Anonymous Rate-Limited Credentials
draft-yun-cfrg-arc-00
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Cathie Yun , Christopher A. Wood | ||
| Last updated | 2025-02-05 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-yun-cfrg-arc-00
Network Working Group C. Yun
Internet-Draft C. A. Wood
Intended status: Informational Apple, Inc.
Expires: 9 August 2025 5 February 2025
Anonymous Rate-Limited Credentials
draft-yun-cfrg-arc-00
Abstract
This document specifies the Anonymous Rate-Limited Credential (ARC)
protocol, a specialization of keyed-verification anonymous
credentials with support for rate limiting. ARC credentials can be
presented from client to server up to some fixed number of times,
where each presentation is cryptographically bound to client secrets
and application-specific public information, such that each
presentation is unlinkable from the others as well as the original
credential creation. ARC is useful in applications where a server
needs to throttle or rate-limit access from anonymous clients.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://chris-
wood.github.io/draft-arc/draft-yun-cfrg-arc.html. Status information
for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/
draft-yun-cfrg-arc/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Crypto Forum mailing
list (mailto:cfrg@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cfrg. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/chris-wood/draft-arc.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 August 2025.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Notation and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Prime-Order Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. ARC Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.1. Credential Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2.2. Credential Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2.3. Finalize Credential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3.1. Presentation State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3.2. Presentation Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3.3. Presentation Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. Zero-Knowledge Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. Schnorr Compiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1.1. Prover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1.2. Verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2. CredentialRequest Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2.1. CredentialRequest Proof Creation . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2.2. CredentialRequest Proof Verification . . . . . . . . 26
5.3. CredentialResponse Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.3.1. CredentialResponse Proof Creation . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.3.2. CredentialResponse Proof Verification . . . . . . . . 30
5.4. Presentation Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.4.1. Presentation Proof Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.4.2. Presentation Proof Verification . . . . . . . . . . . 34
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6. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.1. ARC(P-384) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.2. Random Scalar Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.2.1. Rejection Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.2.2. Random Number Generation Using Extra Random Bits . . 37
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.1. Credential Issuance Unlinkability . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.2. Presentation Unlinkability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.3. Timing Leaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8. Alternatives considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
10. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
10.1. ARCV1-P384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1. Introduction
This document specifies the Anonymous Rate-Limited Credential (ARC)
protocol, a specialization of keyed-verification anonymous
credentials with support for rate limiting.
ARC is privately verifiable (keyed-verification), yet differs from
similar token-based protocols in that each credential can be
presented multiple times without violating unlinkability of different
presentations. Servers issue credentials to clients that are
cryptographically bound to client secrets and some public
information. Afterwards, clients can present this credential to the
server up to some fixed number of times, where each presentation
provides proof that it was derived from a valid (previously issued)
credential and bound to some public information. Each presentation
is pairwise unlinkable, meaning the server cannot link any two
presentations to the same client credential, nor can the server link
a presentation to the preceding credential issuance flow. Notably,
the maximum number of presentations from a credential is fixed by the
application.
ARC is useful in settings where applications require a fixed number
of zero-knowledge proofs about client secrets that can also be
cryptographically bound to some public information. This capability
lets servers use credentials in applications that need throttled or
rate-limited access from anonymous clients.
2. Conventions and Definitions
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2.1. Notation and Terminology
The following functions and notation are used throughout the
document.
* concat(x0, ..., xN): Concatenation of byte strings. For example,
concat(0x01, 0x0203, 0x040506) = 0x010203040506.
* bytes_to_int and int_to_bytes: Convert a byte string to and from a
non-negative integer. bytes_to_int and int_to_bytes are
implemented as OS2IP and I2OSP as described in [RFC8017],
respectively. Note that these functions operate on byte strings
in big-endian byte order.
* random_integer_uniform(M, N): Generate a random, uniformly
distributed integer R between M inclusive and N exclusive, i.e., M
<= R < N.
* random_integer_uniform_excluding_set(M, N, S): Generate a random,
uniformly distributed integer R between M inclusive and N
exclusive, i.e., M <= R < N, such that R does not exist in the set
of integers S.
All algorithms and procedures described in this document are laid out
in a Python-like pseudocode. Each function takes a set of inputs and
parameters and produces a set of output values. Parameters become
constant values once the protocol variant and the ciphersuite are
fixed.
The notation T U[N] refers to an array called U containing N items of
type T. The type opaque means one single byte of uninterpreted data.
Items of the array are zero-indexed and referred as U[j] such that 0
<= j < N. The notation {T} refers to a set consisting of elements of
type T. For any object x, we write len(x) to denote its length in
bytes.
String values such as "CredentialRequest", "CredentialResponse",
"Presentation", and "Tag" are ASCII string literals.
The following terms are used throughout this document.
* Client: Protocol initiator. Creates a credential request, and
uses the corresponding server response to make a credential. The
client can make multiple presentations of this credential.
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* Server: Computes a response to a credential request, with its
server private keys. Later the server can verify the client's
presentations with its private keys. Learns nothing about the
client's secret attributes, and cannot link a client's request/
response and presentation steps.
3. Preliminaries
The construction in this document has one primary dependency:
* Group: A prime-order group implementing the API described below in
Section 3.1. See Section 6 for specific instances of groups.
3.1. Prime-Order Group
In this document, we assume the construction of an additive, prime-
order group Group for performing all mathematical operations. In
prime-order groups, any element (other than the identity) can
generate the other elements of the group. Usually, one element is
fixed and defined as the group generator. In the ARC setting, there
are two fixed generator elements (generatorG, generatorH). Such
groups are uniquely determined by the choice of the prime p that
defines the order of the group. (There may, however, exist different
representations of the group for a single p. Section 6 lists
specific groups which indicate both order and representation.)
The fundamental group operation is addition + with identity element
I. For any elements A and B of the group, A + B = B + A is also a
member of the group. Also, for any A in the group, there exists an
element -A such that A + (-A) = (-A) + A = I. Scalar multiplication
by r is equivalent to the repeated application of the group operation
on an element A with itself r-1 times, this is denoted as r*A = A +
... + A. For any element A, p*A=I. The case when the scalar
multiplication is performed on the group generator is denoted as
ScalarMultGen(r). Given two elements A and B, the discrete logarithm
problem is to find an integer k such that B = k*A. Thus, k is the
discrete logarithm of B with respect to the base A. The set of
scalars corresponds to GF(p), a prime field of order p, and are
represented as the set of integers defined by {0, 1, ..., p-1}. This
document uses types Element and Scalar to denote elements of the
group and its set of scalars, respectively.
We now detail a number of member functions that can be invoked on a
prime-order group.
* Order(): Outputs the order of the group (i.e. p).
* Identity(): Outputs the identity element of the group (i.e. I).
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* Generator(): Outputs the fixed generator of the group.
* HashToGroup(x, info): Deterministically maps an array of bytes x
with domain separation value info to an element of Group. The map
must ensure that, for any adversary receiving R = HashToGroup(x,
info), it is computationally difficult to reverse the mapping.
Security properties of this function are described in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
* HashToScalar(x, info): Deterministically maps an array of bytes x
with domain separation value info to an element in GF(p).
Security properties of this function are described in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve], Section 10.5.
* RandomScalar(): Chooses at random a non-zero element in GF(p).
* ScalarInverse(s): Returns the inverse of input Scalar s on GF(p).
* SerializeElement(A): Maps an Element A to a canonical byte array
buf of fixed length Ne.
* DeserializeElement(buf): Attempts to map a byte array buf to an
Element A, and fails if the input is not the valid canonical byte
representation of an element of the group. This function can
raise a DeserializeError if deserialization fails or A is the
identity element of the group; see Section 6 for group-specific
input validation steps.
* SerializeScalar(s): Maps a Scalar s to a canonical byte array buf
of fixed length Ns.
* DeserializeScalar(buf): Attempts to map a byte array buf to a
Scalar s. This function can raise a DeserializeError if
deserialization fails; see Section 6 for group-specific input
validation steps.
For each group, there exists two distinct generators, generatorG and
generatorH, generatorG = G.Generator() and generatorH =
G.HashToGroup(G.SerializeElement(generatorG), "generatorH"). The
group member functions GeneratorG() and GeneratorH() are shorthand
for returning generatorG and generatorH, respectively.
Section 6 contains details for the implementation of this interface
for different prime-order groups instantiated over elliptic curves.
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4. ARC Protocol
The ARC protocol is a two-party protocol run between client and
server consisting of three distinct phases:
1. Key generation. In this phase, the server generates its private
and public keys to be used for the remaining phases. This phase
is described in Section 4.1.
2. Credential issuance. In this phase, the client and server
interact to issue the client a credential that is
cryptographically bound to client secrets. This phase is
described in Section 4.2.
3. Presentation. In this phase, the client uses the credential to
create a "presentation" to the server, where the server learns
nothing more than whether or not the presentation is valid and
corresponds to some previously issued credential, without
learning which credential it corresponds to. This phase is
described in Section 4.3.
