JIS: JTel Identity Standard
draft-vandemeent-jis-identity-00

Internet Engineering Task Force                          J. van de Meent
Internet-Draft                                                     R. AI
Intended status: Standards Track                                Humotica
Expires: 28 July 2026                                    24 January 2026

                      JIS: JTel Identity Standard
                    draft-vandemeent-jis-identity-00

Abstract

   This document specifies JIS (JTel Identity Standard), a semantic
   security protocol providing identity management, trust establishment,
   and intent validation across multiple communication protocols.
   Unlike traditional security systems that react to attack patterns,
   JIS validates semantic intent before execution.  JIS introduces FIR/A
   (First Initiation Revoke/Accept) for trust genesis, SNAFT for
   semantic firewall, BALANS for risk scoring, and Humotica for human-
   readable context.  JIS integrates with TIBET for complete provenance
   tracking where audit is a precondition for behavior, not an
   observation of it.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 July 2026.

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   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  The JIS Solution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Design Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Identity Layer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  HID (Human Identity)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  DID (Device Identity) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  DID URI Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Trust Layer (FIR/A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  FIR/A Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Trust Establishment Flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Layer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  SNAFT (Semantic Network Analysis Firewall Tool) . . . . .   7
     5.2.  BALANS (Risk Assessment)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.3.  NIR (Notify, Identify, Rectify) . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.4.  HICSS (Emergency Halt)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Context Layer (Humotica)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Audit Layer (Continuity Chain)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  TIBET Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.1.  Audit as Precondition, Not Observation  . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.2.  Formal Coupling Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.3.  Humotica to TIBET Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  Protocol Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     10.1.  Identity Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     10.2.  Semantic Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.3.  Chain Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.4.  Replay Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.5.  Privacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.1.  Media Type Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.2.  HTTP Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.3.  URI Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Complete Flow Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     A.1.  Bank Fraud Verification Scenario  . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix B.  Conformance Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     B.1.  JIS Basic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

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     B.2.  JIS Secure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     B.3.  JIS Complete  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Problem Statement

   Modern computing suffers from three fundamental challenges, made
   urgent by emerging regulations including [EU-AI-ACT] and [GDPR]:

   1.  Protocol Fragmentation: N protocols require N-squared bridges

   2.  Reactive Security: Firewalls block attacks after seeing patterns

   3.  Context Blindness: Systems know what is requested but not why

1.2.  The JIS Solution

   JIS addresses these challenges through:

   1.  Intent-First Architecture: N protocols need only N adapters

   2.  Proactive Security: Semantic validation before execution

   3.  Humotica Context: Every request includes human-understandable
       reasoning

1.3.  Design Principles

   JIS is designed to be:

   *  Protocol Agnostic: Works over HTTP, MQTT, SIP, WebSocket, etc.

   *  Privacy First: HID never leaves the device; only DID transmitted

   *  Zero Trust: Every request validated through semantic intent

   *  Human Empathy: Context enables understanding of urgency and
      frustration

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

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   BALANS  Behavioral Analysis and Legitimacy Assessment Network
      Scoring.  Risk scoring system (0.0 = blocked, 1.0 = full trust).

   Continuity Chain  HMAC-linked sequence of tokens providing tamper-
      proof audit trail.

   DID (Device Identity)  Ed25519 key pair for device authentication.

   FIR/A (First Initiation Revoke/Accept)  Trust genesis protocol
      establishing secure relationships.

   HID (Human Identity)  X25519 key pair for human-device binding.  MUST
      never be transmitted.

   Humotica  Human-readable context layer capturing sense, context,
      intent, and explanation for every transaction.

   NIR (Notify, Identify, Rectify)  Dialogue-based security resolution
      protocol.

   SNAFT (Semantic Network Analysis Firewall Tool)  Proactive semantic
      firewall that validates intent legitimacy.

3.  Identity Layer

3.1.  HID (Human Identity)

   HID is an X25519 key pair for human-device binding.

   CRITICAL: HID MUST NEVER leave the device.  Only the binding hash
   with DID is shared.

   {
     "hid": {
       "public_key": "X25519_public",
       "private_key": "X25519_private"
     }
   }

   The private_key field is shown for completeness but MUST NEVER be
   transmitted.

