Encrypting ICE candidates to improve privacy and connectivity
draft-wang-mmusic-encrypted-ice-candidates-00

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MMUSIC                                                          A. Drake
Internet-Draft                                                 J. Uberti
Intended status: Informational                                   Q. Wang
Expires: May 4, 2020                                              Google
                                                       November 01, 2019

     Encrypting ICE candidates to improve privacy and connectivity
             draft-wang-mmusic-encrypted-ice-candidates-00

Abstract

   WebRTC applications collect ICE candidates as part of the process of
   creating peer-to-peer connections.  To maximize the probability of a
   direct peer-to-peer connection, client private IP addresses can be
   included in this candidate collection, but this has privacy
   implications.  This document describes a way to share local IP
   addresses with local peers without compromising client privacy.
   During the ICE process, local IP addresses are encrypted and
   authenticated using a pre-shared key and cipher suite before being
   put into ICE candidates as hostnames with an ".encrypted" pseudo-top-
   level domain.  Other peers who also have the PSK are able to decrypt
   these addresses and use them normally in ICE processing.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2020.

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Drake, et al.              Expires May 4, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft          encrypted-ice-candidates           November 2019

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  ICE Candidate Gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.1.  Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.2.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  ICE Candidate Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  mDNS Message Flooding via Fallback Resolution . . . . . .   6
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   The technique detailed in [MdnsCandidate] provides a method to share
   local IP addresses with other clients without exposing client private
   IP to applications.  Given the fact that the application may control
   the signaling servers, STUN/TURN servers, and even the remote peer
   implementation, the locality of the out-of-band mDNS signaling can be
   considered the sole source of trust between peers to share local IPs.
   However, mDNS messages are by default scoped to local links
   [RFC6762], and may not be enabled to traverse subnets in certain
   networking environments.  These environments may experience frequent
   failures in mDNS name resolution and significant connectivity
   challenges as a result.  On the other hand, endpoints in these
   environments are typically managed, in such a way that information
   can be securely pushed and shared, including a pre-shared key and its
   associated cipher suite.

   This document proposes a complementary solution for managed networks
   to share local IP addresses over the signaling channel without
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