Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
|WG||Name||Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME|
|Area||Security Area (sec)|
|Status update||Show Changed 2017-11-16|
|Additional resources||Issue tracker, Wiki, Zulip stream|
|Personnel||Chairs||Russ Housley, Tim Hollebeek|
|Area Director||Roman Danyliw|
Charter for Working Group
The PKIX and S/MIME Working Groups have been closed for some time. Some
updates have been proposed to the X.509 certificate documents produced
by the PKIX Working Group and the electronic mail security documents
produced by the S/MIME Working Group.
The LAMPS (Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME) Working
Group is chartered to make updates where there is a known constituency
interested in real deployment and there is at least one sufficiently
well specified approach to the update so that the working group can
sensibly evaluate whether to adopt a proposal.
The LAMPS WG is now tackling these topics:
Specify the use of short-lived X.509 certificates for which no
revocation information is made available by the Certification Authority.
Short-lived certificates have a lifespan that is shorter than the time
needed to detect, report, and distribute revocation information. As a
result, revoking short-lived certificates is unnecessary and pointless.
Update the specification for the cryptographic protection of email
headers -- both for signatures and encryption -- to improve the
implementation situation with respect to privacy, security, usability
and interoperability in cryptographically-protected electronic mail.
Most current implementations of cryptographically-protected electronic
mail protect only the body of the message, which leaves significant
room for attacks against otherwise-protected messages.
The Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) is specified in RFC 4210,
and it offers a vast range of certificate management options. CMP is
currently being used in many different industrial environments, but it
needs to be tailored to the specific needs of such machine-to-machine
scenarios and communication among PKI management entities. The LAMPS
WG will develop a "lightweight" profile of CMP to more efficiently
support of these environments and better facilitate interoperable
implementation, while preserving cryptographic algorithm agility. In
addition, necessary updates and clarifications to CMP will be
specified in a separate document. This work will be coordinated with
the LWIG WG.
Provide concrete guidance for implementers of email user agents to
promote interoperability of end-to-end cryptographic protection of
email messages. This may include guidance about the generation,
interpretation, and handling of protected messages; management of
the relevant certificates; documentation of how to avoid common
failure modes; strategies for deployment in a mixed environment; as
well as test vectors and examples that can be used by implementers
and interoperability testing. The resulting robust consensus
among email user agent implementers is expected to provide more
usable and useful cryptographic security for email users.
Recent progress in the development of quantum computers pose a
threat to widely deployed public key algorithms. As a result,
there is a need to prepare for a day when cryptosystems such as
RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECDSA, ECDH, and EdDSA cannot be depended
upon in the PKIX and S/MIME protocols.
5.a. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
has a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) effort to produce one or more
quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithm standards.
The LAMPS WG will specify the use of these new PQC public key
algorithms with the PKIX certificates and the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS). These specifications will use object identifiers
for the new algorithms that are assigned by NIST.
5.b. A lengthy transition from today's public key algorithms to
PQC public key algorithms is expected. Time will be needed to gain
full confidence in the new PQC public key algorithms.
5.b.i. The LAMPS WG will specify formats, identifiers, enrollment,
and operational practices for "hybrid key establishment" that
combines the shared secret values one or more traditional
key-establishment algorithm and one or more NIST PQC
key-establishment algorithm or a PQC key-establishment algorithm
vetted by the CFRG. The shared secret values will be combined using
HKDF (see RFC 5869), one of the key derivation functions in NIST
SP 800-56C, or a key derivation function vetted by the CFRG.
5.b.ii. The LAMPS WG will specify formats, identifiers, enrollment,
and operational practices for "dual signature" that combine one or
more traditional signature algorithm with one or more NIST PQC
signature algorithm or a PQC algorithm vetted by the CFRG.
In addition, the LAMPS WG may investigate other updates to documents
produced by the PKIX and S/MIME WG. The LAMPS WG may produce
clarifications where needed, but the LAMPS WG shall not adopt
anything beyond clarifications without rechartering.
|Dec 2022||Send draft for rfc6712bis to IESG for standards track publication||
|Dec 2022||Send draft for rfc4210bis to IESG for standards track publication||
|Jul 2022||End-to-end email user agent guidance sent to IESG for informational publication||
|Mar 2022||Short-lived certificate conventions sent to IESG for BCP publication|
|Dec 2021||CMP algorithms sent to IESG for standards track publication||
|Dec 2021||Adopt draft for dual signature in CMS|
|Dec 2021||Adopt draft for dual signatures in PKIX certificates|
|Dec 2021||Adopt draft for hybrid key establishment in CMS|
|Dec 2021||Adopt draft for public keys for hybrid key establishment in PKIX certificates|
|Dec 2021||Adopt draft for PQC signatures in CMS|
|Dec 2021||Lightweight CMP profile sent to IESG for informational publication||
|Dec 2021||CMP updates sent to IESG for standards track publication||
|Dec 2021||Adopt draft for PQC signatures in PKIX certificates|
|Nov 2021||Header protection conventions sent to IESG for standards track publication||
|Oct 2021||Adopt draft for PQC KEM algorithms in CMS|
|Oct 2021||Adopt draft for PQC KEM public keys in PKIX certificates|
|Jul 2021||Adopt a draft for short-lived certificate conventions|
|Done||Adopt draft for rfc6712bis||
|Done||Adopt draft for rfc4210bis||
|Done||Adopt a draft for end-to-end email user agent guidance||