Evidence-Bounded Authorization for Agentic Systems: Evidence Qualification Receipts
draft-watts-agent-evidence-boundary-01
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draft-watts-agent-evidence-boundary-01
Internet Engineering Task Force D. O. Watts
Internet-Draft GoodShyt Group Inc.
Intended status: Experimental 30 October 2026
Expires: 3 May 2027
Evidence-Bounded Authorization for Agentic Systems: Evidence
Qualification Receipts
draft-watts-agent-evidence-boundary-01
Abstract
Autonomous agents increasingly make or propose consequential actions
using premises assembled from model outputs, memory, tools,
telemetry, and external data. Existing authentication and
authorization mechanisms can establish who is acting, under whose
delegation, and which operation is permitted, but they do not by
themselves establish whether the proposition that triggered the
operation has adequate support. This document defines the Evidence
Qualification Receipt (EQR), a transport-neutral JSON data model and
fail-closed verification procedure for binding a proposition to a
declared evidence profile, its supporting evidence digests,
contradiction state, freshness, and evaluation result. An EQR can be
PASS, FAIL, or INDETERMINATE. A PASS EQR is only an authorization
input: it is never itself permission to execute. The design is
append-only: changed evidence produces a successor receipt rather
than rewriting prior epistemic state. The goal is to prevent
evidence, provenance, or model confidence from silently acquiring
authorization semantics.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 May 2027.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Problem Statement and Non-Collapse Requirements . . . . . . . 4
4. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Evidence Qualification Receipt Data Model . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Evaluation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Example EQR Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Integrity Protection and Issuer Authentication . . . . . . . 9
7. Receipt Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Receipt Verification and Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Fail-Closed Qualification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Integration with Authorization Systems . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. Append-Only Lifecycle and Supersession . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. Failure and Error Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12.1. Invoice Payment Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12.2. Operations Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.3. Research Promotion Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
13. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
14. Relationship to Existing Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
16. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
17. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
18. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
19. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
20. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix B. Changes since -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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1. Introduction
Autonomous agents increasingly act on premises derived from model
inference, retrieved memory, external tools, telemetry, documents,
and other agents. Authentication can establish an actor's identity.
Delegation can establish on whose behalf that actor operates.
Authorization can establish whether a requested operation is
permitted. None of those steps, by themselves, establish whether the
proposition used to justify the action is adequately supported.
This creates a failure mode that is easy to miss in otherwise well-
designed authorization systems: a correctly authenticated and
correctly authorized agent can still execute an action because an
unsupported, stale, contradictory, or merely speculative premise was
treated as though it were established evidence.
This document defines an Evidence Qualification Receipt (EQR). An
EQR binds an exact proposition digest to a versioned evidence-
requirements profile, evidence digests, contradiction state, temporal
context, and one of three evaluation results: PASS, FAIL, or
INDETERMINATE. It is intended to be consumed by an authorization
system as one input among identity, delegation, policy, action, and
resource context.
The design follows four non-collapse rules:
* Integrity is not admissibility.
* Evidence is not authority.
* Qualification is not authorization.
* Authorization is not execution.
In particular, a cryptographically valid EQR with evaluation status
PASS does not grant a capability, mint an access token, or require a
resource server to execute an operation.
This document is deliberately transport-neutral. It does not define
a replacement for OAuth, workload identity, RATS, SCITT, or agent
communication protocols. Profiles can bind an EQR or an EQR digest
to those systems.
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2. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Proposition An exact declarative claim whose support state is being
evaluated.
Evidence Profile A versioned set of requirements defining what
evidence, freshness, contradiction handling, comparison rules, and
other checks are required for a proposition class.
Evidence Qualification Receipt (EQR) An immutable result object
binding a proposition, profile, evidence references, and
evaluation outcome.
Issuer The system that evaluates the declared profile and produces
the EQR. Issuer identity is not proof that the evaluation is
substantively correct.
Verifier A component that validates an EQR's syntax, integrity,
bindings, freshness, and local acceptability before making it
available to authorization policy.
Authorization System The component that decides whether an actor may
perform an action on a resource. It can consume an EQR but
remains authoritative for the permission decision.
PASS All required profile checks are satisfied within the declared
scope and tolerances.
FAIL At least one required profile check is contradicted or
violated.
INDETERMINATE No required check has established FAIL, but one or
more required inputs, bridges, freshness conditions, or
contradiction resolutions are missing or unresolved.
3. Problem Statement and Non-Collapse Requirements
Current agent authorization work correctly focuses on identity,
delegation, user consent, policy, transaction binding, and
provenance. A separate question arises before a high-consequence
action: what evidence supports the proposition that made the action
appear necessary or appropriate?
