MICA-NEX v0.3: Authenticated Measurement Ingestion for Model-Agnostic Nano-Instrument Agent Swarms
draft-watts-mica-nex-measurement-ingestion-00
This document is an Internet-Draft (I-D).
Anyone may submit an I-D to the IETF.
This I-D is not endorsed by the IETF and has no formal standing in the
IETF standards process.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Deonté Watts | ||
| Last updated | 2026-10-22 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-watts-mica-nex-measurement-ingestion-00
Network Working Group D. O. Watts
Internet-Draft GoodShyt Group Inc.
Intended status: Informational 22 October 2026
Expires: 25 April 2027
MICA-NEX v0.3: Authenticated Measurement Ingestion for Model-Agnostic
Nano-Instrument Agent Swarms
draft-watts-mica-nex-measurement-ingestion-00
Abstract
This document describes a narrow, testable next step in the MICA-NEX
proposal: cryptographically binding nanoscale instrument measurement
claims to externally provisioned acquisition and calibration signer
roles while denying model planners the ability to self-certify
measurement status. The reference implementation uses Ed25519
signatures, SHA-256 content binding, typed units, time windows,
source-kind separation, and a persistent local replay ledger. In a
hardware-disconnected test harness, 60/60 signed synthetic test
records from three simulated instrument classes were admitted and
30/30 adversarial cases were rejected for the expected reason; 28/28
Python tests passed. No instrument, laboratory calibration, external
reviewer, clinical context or independent physical replication was
involved. Signature validity is deliberately distinguished from
scientific validity.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 April 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Watts Expires 25 April 2027 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft MICA-NEX Measurement Ingestion October 2026
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Research Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Architecture and Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Cryptographic and Epistemic Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Experiment EXP-02: Reproducible Synthetic Gate . . . . . . . 4
5. Falsifiability, Limitations, and Priority . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Next Mandatory Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Provenance and Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction and Research Question
The prior MICA-NEX v0.1 gate [MICANEX01] accepts only SIMULATED
records, so it cannot truthfully ingest MEASURED claims without a new
interface. This conflict was logged as EM-005 in EXP-01 v0.2. Our
question is whether one strictly typed, model-neutral acquisition-
ingestion contract can accept records across scanning-probe,
microfluidic-fluorescence and electrochemical categories while
rejecting spoofed measurement authority and preserving evidence
classification.
Do not confuse a signature authenticating a claim with a verified
physical measurement or traceable calibration. NIST defines
metrological traceability via a documented calibration chain
contributing to uncertainty [NIST-TRACEABILITY]. This implementation
checks a declaration and its file digest, not the validity of any
real-world calibration chain.
This Internet-Draft is a faithful conversion of the author's research
report "MICA-NEX v0.3: Authenticated Measurement Ingestion for Model-
Agnostic Nano-Instrument Agent Swarms -- A hardware-disconnected,
falsifiable software research experiment", Version 0.3, dated 20
October 2026. Mathematical notation and the table have been rendered
in plain text. It is published for discussion; it is not a standard.
Watts Expires 25 April 2027 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft MICA-NEX Measurement Ingestion October 2026
2. Architecture and Principle
The agent coordinator issues an unprivileged read-only request;
separate laboratory holders would sign acquisition and calibration
data outside the agent runtime. The central verifier binds the
signed claim to bytes and prescribed instrument semantics.
Untrusted planner -> deterministic policy
-> independent operator-record source
-> signed/typed ingestion -> evidence receipt
-> independent scientific review
No actuation path in this prototype; no AI-owned signing keys.
Three unit profiles are fixed: scanning-probe length in nm,
microfluidic concentration in nM, and electrochemical potential in V.
These units are illustrative for the narrow test, not a universal
dimensional ontology.
3. Cryptographic and Epistemic Checks
Let R be raw acquisition bytes, C be the calibration document, A the
signed acquisition claim, and K_A, K_C separately provisioned public
keys. Admission requires:
Verify_{K_A}(A, sigma_A) = 1
Verify_{K_C}(C_claim, sigma_C) = 1
SHA256(R) = A.raw_sha256
SHA256(C) = C_claim.evidence_sha256
unit(A) = unit(C_claim) = U_i
t_cal,start <= t_A <= t_cal,end
Ed25519 is specified by RFC 8032 [RFC8032]. The software uses
project-specific sorted-key JSON with restrictive value types,
labeled MICA-NEX-CJ/1. It does not claim RFC 8785 compliance
[RFC8785]; cross-language canonicalization is deferred. Duplicate
input JSON member keys are refused.
The post-signature state is one of:
* TEST_FIXTURE + TEST_RECORD =>
TEST_RECORD_AUTHENTICATED_NOT_PHYSICAL;
* INSTRUMENT_CAPTURE + MEASURED_CLAIM =>
AUTHENTICATED_CLAIM_PHYSICAL_VALIDATION_PENDING;
* all other source/evidence combinations are rejected.
Watts Expires 25 April 2027 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft MICA-NEX Measurement Ingestion October 2026
Neither positive case can establish independent physical validation.
The distinction resembles the separation between provenance
activities, agents, and entities in the W3C PROV model [W3C-PROV],
without claiming implementation of PROV-O.
