree which introduced the
   notion of 'local policy', creating space for ambiguity.  This
   ambiguity has led to various RPKI implementations producing different
   output when presented with the same input, but also operational
   security implications.

Snijders                Expires November 5, 2020                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft        RPKI Default Manifest Policy              May 2020

   This document updates RFC 6486 and introduces the notion of a global
   policy for Manifest validation to encourage harmony between
   implementations.

2.  Suggested Reading

   It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI
   [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482], RPKI-based
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