Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) Threat Analysis for IEEE 802.11 Deployments
RFC 5418

 
Document
Type RFC - Informational (March 2009; No errata)
Last updated 2013-03-02
Replaces draft-kelly-capwap-threat-analysis
Stream IETF
Formats plain text pdf html
Stream
WG state (None)
Consensus Unknown
Document shepherd No shepherd assigned
IESG
IESG state RFC 5418 (Informational)
Telechat date
Responsible AD Dan Romascanu
Send notices to capwap-chairs@ietf.org, draft-ietf-capwap-threat-analysis@ietf.org, scott@hyperthought.com, clancy@LTSnet.net

Email authors IPR References Referenced by Nits Search lists

Network Working Group                                           S. Kelly
Request for Comments: 5418                                Aruba Networks
Category: Informational                                        T. Clancy
                                                                     LTS
                                                              March 2009

      Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP)
              Threat Analysis for IEEE 802.11 Deployments

Status of This Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

Kelly & Clancy               Informational                      [Page 1]
RFC 5418             CAPWAP 802.11 Threat Analysis            March 2009

Abstract

   Early Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) deployments feature a "fat"
   Access Point (AP), which serves as a stand-alone interface between
   the wired and wireless network segments.  However, this model raises
   scaling, mobility, and manageability issues, and the Control and
   Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) protocol is meant to
   address these issues.  CAPWAP effectively splits the fat AP
   functionality into two network elements, and the communication
   channel between these components may traverse potentially hostile
   hops.  This document analyzes the security exposure resulting from
   the introduction of CAPWAP and summarizes the associated security
   considerations for IEEE 802.11-based CAPWAP implementations and
   deployments.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................4
      1.1. Rationale for Limiting Analysis Scope to IEEE 802.11 .......5
      1.2. Notations ..................................................6
   2. Abbreviations and Definitions ...................................7
   3. CAPWAP Security Goals for IEEE 802.11 Deployments ...............8
   4. Overview of IEEE 802.11 and AAA Security ........................8
      4.1. IEEE 802.11 Authentication and AAA .........................9
      4.2. IEEE 802.11 Link Security .................................11
      4.3. AAA Security ..............................................11
      4.4. Cryptographic Bindings ....................................12
   5. Structure of the Analysis ......................................13
   6. Representative CAPWAP Deployment Scenarios .....................14
      6.1. Preliminary Definitions ...................................14
           6.1.1. Split MAC ..........................................15
           6.1.2. Local MAC ..........................................15
           6.1.3. Remote MAC .........................................15
           6.1.4. Data Tunneling .....................................16
      6.2. Example Scenarios .........................................16
           6.2.1. Localized Modular Deployment .......................16
           6.2.2. Internet Hotspot or Temporary Network ..............17
           6.2.3. Distributed Deployments ............................18
                  6.2.3.1. Large Physically Contained Organization ...18
                  6.2.3.2. Campus Deployments ........................18
                  6.2.3.3. Branch Offices ............................18
                  6.2.3.4. Telecommuter or Remote Office .............19
   7. General Adversary Capabilities .................................19
      7.1. Passive versus Active Adversaries .........................20
   8. Vulnerabilities Introduced by CAPWAP ...........................22
Show full document text