Liaison statement
LS on the Proposed Root Server System Governance Framework

# The Proposed Root Server System Governance Framework

The IAB appreciates ICANN’s dedication to safely and strategically evolving the
Root Server System governance framework. However, the IAB has serious concerns
with where things currently stand.

The proposed governance structure appears to codify a framework that lacks the
operational capability to hold the Root Server Operators (RSOs) accountable,
while simultaneously positioning the RSOs for systemic funding and functionally
guaranteed operational longevity. Crucially, we believe that the proposed
structure does not sufficiently address the suggestions made in RSSAC0037 and
RSSAC0038.

While the IAB recognizes the intent behind a phased rollout, we believe that
deferring crucial structural and procedural questions to later phases creates a
material risk. Specifically, once the core Governance Structure is established,
the community may find itself with insufficient oversight and transparency
mechanisms, a limited ability to provide future public comment and, thus,
limited practical opportunities for course correction. To ensure the long-term
stability, accountability, and integrity of the Root Server System, these core
concerns *must* be meaningfully addressed *prior* to the initial establishment
of the proposed governance council.

To safeguard the Root Server System as robust infrastructure devoted to the
global public good, the IAB believes that the transition into the initial phase
of the governance model should be conditioned on the following structural
reforms:

1. **Integrate Other Stakeholders Including Technical Community, Civil Society
& End-Users:** The root server system affects more than those having “direct
operational dependency", and so there should be offered formal representation
from other stakeholders, for example, ALAC, the IETF/IAB, the GAC, the GNSO
(NCSG/CSG), and the RIRs, to balance interests.

2. **Reduce RSO Representation:** To avoid capture, or the perception of
capture, organize the voting structure so that each group (RSOs, the TLDs, and
others) has an equally weighted vote. As is, the RSOs hold fifty percent of the
voting power, which seems counter to the stated RSSAC058 goal C1 of defining
“appropriate decision-making mechanisms”.

3. **No “double-dipping”:** Organizations should not have representation in
multiple groups \- for example, an RSO which also operates a ccTLD or gTLD
should not be able to vote multiple times.

4. **Establish a Binding Independent Review Process (IRP):** Form a neutral,
external panel (independent of the Council) to hear appeals regarding operator
designation, removal, and performance suspension before the Initiation Phase
begins.

5. **Checks and balances:** Provide a mechanism equivalent to the empowered
community’s check on the ICANN Board, but for the Council.

6. **Solve the Funding Model Pre-Establishment:** Require a concrete,
diversified, and binding funding plan—that protects against donor
capture—*before* the Council is chartered, rather than deferring it.

We also wish to register our *significant concerns* regarding the handling of
public comments submitted during the recent consultation on the “[Functional
Model for Root Server System
Governance](https://www.icann.org/en/public-comment/proceeding/functional-model-for-root-server-system-governance-11-08-2025)”.
A significant portion of the substantive feedback offered by the community
appears to have been ignored on a practical level by deferring action to
subsequent implementation stages—namely, the Initiation Phase, Establishment
Phase, and Governance Phase—rather than being addressed in the most critical
first step in defining a foundational model.

If the ICANN Board accepts and proceeds with the GWG plan as it exists now, 
the community writ large will be able to raise concerns about the legitimacy
and effectiveness of the multistakeholder model for the Root Server system.
This is too important of a core internet function to proceed with the current
plan.