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Examples include a payment agent acting because it believes an
invoice is overdue, an operations agent restarting a service because
it believes a health check failed, or a research agent promoting a
result because it believes an experiment met a preregistered
criterion. The permission to perform an operation and the evidence
supporting the premise for that operation are different objects.
An implementation conforming to this document MUST NOT interpret PASS
as an authorization decision. It MUST NOT interpret receipt
integrity as evidence sufficiency. It MUST NOT convert INDETERMINATE
into PASS because an action is time-sensitive or because other
authorization inputs are valid.
The following implication is therefore invalid:
authenticated actor
+
valid delegation
+
permitted operation
+
signed evidence object
|
X does not imply
v
"the triggering proposition is adequately supported"
Figure 1
EQR adds an explicit qualification step without changing which
authorization system ultimately controls execution.
4. Architecture
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proposition + evidence + profile
|
v
+------------------+
| EQR Evaluator |
+------------------+
|
PASS / FAIL /
INDETERMINATE
|
v
+------------------+
| EQR Verifier |
+------------------+
|
qualified input only
|
+---------------+----------------+
| identity | delegation | policy |
| action | resource | EQR |
+---------------+----------------+
|
v
+------------------+
| Authorization |
| System |
+------------------+
ALLOW / DENY
|
v
execution
Figure 2: EQR in an agent authorization path
The evaluator and verifier can be the same deployment component, but
their logical responsibilities are distinct. The evaluator
determines the profile outcome. The verifier determines whether the
receipt can be trusted and used in the current context.
An authorization system MAY require no EQR for low-consequence
operations and a particular EQR profile for higher-consequence
operations. This document does not define those local risk classes.
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5. Evidence Qualification Receipt Data Model
An EQR payload is a JSON object as defined by [RFC8259].
Implementations that compute a digest over a JSON payload SHOULD use
the JSON Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785] before hashing. When an
EQR binds a non-JSON proposition, evidence object, profile, context,
or action, the applicable profile MUST define the canonical byte
representation that is hashed.
The following members are defined:
version String. This document defines version 1.
receipt_id A URI identifying this immutable receipt, using URI
syntax from [RFC3986].
issuer A URI identifying the EQR issuer.
issued_at and expires_at Timestamps bounding receipt freshness.
They MUST use the Internet date/time format defined by [RFC3339].
profile Object containing a stable profile identifier and digest of
the exact profile bytes used.
claim Object containing a stable claim identifier and digest of the
exact proposition evaluated.
context_digest Optional digest binding the evaluation to a declared
snapshot, transaction, or other context.
action_digest Optional digest binding the receipt to a proposed
action. High-consequence profiles SHOULD require this member when
the proposition is evaluated specifically to justify an action.
evaluation Object containing status, requirements_satisfied, and the
number or digests of unresolved blocking contradictions.
evidence Array of evidence descriptors. Each descriptor binds at
least a digest and evidence class; deployments can add local
metadata such as freshness or an access-controlled retrieval
reference. This document defines sha-256 as the mandatory-to-
implement digest algorithm [RFC6234]. Digest values MUST use
base64url encoding without padding as specified in [RFC4648].
supersedes Optional receipt identifier of a predecessor EQR
superseded by new evidence. The predecessor is not modified.
nonce Optional verifier- or transaction-supplied value for replay
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resistance.
5.1. Evaluation Status
The evaluation.status member MUST be exactly one of: pass, fail, or
indeterminate.
An issuer MUST produce fail when any required profile condition is
known to be violated. Otherwise, if any required condition is
missing, unresolved, stale, or outside declared tolerance, the issuer
MUST produce indeterminate. The issuer MUST produce pass only when
all required conditions are satisfied.
An empty required-condition set MUST NOT yield PASS. A profile that
intentionally requires no evidence does not need an EQR.