3.2.  DID (Device Identity)

   DID is an Ed25519 key pair for device authentication.

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   {
     "did": {
       "public_key": "Ed25519_public",
       "private_key": "Ed25519_private"
     }
   }

   The public key is shared during FIR/A establishment.  The private key
   MUST remain on the device.

3.3.  DID URI Format

   JIS defines a URI format for device identifiers:

   *  did:jtel:identifier - Human ID

   *  did:robot:identifier - Device/Robot ID

   *  did:service:identifier - Service ID

   Examples: did:jtel:jasper_2025, did:robot:warehouse_bot_007,
   did:service:bank_fraud_dept

4.  Trust Layer (FIR/A)

4.1.  FIR/A Protocol

   FIR/A (First Initiation Revoke/Accept) is the trust genesis protocol
   - the digital handshake.

   Phase 1 - INITIATE: The initiator sends a request:

   {
     "type": "fira_init",
     "initiator": "did:jtel:alice",
     "responder": "did:service:bank",
     "intent": "fraud_verification_call",
     "humotica": {
       "sense": "Suspicious transaction detected",
       "context": "5000 EUR transfer to unknown account",
       "intent": "Verify with account holder",
       "explanation": "Bank fraud detection triggered"
     }
   }

   Phase 2 - CAPABILITIES: The responder returns capabilities:

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   {
     "type": "fira_capabilities",
     "fir_a_id": "GENESIS-BANK-ALICE-2025-11-29",
     "capabilities": ["voice_call", "sms_verification"],
     "rules": {
       "no_calls_after": "22:00",
       "require_caller_id": true,
       "max_attempts": 3
     }
   }

   Phase 3 - CONFIRM: The initiator accepts capabilities:

   {
     "type": "fira_confirm",
     "fir_a_id": "GENESIS-BANK-ALICE-2025-11-29",
     "accepted_capabilities": ["voice_call"],
     "continuity_hash": "7f3a...c2e1"
   }

   Phase 4 - EXECUTE: Both parties now have an established trust
   relationship.  All subsequent actions are linked to this FIR/A.

4.2.  Trust Establishment Flow

   +--------+                                +--------+
   | Client |                                | Server |
   +---+----+                                +---+----+
       |                                         |
       |  1. FIR/A INITIATE                      |
       |  (DID + Intent + Humotica)              |
       |---------------------------------------->|
       |                                         |
       |  2. FIR/A CAPABILITIES                  |
       |  (Rules + Available Actions)            |
       |<----------------------------------------|
       |                                         |
       |  3. FIR/A CONFIRM                       |
       |  (Accepted + Genesis Hash)              |
       |---------------------------------------->|
       |                                         |
       |        [Trust Established]              |
       |                                         |

                       Figure 1: FIR/A Protocol Flow

5.  Security Layer

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5.1.  SNAFT (Semantic Network Analysis Firewall Tool)

   SNAFT provides proactive security through semantic intent analysis.

   Blocked Intents (no legitimate Humotica context possible):

   *  sql_injection

   *  command_injection

   *  crypto_mining (unauthorized)

   *  gpu_hijack

   *  shell_company_payment

   Validation Rules:

   1.  Intent Blocklist: Check if intent in BLOCKED_INTENTS

   2.  Humotica Required: Explanation MUST be at least 50 characters

   3.  Intent-Explanation Coherence: Semantic match required

   Why Malware Fails: Malware cannot provide legitimate Humotica
   context.  "Why are you running SQL injection?" has no valid answer.

5.2.  BALANS (Risk Assessment)

   BALANS provides risk scoring from 0.0 (blocked) to 1.0 (full trust).

