Countersigning COSE Envelopes in Transparency Services
draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-03
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Henk Birkholz , Maik Riechert , Antoine Delignat-Lavaud , Cedric Fournet | ||
| Last updated | 2023-11-06 (Latest revision 2023-04-26) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
A transparent and authentic Transparent Registry service in support of a supply chain's integrity, transparency, and trust requires all peers that contribute to the Registry operations to be trustworthy and authentic. In this document, a countersigning variant is specified that enables trust assertions on Merkle-tree based operations for global supply chain registries. A generic procedure for producing payloads to be signed and validated is defined and leverages solutions and principles from the Concise Signing and Encryption (COSE) space.
Authors
Henk Birkholz
Maik Riechert
Antoine Delignat-Lavaud
Cedric Fournet
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)