Last Call Review of draft-ietf-isis-auto-conf-04
review-ietf-isis-auto-conf-04-genart-lc-sparks-2017-04-07-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-isis-auto-conf |
---|---|---|
Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 05) | |
Type | Last Call Review | |
Team | General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) (genart) | |
Deadline | 2017-04-10 | |
Requested | 2017-03-22 | |
Authors | Bing Liu , Les Ginsberg , Bruno Decraene , Ian Farrer , Mikael Abrahamsson | |
I-D last updated | 2017-04-07 | |
Completed reviews |
Secdir Last Call review of -04
by Radia Perlman
(diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -04 by Will (Shucheng) LIU (diff) Genart Last Call review of -04 by Robert Sparks (diff) |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Robert Sparks |
State | Completed | |
Request | Last Call review on draft-ietf-isis-auto-conf by General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) Assigned | |
Reviewed revision | 04 (document currently at 05) | |
Result | Ready w/issues | |
Completed | 2017-04-07 |
review-ietf-isis-auto-conf-04-genart-lc-sparks-2017-04-07-00
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just like any other last call comments. For more information, please see the FAQ at <https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>. Document: draft-ietf-isis-auto-conf-04 Reviewer: Robert Sparks Review Date: 2017-04-07 IETF LC End Date: 2017-04-10 IESG Telechat date: 2017-04-13 Summary: Ready for publication as Proposed Standard, but with one possible thing to add to the security consideration section This document is clear and seems straightforward to implement. I think, however, there is an attack possibility you should call out in the security considerations section. As home routers are used as examples of elements that might use this protocol, consider the case of a malicious party wanting to deny service in that home. A suborned device in the home could watch for the protocol, and present a crafted packet to force the home router(s) to re-start the autoconfiguration protocol continually (by claiming to be a duplicate and being careful to make it the routers job to restart). Having the md5 password configured would mitigate this attack.