BIKE and SIKE Hybrid Key Exchange Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-campagna-tls-bike-sike-hybrid-00

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Internet Engineering Task Force                              M. Campagna
Internet-Draft                                               E. Crockett
Intended status: Experimental                                        AWS
Expires: September 28, 2019                               March 27, 2019

  BIKE and SIKE Hybrid Key Exchange Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
                             Security (TLS)
                 draft-campagna-tls-bike-sike-hybrid-00

Abstract

   This document describes new hybrid key exchange schemes for the
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which are based on combining
   Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) with one of the Bit Flipping Key
   Exchange (BIKE) or the Supersingular Isogeny Key Exchange (SIKE)
   schemes.  In particular, this document specifies the use of BIKE or
   SIKE in combination with ECDHE as a hybrid key agreement in a TLS 1.2
   handshake, together with the use of ECDSA or RSA for authentication.
   Hybrid key exchange refers to executing two separate key exchanges
   and subsequently feeding the two resulting shared secrets into the
   existing TLS Pseudo Random Function (PRF), in order to derive a
   master secret.

Context

   This draft is experimental.  It is intended to define hybrid key
   exchanges in sufficient detail to allow independent experimentations
   to interoperate.  While the NIST standardization process is still a
   few years away from being complete, we know that many TLS users have
   highly sensitive workloads that would benefit from the speculative
   additional protections provided by quantum-safe key exchanges.  These
   key exchanges are likely to change through the standardization
   process.  Early experiments serve to understand the real-world
   performance characteristics of these quantum-safe schemes as well as
   provide speculative additional confidentiality assurances against a
   future adversary with a large-scale quantum computer.

   Comments are solicited and can be sent to all authors at
   mcampagna@amazon.com.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute

Campagna & Crockett    Expires September 28, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         Hybrid Key Exchange for TLS            March 2019

   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Key Exchange Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Key Encapsulation Method (KEM)  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  ECDHE_BIKE_[SIG]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  ECDHE_SIKE_[SIG]  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Hybrid Premaster Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Concatenated premaster secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  TLS Extensions for BIKE and SIKE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Data Structures and Computations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Client Hello Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.1.1.  When these extensions are sent  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.1.2.  Meaning of these extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.1.3.  Structure of these extensions . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.1.4.  Actions of the sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.5.  Actions of the receiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.6.  Supported BIKE Parameter Extension  . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.1.7.  Supported SIKE Parameter Extension  . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11