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Data minimization
draft-arkko-iab-data-minimization-principle-01

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Author Jari Arkko
Last updated 2022-03-07
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draft-arkko-iab-data-minimization-principle-01
Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                                March 2022
Expires: 7 September 2022

                           Data minimization
             draft-arkko-iab-data-minimization-principle-01

Abstract

   Communications security has been at the center of many security
   improvements in the Internet.  The goal has been to ensure that
   communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.
   This document recommends that this is no longer alone sufficient to
   cater for the security and privacy issues seen on the Internet today.
   For instance, it is often also necessary to protect against endpoints
   that are compromised, malicious, or whose interests simply do not
   align with the interests of users.  While such protection is
   difficult, there are some measures that can be taken.  It is
   important to consider the role of data passed to various parties -
   including the primary protocol participants - and balance the
   information given to them considering their roles and possible
   compromise of the information.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 September 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Discussion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Dealing with compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Related work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   Communications security has been at the center of many security
   improvements on the Internet.  The goal has been to ensure that
   communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.

   This has been exemplified in many aspects of IETF efforts, in the
   threat models [RFC3552], concerns about surveillance [RFC7258], IAB
   statements [Confidentiality], and the introduction of encryption in
   many protocols [RFC9000], [RFC7858], [RFC8484].  This has been very
   successful.  Advances in protecting most of our communications with
   strong cryptographic has resulted in much improved security.  Work on
   these advances continues to be a key part of IETF's security effort.

   This document recommends that further action is needed, however.  For
   instance, the possibility that endpoints are compromised, malicious,
   or have interests that do not align with the interests of users.
   Given the advances in communication seceurity, adversaries have had
   to increase their pressure against new avenues of attack.  New
   adversaries and risks have also arisen, e.g., due to increasing
   amount of information stored in various Internet services.

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   While such protection is difficult, there are some measures that can
   be taken.  This document focuses on the specific question of data
   passed to various parties - including the primary protocol
   participants.  What information given to any other party needs to
   depend on the role of that party, with the possibility of a
   compromised access to the information kept in mind.  This
   consideration is important particularly when designing new technology
   or planning new deployments.

   Careful control of information is also necessary from the perspective
   of technology evolution.  For instance, allowing a participant to
   unnecessarily collect or receive information may lead to a similar
   effect as described in [RFC8546] for protocols: over time,
   unnecessary information will get used with all the associated
   downsides, regardless of what deployment expectations there were
   during protocol design.  This may also lead to ossification, as
   systems start to expect they have access to the information.

2.  Recommendations

   The Principle of Least Privilege [PoLP] is applicable:

   "Every program and every user of the system should operate
    using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the
    job."

   In this context, it is recommended that the protocol participants
   minimize the information they share.  I.e., they should provide only
   the information to each other that is necessary for the function that
   is expected to be performed by the other party.

   This recommendation is of course very similar to the current approach
   to communications security.  As with communication security, we try
   to avoid providing too much information as it may be misused or leak
   through attacks.  The same principle applies not just to routers and
   potential attackers on path, but also many other services in the
   Internet, including servers that provide some function.

   Of course, participants may provide more information to each after
   careful consideration, e.g., information provided in exchange of some
   benefit, or to parties that are trusted by the participant.

3.  Discussion

   Information disclosure may relate to different types of protocol
   exchanges:

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   *  The interaction of an endpoint with the network, e.g., information
      they provide in any network attachment process or the wire images
      of the packets sent via the network.

   *  The interaction of an endpoint with intermediaries, in the meaning
      discussed by Thomson [I-D.thomson-tmi].

   *  The interaction of an endpoint with a service, such as a website
      or social networking function.

   *  End-to-end interactions between users, represented by applications
      running on their computers.

   It is also important to observe that information disclosure can
   appear in several ways.  It can be explicitly carried information,
   e.g., a data item in a message sent to a protocol participant.  But
   it can also be indirectly inferred information, such as message
   arrival times or patterns in the traffic flow.  Information may also
   be obtained from fingerprinting the protocol participants, in an
   effort to identify unique endpoints or users.  Finally, information
   gathered from a collaboration among several parties, e.g., websites
   and social media systems collaborating to identify visiting users
   [WP2021].

3.1.  Dealing with compromise

   Even with careful exposure of information, compromises may occur.  It
   is important to build defenses to protect information, even when some
   component in a system is or becomes compromised.  This may involve
   designs where no single party has all information such as with
   Oblivious DNS, cryptographic designs where a service such as with the
   recent IETF PPM effort, service side encryption of data at rest,
   confidential computing, and other mechanisms.

   Protocols can ensure that forward secrecy is provided, so that the
   damage resulting from a compromise of keying material has limited
   impact.

   On the client side, the client may trust that another party handles
   information appropriately, but take steps to ensure or verify that
   this is the case.  For instance, as discussed above, the client can
   encrypt a message only to the actual final recipient, even if the
   server holds our message before it is delivered.

   A corollary of the recommendation is that information should not be
   disclosed, stored, or routed in cleartext through services that do
   not need to have that information for the function they perform.

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   For instance, a transport connection between two components of a
   system is not an end-to-end connection even if it encompasses all the
   protocol layers up to the application layer.  It is not end-to-end,
   if the information or control function it carries extends beyond
   those components.  For instance, just because an e-mail server can
   read the contents of an e-mail message do not make it a legitimate
   recipient of the e-mail.

   The general topic of ensuring that protocol mechanisms stays
   evolvable and workable is covered in [I-D.iab-use-it-or-lose-it].
   But the associated methods for reducing fingerprinting possibilities
   probably deserve further study.
   [I-D.wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting] discusses one aspect of this.