5.2. Example EQR Payload
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{
"version": "1",
"receipt_id": "urn:uuid:6ac9f8f0-30e1-4b4c-a142-9f5cb5ad58f1",
"issuer": "https://qualifier.example",
"issued_at": "2026-09-12T23:50:00Z",
"expires_at": "2026-09-13T00:05:00Z",
"profile": {
"id": "https://example.org/profiles/invoice-overdue/v1",
"hash_alg": "sha-256",
"digest": "BASE64URL(PROFILE_DIGEST)"
},
"claim": {
"id": "urn:example:claim:invoice-8472-overdue",
"hash_alg": "sha-256",
"digest": "BASE64URL(PROPOSITION_DIGEST)"
},
"context_digest": "BASE64URL(CONTEXT_DIGEST)",
"action_digest": "BASE64URL(PROPOSED_ACTION_DIGEST)",
"evaluation": {
"status": "pass",
"requirements_satisfied": true,
"blocking_contradictions": []
},
"evidence": [
{
"class": "signed_invoice_record",
"hash_alg": "sha-256",
"digest": "BASE64URL(EVIDENCE_DIGEST)",
"fresh_until": "2026-09-13T00:05:00Z"
}
],
"nonce": "t9mS6wqz2Dbf",
"supersedes": null
}
Placeholder digest text in this example is non-normative.
6. Integrity Protection and Issuer Authentication
This document does not define a new signature format. An inter-
domain EQR MUST be integrity protected and bound to an authenticated
issuer using a mechanism acceptable to the verifier. JWS [RFC7515]
and COSE Sign1 [RFC9052] are examples of existing mechanisms that can
be profiled for this purpose.
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A verifier MUST NOT infer substantive evidence quality from
successful signature verification. Signature validation establishes
integrity and issuer binding; it does not establish that the issuer
used an adequate evidence profile or evaluated it correctly.
7. Receipt Production
Before producing an EQR, an issuer MUST bind the exact proposition
and exact evidence profile. The profile MUST identify each required
condition and the rule for handling missing values, stale values,
contradictory evidence, and comparison tolerances.
Where a profile compares multiple representations of the same
property, the profile MUST define the comparison space, units,
transformation or bridge, snapshot alignment, and tolerance. A unit
mismatch or incompatible comparison type is a profile failure.
Missing or unresolved calibration is INDETERMINATE.
The issuer MUST NOT silently substitute a different proposition,
evidence profile, evidence source, or action after evaluation. Such
a change requires a new receipt.
8. Receipt Verification and Use
A verifier consuming an EQR MUST perform the following checks before
exposing the receipt to authorization policy:
1. Validate syntax and the supported EQR version.
2. Validate required integrity protection and issuer authentication.
3. Validate receipt freshness and, when present, nonce or
transaction binding.
4. Validate the proposition digest against the proposition used by
the proposed action.
5. Validate the profile identifier and profile digest against an
acceptable local profile.
6. Validate context and action digests when required by local
policy.
7. Apply local trust policy to the issuer and evidence classes.
8. Expose the EQR evaluation status to the authorization system
without rewriting it.
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A verifier can classify a receipt as syntactically/integrity VALID
while its embedded evaluation remains FAIL or INDETERMINATE. Receipt
validity and proposition qualification are separate dimensions.
8.1. Fail-Closed Qualification
When an authorization policy requires a PASS EQR, FAIL and
INDETERMINATE MUST NOT satisfy that requirement.
def qualifies_for_policy(eqr, local_policy, action):
if not syntax_and_integrity_valid(eqr):
return False
if not fresh_and_bound(eqr, action):
return False
if eqr["evaluation"]["status"] != "pass":
return False
if eqr["evaluation"]["requirements_satisfied"] is not True:
return False
if eqr["evaluation"]["blocking_contradictions"]:
return False
return local_policy.accepts_evidence_qualification(eqr, action)
Returning true from this procedure means only that one authorization
precondition is satisfied. It does not mean the action is
authorized.
9. Integration with Authorization Systems
Authorization remains a separate function:
authorization_decision =
local_policy(
principal,
delegation,
proposed_action,
protected_resource,
current_context,
verified_evidence_qualification
)
execute only if authorization_decision == ALLOW
Figure 3
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Existing agent authorization mechanisms can carry an EQR by value, by
digest, or by a reference whose dereferencing and trust semantics are
defined by a profile. For example, an OAuth deployment could bind an
EQR reference to transaction-specific authorization state or to Rich
Authorization Requests [RFC9396]. This document does not register an
OAuth authorization-details type or token claim.
When an evidence challenge mechanism is used to request missing
evidence, satisfying the challenge can result in a newly evaluated
EQR. The new EQR is still not authorization and does not guarantee
execution.
10. Append-Only Lifecycle and Supersession
EQR state is append-only. An implementation MUST NOT mutate an
existing receipt from INDETERMINATE to PASS, from FAIL to PASS, or
from PASS to another state after issuance.
New evidence, a corrected profile, a changed action, or a changed
evaluation result requires a new EQR with a new receipt_id. The
successor MAY identify its predecessor in supersedes. A verifier
MUST NOT treat supersession as deletion of the predecessor.
