Operations Model for Router Keying
RFC 7211

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        S. Hartman
Request for Comments: 7211                             Painless Security
Category: Informational                                         D. Zhang
ISSN: 2070-1721                             Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.
                                                               June 2014

                   Operations Model for Router Keying

Abstract

   The IETF is engaged in an effort to analyze the security of routing
   protocol authentication according to design guidelines discussed in
   RFC 6518, "Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP)
   Design Guidelines".  Developing an operational and management model
   for routing protocol security that works with all the routing
   protocols will be critical to the deployability of these efforts.
   This document gives recommendations to operators and implementors
   regarding management and operation of router authentication.  These
   recommendations will also assist protocol designers in understanding
   management issues they will face.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7211.

Hartman & Zhang               Informational                     [Page 1]
RFC 7211           Operations Model for Router Keying          June 2014

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Breakdown of KARP Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Integrity of the Key Table  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Management of Key Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Interactions with Automated Key Management  . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Virtual Routing and Forwarding Instances (VRFs) . . . . .   6
   4.  Credentials and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Preshared Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.1.  Sharing Keys and Zones of Trust . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.2.  Key Separation and Protocol Design  . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  Public Key Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.4.  The Role of Central Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Grouping Peers Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Administrator Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.1.  Enrollment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.2.  Handling Faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  Upgrade Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

Hartman & Zhang               Informational                     [Page 2]
RFC 7211           Operations Model for Router Keying          June 2014

1.  Introduction

   The Keying and Authentication of Routing Protocols (KARP) working
   group is designing improvements to the cryptographic authentication
   of IETF routing protocols.  These improvements include enhancing how
   integrity functions are handled within each protocol as well as
   designing an automated key management solution.

   This document discusses issues to consider when thinking about the
   operational and management model for KARP.  Each implementation will