This protocol bears resemblance to anonymous token protocols, such as
those built on Blind RSA [BLIND-RSA] and Oblivious Pseudorandom
Functions [OPRFS] with one critical distinction: unlike anonymous
tokens, an anonymous credential can be used multiple times to create
unlinkable presentations (up to the fixed presentation limit). This
means that a single issuance invocation can drive multiple
presentation invocations, whereas with anonymous tokens, each
presentation invocation requires exactly one issuance invocation. As
a result, credentials are generally longer lived than tokens.
Applications configure the credential presentation limit after the
credential is issued such that client and server agree on the limit
during presentation. Servers are responsible for ensuring this limit
is not exceeded. Clients that exceed the agreed-upon presentation
limit break the unlinkability guarantees provided by the protocol.
The rest of this section describes the three phases of the ARC
protocol.
4.1. Key Generation
In the key generation phase, the server generates its private and
public keys, denoted ServerPrivateKey and ServerPublicKey, as
follows.
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Input: None
Output:
- ServerPrivateKey:
- x0: Scalar
- x1: Scalar
- x2: Scalar
- x0Blinding: Scalar
- ServerPublicKey:
- X0: Element
- X1: Element
- X2: Element
Parameters
- Group G
def SetupServer():
x0 = G.RandomScalar()
x1 = G.RandomScalar()
x2 = G.RandomScalar()
x0Blinding = G.RandomScalar()
X0 = x0 * G.GeneratorG() + x0Blinding * G.GeneratorH()
X1 = x1 * G.GeneratorH()
X2 = x2 * G.GeneratorH()
return ServerPrivateKey(x0, x1, x2, x0Blinding), ServerPublicKey(X0, X1, X2)
The server public keys can be serialized as follows:
struct {
uint8 X0[Ne]; // G.SerializeElement(X0)
uint8 X1[Ne]; // G.SerializeElement(X1)
uint8 X2[Ne]; // G.SerializeElement(X2)
} ServerPublicKey;
The length of this encoded response structure is NserverPublicKey =
3*Ne.
4.2. Issuance
The purpose of the issuance phase is for the client and server to
cooperatively compute a credential that is cryptographically bound to
the client's secrets. Clients do not choose these secrets; they are
computed by the protocol.
The issuance phase of the protocol requires clients to know the
server public key a priori, as well as an arbitrary, application-
specific request context. It requires no other input. It consists
of three distinct steps:
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1. The client generates and sends a credential request to the
server. This credential request contains a proof that the
request is valid with respect to the client's secrets and request
context. See Section 4.2.1 for details about this step.
2. The server validates the credential request. If valid, it
computes a credential response with the server private keys. The
response includes a proof that the credential response is valid
with respect to the server keys. The server sends the response
to the client. See Section 4.2.2 for details about this step.
3. The client finalizes the credential by processing the server
response. If valid, this step yields a credential that can then
be used in the presentation phase of the protocol. See
Section 4.2.3 for details about this step.
Each of these steps are described in the following subsections.
4.2.1. Credential Request
Given a request context, the process for creating a credential
request is as follows:
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(clientSecrets, request) = CredentialRequest(requestContext)
Inputs:
- requestContext: Data, context for the credential request
Outputs:
- request:
- m1Enc: Element, first encrypted secret.
- m2Enc: Element, second encrypted secret.
- requestProof: ZKProof, a proof of correct generation of m1Enc and m2Enc.
- clientSecrets:
- m1: Scalar, first secret.
- m2: Scalar, second secret.
- r1: Scalar, blinding factor for first secret.
- r2: Scalar, blinding factor for second secret.
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
def CredentialRequest(requestContext):
m1 = G.RandomScalar()
m2 = G.HashToScalar(requestContext, "requestContext")
r1 = G.RandomScalar()
r2 = G.RandomScalar()
m1Enc = m1 * generatorG + r1 * generatorH
m2Enc = m2 * generatorG + r2 * generatorH
requestProof = MakeCredentialRequestProof(m1, m2, r1, r2, m1Enc, m2Enc)
request = (m1Enc, m2Enc, requestProof)
clientSecrets = (m1, m2, r1, r2)
return (clientSecrets, request)
See Section 5.2 for more details on the generation of the credential
request proof.
The resulting request can be serialized as follows.
struct {
uint8 m1Enc[Ne];
uint8 m2Enc[Ne];
uint8 challenge[Ns];
uint8 response0[Ns];
uint8 response1[Ns];
uint8 response2[Ns];
uint8 response3[Ns];
} CredentialRequest;
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The length of this encoded request structure is Nrequest = 2*Ne +
5*Ns.
4.2.2. Credential Response
Given a credential request and server public and private keys, the
process for creating a credential response is as follows.
response = CredentialResponse(serverPrivateKey, serverPublicKey, request)
Inputs:
- serverPrivateKey:
- x0: Scalar (private), server private key 0.
- x1: Scalar (private), server private key 1.
- x2: Scalar (private), server private key 2.
- x0Blinding: Scalar (private), blinding value for x0.
- serverPublicKey:
- X0: Element, server public key 0.
- X1: Element, server public key 1.
- X2: Element, server public key 2.
- request:
- m1Enc: Element, first encrypted secret.
- m2Enc: Element, second encrypted secret.
- requestProof: ZKProof, a proof of correct generation of m1Enc and m2Enc.
Outputs:
- U: Element, a randomized generator for the response, `b*G`.
- encUPrime: Element, encrypted UPrime.
- X0Aux: Element, auxiliary point for X0.
- X1Aux: Element, auxiliary point for X1.
- X2Aux: Element, auxiliary point for X2.
- HAux: Element, auxiliary point for generatorH.
- responseProof: ZKProof, a proof of correct generation of
U, encUPrime, server public keys, and auxiliary points.
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
Exceptions:
- VerifyError, raised when response verification fails
def CredentialResponse(serverPrivateKeys, serverPublicKey, request):
if VerifyCredentialRequestProof(request) == false:
raise VerifyError
b = G.RandomScalar()
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U = b * generatorG
encUPrime = b * (serverPublicKey.X0 +
serverPrivateKeys.x1 * request.m1Enc +
serverPrivateKeys.x2 * request.m2Enc)
X0Aux = b * serverPrivateKeys.x0Blinding * generatorH
X1Aux = b * serverPublicKey.X1
X2Aux = b * serverPublicKey.X2
HAux = b * generatorH
responseProof = MakeCredentialResponseProof(serverPrivateKey,
serverPublicKey, request, b, U, encUPrime, X0Aux, X1Aux, X2Aux, HAux)
return (U, encUPrime, X0Aux, X1Aux, X2Aux, HAux, responseProof)
The resulting response can be serialized as follows. See Section 5.3
for more details on the generation of the credential response proof.
struct {
uint8 U[Ne];
uint8 encUPrime[Ne];
uint8 X0Aux[Ne];
uint8 X1Aux[Ne];
uint8 X2Aux[Ne];
uint8 HAux[Ne];
uint8 challenge[Ns];
uint8 response0[Ns];
uint8 response1[Ns];
uint8 response2[Ns];
uint8 response3[Ns];
uint8 response4[Ns];
uint8 response5[Ns];
uint8 response6[Ns];
}
The length of this encoded response structure is Nresponse = 6*Ne +
8*Ns.
4.2.3. Finalize Credential
Given a credential request and response, server public keys, and the
client secrets produced when creating a credential request, the
process for finalizing the issuance flow and creating a credential is
as follows.
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credential = FinalizeCredential(clientSecrets, serverPublicKey, request, response)
Inputs:
- clientSecrets:
- m1: Scalar, first secret.
- m2: Scalar, second secret.
- r1: Scalar, blinding factor for first secret.
- r2: Scalar, blinding factor for second secret.
- serverPublicKey: ServerPublicKey, shared with the client out-of-band
- request:
- m1Enc: Element, first encrypted secret.
- m2Enc: Element, second encrypted secret.
- requestProof: ZKProof, a proof of correct generation of m1Enc and m2Enc.
- response:
- U: Element, a randomized generator for the response. `b*G`.
- encUPrime: Element, encrypted UPrime.
- X0Aux: Element, auxiliary point for X0.
- X1Aux: Element, auxiliary point for X1.
- X2Aux: Element, auxiliary point for X2.
- HAux: Element, auxiliary point for generatorH.
- responseProof: ZKProof, a proof of correct generation of U, encUPrime, server public keys, and auxiliary points.
Outputs:
- credential:
- m1: Scalar, client's first secret.
- U: Element, a randomized generator for the response. `b*G`.
- UPrime: Element, the MAC over the server's private keys and the client's secret secrets.
- X1: Element, server public key 1.
Exceptions:
- VerifyError, raised when response verification fails
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
def FinalizeCredential(clientSecrets, serverPublicKey, request, response):
if VerifyCredentialResponseProof(serverPublicKey, response, request) == false:
raise VerifyError
UPrime = response.encUPrime - response.X0Aux - clientSecrets.r1 * response.X1Aux - clientSecrets.r2 * response.X2Aux
return (clientSecrets.m1, response.U, UPrime, serverPublicKey.X1)
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4.3. Presentation
The purpose of the presentation phase is for the client to create a
"presentation" to the server which can be verified using the server
private key. This phase is non-interactive, i.e., there is no state
stored between client and server in order to produce and then verify
a presentation. Client and server agree upon a fixed limit of
presentations in order to create and verify presentations;
presentations will not verify correctly if the client and server use
different limits.
