Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-00

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Internet Engineering Task Force                             H. Wang, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                   Y. Yang
Intended status: Standards Track                                 X. Kang
Expires: September 2, 2018                   Huawei Technology Pte. Ltd.
                                                           March 1, 2018

 Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
                Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
               draft-wang-tls-raw-public-key-with-ibc-00

Abstract

   This document specifies the use of identity as a raw public key in
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
   (DTLS).  The protocol procedures are kept unchanged, but cipher
   suites are extended to support Identity-based signature (IBS).  The
   example OID tables in the RFC 7250 [RFC7250] are expanded with OIDs
   specific to the IBC-based signature algorithms.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 2, 2018.

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   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Wang, et al.            Expires September 2, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           TLS-RAW-Public-Key-IBC               March 2018

   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Extension of RAW Public Key to IBC-based Identity . . . . . .   4
   4.  Parameters for Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  New Key Exchange Algorithms and Cipher Suites . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  TLS Client and Server Handshake Behavior  . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  Client Hello  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.2.  Server Hello  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.3.  Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.4.  Server Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  TLS Client and Server Use ECCSI . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.2.  Combined Usage of Raw Public Keys and X.509 Certificates   10
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix A.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   DISCLAIMER: This is a personal draft and has not yet seen significant
   security analysis.

   Traditionally, TLS/DTLS client and server exchange public keys
   endorsed by PKIX [PKIX] certificates.  It is considered complicate
   and may cause security weaknesses with the use of PKIX certificates
   [Defeating-SSL].  To simplify certificates exchange, using RAW public
   key in TLS/DTLS has been specified in RFC 7250.  That is, instead of
   transmitting a full certificate in the TLS messages, only public keys
   are exchanged between client and server.  However, an out-of-band
   mechanism for public key and identity binding is assumed.

   Recently, 3GPP has adopted the EAP authentication framework for 5G
   and EAP-TLS is considered as one of candidate authentication methods
   for private networks, especially for networks with a large number of
   IOT devices.  For IOT networks, TLS/DTLS with RAW public key is
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