Router Keying for BGPsec
RFC 8635
Document | Type | RFC - Proposed Standard (August 2019; No errata) | |
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Randy Bush , Sean Turner , Keyur Patel | ||
Last updated | 2019-08-07 | ||
Replaces | draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying | ||
Stream | Internent Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
Document shepherd | Chris Morrow | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2018-11-05) | ||
IESG | IESG state | RFC 8635 (Proposed Standard) | |
Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Warren Kumari | ||
Send notices to | Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net> | ||
IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
IANA action state | No IANA Actions |
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush Request for Comments: 8635 IIJ Lab & Arrcus Category: Standards Track S. Turner ISSN: 2070-1721 sn3rd K. Patel Arrcus, Inc. August 2019 Router Keying for BGPsec Abstract BGPsec-speaking routers are provisioned with private keys in order to sign BGPsec announcements. The corresponding public keys are published in the Global Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), enabling verification of BGPsec messages. This document describes two methods of generating the public-private key pairs: router-driven and operator-driven. Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8635. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Bush, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 8635 Router Keying for BGPsec August 2019 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Management/Router Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Exchange Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. Generate PKCS#10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.1. Router-Driven Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.2. Operator-Driven Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.2.1. Using PKCS#8 to Transfer Private Keys . . . . . . . . 6 7. Send PKCS#10 and Receive PKCS#7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Install Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Advanced Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.1. Key Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10.2. Key Rollover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10.3. Key Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10.4. Router Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Appendix A. Management/Router Channel Security . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix B. An Introduction to BGPsec Key Management . . . . . . 18 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 1. Introduction BGPsec-speaking routers are provisioned with private keys, which allow them to digitally sign BGPsec announcements. To verify the signature, the public key, in the form of a certificate [RFC8209], is published in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document describes provisioning of BGPsec-speaking routers with the appropriate public-private key pairs. There are two methods: router- driven and operator-driven. These two methods differ in where the keys are generated: on the router in the router-driven method, and elsewhere in the operator- driven method. The two methods also differ in who generates the private/public key pair: the operator generates the pair and sends it to the router inShow full document text