The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Protocol
draft-barnes-mls-protocol-01
| Document | Type | Replaced Internet-Draft (mls WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2018-08-07 (latest revision 2018-07-02) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-mls-protocol | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
pdf
htmlized
bibtex
|
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| Stream | WG state | Adopted by a WG | |
| Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-mls-protocol | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-barnes-mls-protocol-01.txt
Abstract
Messaging applications are increasingly making use of end-to-end security mechanisms to ensure that messages are only accessible to the communicating endpoints, and not to any servers involved in delivering messages. Establishing keys to provide such protections is challenging for group chat settings, in which more than two participants need to agree on a key but may not be online at the same time. In this document, we specify a key establishment protocol that provides efficient asynchronous group key establishment with forward secrecy and post-compromise security for groups in size ranging from two to thousands.
Authors
Richard Barnes
(rlb@ipv.sx)
Jon Millican
(jmillican@fb.com)
Emad Omara
(emadomara@google.com)
Katriel Cohn-Gordon
(me@katriel.co.uk)
Raphael Robert
(raphael@wire.com)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)