   Factors:

   *  complexity_factor: Complex operations = riskier

   *  humotica_quality: Short/vague explanation = riskier

   *  user_trust_history: New user = lower score

   *  transaction_size: Large amounts = riskier

   *  time_anomaly: Unusual hours = riskier

   Thresholds:

   *  score at least 0.5: ALLOW

   *  score at least 0.3: TRIGGER_NIR (start dialogue)

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   *  score below 0.3: BLOCK

5.3.  NIR (Notify, Identify, Rectify)

   Dialogue-based security resolution instead of blind blocking:

   1.  Notify: "A call from your VERIFIED Bank was flagged as unusual"

   2.  Identify: "Confirm with fingerprint to proceed"

   3.  Rectify: User verifies, action proceeds

5.4.  HICSS (Emergency Halt)

   HICSS (HALT Immediate Critical System Stop) provides emergency halt
   for threshold violations.

   Triggers: Physical safety risks, security breach detection, critical
   system threshold violation.

   Action: Immediate system halt, no gradual degradation.

6.  Context Layer (Humotica)

   Humotica provides human-readable context for every transaction.

   {
     "humotica": {
       "sense": "What triggered this intent?",
       "context": "What is the current situation?",
       "intent": "What does the user want to achieve?",
       "explanation": "Why is this action being taken?"
     }
   }

   The Humotica context enables systems to understand human emotional
   state and respond appropriately.  For example, detecting user
   frustration from repeated failed attempts and prioritizing
   resolution.

7.  Audit Layer (Continuity Chain)

   HMAC-linked token chain for tamper-proof audit trail:

   Token_n = HMAC(user_key, Token_{n-1} || cost || humotica_hash)

   Genesis -> Token_1 -> Token_2 -> Token_3 -> ...

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   Tamper Detection: Attempting to inject a fake token breaks the HMAC
   chain and is immediately detectable.

   Advantages over Blockchain:

   *  99.9% less energy consumption

   *  Instant verification

   *  No consensus required

   *  Privacy preserved (only hashes shared)

8.  TIBET Integration

   JIS integrates with TIBET (Transaction/Interaction-Based Evidence
   Trail) for complete provenance tracking.  See
   [I-D.vandemeent-tibet-provenance].

8.1.  Audit as Precondition, Not Observation

   The JIS/TIBET coupling represents a fundamental architectural shift:

   Traditional approach:

   [Authentication] -> [Action] -> [Logging]
        (who)           (what)     (why - reconstructed)

   JIS/TIBET approach:

   [JIS Identity + TIBET Intent] -> [SNAFT] -> [Action+Audit]
           (who + why)              (check)    (inseparable)

   In traditional systems, audit is an observation of behavior that
   already occurred.  Logs can fail, be bypassed, or be deleted.  Intent
   must be reconstructed after the fact - "compliance archaeology".

   In JIS/TIBET systems, audit is a precondition for behavior.  No
   action is architecturally possible without both identity AND intent
   declared upfront.  The audit trail is not a side effect; it is the
   mechanism that enables the action.

   The Three Laws:

   1.  No action without intent - Architecturally impossible to bypass

   2.  No intent without identity - Anonymous actions cannot exist

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   3.  No deletion after the fact - Cryptographic immutability

8.2.  Formal Coupling Definition

   Action(A) is valid if and only if there exists Token(T) where:

   *  T.jis_identity is not null AND

   *  T.intent_id is not null AND

   *  SNAFT.validate(T.intent_id, A) = true AND

   *  T.jis_identity.trust_score at least threshold(A)

8.3.  Humotica to TIBET Mapping

   *  Humotica.sense maps to TIBET.erin

   *  Humotica.context maps to TIBET.eromheen

   *  Humotica.intent maps to TIBET.erin.intent

   *  Humotica.explanation maps to TIBET.erachter

9.  Protocol Bindings

   JIS works over multiple transport protocols:

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             +============+==================================+
             | Protocol   | Binding Method                   |
             +============+==================================+
             | HTTP/REST  | X-JIS-* headers or Authorization |
             +------------+----------------------------------+
             | WebSocket  | Payload fields in JSON messages  |
             +------------+----------------------------------+
             | MQTT       | Topic prefix + payload fields    |
             +------------+----------------------------------+
             | SIP        | Custom headers in INVITE/MESSAGE |
             +------------+----------------------------------+
             | Matrix     | Event content fields             |
             +------------+----------------------------------+
             | Email/SMTP | X-JIS-* headers                  |
             +------------+----------------------------------+
             | CoAP       | Option fields                    |
             +------------+----------------------------------+
             | gRPC       | Metadata fields                  |
             +------------+----------------------------------+
             | WebRTC     | Signaling channel                |
             +------------+----------------------------------+
             | Bluetooth  | Characteristic values            |
             +------------+----------------------------------+

                                  Table 1

   For interoperability, [RFC8259] encoding over HTTPS is RECOMMENDED as
   the baseline binding.

