Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Y. Nir
Request for Comments: 6867 Check Point
Category: Experimental Q. Wu
ISSN: 2070-1721 Huawei
January 2013
An Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
Extension to Support EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)
Abstract
This document updates the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2
(IKEv2) described in RFC 5996. This extension allows an IKE Security
Association (SA) to be created and authenticated using the Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Re-authentication Protocol extension,
as described in RFC 6696.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for examination, experimental implementation, and
evaluation.
This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF
community. It has received public review and has been approved for
publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not
all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of
Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6867.
Nir & Wu Experimental [Page 1]RFC 6867 ERP for IKE January 2013Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
1. Introduction
IKEv2, as specified in [RFC5996], allows (Section 2.16)
authentication of the initiator using an EAP method. Using EAP
significantly increases the count of round trips required to
establish the IPsec SA and also may require user interaction. This
makes it inconvenient to allow a single remote access client to
create multiple IPsec tunnels with multiple IPsec gateways that
belong to the same domain.
The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP), as described in [RFC6696],
allows an EAP peer to authenticate to multiple authenticators while
performing the full EAP method only once. Subsequent authentications
require fewer round trips and no user interaction.
Bringing these two technologies together allows a remote access IPsec
client to create multiple tunnels with different gateways that belong
to a single domain as well as using the keys from other contexts of
using EAP, such as network access within the same domain, to
transparently connect to VPN gateways within this domain.
Additionally, it allows for faster set up of new tunnels when
previous tunnels have been torn down due to things like network
outage, device suspension, or a temporary move out of range. This is
similar to the session resumption mechanism described in [RFC5723].
One exception being that instead of a ticket stored by the client,
the re-authentication Master Session Key (rMSK) (see Section 4.6 of
[RFC6696]) is used as the session key stored on both the client and
the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server.
Nir & Wu Experimental [Page 2]RFC 6867 ERP for IKE January 20131.1. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Usage Scenarios
This work is motivated by the following scenarios:
o Multiple tunnels for a single remote access VPN client. Suppose a
company has offices in New York City, Paris, and Shanghai. For
datatracker.ietf.org