Data minimization
draft-arkko-iab-data-minimization-principle-01
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| Author | Jari Arkko | ||
| Last updated | 2022-03-07 | ||
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draft-arkko-iab-data-minimization-principle-01
Network Working Group J. Arkko
Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Informational March 2022
Expires: 7 September 2022
Data minimization
draft-arkko-iab-data-minimization-principle-01
Abstract
Communications security has been at the center of many security
improvements in the Internet. The goal has been to ensure that
communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.
This document recommends that this is no longer alone sufficient to
cater for the security and privacy issues seen on the Internet today.
For instance, it is often also necessary to protect against endpoints
that are compromised, malicious, or whose interests simply do not
align with the interests of users. While such protection is
difficult, there are some measures that can be taken. It is
important to consider the role of data passed to various parties -
including the primary protocol participants - and balance the
information given to them considering their roles and possible
compromise of the information.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 September 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Dealing with compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
Communications security has been at the center of many security
improvements on the Internet. The goal has been to ensure that
communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.
This has been exemplified in many aspects of IETF efforts, in the
threat models [RFC3552], concerns about surveillance [RFC7258], IAB
statements [Confidentiality], and the introduction of encryption in
many protocols [RFC9000], [RFC7858], [RFC8484]. This has been very
successful. Advances in protecting most of our communications with
strong cryptographic has resulted in much improved security. Work on
these advances continues to be a key part of IETF's security effort.
This document recommends that further action is needed, however. For
instance, the possibility that endpoints are compromised, malicious,
or have interests that do not align with the interests of users.
Given the advances in communication seceurity, adversaries have had
to increase their pressure against new avenues of attack. New
adversaries and risks have also arisen, e.g., due to increasing
amount of information stored in various Internet services.
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While such protection is difficult, there are some measures that can
be taken. This document focuses on the specific question of data
passed to various parties - including the primary protocol
participants. What information given to any other party needs to
depend on the role of that party, with the possibility of a
compromised access to the information kept in mind. This
consideration is important particularly when designing new technology
or planning new deployments.
Careful control of information is also necessary from the perspective
of technology evolution. For instance, allowing a participant to
unnecessarily collect or receive information may lead to a similar
effect as described in [RFC8546] for protocols: over time,
unnecessary information will get used with all the associated
downsides, regardless of what deployment expectations there were
during protocol design. This may also lead to ossification, as
systems start to expect they have access to the information.
2. Recommendations
The Principle of Least Privilege [PoLP] is applicable:
"Every program and every user of the system should operate
using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the
job."
In this context, it is recommended that the protocol participants
minimize the information they share. I.e., they should provide only
the information to each other that is necessary for the function that
is expected to be performed by the other party.
This recommendation is of course very similar to the current approach
to communications security. As with communication security, we try
to avoid providing too much information as it may be misused or leak
through attacks. The same principle applies not just to routers and
potential attackers on path, but also many other services in the
Internet, including servers that provide some function.
Of course, participants may provide more information to each after
careful consideration, e.g., information provided in exchange of some
benefit, or to parties that are trusted by the participant.
3. Discussion
Information disclosure may relate to different types of protocol
exchanges:
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* The interaction of an endpoint with the network, e.g., information
they provide in any network attachment process or the wire images
of the packets sent via the network.
* The interaction of an endpoint with intermediaries, in the meaning
discussed by Thomson [I-D.thomson-tmi].
* The interaction of an endpoint with a service, such as a website
or social networking function.
* End-to-end interactions between users, represented by applications
running on their computers.
It is also important to observe that information disclosure can
appear in several ways. It can be explicitly carried information,
e.g., a data item in a message sent to a protocol participant. But
it can also be indirectly inferred information, such as message
arrival times or patterns in the traffic flow. Information may also
be obtained from fingerprinting the protocol participants, in an
effort to identify unique endpoints or users. Finally, information
gathered from a collaboration among several parties, e.g., websites
and social media systems collaborating to identify visiting users
[WP2021].
3.1. Dealing with compromise
Even with careful exposure of information, compromises may occur. It
is important to build defenses to protect information, even when some
component in a system is or becomes compromised. This may involve
designs where no single party has all information such as with
Oblivious DNS, cryptographic designs where a service such as with the
recent IETF PPM effort, service side encryption of data at rest,
confidential computing, and other mechanisms.
Protocols can ensure that forward secrecy is provided, so that the
damage resulting from a compromise of keying material has limited
impact.
On the client side, the client may trust that another party handles
information appropriately, but take steps to ensure or verify that
this is the case. For instance, as discussed above, the client can
encrypt a message only to the actual final recipient, even if the
server holds our message before it is delivered.
A corollary of the recommendation is that information should not be
disclosed, stored, or routed in cleartext through services that do
not need to have that information for the function they perform.
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For instance, a transport connection between two components of a
system is not an end-to-end connection even if it encompasses all the
protocol layers up to the application layer. It is not end-to-end,
if the information or control function it carries extends beyond
those components. For instance, just because an e-mail server can
read the contents of an e-mail message do not make it a legitimate
recipient of the e-mail.
The general topic of ensuring that protocol mechanisms stays
evolvable and workable is covered in [I-D.iab-use-it-or-lose-it].
But the associated methods for reducing fingerprinting possibilities
probably deserve further study.
[I-D.wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting] discusses one aspect of this.