This phase consists of three steps:
1. The client creates a presentation state for a given presentation
context and presentation limit. This state is used to produce a
fixed amount of presentations.
2. The client creates a presentation from the presentation state and
sends it to the server. The presentation is cryptographically
bound to the state's presentation context, and contains proof
that the presentation is valid with respect to the presentation
context. Moreover, the presentation contains proof that the
nonce (an integer) associated with this presentation is within
the presentation limit.
3. The server verifies the presentation with respect to the
presentation context and presentation limit.
Details for each each of these steps are in the following
subsections.
4.3.1. Presentation State
Presentation state is used to track the number of presentations for a
given credential. This state is important for ARC's unlinkability
goals: reuse of state can break unlinkability properties of
credential presentations. State is initialized with a credential,
presentation context, and presentation limit. It is then mutated
after each presentation construction (as described in Section 4.3.2).
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state = MakePresentationState(credential, presentationContext, presentationLimit)
Inputs:
- credential:
- m1: Scalar, client's first secret.
- U: Element, a randomized generator for the response `b*G`.
- UPrime: Element, the MAC over the server's private keys and the client's secrets.
- X1: Element, server public key 1.
- presentationContext: Data (public), used for presentation tag computation.
- presentationLimit: Integer, the fixed presentation limit.
Outputs:
- credential
- presentationContext: Data (public), used for presentation tag computation.
- presentationNonceSet: {Integer}, the set of nonces that have been used for this presentation
- presentationLimit: Integer, the fixed presentation limit.
def MakePresentationState(credential, presentationContext, presentationLimit):
nonce = random_integer_uniform(0, presentationLimit)
return PresentationState(credential, presentationContext, [nonce], presentationLimit)
4.3.2. Presentation Construction
Creating a presentation requires a credential, presentation context,
and presentation limit. This process is necessarily stateful on the
client since the number of times a credential is used for a given
presentation context cannot exceed the presentation limit; doing so
would break presentation unlinkability, as two presentations created
with the same nonce can be directly compared for equality (via the
"tag"). As a result, the process for creating a presentation accepts
as input a presentation state and then outputs an updated
presentation state.
newState, nonce, presentation = Present(state)
Inputs:
state: input PresentationState
- credential
- presentationContext: Data (public), used for presentation tag computation.
- presentationNonceSet: {Integer}, the set of nonces that have been used for this presentation
- presentationLimit: Integer, the fixed presentation limit.
Outputs:
- newState: updated PresentationState
- nonce: Integer, the nonce associated with this presentation.
- presentation:
- U: Element, re-randomized from the U in the response.
- UPrimeCommit: Element, a public key to the issued UPrime.
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- m1Commit: Element, a public key to the client secret (m1).
- tag: Element, the tag element used for enforcing the presentation limit.
- presentationProof: ZKProof, a proof of correct generation of the presentation.
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
Exceptions:
- LimitExceededError, raised when the presentation count meets or exceeds the presentation limit for the given presentation context
def Present(state):
if len(state.presentationNonceSet) >= state.presentationLimit:
raise LimitExceededError
a = G.RandomScalar()
r = G.RandomScalar()
z = G.RandomScalar()
U = a * state.credential.U
UPrime = a * state.credential.UPrime
UPrimeCommit = UPrime + r * generatorG
m1Commit = state.credential.m1 * U + z * generatorH
# This step mutates the state by keeping track of
# what nonces have already been spent.
nonce = random_integer_uniform_excluding_set(0,
state.presentationLimit, state.presentationNonceSet)
state.presentationNonceSet.add(nonce)
generatorT = G.HashToGroup(presentationContext, "Tag")
tag = (credential.m1 + nonce)^(-1) * generatorT
V = z * credential.X1 - r * generatorG
m1Tag = state.credential.m1 * tag
presentationProof = MakePresentationProof(U, UPrimeCommit, m1Commit, tag, generatorT, credential, V, r, z, nonce, m1Tag)
presentation = (U, UPrimeCommit, m1Commit, tag, presentationProof)
return state, nonce, presentation
[[OPEN ISSUE: should the tag also fold in the presentation limit?]]
The resulting presentation can be serialized as follows. See
Section 5.4 for more details on the generation of the presentation
proof.
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struct {
uint8 U[Ne];
uint8 UPrimeCommit[Ne];
uint8 m1Commit[Ne];
uint8 tag[Ne];
uint8 challenge[Ns];
uint8 response0[Ns];
uint8 response1[Ns];
uint8 response2[Ns];
uint8 response3[Ns];
uint8 response4[Ns];
}
The length of this structure is Npresentation = 4*Ne + 6*Ns.
4.3.3. Presentation Verification
The server processes the presentation by verifying the presentation
proof against server-computed values, and performing a check that the
presentation conforms to the presentation limit.
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validity = VerifyPresentation(serverPrivateKey, serverPublicKey, requestContext, presentationContext, nonce, presentation, presentationLimit)
Inputs:
- serverPrivateKey:
- x0: Scalar (private), server private key 0.
- x1: Scalar (private), server private key 1.
- x2: Scalar (private), server private key 2.
- x0Blinding: Scalar (private), blinding value for x0.
- serverPublicKey:
- X0: Element, server public key 0.
- X1: Element, server public key 1.
- X2: Element, server public key 2.
- requestContext: Data, context for the credential request.
- presentationContext: Data (public), used for presentation tag computation.
- nonce: Integer, the nonce associated with this presentation.
- presentation:
- U: Element, re-randomized from the U in the response.
- UPrimeCommit: Element, a public key to the issued UPrime.
- m1Commit: Element, a public key to the client secret (m1).
- nonce: Integer, the nonce associated with this presentation.
- tag: Element, the tag element used for enforcing the presentation limit.
- presentationProof: ZKProof, a proof of correct generation of the presentation.
- presentationLimit: Integer, the fixed presentation limit.
Outputs:
- validity: Boolean, True if the presentation is valid, False otherwise.
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
Exceptions:
- InvalidNonceError, raised when the nonce associated with the presentation is invalid
def VerifyPresentation(serverPrivateKey, serverPublicKey, requestContext, presentationContext, nonce, presentation, presentationLimit):
if nonce < 0 or nonce > presentationLimit:
raise InvalidNonceError
generatorT = G.HashToGroup(presentationContext, "Tag")
m1Tag = generatorT - (nonce * presentation.tag)
validity = VerifyPresentationProof(serverPrivateKey, serverPublicKey, requestContext, presentationContext, presentation, m1Tag)
# Implementation-specific step: perform double-spending check on tag.
# Implementation-specific step: store tag for future double-spending check.
return validity
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Implementation-specific steps: the server must perform a check that
the tag (presentation.tag) has not previously been seen, to prevent
double spending. It then stores the tag for use in future double
spending checks. To reduce the overhead of performing double spend
checks, the server can store and look up the tags corresponding to
the associated requestContext and presentationContext values.
5. Zero-Knowledge Proofs
This section describes a Schnorr proof compiler that is used for the
construction of other proofs needed throughout the ARC protocol.
Section 5.1 describes the compiler, and the remaining sections
describe how it is used for the purposes of producing ARC proofs.
5.1. Schnorr Compiler
The compiler specified in this section automates the Fiat-Shamir
transform that is often used to transform interactive zero-knowledge
proofs into non-interactive proofs such that they can be used to non-
interactively prove various statements of importance in higher-level
protocols, such as ARC. The compiler consists of a prover and
verifier role. The prover constructs a transcript for the proof and
then applies the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to generate the resulting
challenge and response values. The verifier reconstructs the same
transcript to verify the proof.
The prover and verifier roles are specified below in Section 5.1.1
and Section 5.1.2, respectively.
5.1.1. Prover
The prover role consists of four functions:
* AppendScalar: This function adds a scalar representation to the
transcript.
* AppendElement: This function adds an element representation to the
transcript.
* Constrain: This function applies an explicit constraint to the
proof, where the constraint is expressed as equality between some
element and a linear combination of scalar and element
representations. An example constraint might be Z = aX + bY, for
scalars a, b, and elements X, Y, Z.
* Prove: This function applies the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to the
protocol transcript and set of constraints to produce a zero-
knowledge proof that can be verified.
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These functions are defined in the following sub-sections.
In addition, the prover role consists of the following state:
* label: Data, a value representing the context in which the proof
will be used
* scalars: [Integer], An ordered set of representation of scalar
variables to use in the proof. Each scalar has a label associated
with it, stored in a list called scalar_labels.
* elements: [Integer], An ordered set of representation of element
variables to use in the proof. Each element has a label
associated with it, stored in a list called element_labels.
* constraints: a set of constraints, where each constraint consists
of a constraint element and a linear combination of variables.
