Hybrid Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Methods (PQ KEM) for Transport Layer Security 1.2 (TLS)
draft-campagna-tls-bike-sike-hybrid-07
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
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Authors | Matt Campagna , Eric Crockett | ||
Last updated | 2022-03-06 (Latest revision 2021-09-02) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Hybrid key exchange refers to executing two independent key exchanges and feeding the two resulting shared secrets into a Pseudo Random Function (PRF), with the goal of deriving a secret which is as secure as the stronger of the two key exchanges. This document describes new hybrid key exchange schemes for the Transport Layer Security 1.2 (TLS) protocol. The key exchange schemes are based on combining Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) with a post-quantum key encapsulation method (PQ KEM) using the existing TLS PRF.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)