EQR:v1
status = indeterminate
|
| new evidence
v
EQR:v2
supersedes = EQR:v1
status = pass
EQR:v1 remains immutable historical evidence.
Figure 4
This lifecycle allows an audit system to reconstruct what was known,
missing, or contradicted at the time of each authorization decision.
11. Failure and Error Semantics
Profiles and transports can define their own error codes, but
implementations should preserve the following distinctions:
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+===============================================+===============+
| Condition | Result |
+===============================================+===============+
| Receipt malformed, signature invalid, or | INVALID |
| binding mismatch | receipt |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------------+
| Required evidence contradicts profile | VALID receipt |
| | with FAIL |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------------+
| Required evidence missing, stale, unresolved, | VALID receipt |
| or uncertainty crosses a threshold | with |
| | INDETERMINATE |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------------+
| All required conditions satisfied | VALID receipt |
| | with PASS |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------------+
| PASS EQR but authorization policy denies | DENY action |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------------+
Table 1: Required distinctions
Collapsing INVALID, FAIL, INDETERMINATE, and authorization DENY into
one generic "false" loses information useful for remediation and
auditing.
12. Examples
12.1. Invoice Payment Agent
An agent proposes a payment because it claims invoice 8472 is
overdue. The authorization system already knows the user delegated
payment authority up to a configured amount. Local policy also
requires a PASS EQR for the proposition "invoice 8472 is overdue"
under a profile requiring a signed invoice record, due-date
comparison, duplicate-payment check, and freshness under five
minutes.
If the invoice record is present but the duplicate-payment service is
unavailable, the EQR is INDETERMINATE. The valid delegation does not
upgrade that state. The authorization system denies or defers
according to local policy.
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12.2. Operations Agent
An operations agent proposes a restart because a health signal
exceeded a threshold. A profile requires agreement between two
telemetry representations after unit normalization and time-window
alignment. A reading of 250 milliseconds and 0.25 seconds can agree
after a declared bridge, but this correspondence does not prove that
both instruments observed the intended event.
If timestamps cannot be aligned, the EQR is INDETERMINATE. If units
are declared incompatible, the profile fails. If all required
comparisons and freshness checks pass, the EQR can become an input to
a separate restart authorization policy.
12.3. Research Promotion Agent
A research workflow proposes to promote a result from "candidate" to
"supported". The evidence profile requires locked source digests,
numeric trace bindings, registered risk criteria, and a reproduction
receipt. If independent reproduction is required but absent, the
result is INDETERMINATE even when all local checks pass. A local
success receipt cannot silently satisfy an independent-reproduction
requirement.
13. Implementation Status
This section is non-normative and is included to provide transparency
about the maturity of the design.
The author maintains a local Python reference package for a broader
fail-closed theoretical profile. The currently frozen package
executes finite boundary checks for three-valued prerequisite
conjunction, missing and mistyped comparisons, uncertainty crossing
tolerance, empty and tied selections, blocked fiction-to-empirical
promotion, and unresolved-evidence promotion. The local verification
report records 40 named checks passing. It also records that the
package is a frozen theoretical candidate, not an empirical
validation or deployment authorization.
The referenced local package digest is:
e53b16656c9a98a4851bfc0b627bd7df189b83c4df77f753361b58b9b8cd7f33. No
interoperable network implementation or independent reproduction is
claimed by this -00 draft.
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14. Relationship to Existing Work
AI-agent authentication and authorization work describes how existing
identity and authorization standards can be applied to agents
[I-D.aiagent-auth]. Agent Operation Authorization defines action-
specific authorization proposals and tokens [I-D.agent-operation].
OAuth Authorization Evidence records user confirmation and audit
evidence associated with access tokens [I-D.oauth-authz-evidence].
Authorization Evidence Challenge describes how a relying party can
request missing authorization evidence [I-D.ae-challenge]. Agent
Action Capsule provenance binding relates authorization, memory
provenance, and recorded action outcomes [I-D.aac-provenance].
EQR is intended to be complementary. Its narrow question is: under a
declared evidence profile, what is the current qualification state of
the exact proposition being offered as a premise for an action? It
neither replaces user consent evidence nor defines the authorization
decision itself.
15. Security Considerations
EQR introduces an additional input to authorization systems and
therefore creates new downgrade, replay, misbinding, and trust-
confusion risks.
*Authority laundering:* A verifier MUST NOT treat a valid signature,
reputable issuer, neighboring true statement, or PASS result under
one profile as authority for a different proposition, profile,
context, or action.