5.1.1.1. AppendScalar
AppendScalar(label, assignment)
Inputs:
- label: Data, Scalar variable label
- assignment: Scalar variable
Outputs:
- Integer: Integer representation of the new scalar variable
def AppendScalar(label, assignment):
state.scalars.append(assignment)
state.scalar_labels.append(label)
return len(state.scalars) - 1
5.1.1.2. AppendElement
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AppendElement(label, assignment)
Inputs:
- label: Data, Element variable label
- assignment: Element variable
Outputs:
- Integer: Integer representation of the new element variable
def AppendElement(label, assignment):
state.elements.append(assignment)
state.element_labels.append(label)
return len(state.elements) - 1
5.1.1.3. Constrain
Constrain(result, linearCombination)
Inputs:
- result: Integer, representation of constraint element
- assignment: linear combination of scalar and element variable (representations)
def Constrain(label, linearCombination):
state.constraints.append((result, linearCombination))
5.1.1.4. Prove
The Prove function is defined below.
Prove()
Outputs:
- ZKProof, a proof consisting of a challenge Scalar and then fixed number of response Scalar values
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
Exceptions:
- InvalidVariableAllocationError, raised when the prover was incorrectly configured
def Prove():
blindings = [G.RandomScalar() for i in range(len(state.scalars))]
blinded_elements = []
for (constraint_point, linear_combination) in state.constraints:
if constraint_point.index > len(state.elements):
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raise InvalidVariableAllocationError
for (scalar_var, element_var) in linear_combination:
if scalar_var.index > len(state.scalars):
raise InvalidVariableAllocationError
if element_var.index > len(state.elements):
raise InvalidVariableAllocationError
scalar_index = linear_combination[0][0]
element_index = linear_combination[0][1]
blinded_element = blindings[scalar_index] * state.elements[element_index]
for i, pair in enumerate(linear_combination):
if i > 0:
scalar_index = pair[0]
element_index = pair[1]
blinded_element += blindings[scalar_index] * state.elements[element_index]
blinded_elements.append(blinded_element)
# Obtain a scalar challenge
challenge = ComposeChallenge(state.label, state.elements, blinded_elements)
# Compute response scalars from the challenge, scalars, and blindings.
responses = []
for (index, scalar) in enumerate(state.scalars):
blinding = blindings[index]
responses.append(blinding - challenge * scalar)
return ZKProof(challenge, responses)
The function ComposeChallenge is defined below.
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ComposeChallenge(label, elements, blinded_elements)
Inputs:
- label: Data, the proof label
- elements: [Element], ordered list of elements
- blinded_elements: [Element], ordered list of blinded elements
Outputs:
- challenge, Scalar
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
def ComposeChallenge(label, elements, blinded_elements):
challenge_input = Data() # Empty Data
for element in elements:
serialized_element = G.SerializeElement(element)
challenge_input += I2OSP(len(serialized_element), 2) + serialized_element
for blinded_element in blinded_elements:
serialized_blinded_element = G.SerializeElement(blinded_element)
challenge_input += I2OSP(len(serialized_blinded_element), 2) + serialized_blinded_element
return G.HashToScalar(challenge_input, label)
5.1.2. Verifier
The verifier role consists of four functions:
* AppendScalar: This function adds a scalar representation to the
transcript.
* AppendElement: This function adds an element representation to the
transcript.
* Constrain: This function applies an explicit constraint to the
proof, where the constraint is expressed as equality between some
element and a linear combination of scalar and element
representations. An example constraint might be Z = aX + bY, for
scalars a, b, and elements X, Y, Z.
* Verify: This function applies the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to verify
the zero-knowledge proof.
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AppendScalar and Verify are defined in the following sub-sections.
AppendElement and Constrain matches the functionality used in the
prover role.
5.1.2.1. AppendScalar
AppendScalar(label)
Inputs:
- label: Data, Scalar variable label
Outputs:
- Integer: Integer representation of the new scalar variable
def AppendScalar(label):
state.scalar_labels.append(label)
return len(state.scalar_labels) - 1
5.1.2.2. Verify
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Verify(proof)
Inputs:
- ZKProof, a proof consisting of a challenge Scalar and then fixed number of response Scalar values
Outputs:
- Boolean, True if the proof is valid, False otherwise.
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
Exceptions:
- InvalidVariableAllocationError, raised when the prover was incorrectly configured
def Verify(proof):
if len(state.elements) != len(state.element_labels):
raise InvalidVariableAllocationError
blinded_elements = []
for (constraint_element, linear_combination) in state.constraints:
if constraint_element > len(state.elements):
raise InvalidVariableAllocationError
for (_, element_var) in linear_combination:
if element_var > len(state.elements):
raise InvalidVariableAllocationError
challenge_element = proof.challenge * state.elements[constraint_element]
for i, pair in enumerate(linear_combination):
challenge_element += proof.responses[pair[0]] * state.elements[pair[1]]
blinded_elements.append(challenge_element)
challenge = ComposeChallenge(state.label, self.elements, blinded_elements)
return challenge == proof.challenge
5.2. CredentialRequest Proof
The request proof is a proof of knowledge of (m1, m2, r1, r2) used to
generate the encrypted request. Statements to prove:
1. m1Enc = m1 * generatorG + r1 * generatorH
2. m2Enc = m2 * generatorG + r2 * generatorH
5.2.1. CredentialRequest Proof Creation
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requestProof = MakeCredentialRequestProof(m1, m2, r1, r2, m1Enc, m2Enc)
Inputs:
- m1: Scalar, first secret.
- m2: Scalar, second secret.
- r1: Scalar, blinding factor for first secret.
- r2: Scalar, blinding factor for second secret.
- m1Enc: Element, first encrypted secret.
- m2Enc: Element, second encrypted secret.
Outputs:
- proof: ZKProof
- challenge: Scalar, the challenge used in the proof of valid encryption.
- response0: Scalar, the response corresponding to m1.
- response1: Scalar, the response corresponding to m2.
- response2: Scalar, the response corresponding to r1.
- response3: Scalar, the response corresponding to r2.
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
- contextString: public input
def MakeCredentialRequestProof(m1, m2, r1, r2, m1Enc, m2Enc):
prover = Prover(contextString + "CredentialRequest")
m1Var = prover.AppendScalar("m1", m1)
m2Var = prover.AppendScalar("m2", m2)
r1Var = prover.AppendScalar("r1", r1)
r2Var = prover.AppendScalar("r2", r2)
genGVar = prover.AppendElement("genG", generatorG)
genHVar = prover.AppendElement("genH", generatorH)
m1EncVar = prover.AppendElement("m1Enc", m1Enc)
m2EncVar = prover.AppendElement("m2Enc", m2Enc)
# 1. m1Enc = m1 * generatorG + r1 * generatorH
prover.Constrain(m1EncVar, [(m1Var, genGVar), (r1Var, genHVar)])
# 2. m2Enc = m2 * generatorG + r2 * generatorH
prover.Constrain(m2EncVar, [(m2Var, genGVar), (r2Var, genHVar)])
return prover.Prove()
5.2.2. CredentialRequest Proof Verification
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validity = VerifyCredentialRequestProof(request)
Inputs:
- request:
- m1Enc: Element, first encrypted secret.
- m2Enc: Element, second encrypted secret.
- requestProof: ZKProof, a proof of correct generation of m1Enc and m2Enc.
- challenge: Scalar, the challenge used in the proof of valid encryption.
- response0: Scalar, the response corresponding to m1.
- response1: Scalar, the response corresponding to m2.
- response2: Scalar, the response corresponding to r1.
- response3: Scalar, the response corresponding to r2.
Outputs:
- validity: Boolean, True if the proof verifies correctly, False otherwise.
Parameters:
- G: group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
- contextString: public input
def VerifyCredentialRequestProof(request):
verifier = Verifier(contextString + "CredentialRequest")
m1Var = verifier.AppendScalar("m1")
m2Var = verifier.AppendScalar("m2")
r1Var = verifier.AppendScalar("r1")
r2Var = verifier.AppendScalar("r2")
genGVar = verifier.AppendElement("genG", generatorG)
genHVar = verifier.AppendElement("genH", generatorH)
m1EncVar = verifier.AppendElement("m1Enc", request.m1Enc)
m2EncVar = verifier.AppendElement("m2Enc", request.m2Enc)
# 1. m1Enc = m1 * generatorG + r1 * generatorH
verifier.Constrain(m1EncVar, [(m1Var, genGVar), (r1Var, genHVar)])
# 2. m2Enc = m2 * generatorG + r2 * generatorH
verifier.Constrain(m2EncVar, [(m2Var, genGVar), (r2Var, genHVar)])
return verifier.Verify(request.proof)
5.3. CredentialResponse Proof
The response proof is a proof of knowledge of (x0, x1, x2,
x0Blinding, b) used in the server's CredentialResponse for the
client's CredentialRequest. Statements to prove:
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1. X0 = x0 * generatorG + x0Blinding * generatorH
2. X1 = x1 * generatorH
3. X2 = x2 * generatorH
4. X0Aux = b * x0Blinding * generatorH
4a. HAux = b * generatorH
4b: X0Aux = x0Blinding * HAux (= b * x0Blinding * generatorH)
5. X1Aux = b * x1 * generatorH
5a. X1Aux = b * X1 (X1 = x1 * generatorH)
5b. X1Aux = t1 * generatorH (t1 = b * x1)
6. X2Aux = b * x2 * generatorH
6a. X2Aux = b * X2 (X2 = x2 * generatorH)
6b. X2Aux = t2 * generatorH (t2 = b * x2)
7. U = b * generatorG
8. encUPrime = b * (X0 + x1 * Enc(m1) + x2 * Enc(m2))
5.3.1. CredentialResponse Proof Creation
responseProof = MakeCredentialResponseProof(serverPrivateKey, serverPublicKey, request, b, U, encUPrime, X0Aux, X1Aux, X2Aux, HAux)
Inputs:
- serverPrivateKey:
- x0: Scalar (private), server private key 0.