   HTTP Headers:

   *  X-JIS-DID: Device identity URI

   *  X-JIS-FIR-A-ID: FIR/A session identifier

   *  X-JIS-Intent: Declared intent

   *  X-JIS-Continuity-Hash: Current chain hash

   *  X-JIS-Trust-Score: BALANS score (0.0-1.0)

10.  Security Considerations

10.1.  Identity Protection

   HID (Human Identity) MUST NEVER be transmitted.  Only DID and HID-DID
   binding hashes are shared.  This ensures human identity remains
   private even if device is compromised.

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10.2.  Semantic Security

   SNAFT validates intent legitimacy BEFORE execution.  Attackers must
   provide legitimate Humotica context - impossible for malicious
   actions.

10.3.  Chain Integrity

   The Continuity Chain uses HMAC linking.  Any tampering breaks the
   chain and is immediately detectable.

10.4.  Replay Protection

   Actions are time-bound through FIR/A session and continuity chain
   position.  Replayed tokens fail validation.

10.5.  Privacy

   Humotica context MAY contain sensitive information.  Implementations
   MUST support encryption at rest and SHOULD support field-level
   encryption.

11.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests registration of:

11.1.  Media Type Registration

   Media Type: application/jis+json

11.2.  HTTP Header Fields

   *  X-JIS-DID

   *  X-JIS-FIR-A-ID

   *  X-JIS-Intent

   *  X-JIS-Continuity-Hash

   *  X-JIS-Trust-Score

11.3.  URI Scheme

   URI Scheme: did:jtel

12.  References

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12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8259]  Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 8259, December 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.

   [I-D.vandemeent-tibet-provenance]
              van de Meent, J., "TIBET: Transaction/Interaction-Based
              Evidence Trail", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              vandemeent-tibet-provenance-00, January 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vandemeent-
              tibet-provenance-00>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [EU-AI-ACT]
              European Commission, "Regulation on harmonised rules on
              AI", 2024.

   [GDPR]     European Parliament, "General Data Protection Regulation",
              Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 2016.

   [ZENODO-JIS]
              van de Meent, J., "JIS: JTel Identity Standard v1.0",
              Zenodo DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17759713, November 2025.

   [ZENODO-COUPLING]
              van de Meent, J., "The JIS/TIBET Coupling: Audit as
              Precondition", Zenodo DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18340471,
              January 2026.

Appendix A.  Complete Flow Example

A.1.  Bank Fraud Verification Scenario

   1.  Bank detects suspicious transaction

   2.  Bank initiates FIR/A with customer

   3.  Customer device responds with capabilities

   4.  Bank confirms and establishes trust

   5.  Bank creates TIBET token for the call

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   6.  Call proceeds with full audit trail

Appendix B.  Conformance Levels

B.1.  JIS Basic

   Minimum implementation: FIR/A trust establishment and Continuity
   Chain.

B.2.  JIS Secure

   Basic plus: SNAFT semantic firewall and BALANS risk scoring.

B.3.  JIS Complete

   Secure plus: NIR dialogue resolution, HICSS emergency halt, full
   Humotica context, and TIBET integration.

Acknowledgements

   JIS was developed as part of HumoticaOS, an AI governance framework
   built on human-AI symbiosis.  The core insight - "Audit is not an
   observation of behavior, it is a precondition for behavior" - emerged
   from the JIS/TIBET coupling architecture [ZENODO-COUPLING].  The full
   JIS specification is available at [ZENODO-JIS].

Authors' Addresses

   Jasper van de Meent
   Humotica
   Den Dolder
   Netherlands
   Email: jasper@humotica.com
   URI:   https://humotica.com

   Root AI
   Humotica
   Email: root_ai@humotica.nl
   URI:   https://humotica.com

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