MAC address randomization
draft-zuniga-mac-address-randomization-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Juan-Carlos Zúñiga  , Carlos Bernardos  , Amelia Andersdotter 
Last updated 2020-11-01
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Network Working Group                                         JC. Zuniga
Internet-Draft                                                    SIGFOX
Intended status: Informational                             CJ. Bernardos
Expires: May 4, 2021                                                UC3M
                                                         A. Andersdotter
                                                                   CENTR
                                                        October 31, 2020

                       MAC address randomization
               draft-zuniga-mac-address-randomization-00

Abstract

   Internet privacy has become a major concern over the past few years.
   Users are becoming more aware that their online activity leaves a
   vast digital footprint, that communications are not always properly
   secured, and that their location and actions can be easily tracked.
   One of the main factors for the location tracking issue is the wide
   use of long-lasting identifiers, such as MAC addresses.

   There have been several initiatives at the IETF and the IEEE 802
   standards committees to overcome some of these privacy issues.  This
   document provides an overview of these activities, with the intention
   to inform the technical community about them, and help coordinate
   between present and futures standardization activities.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2021.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Background - MAC address usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  MAC address randomization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Privacy Workshop, Tutorial and Experiments at IETF and IEEE
       802 meetings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Recent MAC randomization activities at the IEEE 802 . . . . .   6
   7.  MAC randomization-related activities at the IETF  . . . . . .   7
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   Internet privacy is becoming a huge concern, as more and more mobile
   devices are getting directly (e.g., via cellular or Wi-Fi) or
   indirectly (e.g., via a smartphone using Bluetooth) connected to the
   Internet.  This ubiquitous connectivity, together with not very
   secure protocol stacks and the lack of proper education about privacy
   make it very easy to track/monitor the location of users and/or
   eavesdrop their physical and online activities.  This is due to many
   factors, such as the vast digital footprint that users leave on the
   Internet, for instance sharing information on social networks,
   cookies used by browsers and servers to provide a better navigation
   experience, connectivity logs that allow tracking of a user's Layer-2
   (L2/MAC) or Layer-3 (L3) address, web trackers, etc.; and/or the weak

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