The Data Model of Network Infrastructure Device Data Plane Security Baseline
draft-xia-sacm-nid-dp-security-baseline-00

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Network Working Group                                             L. Xia
Internet-Draft                                                  G. Zheng
Intended status: Standards Track                                  Huawei
Expires: March 11, 2018                               September 07, 2017

  The Data Model of Network Infrastructure Device Data Plane Security
                                Baseline
               draft-xia-sacm-nid-dp-security-baseline-00

Abstract

   The following contents propose part of the security baseline YANG
   output for network infrastructure device: data plane security
   baseline.  The companion documents [I-D.ietf- dong-sacm-nid-cp-
   security-baseline], [I-D.ietf-lin-sacm-nid-mp-security-baseline], [I-
   D.ietf-xia-sacm-nid-app-infr-layers-security-baseline] cover other
   parts of the security baseline YANG output for network infrastructure
   device respectively: control plane security baseline, management
   plane security baseline, application layer and infrastructure layer
   security baseline.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 11, 2018.

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Xia & Zheng              Expires March 11, 2018                 [Page 1]
Internet-DraftNetwork Infrastructure Device Data Plane SecSeptember 2017

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Security Baseline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Security Baseline Data Model Design . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.4.  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Key Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Tree Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Data Model Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Layer 2 protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  ARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  URPF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.4.  DHCP Snooping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.5.  Control Plane Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     4.6.  Data Plane Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     4.7.  TCP/IP Attack Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   5.  Network Infrastructure Device Security Baseline Yang Module .  35
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Objective

   Network security is an integral part of the overall network
   deployment and operation.  Due to some basic reasons, network
   infrastructure devices (e.g. switches, routers, firewalls) are always
   the objectives or exploited by the network attackers to bring damages
   to the victim network:

   o  the existence of a lot of unsafe access channels: for the history
      reason, some old and unsafe protocols still run in the routers,
      like: SNMP v1/v2, Telnet, etc, and are not mandatory to be
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