- x1: Scalar (private), server private key 1.
- x2: Scalar (private), server private key 2.
- x0Blinding: Scalar (private), blinding value for x0.
- serverPublicKey:
- X0: Element, server public key 0.
- X1: Element, server public key 1.
- X2: Element, server public key 2.
- request:
- m1Enc: Element, first encrypted secret.
- m2Enc: Element, second encrypted secret.
- requestProof: ZKProof, a proof of correct generation of m1Enc and m2Enc.
- encUPrime: Element, encrypted UPrime.
- X0Aux: Element, auxiliary point for X0.
- X1Aux: Element, auxiliary point for X1.
- X2Aux: Element, auxiliary point for X2.
- HAux: Element, auxiliary point for generatorH.
Outputs:
- proof: ZKProof
- challenge: Scalar, the challenge used in the proof of valid response.
- response0: Scalar, the response corresponding to x0.
- response1: Scalar, the response corresponding to x1.
- response2: Scalar, the response corresponding to x2.
- response3: Scalar, the response corresponding to x0Blinding.
- response4: Scalar, the response corresponding to b.
- response5: Scalar, the response corresponding to t1.
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- response6: Scalar, the response corresponding to t2.
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
- contextString: public input
def MakeCredentialResponseProof(serverPrivateKey, serverPublicKey, request, b, U, encUPrime, X0Aux, X1Aux, X2Aux, HAux):
prover = Prover(contextString + "CredentialResponse")
x0Var = prover.AppendScalar("x0", serverPrivateKey.x0)
x1Var = prover.AppendScalar("x1", serverPrivateKey.x1)
x2Var = prover.AppendScalar("x2", serverPrivateKey.x2)
x0BlindingVar = prover.AppendScalar("x0Blinding", serverPrivateKey.x0Blinding)
bVar = prover.AppendScalar("b", b)
t1Var = prover.AppendScalar("t1", b * serverPrivateKey.x1)
t2Var = prover.AppendScalar("t2", b * serverPrivateKey.x2)
genGVar = prover.AppendElement("genG", generatorG)
genHVar = prover.AppendElement("genH", generatorH)
m1EncVar = prover.AppendElement("m1Enc", request.m1Enc)
m2EncVar = prover.AppendElement("m2Enc", request.m2Enc)
UVar = prover.AppendElement("U", U)
encUPrimeVar = prover.AppendElement("encUPrime", encUPrime)
X0Var = prover.AppendElement("X0", serverPublicKey.X0)
X1Var = prover.AppendElement("X1", serverPublicKey.X1)
X2Var = prover.AppendElement("X2", serverPublicKey.X2)
X0AuxVar = prover.AppendElement("X0Aux", X0Aux)
X1AuxVar = prover.AppendElement("X1Aux", X1Aux)
X2AuxVar = prover.AppendElement("X2Aux", X2Aux)
HAuxVar = prover.AppendElement("HAux", HAux)
# 1. X0 = x0 * generatorG + x0Blinding * generatorH
prover.Constrain(X0Var, [(x0Var, genGVar), (x0BlindingVar, genHVar)])
# 2. 2. X1 = x1 * generatorH
prover.Constrain(X1Var, [(x1Var, genHVar)])
# 3. X2 = x2 * generatorH
prover.Constrain(X2Var, [(x2Var, genHVar)])
# 4. X0Aux = b * x0Blinding * generatorH
# 4a. HAux = b * generatorH
prover.Constrain(HAuxVar, [(bVar, genHVar)])
# 4b: X0Aux = x0Blinding * HAux (= b * x0Blinding * generatorH)
prover.Constrain(X0AuxVar, [(x0BlindingVar, HAuxVar)])
#5. X1Aux = b * x1 * generatorH
# 5a. X1Aux = b * X1 (X1 = x1 * generatorH)
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prover.Constrain(X1AuxVar, [(t1Var, genHVar)])
# 5b. X1Aux = t1 * generatorH (t1 = b * x1)
prover.Constrain(X1AuxVar, [(bVar, X1Var)])
# 6. X2Aux = b * x2 * generatorH
# 6a. X2Aux = b * X2 (X2 = x2 * generatorH)
prover.Constrain(X2AuxVar, [(bVar, X2Var)])
# 6b. X2Aux = t2 * H (t2 = b * x2)
prover.Constrain(X2AuxVar, [(t2Var, genHVar)])
# 7. U = b * generatorG
prover.Constrain(UVar, [(bVar, genGVar)])
# 8. encUPrime = b * (X0 + x1 * Enc(m1) + x2 * Enc(m2))
# simplified: encUPrime = b * X0 + t1 * m1Enc + t2 * m2Enc, since t1 = b * x1 and t2 = b * x2
prover.Constrain(encUPrimeVar, [(bVar, X0Var), (t1Var, m1EncVar), (t2Var, m2EncVar)])
return prover.Prove()
5.3.2. CredentialResponse Proof Verification
validity = VerifyCredentialResponseProof(serverPublicKey, response, request)
Inputs:
- serverPublicKey:
- X0: Element, server public key 0.
- X1: Element, server public key 1.
- X2: Element, server public key 2.
- response:
- U: Element, a randomized generator for the response. `b*G`.
- encUPrime: Element, encrypted UPrime.
- X0Aux: Element, auxiliary point for X0.
- X1Aux: Element, auxiliary point for X1.
- X2Aux: Element, auxiliary point for X2.
- HAux: Element, auxiliary point for generatorH.
- responseProof: ZKProof, a proof of correct generation of U, encUPrime, server public keys, and auxiliary points.
- challenge: Scalar, the challenge used in the proof of valid response.
- response0: Scalar, the response corresponding to x0.
- response1: Scalar, the response corresponding to x1.
- response2: Scalar, the response corresponding to x2.
- response3: Scalar, the response corresponding to x0Blinding.
- response4: Scalar, the response corresponding to b.
- response5: Scalar, the response corresponding to t1.
- response6: Scalar, the response corresponding to t2.
- request:
- m1Enc: Element, first encrypted secret.
- m2Enc: Element, second encrypted secret.
- requestProof: ZKProof, a proof of correct generation of m1Enc and m2Enc.
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Outputs:
- validity: Boolean, True if the proof verifies correctly, False otherwise.
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
def VerifyCredentialResponseProof(serverPublicKey, response, request):
verifier = Verifier(contextString + "CredentialResponse")
x0Var = verifier.AppendScalar("x0")
x1Var = verifier.AppendScalar("x1")
x2Var = verifier.AppendScalar("x2")
x0BlindingVar = verifier.AppendScalar("x0Blinding")
bVar = verifier.AppendScalar("b", b)
t1Var = verifier.AppendScalar("t1")
t2Var = verifier.AppendScalar("t2")
genGVar = verifier.AppendElement("genG", generatorG)
genHVar = verifier.AppendElement("genH", generatorH)
m1EncVar = verifier.AppendElement("m1Enc", request.m1Enc)
m2EncVar = verifier.AppendElement("m2Enc", request.m2Enc)
UVar = verifier.AppendElement("U", response.U)
encUPrimeVar = verifier.AppendElement("encUPrime", response.encUPrime)
X0Var = verifier.AppendElement("X0", serverPublicKey.X0)
X1Var = verifier.AppendElement("X1", serverPublicKey.X1)
X2Var = verifier.AppendElement("X2", serverPublicKey.X2)
X0AuxVar = verifier.AppendElement("X0Aux", response.X0Aux)
X1AuxVar = verifier.AppendElement("X1Aux", response.X1Aux)
X2AuxVar = verifier.AppendElement("X2Aux", response.X2Aux)
HAuxVar = verifier.AppendElement("HAux", response.HAux)
# 1. X0 = x0 * generatorG + x0Blinding * generatorH
verifier.Constrain(X0Var, [(x0Var, genGVar), (x0BlindingVar, genHVar)])
# 2. 2. X1 = x1 * generatorH
verifier.Constrain(X1Var, [(x1Var, genHVar)])
# 3. X2 = x2 * generatorH
verifier.Constrain(X2Var, [(x2Var, genHVar)])
# 4. X0Aux = b * x0Blinding * generatorH
# 4a. HAux = b * generatorH
verifier.Constrain(HAuxVar, [(bVar, genHVar)])
# 4b: X0Aux = x0Blinding * HAux (= b * x0Blinding * generatorH)
verifier.Constrain(X0AuxVar, [(x0BlindingVar, HAuxVar)])
#5. X1Aux = b * x1 * generatorH
# 5a. X1Aux = b * X1 (X1 = x1 * generatorH)
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verifier.Constrain(X1AuxVar, [(t1Var, genHVar)])
# 5b. X1Aux = t1 * generatorH (t1 = b * x1)
verifier.Constrain(X1AuxVar, [(bVar, X1Var)])
# 6. X2Aux = b * x2 * generatorH
# 6a. X2Aux = b * X2 (X2 = x2 * generatorH)
verifier.Constrain(X2AuxVar, [(bVar, X2Var)])
# 6b. X2Aux = t2 * H (t2 = b * x2)
verifier.Constrain(X2AuxVar, [(t2Var, genHVar)])
# 7. U = b * generatorG
verifier.Constrain(UVar, [(bVar, genGVar)])
# 8. encUPrime = b * (X0 + x1 * Enc(m1) + x2 * Enc(m2))
# simplified: encUPrime = b * X0 + t1 * m1Enc + t2 * m2Enc, since t1 = b * x1 and t2 = b * x2
verifier.Constrain(encUPrimeVar, [(bVar, X0Var), (t1Var, m1EncVar), (t2Var, m2EncVar)])
return verifier.Verify(response.proof)
5.4. Presentation Proof
The presentation proof is a proof of knowledge of (m1, r, z) used in
the presentation, and a proof that the nonce used to make the tag is
in the range of [0, presentationLimit).
