DNS-over-TLS for insecure delegations
draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-for-insecure-delegations-01

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Last updated 2019-03-11
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Network Working Group                                        M. Bretelle
Internet-Draft                                                  Facebook
Intended status: Standards Track                          March 11, 2019
Expires: September 12, 2019

                 DNS-over-TLS for insecure delegations
         draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-for-insecure-delegations-01

Abstract

   This document describes an alternative mechanism to DANE ([RFC6698])
   in order to authenticate a DNS-over-TLS (DoT [RFC7858]) authoritative
   server by not making DNSSEC a hard requirement, making DoT server
   authentication available for insecure delegations.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Authenticating an insecure delegation . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Public Key Infrastructure (PKIX)  . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Subject Public Key Info (SPKI)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.3.  Authenticating from the parent  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.3.1.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  DSPKI Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  The DSPKI Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.1.1.  DSPKI RDATA Wire Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   This document describes an alternative mechanism to DANE ([RFC6698])
   as described in [I-D.bortzmeyer-dprive-resolver-to-auth] Section 2
   extending the authentication of DNS over Transport Layer Security
   (DoT) [RFC7858] to insecure delegations and therefore enabling the
   onboarding of DoT authoritative servers without the requirement for
   the authorities to support DNSSEC ([RFC4033], [RFC4034], and
   [RFC4035]).  To do so, this document introduce the Delegation Subject
   Public Key Info (DSPKI) resource record, its purpose, usage and
   format.

2.  Terminology

   A server that supports DNS-over-TLS is called a "DoT server" to
   differentiate it from a "DNS Server" (one that provides DNS service
   over any other protocol), likewise, a client that supports this
   protocol is called a "DoT client"

   A secure delegation ([RFC4956] Section 2) is a signed name containing
   a delegation (NS RRset), and a signed DS RRset, signifying a
   delegation to a signed zone.

   An insecure delegation ([RFC4956] Section 2) is a signed name
   containing a delegation (NS RRset), but lacking a DS RRset,
   signifying a delegation to an unsigned subzone.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP

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   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Authenticating an insecure delegation
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