BIKE and SIKE Hybrid Key Exchange Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-campagna-tls-bike-sike-hybrid-00
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Active Internet-Draft (individual)
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Matt Campagna
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Eric Crockett
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2019-03-27
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Internet Engineering Task Force M. Campagna
Internet-Draft E. Crockett
Intended status: Experimental AWS
Expires: September 28, 2019 March 27, 2019
BIKE and SIKE Hybrid Key Exchange Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)
draft-campagna-tls-bike-sike-hybrid-00
Abstract
This document describes new hybrid key exchange schemes for the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which are based on combining
Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) with one of the Bit Flipping Key
Exchange (BIKE) or the Supersingular Isogeny Key Exchange (SIKE)
schemes. In particular, this document specifies the use of BIKE or
SIKE in combination with ECDHE as a hybrid key agreement in a TLS 1.2
handshake, together with the use of ECDSA or RSA for authentication.
Hybrid key exchange refers to executing two separate key exchanges
and subsequently feeding the two resulting shared secrets into the
existing TLS Pseudo Random Function (PRF), in order to derive a
master secret.
Context
This draft is experimental. It is intended to define hybrid key
exchanges in sufficient detail to allow independent experimentations
to interoperate. While the NIST standardization process is still a
few years away from being complete, we know that many TLS users have
highly sensitive workloads that would benefit from the speculative
additional protections provided by quantum-safe key exchanges. These
key exchanges are likely to change through the standardization
process. Early experiments serve to understand the real-world
performance characteristics of these quantum-safe schemes as well as
provide speculative additional confidentiality assurances against a
future adversary with a large-scale quantum computer.
Comments are solicited and can be sent to all authors at
mcampagna@amazon.com.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
Campagna & Crockett Expires September 28, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Hybrid Key Exchange for TLS March 2019
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Key Exchange Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Key Encapsulation Method (KEM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. ECDHE_BIKE_[SIG] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. ECDHE_SIKE_[SIG] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Hybrid Premaster Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Concatenated premaster secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. TLS Extensions for BIKE and SIKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Data Structures and Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Client Hello Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.1. When these extensions are sent . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.2. Meaning of these extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.3. Structure of these extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.4. Actions of the sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.5. Actions of the receiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.6. Supported BIKE Parameter Extension . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.7. Supported SIKE Parameter Extension . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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