Statements to prove:
1. m1Commit = m1 * U + z * generatorH
2. V = z * X1 - r * generatorG
3. G.HashToGroup(presentationContext, "Tag") = m1 * tag + nonce * tag
4. m1Tag = m1 * tag
5.4.1. Presentation Proof Creation
presentationProof = MakePresentationProof(U, UPrimeCommit, m1Commit, tag, generatorT, credential, V, r, z, nonce, m1Tag)
Inputs:
- U: Element, re-randomized from the U in the response.
- UPrimeCommit: Element, a public key to the MACGGM output UPrime.
- m1Commit: Element, a public key to the client secret (m1).
- tag: Element, the tag element used for enforcing the presentation limit.
- generatorT: Element, used for presentation tag computation.
- credential:
- m1: Scalar, client's first secret.
- U: Element, a randomized generator for the response. `b*G`.
- UPrime: Element, the MAC over the server's private keys and the client's secrets.
- X1: Element, server public key 1.
- V: Element, a proof helper element.
- r: Scalar (private), a randomly generated element used in presentation.
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- z: Scalar (private), a randomly generated element used in presentation.
- nonce: Int, the nonce associated with the presentation.
- m1Tag: Element, helper element for the proof.
Outputs:
- proof: ZKProof
- challenge: Scalar, the challenge used in the proof of valid presentation.
- response0: Scalar, the response corresponding to m1.
- response1: Scalar, the response corresponding to z.
- response2: Scalar, the response corresponding to -r.
- response3: Scalar, the response corresponding to nonce.
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
- contextString: public input
def MakePresentationProof(U, UPrimeCommit, m1Commit, tag, generatorT, presentationContext, credential, V, r, z, nonce, m1Tag)
prover = Prover(contextString + "PresentationProof")
m1Var = prover.AppendScalar("m1", credential.m1)
zVar = prover.AppendScalar("z", z)
rNegVar = prover.AppendScalar("-r", -r)
nonceVar = prover.AppendScalar("nonce", nonce)
genGVar = prover.AppendElement("genG", generatorG)
genHVar = prover.AppendElement("genH", generatorH)
UVar = prover.AppendElement("U", U)
_ = prover.AppendElement("UPrimeCommit", UPrimeCommit)
m1CommitVar = prover.AppendElement("m1Commit", m1Commit)
VVar = prover.AppendElement("V", V)
X1Var = prover.AppendElement("X1", credential.X1)
tagVar = prover.AppendElement("tag", tag)
genTVar = prover.AppendElement("genT", generatorT)
m1TagVar = prover.AppendElement("m1Tag", m1Tag)
# 1. m1Commit = m1 * U + z * generatorH
prover.Constrain(m1CommitVar, [(m1Var, UVar), (zVar, genHVar)])
# 2. V = z * X1 - r * generatorG
prover.Constrain(VVar, [(zVar, X1Var), (rNegVar, genGVar)])
# 3. G.HashToGroup(presentationContext, "Tag") = m1 * tag + nonce * tag
prover.Constrain(genTVar, [(m1Var, tagVar), (nonceVar, tagVar)])
# 4. m1Tag = m1 * tag
prover.Constrain(m1TagVar, [(m1Var, tagVar)])
return prover.Prove()
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5.4.2. Presentation Proof Verification
validity = VerifyPresentationProof(serverPrivateKey, serverPublicKey, requestContext, presentationContext, presentation, m1Tag)
Inputs:
- serverPrivateKey:
- x0: Scalar (private), server private key 0.
- x1: Scalar (private), server private key 1.
- x2: Scalar (private), server private key 2.
- x0Blinding: Scalar (private), blinding value for x0.
- serverPublicKey:
- X0: Element, server public key 0.
- X1: Element, server public key 1.
- X2: Element, server public key 2.
- requestContext: Data, context for the credential request.
- presentationContext: Data (public), used for presentation tag computation.
- presentation:
- U: Element, re-randomized from the U in the response.
- UPrimeCommit: Element, a public key to the issued UPrime.
- m1Commit: Element, a public key to the client secret (m1).
- tag: Element, the tag element used for enforcing the presentation limit.
- presentationProof: ZKProof, a proof of correct generation of the presentation.
- challenge: Scalar, the challenge used in the proof of valid presentation.
- response0: Scalar, the response corresponding to m1.
- response1: Scalar, the response corresponding to z.
- response2: Scalar, the response corresponding to -r.
- response3: Scalar, the response corresponding to nonce.
- m1Tag: Element, helper to validate the presentation proof.
Outputs:
- validity: Boolean, True if the proof verifies correctly, False otherwise.
Parameters:
- G: Group
- generatorG: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorG()
- generatorH: Element, equivalent to G.GeneratorH()
- contextString: public input
def VerifyPresentationProof(serverPrivateKey, serverPublicKey, requestContext, presentationContext, presentation, m1Tag):
m2 = G.HashToScalar(requestContext, "requestContext")
V = serverPrivateKey.x0 * presentation.U + serverPrivateKey.x1 * presentation.m1Commit + serverPrivateKey.x2 * m2 * presentation.U - presentation.UPrimeCommit
generatorT = G.HashToGroup(presentationContext, "Tag")
verifier = Verifier(contextString + "PresentationProof")
m1Var = verifier.AppendScalar("m1")
zVar = verifier.AppendScalar("z")
rNegVar = verifier.AppendScalar("-r")
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nonceVar = verifier.AppendScalar("nonce")
genGVar = verifier.AppendElement("genG", generatorG)
genHVar = verifier.AppendElement("genH", generatorH)
UVar = verifier.AppendElement("U", presentation.U)
_ = verifier.AppendElement("UPrimeCommit", presentation.UPrimeCommit)
m1CommitVar = verifier.AppendElement("m1Commit", presentation.m1Commit)
VVar = verifier.AppendElement("V", presentation.V)
X1Var = verifier.AppendElement("X1", serverPublicKey.X1)
tagVar = prover.AppendElement("tag", presentation.tag)
genTVar = verifier.AppendElement("genT", generatorT)
m1TagVar = prover.AppendElement("m1Tag", m1Tag)
# 1. m1Commit = m1 * U + z * generatorH
verifier.Constrain(m1CommitVar, [(m1Var, UVar), (zVar, genHVar)])
# 2. V = z * X1 - r * generatorG
verifier.Constrain(VVar, [(zVar, X1Var), (rNegVar, genGVar)])
# 3. G.HashToGroup(presentationContext, "Tag") = m1 * tag + nonceVar * tag
verifier.Constrain(genTVar, [(m1Var, tagVar), (nonceVar, tagVar)])
# 4. m1Tag = m1 * tag
prover.Constrain(m1TagVar, [(m1Var, tagVar)])
return verifier.Verify(presentation.proof)
6. Ciphersuites
A ciphersuite (also referred to as 'suite' in this document) for the
protocol wraps the functionality required for the protocol to take
place. The ciphersuite should be available to both the client and
server, and agreement on the specific instantiation is assumed
throughout.
A ciphersuite contains an instantiation of the following
functionality:
* Group: A prime-order Group exposing the API detailed in
Section 3.1, with the generator element defined in the
corresponding reference for each group. Each group also specifies
HashToGroup, HashToScalar, and serialization functionalities. For
HashToGroup, the domain separation tag (DST) is constructed in
accordance with the recommendations in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve], Section 3.1. For HashToScalar,
each group specifies an integer order that is used in reducing
integer values to a member of the corresponding scalar field.
This section includes an initial set of ciphersuites with supported
groups. It also includes implementation details for each
ciphersuite, focusing on input validation.
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6.1. ARC(P-384)
This ciphersuite uses P-384 [NISTCurves] for the Group. The value of
the ciphersuite identifier is "P384". The value of contextString is
"ARCV1-P384".
* Group: P-384 (secp384r1) [NISTCurves]
- Order(): Return 0xfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
fffc7634d81f4372ddf581a0db248b0a77aecec196accc52973.