*Replay:* High-consequence deployments SHOULD bind receipts to a
short validity interval and, where appropriate, a nonce, transaction,
or action digest. Replaying an old PASS receipt after the relevant
evidence became stale can cause unsafe authorization.
*Profile substitution:* Both a stable profile identifier and digest
are included because a mutable profile URI alone permits semantic
substitution. A verifier MUST reject a profile digest that does not
match its accepted profile bytes.
*Evidence reference attacks:* Optional evidence retrieval references
can create SSRF, access-control, and exfiltration risks. A verifier
MUST NOT dereference arbitrary locations solely because they appear
in a receipt. Retrieval policy is local.
*Compromised issuer:* Cryptographic integrity cannot make a dishonest
or compromised issuer correct. Authorization systems need explicit
issuer trust, profile acceptance, and evidence class policy.
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*Denial of service:* Evidence graphs and contradiction sets can be
large. Profiles should bound input sizes, recursion, remote lookups,
and verification cost before evaluation begins.
*Confused-deputy execution:* A PASS EQR that is not bound to the
intended proposition or action can be reused to justify a different
action. Exact proposition and action bindings are recommended
whenever an EQR participates in a high-consequence decision.
16. Privacy Considerations
Evidence supporting an agent decision can contain personal,
confidential, financial, medical, location, behavioral, or
proprietary information. EQR is designed to permit digest-only
evidence descriptors so that an authorization path need not copy
source data into every token or receipt.
Implementations SHOULD minimize the proposition text, evidence
metadata, retrieval locations, and correlation identifiers exposed
across trust boundaries. Where a proposition itself is sensitive,
deployments should exchange a digest or privacy-preserving reference
and reveal the plaintext only to components that require it.
Long-lived globally unique identifiers can create correlation risk.
Deployments should scope receipt and claim identifiers to the
smallest useful administrative domain unless cross-domain
auditability is a requirement.
17. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions. A future revision or companion
profile that defines a registered media type, OAuth authorization-
details type, token claim, or CBOR label will need corresponding IANA
considerations.
18. Conclusion
Agent authorization systems need to distinguish the permission to act
from the support for the proposition that motivated the action. EQR
provides a small transport-neutral object for preserving that
distinction. The governing rule is simple: evidence can qualify an
authorization premise, but it cannot silently become authorization.
19. Normative References
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
20. Informative References
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
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Internet-Draft Evidence-Bounded Agent Authorization October 2026
[RFC9396] Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0
Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, May 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9396>.
[I-D.aiagent-auth]
Kasselman, P., Lombardo, J., Rosomakho, Y., Campbell, B.,
Steele, N., and A. Parecki, "AI Agent Authentication and
Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
klrc-aiagent-auth-03, July 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-klrc-aiagent-
auth/>.
[I-D.agent-operation]
Liu, D., Zhu, H., and S. Krishnan, "Agent Operation
Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
liu-agent-operation-authorization-02, March 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-agent-
operation-authorization/>.
[I-D.oauth-authz-evidence]
Liu, D., "Authorization Evidence and Audit Trail for OAuth
2.0 Access Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-liu-oauth-authorization-evidence-01, June 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-oauth-
authorization-evidence/>.
[I-D.ae-challenge]
Schrock, I., "An Authorization Evidence Challenge for
High-Risk Agent Actions", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-schrock-ae-challenge-08, September 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schrock-ae-
challenge/>.
[I-D.aac-provenance]
Rampalli, K., "Binding Per-Action Authorization and Memory
Provenance into Agent Action Capsules", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-rampalli-scitt-capsule-provenance-
binding-00, July 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/
draft-rampalli-scitt-capsule-provenance-binding/>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The author thanks the IETF community authors whose 2026 work on agent
authentication, transaction authorization, authorization evidence,
evidence challenge semantics, and action provenance helped clarify
the specific non-collapse boundary addressed by this draft.
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Appendix B. Changes since -00
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Editorial and tooling-conformance changes only; no technical content
was changed.
* Replaced Requirements Language paragraph with the exact BCP 14
(RFC 8174) boilerplate (idnits)
* Removed unreferenced bibliography entries (xml2rfc/idnits "unused
reference"): RFC9334
* Updated outdated reference draft-schrock-ae-challenge-05 to
current -08
* Normalized author metadata (full name with ASCII form, initials,
organization GoodShyt Group Inc., San Francisco CA postal, email,
ORCID URI)
* Updated document date and revision number.
Author's Address
Deonté O'dell Watts
GoodShyt Group Inc.
San Francisco, CA
United States of America
Email: deonte@goodshyt.fun
URI: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-8586-3650
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