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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth-01

Request Review of draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 02)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2015-07-02
Requested 2015-06-25
Authors Sarah Banks , Fernando Calabria , Gery Czirjak , Ramdas Machat
I-D last updated 2015-07-02
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -01 by Roni Even (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -01 by Liang Xia (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Liang Xia
State Completed
Review review-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth-01-secdir-lc-xia-2015-07-02
Reviewed revision 01 (document currently at 02)
Result Has Issues
Completed 2015-07-02

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
 directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just
 like any other last call comment.

This draft specifies a set of common methodologies and procedures designed to
characterize the overall behavior of a Device Under Test (DUT), subject to an
ISSU event.

I have the following comments:


Should the ISSU test methodology include the verification and test when the DUT
is under network DDoS attacks?


In the software download stage, in addition to compatibility checks and
verification of checksums, we should also explicitly mention that the device
should verify the authenticity and integrity of its download.
 I.e. verify signatures on signed code and OCSP/CRL for the used signature. And
 that a system must not load unverified code;


even in a test environment all deployed software components must be verified
(e.g. using signatures);


Nits: this draft has expired on May-30, 2015

Recommendation:  Ready With Issues