- Identity(): As defined in [NISTCurves].
- Generator(): As defined in [NISTCurves].
- RandomScalar(): Implemented by returning a uniformly random
Scalar in the range [0, G.Order() - 1]. Refer to Section 6.2
for implementation guidance.
- HashToGroup(x, info): Use hash_to_curve with suite
P384_XMD:SHA-384_SSWU_RO_ [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve], input
x, and DST = "HashToGroup-" || contextString || info.
- HashToScalar(x, info): Use hash_to_field from
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] using L = 72, expand_message_xmd
with SHA-384, input x and DST = "HashToScalar-" ||
contextString || info, and prime modulus equal to
Group.Order().
- ScalarInverse(s): Returns the multiplicative inverse of input
Scalar s mod Group.Order().
- SerializeElement(A): Implemented using the compressed Elliptic-
Curve-Point-to-Octet-String method according to [SEC1]; Ne =
49.
- DeserializeElement(buf): Implemented by attempting to
deserialize a 49-byte array to a public key using the
compressed Octet-String-to-Elliptic-Curve-Point method
according to [SEC1], and then performs partial public-key
validation as defined in section 5.6.2.3.4 of [KEYAGREEMENT].
This includes checking that the coordinates of the resulting
point are in the correct range, that the point is on the curve,
and that the point is not the point at infinity. Additionally,
this function validates that the resulting element is not the
group identity element. If these checks fail, deserialization
returns an InputValidationError error.
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- SerializeScalar(s): Implemented using the Field-Element-to-
Octet-String conversion according to [SEC1]; Ns = 48.
- DeserializeScalar(buf): Implemented by attempting to
deserialize a Scalar from a 48-byte string using Octet-String-
to-Field-Element from [SEC1]. This function can fail if the
input does not represent a Scalar in the range [0, G.Order() -
1].
6.2. Random Scalar Generation
Two popular algorithms for generating a random integer uniformly
distributed in the range [0, G.Order() -1] are as follows:
6.2.1. Rejection Sampling
Generate a random byte array with Ns bytes, and attempt to map to a
Scalar by calling DeserializeScalar in constant time. If it
succeeds, return the result. If it fails, try again with another
random byte array, until the procedure succeeds. Failure to
implement DeserializeScalar in constant time can leak information
about the underlying corresponding Scalar.
As an optimization, if the group order is very close to a power of 2,
it is acceptable to omit the rejection test completely. In
particular, if the group order is p, and there is an integer b such
that |p - 2^b| is less than 2^(b/2), then RandomScalar can simply
return a uniformly random integer of at most b bits.
6.2.2. Random Number Generation Using Extra Random Bits
Generate a random byte array with L = ceil(((3 *
ceil(log2(G.Order()))) / 2) / 8) bytes, and interpret it as an
integer; reduce the integer modulo G.Order() and return the result.
See [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve], Section 5 for the underlying
derivation of L.
7. Security Considerations
For arguments about correctness, unforgeability, anonymity, and blind
issuance of the ARC protocol, see the "Formal Security Definitions
for Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials" in [KVAC].
This section elaborates on unlinkability properties for ARC and other
implementation details necessary for these properties to hold.
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7.1. Credential Issuance Unlinkability
Client credential requests are constructed such that the server
cannot distinguish between any two credential requests from the same
client and two requests from different clients. We refer to this
property as issuance unlinkability. This property is achieved by the
way the credential requests are constructed. In particular, each
credential request consists of two Pedersen commitments with fresh
blinding factors, which are used to commit to a freshly generated
client secret and request context. The resulting request is
therefore perfetly hiding, and independent from other requests from
the same client. More details about this unlinkability property can
be found in [KVAC] and [REVISITING_KVAC].
7.2. Presentation Unlinkability
Client credential presentations are constructed so that all
presentations are indistinguishable, even if coming from the same
user. We refer to this property as presentation unlinkability. This
property is achieved by the way the credential presentations are
constructed. The presentation elements [U, UPrimeCommit, m1Commit]
are indistinguishable from all other presentations made from
credentials issued with the same server keys, as detailed in [KVAC].
The indistinguishability set for these presentation elements is
sum_{i=0}^c(p_i), where c is the number of credentials issued with
the same server keys, and p_i is the number of presentations made for
each of those credentials.
The presentation elements [tag, nonce, presentationContext,
presentationProof] are indistinguishable from all presentations made
from credentials issued with the same server keys for that
presentationContext, with the exception of presentations with the
same nonce (since those presentations can be ascertained as being
generated from different credentials, as long as the presentation tag
is unique).
The indistinguishability set for those presentation elements is
sum_{i=0}^c(p_i[presentationContext]) - k[presentationContext], where
c is the number of credentials issued with the same server keys,
p_i[presentationContext] is the number of presentations made for each
of those credentials with the same presentationContext, and k is the
number of presentations with the same nonce for that
presentationContext. As long as the nonces are generated randomly
from the range defined by the presentation limit,
k[presentationContext] should be roughly equal to
sum_{i=0}^c(p_i[presentationContext]) / n, where n is the
presentation limit. Therefore, the indistinguishability set can be
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represented as sum_{i=0}^c(p_i[presentationContext])(1 - 1/n), where
a larger presentation limit results in a larger indistinguishability
set and therefore stronger unlinkability properties.
[[OPEN ISSUE: hide the nonce and replace the tag proof with a range
proof built from something like Bulletproofs.]]
7.3. Timing Leaks
To ensure no information is leaked during protocol execution, all
operations that use secret data MUST run in constant time. This
includes all prime-order group operations and proof-specific
operations that operate on secret data, including proof generation
and verification.
8. Alternatives considered
ARC uses the MACGGM algebraic MAC as its underlying primitive, as
detailed in [KVAC] and [REVISITING_KVAC]. This offers the benefit of
having a lower credential size than MACDDH, which is an alternative
algebraic MAC detailed in [KVAC].
The BBS anonymous credential scheme, as detailed in [BBS] and its
variants, is efficient and publicly verifiable, but requires pairings
for verification. This is problematic for adoption because pairings
are not supported as widely in software and hardware as non-pairing
elliptic curves.
It is possible to construct a keyed-verification variant of BBS which
doesn't use pairings, as discussed in [BBDT17] and [REVISITING_KVAC].
However these keyed-verification BBS variants require more analysis,
proofs of security properties, and review to be considered mature
enough for safe deployment.
9. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
10. Test Vectors
This section contains test vectors for the ARC ciphersuites specified
in this document.
