Opportunistic Wireless Encryption
RFC 8110
| Document | Type |
RFC - Informational
(March 2017; Errata)
Was draft-harkins-owe (individual in sec area)
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2020-01-21 | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized with errata bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | (None) | |
| Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 8110 (Informational) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | Stephen Farrell | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - No Actions Needed | |
| IANA action state | No IANA Actions | ||
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Harkins, Ed.
Request for Comments: 8110 HP Enterprise
Category: Informational W. Kumari, Ed.
ISSN: 2070-1721 Google
March 2017
Opportunistic Wireless Encryption
Abstract
This memo specifies an extension to IEEE Std 802.11 to provide for
opportunistic (unauthenticated) encryption to the wireless media.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8110.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 1]
RFC 8110 Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. 802.11 Network Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Opportunistic Wireless Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. OWE Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. OWE Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. OWE Post-Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5. OWE PMK Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 2]
RFC 8110 Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017
1. Introduction
This memo describes Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) -- a mode
of opportunistic security [RFC7435] for IEEE Std 802.11 that provides
encryption of the wireless medium but no authentication.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
1.2. Notation
This memo uses the following notation:
y = F(X)
An element-to-scalar mapping function. For an elliptic curve
group, it takes a point on the curve and returns the
x-coordinate; for a finite field element, it is the identity
function, just returning the element itself.
Z = DH(x,Y)
For an elliptic curve, DH(x,Y) is the multiplication of point Y
by the scalar value x, creating a point on the curve Z; for
finite field cryptography, DH(x,Y) is an exponentiation of
element Y to the power of x (implied modulo a field defining
prime, p) resulting in an element Z.
a = len(b)
Indicates the length in bits of the string b.
2. Background
Internet access has become an expected service at many locations --
for example, coffee shops, airports, and hotels. In many cases, this
is offered over "Open" (unencrypted) wireless networks, because
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