IETF Last Call Review of draft-ietf-lsr-dynamic-flooding-algorithm-04
review-ietf-lsr-dynamic-flooding-algorithm-04-secdir-lc-hardaker-2026-08-03-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-lsr-dynamic-flooding-algorithm |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 05) | |
| Type | IETF Last Call Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2026-08-03 | |
| Requested | 2026-07-13 | |
| Authors | Sarah Chen , Tony Li | |
| I-D last updated | 2026-09-11 (Latest revision 2026-08-23) | |
| Completed reviews |
Rtgdir IETF Last Call review of -02
by Adrian Farrel
(diff)
Genart IETF Last Call review of -04 by Joel M. Halpern (diff) Opsdir IETF Last Call review of -04 by Luigi Iannone (diff) Secdir IETF Last Call review of -04 by Wes Hardaker (diff) |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | Wes Hardaker |
| State | Completed | |
| Request | IETF Last Call review on draft-ietf-lsr-dynamic-flooding-algorithm by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
| Posted at | https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/hPnMZcJYAKZz6D7-ZE7HTBrvwHo | |
| Reviewed revision | 04 (document currently at 05) | |
| Result | Has nits | |
| Completed | 2026-08-03 |
review-ietf-lsr-dynamic-flooding-algorithm-04-secdir-lc-hardaker-2026-08-03-00
Reviewer: Wes Hardaker Review result: Almost Ready I reviewed this document as part of the Security Directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area Directors. Document authors, document editors, and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other IETF Last Call comments. Document: draft-ietf-lsr-dynamic-flooding-algorithm-04 Reviewer: Wes Hardaker Review Date: 2026-08-03 Comments: * Security considerations (since this is a secdir review, I'm listing it first!): Though you're right that this document includes all of the security considerations from the other document, I'm not sure that you can totally get away with saying there is nothing else new. Because this is an experimental draft, it may not be quite as important to be accurate about the security considerations, but you are introducing a brand new algorithm, which means that the ramifications associated with executing that algorithm may provide an additional security footprint. Specifically, the network size can affect the order of the complexity, deliberately flapping states can cause a leader to possibly recalculate the topology on a frequent basis, some topologies may be more expensive to calculate than others, and all of the algorithm parameter choices affect the computation resources needed for the particular node. Maybe? (thinking out loud). Most centrally, for example, how frequently are these calculations re-performed and is this a possible denial of service factor by anyone that can alter the topology even by a flapping link state, eg. Do feel free to declare my thinking/wondering wrong, however. * Abstract: the wording "discloses the algorithm" makes me wonder if all the IPR was properly handled :-) * In general because there are multiple uses of "topology" you should double check that all are properly identified with "sparse", "base", "dynamic", etc just to check clarity. I didn't check every usage. * EG, in section 1 bullet "3." I believe the first sentence should end in "base topology" not just "topology" * 1.1.2: bullet 1: Since this is an experiment and these are supposed to be criteria, I wondered how "correctly interpreted" could be measured. * 1.1.2: bullet 7: Similar, how is robustness measured? * Section 3: It would be helpful if at the top of the section there was a note indicating that this is a high level summary and to see section 4 for more details. (I do agree the summary was very helpful though). * Section 3: I think the phrase "denoted by G'({}, {})" is misleading a bit. G' is really the name of a vertex/edge set where it starts as empty, and is thus G'({}, {}). Then bullet 1 reads a bit better, though "This cycle is added to the G' subgraph so it becomes G'(V(0), E(0))" may be even better. * Section 3: Bullet 1 says to use a subset of edges, as does section 4, but given some advice somewhere on the right quantity to pick would be helpful. * Section 3, bullets 2 and 3 -- these say "not included in the subgraph" or "are included in the subgraph" in sort of a confusing way. Section 4.2 says that the start nodes of the subgraph *are* already included (in fact that's how you pick them), but that's not what I got out of this high level summary. My initial reading thought the new subset selection would contain zero nodes from the original set. * Section 4: The final sentence in the first paragraph states "easily implemented" is immeditaely followed by the next paragraph with a list of implementation specific algorithms (DFS depth limit .. endpoint selection) made me laugh, as they may not be as easily implemented. * Section 4: DFS is mentioned here, but not expanded until 4.1. * Section 4.1 bullet 2: find *the* starting node - I'd either state what node that should be (its hinted later it should be the one with the highest scale) or change "the" to "an" to be more generic. * Section 5: I was happy to see the example spelled out, as they greatly helped me understand the algorithm. You might include the resulting G() vectors for even better help to the reader.