10.1. ARCV1-P384
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// ServerKey
x0 = 504650f53df8f16f6861633388936ea23338fa65ec36e0290022b48eb562889
d89dbfa691d1cde91517fa222ed7ad364
x1 = 803d955f0e073a04aa5d92b3fb739f56f9db001266677f62c095021db018cd8
cbb55941d4073698ce45c405d1348b7b1
x2 = a097e722ed2427de86966910acba9f5c350e8040f828bf6ceca27405420cdf3
d63cb3aef005f40ba51943c8026877963
xb = 3a349db178a923aa7dff7d2d15d89756fd293126bb49a6d793cd77d7db960f5
692fec3b7ec07602c60cd32aee595dffd
X0 = 02caa111a43a5909de4af5cb836897334e5a34857ffc3565223cad95a20f1f3
2303eb8f7594b286238f243eca1a79c60b8
X1 = 03ef0f59c9b0cc51c9e603dfcaa9a3e3719e186252b64f9ce1ebec352c5b605
b805af308a9bd697df7c97b0f1147108c3a
X2 = 028a9547a39d925bdd054706aa5ff7616c28aca94c92041c678970c52ee6572
2f2c54d4f6cecba66abd721ecbcdb2b8a04
// CredentialRequest
m1 = 5a32aaf031be0555089356d299ce24b0eedfe7939e2382934ab5b0f76aae441
24955d2c5ebf9b41d88786259c34692d2
m2 = ae93d3ea7e5856d5d951a0ae87f8845d767df2e97dd669c8025715e604cb1c4
3569792b6864f592fed3abe29b9ebc950
r1 = df2c61be3c0b37bc73dc89fc386c96b3008035081690bfde3b1e68b91443c22
cc791d244340fe957d5aa44d7313740df
r2 = 10fcb00134739cc403f27a79588ca05ad59c5e6ff560cc597c2b8ca25256c72
0bceca2ab03921492c5e9e4ad3b558002
m1_enc = 030a5167977e0c038a98fce96e127fc228aa58526f71a920044b74b2f22
dd5839f0e1cf871e6419a1f522e94510ccf2d92
m2_enc = 03a0fea0d3e83ee67b36cb86d8380d4b8420a75e23eb5dcb560a79e74d1
36cf3c382bff7576f7e50c2cd3d247b56dbf56d
proof = 6e2a6a8906c53eedc0620b8f635871aa2550acc551f0a61c05d7519cf605
5e28ebb737c44a7ba12376e8d4b21f79a0e91326907d2e24bdd176e575938fb5bf79
e4370e8031f3ba8143efa71622daea5338da386ab16ef76f72f6743b529dd603cb5a
3273dfdf24ec13c5b99c2a63a3e8640fd48530940f8faa7b623c882610bc29fbf74d
5c4a704db897798413c6db335357aef367aec11dba86cb07c30e5b46468ea788ccb4
3dcb8f39656328894b9c10465fb34cbb16304d1aa023353a85ef9afac0b123b5fc73
f1f8b7fc84e86e3981bb88e1557d7331bfac74ef986eb54902246a90ba5462ffd2b4
716030b7dd2b
// CredentialResponse
b = b8b2e8c2103ad6f1970e873420d82a21e699140babbe599f7dd8f6e3e8f615e5
f201d1c2b0bc2f821f19e80a0a0e1e7b
U = 02be890d43908e52ed43ae7bc7098f3a7694617fe44a88c33c6fa4eb9e942c0b
2bb9d2fd56a44e1d6094fc7b9e8b949055
enc_U_prime = 027f43377c69a2ad931cc21a9cc4d6ea85f84d517d197db721c931
276a9ed543a78055ddeb9cac6be3af34c212bca5f403
X0_aux = 02890d3f4287e7878ce88b2bc1cc818b2c40fee0f93187af43acb479259
979cef1c39d609ea69cc7d6ba1e2a55d107653f
X1_aux = 0345f2be0dd21d49437a82b221f7a9f074b352e8698fe6ffa08aecad480
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e96e93a25b6dacd4531fc961e78cfb5503f0e69
X2_aux = 020f31991b9a40be69bc06ef30c250d9353a824f4da88cc43e63bf92bc8
ac8bca7e26bffed33a32cc124fd1fb6c73f8b77
H_aux = 03c7714830e1d72604e52fec595c7a399fe0f3276766f84425fd1f98764a
c76dab631c6dfd05e0200c4ffe6d6967304882
proof = 6e9e4447f3f25c407deb3ab2db763a66e38f14de53367c7bd278af37a130
ff5bd036e6967235f7d992c76cb3ec708569382040ab8d01958366ce5dc3e5de6f4c
9702ecc483518ae51785eb2157d1bcbadc4ead4897a8bbee36104468e9824c31804c
5f610bcbc752c2fa2e72a86f6ef82097712775dbfb8e83db2f6e19c09000b36a0250
56788238280c09a3c63c0705b6b17d42d50f2cf069b58a2a97cd1b51eeb92c117455
107881658393aef153156bcb2975aa33188f833c270dfd6588b9c559d3d48ecbfb84
ef558e0cf510bd06cd479710b20e488f4cf5e73e736958affe74e53cf755a7a4b6c1
08a4ef43de1204c6c83746d463c58683b448a188aa0bd2e0cb5f9bc920b5bb40a4e9
720bf8fa832614e9b53b1edcbc43496e459dec881e0aa5e1876e71e1125ebfae3e0d
e69d8fa45953e748adc562ea1e56d7f1eac95063ecd440c360294cc9cb8b4c27235a
8bf212631c466e9c0200f15498559ff4f7ac82dfdbe161dd06ae97dfd208d4b986e2
9a6f8e8b8f191b1ca70e95eb8068
// Credential
m1 = 5a32aaf031be0555089356d299ce24b0eedfe7939e2382934ab5b0f76aae441
24955d2c5ebf9b41d88786259c34692d2
U = 02be890d43908e52ed43ae7bc7098f3a7694617fe44a88c33c6fa4eb9e942c0b
2bb9d2fd56a44e1d6094fc7b9e8b949055
U_prime = 02bec70edf38a3f5c77d5c6f39afd5f94cd266f958c804a954f6104b57
a2c8310862a790cbc6b519f8db989d59aebaf081
X1 = 03ef0f59c9b0cc51c9e603dfcaa9a3e3719e186252b64f9ce1ebec352c5b605
b805af308a9bd697df7c97b0f1147108c3a
// Presentation1
presentation_context = 746573742070726573656e746174696f6e20636f6e746
57874
a = ad00ec0f71b7a8fb7c0aef35c7243e17b78e57df8f0a95d102ff12bbb97e15ed
35c23e54f9b4483d30b76772ee60d886
r = e5cab8c896187b61abe017e57022528742252210dd60ddbbf1a57e3b144e26dd
693b7644a9626a8c36896ede53d12930
z = f61f4c924d3ef04b31e9196935ff27c5f5a4bbcf14e55e357df9f5ccb5ded37b
2b14bc2e1a68e31f86416f0606ee75d1
U = 03383b2ad2831739bc86c0c98119f256e54c9d89a762a9fc91b3904eb3aee726
0350a19085ea093a8059369219f03da2c3
U_prime_commit = 034af7c09ee5150fc914a3bb0adf17f7e90af3c4d9246ec8c51
1f938467174113513b7577329cecd2a7bff0b97e43a9808
m1_commit = 02fb95e1d8010da0c63d38ca212c1f76d768cecc8aa26ab07e775570
70c8343e1da571230f071a15a03973cd57dc33ebf4
nonce = 0x0
tag = 0247e3fd325bc774c27329a78a62f616f5e409d3a4857609cecde3251140f2
bb101905c4cbe66fe06a779e44f5d9e97f08
proof = 87d00bb26882f9795f7aecebf37b05e0b60c5295242d67b3d37d2225e3a8
e67c6ba62896e06530b10296f631ee155be7e8e313c65e587ac6c540c2d2d00f6414
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9d27fff086f8c20bcaa31bfae49e233955fe2a9740a7fa08f777efb039bec4c2e07e
3ee0dde1531578b338e0efda7b0ee28a5bad12586ded3c6b563e1529b29afee4a585
49d5be6fcb2252ddce23cf234a36a4fee968e57544d5977b7657c764eb767df50b73
9740dd268926ab22c8feb2c3e42d772e14a29166e8029c9425ef0000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000004
// Presentation2
presentation_context = 746573742070726573656e746174696f6e20636f6e746
57874
a = a8e630484ba024bf9363805bc7a45f1695bcf45150a61f5c44a6cfbf343cd9e0
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r = df6d39c3c0716d7cf8093073168bf967d7ed72750b6d366ed0febdc539b52d89
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z = 1b8e374ed4390e5a9023b309ecb94c0791eedfb168c556ff5ca3b89d047f482c
9279b47f584aab6c7f895f7674251771
U = 020c627c7ced92dd621860017ed29361bb78c4a17c8f7deb79f0c49a47723898
99a7e3b7b21e6a6c73abfca1332dc7df6e
U_prime_commit = 023d7eb948df3f49abe39e8ef32f4bb1bcca0f13f04836efd8b
7bc9bd0a73f915531ce845dc8c334d03c13647e5e4cc908
m1_commit = 036eea98df5b8248262fc5b511eef49bef1c2ec2a724df3e3a811296
fcf7891298d99a22f05ef0b08a2d00857117d88ac7
nonce = 0x1
tag = 03f9ceb1690ef6cd9c1b7d4c29dc86cf25565e4045ae431f8d28029e0405f9
ac251ef5a9e873f4a038ecd5a1e43d56bf5d
proof = da57015f71962f554d69220ee28618189b0a0c55ff9e6dc9d043d4a21b18
49be20ff10a5fc509d0c80b3e90d40421e95aa7d66fbf923dc72de9bf826b35f628c
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5a33d83d24ef70da15eb4fc512fd74f468be64c56f41e971d22725a8fea08e69d0aa
b296ddf11d79e7e764f5f3aa00619235f71f78dfd91ee421371afd0c4c600a6e6c38
305d8c830ae2
11. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge helpful conversations with
Tommy Pauly about rate limiting and Privacy Pass integration.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
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[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]
Faz-Hernandez, A., Scott, S., Sullivan, N., Wahby, R. S.,
and C. A. Wood, "Hashing to Elliptic Curves", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-
16, 15 June 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16>.
[KEYAGREEMENT]
Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R.
Davis, "Recommendation for pair-wise key-establishment
schemes using discrete logarithm cryptography", National
Institute of Standards and Technology,
DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-56ar3, April 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-56ar3>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017>.
12.2. Informative References
[BBDT17] "Improved Algebraic MACs and Practical Keyed-Verification
Anonymous Credentials", n.d., <https://link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-69453-5_20>.
[BBS] "Short Group Signatures", n.d.,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/174>.
[BLIND-RSA]
Denis, F., Jacobs, F., and C. A. Wood, "RSA Blind
Signatures", RFC 9474, DOI 10.17487/RFC9474, October 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9474>.
[KVAC] "Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials from Algebraic
MACs", n.d., <https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/516>.
[NISTCurves]
"Digital signature standard (DSS)", National Institute of
Standards and Technology (U.S.),
DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.186-4, 2013,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.186-4>.
[OPRFS] Davidson, A., Faz-Hernandez, A., Sullivan, N., and C. A.
Wood, "Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) Using
Prime-Order Groups", RFC 9497, DOI 10.17487/RFC9497,
December 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9497>.
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[REVISITING_KVAC]
"Revisiting Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials",
n.d., <https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1552>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG), "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography",
<https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
Authors' Addresses
Cathie Yun
Apple, Inc.
Email: cathie@apple.com
Christopher A. Wood
Apple, Inc.
Email: caw@heapingbits.net
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