3.2.  Related work

   Trends in attacks have been discussed at length in, for instance, in
   [RFC8980], [I-D.farrell-etm]
   [I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance],
   [I-D.lazanski-smart-users-internet], and others.

   Hardie [RFC8558] discusses path signals, i.e., messages to or from
   on-path elements to endpoints.  In the past, path signals were often
   implicit, e.g., network nodes interpreting in a particular way
   transport protocol headers originally intended for end-to-end
   consumption.  The document recommends a principle that implicit
   signals should be avoided and that explicit signals be used instead,
   and only when the signal's originator intends that it be used by the
   network elements on the path.

   Arkko, Kuhlewind, Pauly, and Hardie
   [I-D.iab-path-signals-collaboration] discuss the same topic, and
   extend the RFC 8558 principles with recommendations to ensure minimum
   set of parties, minimum information, and consent.

   Thomson [I-D.thomson-tmi] discusses the role intermediaries in the
   Internet architecture, at different layers of the stack.  For
   instance, a router is an intermediary, some parts of DNS
   infrastructure can be intermediaries, messaging gateways are
   intermediaries.  Thomson discusses when intermediaries are or are not
   an appropriate tool, and presents a number of principles relating to
   the use of intermediaries, e.g., deliberate selection of protocol
   participants or limiting the capabilities or information exposure
   related to the intermediaries.

   Trammel and Kuehlewind [RFC8546] discuss the concept of a "wire
   image" of a protocol.  This is an abstraction of the information
   available to an on-path non-participant in a networking protocol.  It

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   relates to the topic of non-participants interpreting information
   that is available to them in the "wire image" (or associated timing
   and other indirect information).  The issues are largely the same
   even for participants.  Even proper protocol participants may start
   to use information available to them, regardless of whether it was
   intended to that participant or simply relayed through them.

4.  Acknowledgements

   The author would like to thank the members of the IAB, and the
   participants of IETF SAAG WG, Model-T IAB program, and the 2019 IAB
   DEDR workshop that all discussed some aspects of these issues.  The
   author would like to acknowledge the significant contributions of
   Martin Thomson, Stephen Farrell, Mark McFadden, John Mattsson, Chris
   Wood, Dominique Lazanski, Eric Rescorla, Russ Housley, Robin Wilton,
   Mirja Kuehlewind, Tommy Pauly, Jaime Jimenez and Christian Huitema in
   discussions around this general problem area.

5.  Informative References

   [AmIUnique]
              INRIA, ., "Am I Unique?", https://amiunique.org , 2020.

   [Confidentiality]
              The Internet Architecture Board, ., "IAB Statement on
              Internet Confidentiality", https://www.iab.org/2014/11/14/
              iab-statement-on-internet-confidentiality/ , November
              2014.

   [Fingerprinting]
              Laperdrix, P., Bielova, N., Baudry, B., and G. Avoine,
              "Browser Fingerprinting: A survey", arXiv:1905.01051v2
              [cs.CR] 4 Nov 2019 , November 2019.

   [I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance]
              Arkko, J. and S. Farrell, "Internet Threat Model
              Guidance", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-arkko-
              arch-internet-threat-model-guidance-00, 12 July 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-arkko-arch-
              internet-threat-model-guidance-00.txt>.

   [I-D.farrell-etm]
              Farrell, S., "We're gonna need a bigger threat model",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-farrell-etm-03, 6
              July 2019, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-farrell-
              etm-03.txt>.

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   [I-D.iab-path-signals-collaboration]
              Arkko, J., Hardie, T., Pauly, T., and M. Kühlewind,
              "Considerations on Application - Network Collaboration
              Using Path Signals", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-iab-path-signals-collaboration-00, 7 March 2022,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-iab-path-signals-
              collaboration-00.txt>.

   [I-D.iab-use-it-or-lose-it]
              Thomson, M. and T. Pauly, "Long-Term Viability of Protocol
              Extension Mechanisms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-iab-use-it-or-lose-it-04, 12 October 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-iab-use-it-or-lose-
              it-04.txt>.

   [I-D.lazanski-smart-users-internet]
              Lazanski, D., "An Internet for Users Again", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-lazanski-smart-users-
              internet-00, 8 July 2019,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-lazanski-smart-
              users-internet-00.txt>.

   [I-D.thomson-tmi]
              Thomson, M., "Principles for the Involvement of
              Intermediaries in Internet Protocols", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-thomson-tmi-02, 6 July 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-thomson-tmi-
              02.txt>.

   [I-D.wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting]
              Goldberg, I., Wang, T., and C. A. Wood, "Network-Based
              Website Fingerprinting", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting-00, 4 November
              2019, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-wood-pearg-
              website-fingerprinting-00.txt>.

   [PoLP]     Saltzer, J. and M. Schroader, "The Protection of
              Information in Computer Systems", Fourth ACM Symposium on
              Operating System Principles , October 1975.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

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   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

   [RFC8546]  Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "The Wire Image of a
              Network Protocol", RFC 8546, DOI 10.17487/RFC8546, April
              2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8546>.

   [RFC8558]  Hardie, T., Ed., "Transport Protocol Path Signals",
              RFC 8558, DOI 10.17487/RFC8558, April 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8558>.

   [RFC8980]  Arkko, J. and T. Hardie, "Report from the IAB Workshop on
              Design Expectations vs. Deployment Reality in Protocol
              Development", RFC 8980, DOI 10.17487/RFC8980, February
              2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8980>.

   [RFC9000]  Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
              Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.

   [WP2021]   Fowler, Geoffrey A., "There’s no escape from Facebook,
              even if you don’t use it", Washington Post , August 2021.

Author's Address

   Jari Arkko
   Ericsson
   Valitie 1B
   FI- Kauniainen
   Finland
   Email: jari.arkko@piuha.net

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