Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
RFC 6818
Document | Type |
RFC - Proposed Standard
(January 2013; No errata)
Updates RFC 5280
|
|
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Author | Peter Yee | ||
Last updated | 2015-10-14 | ||
Stream | IETF | ||
Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | In WG Last Call | |
Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
IESG | IESG state | RFC 6818 (Proposed Standard) | |
Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Sean Turner | ||
IESG note | Steve Kent (kent@bbn.com) is the Document Shepherd | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Yee Request for Comments: 6818 AKAYLA Updates: 5280 January 2013 Category: Standards Track ISSN: 2070-1721 Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile Abstract This document updates RFC 5280, the "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile". This document changes the set of acceptable encoding methods for the explicitText field of the user notice policy qualifier and clarifies the rules for converting internationalized domain name labels to ASCII. This document also provides some clarifications on the use of self-signed certificates, trust anchors, and some updated security considerations. Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6818. Yee Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 6818 RFC 5280 Clarifications January 2013 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................2 1.1. Terminology ................................................3 2. Update to RFC 5280, Section 3.2: "Certification Paths and Trust" 3 3. Update to RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.4: "Certificate Policies" .....3 4. Update to RFC 5280, Section 6.2: "Using the Path Validation Algorithm" ......................................................4 5. Update to RFC 5280, Section 7.3: "Internationalized Domain Names in Distinguished Names" ............................5 6. Security Considerations .........................................5 7. Update to RFC 5280, Section 11.1: "Normative References" ........7 8. Update to RFC 5280, Section 11.2: "Informative References" ......7 9. References ......................................................7 9.1. Normative References .......................................7 9.2. Informative References .....................................7 10. Acknowledgements ................................................8 1. Introduction This document updates the "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280]. This document makes a recommendation that self-signed certificates used to convey trust anchor data be marked as certificate authority (CA) certificates, which is not always current practice. The use of self-signed certificates as trust anchors in Section 6.2 of [RFC5280] is clarified. While it is optional to use additional information in these certificates in the path validation process, [RFC5937] is noted as providing guidance in that regard. Yee Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 6818 RFC 5280 Clarifications January 2013 The acceptable and unacceptable encodings for the explicitText field of the user notice policy qualifier are updated to bring them in line with existing practice. The rules in Section 7.3 of [RFC5280] for ASCII encoding of Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) as Distinguished Names are aligned with the rules in Section 7.2 of that document that govern IDN encoding as GeneralNames. In light of some observed attacks [Prins], the Security Considerations section now gives added depth to the consequences of CA key compromise. This section additionally notes that collision resistance is not a required property of one-way hash functions when used to generate key identifiers. This document also adds normative and informative references forShow full document text