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Enhancing Route Origin Validation by Aggregating Validated ROA Payloads
draft-zhang-sidrops-vrp-aggregation-04

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Expired & archived
Authors Jia Zhang , Mingwei Xu , Yangyang Wang
Last updated 2026-08-30 (Latest revision 2026-02-26)
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:

Abstract

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) enables address space holders to issue Route Origin Authorization (ROA) objects to authorize one or more Autonomous Systems (ASes) to originate BGP routes for specific IP address prefixes. Individual BGP speakers can utilize Validated ROA Payloads (VRPs) to validate the legitimacy of BGP announcements. This document highlights potential validation errors, and recommends extension of VRPs from reasonable aggregation to enhance Route Origin Validation (ROV) and prevent validation errors that may occur due to traffic engineering or route aggregation policies.

Authors

Jia Zhang
Mingwei Xu
Yangyang Wang

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)