Paper (S47): TLS Preflight: smaller, faster and more private handshakes
slides-pqws-s47-00
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Slides | IAB Workshop on Accelerating the Deployment of Post-Quantum Authentication (pqws) Team Snapshot | |
|---|---|---|
| Title | Paper (S47): TLS Preflight: smaller, faster and more private handshakes | |
| Abstract | Dennis Jackson (Mozilla) Post-quantum (PQ) cryptography makes TLS handshakes substantially larger [1]. Merkle Tree Certifi- cates (MTCs) [2] shrink the certificate chain. KEMTLS [3] goes … Dennis Jackson (Mozilla) Post-quantum (PQ) cryptography makes TLS handshakes substantially larger [1]. Merkle Tree Certifi- cates (MTCs) [2] shrink the certificate chain. KEMTLS [3] goes further by replacing the handshake signature with a much smaller KEM ciphertext, but requires invasive changes to the TLS state machine, which have proven a barrier to deployment. Meanwhile, Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) [4] would further inflate TLS handshake size if it were naively switched to PQ primitives. TLS Preflight aims to address the issues blocking deployment of KEMTLS and PQ ECH. It achieves size reductions similar to KEMTLS while being much easier to implement, and brings PQ security to ECH without inflating the handshake. It also lets clients make zero round-trip (0-RTT) connections on their very first contact with a server, which TLS 1.3 cannot do today, cutting latency on first connections |
|
| State | Active | |
| Other versions | ||
| Last updated | 2026-10-07 |
slides-pqws-s47-00
Not available as plain text.
Download as PDF.