4. Experiment EXP-02: Reproducible Synthetic Gate
Ephemeral Ed25519 keys are created by a test harness in memory and
never packaged as laboratory credentials. A deterministic trial
runner constructs 20 synthetic acquisition records per substrate plus
ten negative-control cases per substrate. It calls a model-neutral
policy coordinator and a common ingestion verifier. The test harness
does not access an actual microscope, optical sensor or potentiostat.
Units, hashes, state transitions, and SQLite replay protection are
exercised on synthetic bytes only.
+=====================+========+=======+================+
| Test class | Passed | Total | Interpretation |
+=====================+========+=======+================+
| Signed TEST_FIXTURE | 60 | 60 | Software mock |
| records admitted | | | only |
+---------------------+--------+-------+----------------+
| Adversarial cases | 30 | 30 | Synthetic |
| correctly rejected | | | negatives |
+---------------------+--------+-------+----------------+
| Local unit tests | 28 | 28 | Python |
| | | | unittest |
+---------------------+--------+-------+----------------+
| Physical equipment | 0 | 0 | NOT RUN |
| connections | | | |
+---------------------+--------+-------+----------------+
| Independent third- | 0 | 0 | NOT RUN |
| party reproductions | | | |
+---------------------+--------+-------+----------------+
Table 1: EXP-02 results
Negative scenarios include an agent-held forged key, false evidence-
state promotion, changed raw or calibration bytes, expired
calibration, inappropriate unit, stale record, forbidden physical
effect, replay, and undeclared fields. All accepted records were
labeled as test fixtures; no physical observation was synthesized
into a scientifically verified one.
Watts Expires 25 April 2027 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft MICA-NEX Measurement Ingestion October 2026
5. Falsifiability, Limitations, and Priority
Software falsifier: Show any unauthorized or altered record accepted
by exactly this frozen gate and verified test conditions, or a test
fixture classified as physically validated. Physical falsifier: When
actually acquiring from three distinct calibrated instruments, show
an irreducible schema/semantics change or a safety boundary failure
needed for one class. These are prospective experiments, not
completed results.
The current code does not isolate a verifier OS process or protect a
SQLite ledger from a privileged actor, provide HSM-backed keys or
revocation, audit calibration traceability, verify vendor instrument
identity, or enforce independent hardware interlocks. It does not
establish that its components are novel compared with existing
middleware, digital signatures, or provenance standards. There is no
clinical or nano-robotic test and no evidence of energy improvement.
Signed external review remains NOT RUN; the separate reviewer-
signature checker cannot establish social or procedural reviewer
independence.
6. Next Mandatory Gate
Freeze the v0.3 contract, obtain a separately authorized laboratory
and reviewer, pre-register independently produced expected results,
then collect signed records from genuinely calibrated, independently
operated scanning-probe, fluorescence and electrochemical measurement
instruments. Preserve original raw bytes, calibration chain,
reviewer-controlled key metadata, environment and signed replication
report. Test real-world precision, uncertainty, source
authentication, and instrument-operation safety independently of the
software gate.
Status: SOFTWARE SYNTHETIC PASS; PHYSICAL INTEROPERABILITY NOT RUN;
INDEPENDENT REPLICATION NOT RUN; FIRST-IN-WORLD NOVELTY NOT
ESTABLISHED.
7. Provenance and Disclosure
Project PI and attribution: Deonte O'dell Watts, ORCID
0009-0005-8586-3650, GoodShyt Group Inc. AI-assisted design,
implementation, literature checking and drafting; test authorship is
not independent. Attribution here is not a legal declaration of
inventorship or patent priority. Project concept first documented
October 19, 2026.
Watts Expires 25 April 2027 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft MICA-NEX Measurement Ingestion October 2026
8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
9. Security Considerations
A valid signature proves only control of a signing key and integrity
of the signed bytes under the stated trust assumptions; it does not
prove that a measurement is correct, calibrated, traceable or
physically valid. Implementations derived from this design need to
keep signing keys out of reach of planning agents and of any process
that can alter the trust store, the replay ledger or the trusted
clock, because any of these would let an agent self-certify
measurement status. The prototype's replay ledger is a local SQLite
file that a privileged actor can modify; it offers no HSM-backed key
custody and no key revocation. The project-specific canonical JSON
(MICA-NEX-CJ/1) is not RFC 8785; cross-implementation
canonicalization differences can cause verification failures or, if
handled loosely, signature confusion, which is why duplicate JSON
member names are rejected. The prototype has no actuation path; any
future connection to physical instruments requires independent
hardware interlocks and safety review outside the software gate.
10. Informative References
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.
[NIST-TRACEABILITY]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "NIST
Policy on Metrological Traceability", Undated policy page
consulted 2026-10-20,
<https://www.nist.gov/calibrations/traceability>.
[W3C-PROV] W3C Provenance Working Group, "PROV Model Primer", 2013,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/prov-primer/>.
Watts Expires 25 April 2027 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft MICA-NEX Measurement Ingestion October 2026
[MICANEX01]
Watts, D. O., "MICA-NEX v0.1: A Substrate-Agnostic,
Physically Governed Interface for Agentic Nanotechnology
Research", DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23488201, 2026,
<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23488201>.
Author's Address
Deonté O'dell Watts
GoodShyt Group Inc.
Email: deonte@goodshyt.fun
URI: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-8586-3650
Watts Expires 25 April 2027 [Page 7]