3.2. Related work
Trends in attacks have been discussed at length in, for instance, in
[RFC8980], [I-D.farrell-etm]
[I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance],
[I-D.lazanski-smart-users-internet], and others.
Hardie [RFC8558] discusses path signals, i.e., messages to or from
on-path elements to endpoints. In the past, path signals were often
implicit, e.g., network nodes interpreting in a particular way
transport protocol headers originally intended for end-to-end
consumption. The document recommends a principle that implicit
signals should be avoided and that explicit signals be used instead,
and only when the signal's originator intends that it be used by the
network elements on the path.
Arkko, Kuhlewind, Pauly, and Hardie
[I-D.iab-path-signals-collaboration] discuss the same topic, and
extend the RFC 8558 principles with recommendations to ensure minimum
set of parties, minimum information, and consent.
Thomson [I-D.thomson-tmi] discusses the role intermediaries in the
Internet architecture, at different layers of the stack. For
instance, a router is an intermediary, some parts of DNS
infrastructure can be intermediaries, messaging gateways are
intermediaries. Thomson discusses when intermediaries are or are not
an appropriate tool, and presents a number of principles relating to
the use of intermediaries, e.g., deliberate selection of protocol
participants or limiting the capabilities or information exposure
related to the intermediaries.
Trammel and Kuehlewind [RFC8546] discuss the concept of a "wire
image" of a protocol. This is an abstraction of the information
available to an on-path non-participant in a networking protocol. It
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relates to the topic of non-participants interpreting information
that is available to them in the "wire image" (or associated timing
and other indirect information). The issues are largely the same
even for participants. Even proper protocol participants may start
to use information available to them, regardless of whether it was
intended to that participant or simply relayed through them.
4. Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the members of the IAB, and the
participants of IETF SAAG WG, Model-T IAB program, and the 2019 IAB
DEDR workshop that all discussed some aspects of these issues. The
author would like to acknowledge the significant contributions of
Martin Thomson, Stephen Farrell, Mark McFadden, John Mattsson, Chris
Wood, Dominique Lazanski, Eric Rescorla, Russ Housley, Robin Wilton,
Mirja Kuehlewind, Tommy Pauly, Jaime Jimenez and Christian Huitema in
discussions around this general problem area.
5. Informative References
[AmIUnique]
INRIA, ., "Am I Unique?", https://amiunique.org , 2020.
[Confidentiality]
The Internet Architecture Board, ., "IAB Statement on
Internet Confidentiality", https://www.iab.org/2014/11/14/
iab-statement-on-internet-confidentiality/ , November
2014.
[Fingerprinting]
Laperdrix, P., Bielova, N., Baudry, B., and G. Avoine,
"Browser Fingerprinting: A survey", arXiv:1905.01051v2
[cs.CR] 4 Nov 2019 , November 2019.
[I-D.arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-guidance]
Arkko, J. and S. Farrell, "Internet Threat Model
Guidance", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-arkko-
arch-internet-threat-model-guidance-00, 12 July 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-arkko-arch-
internet-threat-model-guidance-00.txt>.
[I-D.farrell-etm]
Farrell, S., "We're gonna need a bigger threat model",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-farrell-etm-03, 6
July 2019, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-farrell-
etm-03.txt>.
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[I-D.iab-path-signals-collaboration]
Arkko, J., Hardie, T., Pauly, T., and M. Kühlewind,
"Considerations on Application - Network Collaboration
Using Path Signals", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-iab-path-signals-collaboration-00, 7 March 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-iab-path-signals-
collaboration-00.txt>.
[I-D.iab-use-it-or-lose-it]
Thomson, M. and T. Pauly, "Long-Term Viability of Protocol
Extension Mechanisms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-iab-use-it-or-lose-it-04, 12 October 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-iab-use-it-or-lose-
it-04.txt>.
[I-D.lazanski-smart-users-internet]
Lazanski, D., "An Internet for Users Again", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-lazanski-smart-users-
internet-00, 8 July 2019,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-lazanski-smart-
users-internet-00.txt>.
[I-D.thomson-tmi]
Thomson, M., "Principles for the Involvement of
Intermediaries in Internet Protocols", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-thomson-tmi-02, 6 July 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-thomson-tmi-
02.txt>.
[I-D.wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting]
Goldberg, I., Wang, T., and C. A. Wood, "Network-Based
Website Fingerprinting", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-wood-pearg-website-fingerprinting-00, 4 November
2019, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-wood-pearg-
website-fingerprinting-00.txt>.
[PoLP] Saltzer, J. and M. Schroader, "The Protection of
Information in Computer Systems", Fourth ACM Symposium on
Operating System Principles , October 1975.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
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[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
(DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.
[RFC8546] Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "The Wire Image of a
Network Protocol", RFC 8546, DOI 10.17487/RFC8546, April
2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8546>.
[RFC8558] Hardie, T., Ed., "Transport Protocol Path Signals",
RFC 8558, DOI 10.17487/RFC8558, April 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8558>.
[RFC8980] Arkko, J. and T. Hardie, "Report from the IAB Workshop on
Design Expectations vs. Deployment Reality in Protocol
Development", RFC 8980, DOI 10.17487/RFC8980, February
2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8980>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
[WP2021] Fowler, Geoffrey A., "There’s no escape from Facebook,
even if you don’t use it", Washington Post , August 2021.
Author's Address
Jari Arkko
Ericsson
Valitie 1B
FI- Kauniainen
Finland
Email: jari.arkko@piuha.net
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