HTTPS Token Binding and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
draft-campbell-tokbind-tls-term-00
|
| Document |
Type |
|
Active Internet-Draft (individual)
|
|
Last updated |
|
2017-01-11
|
|
Stream |
|
(None)
|
|
Intended RFC status |
|
(None)
|
|
Formats |
|
plain text
pdf
xml
html
bibtex
|
| Stream |
Stream state |
|
(No stream defined) |
|
Consensus Boilerplate |
|
Unknown
|
|
RFC Editor Note |
|
(None)
|
| IESG |
IESG state |
|
I-D Exists
|
|
Telechat date |
|
|
|
Responsible AD |
|
(None)
|
|
Send notices to |
|
(None)
|
Internet Engineering Task Force B. Campbell
Internet-Draft Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track January 11, 2017
Expires: July 15, 2017
HTTPS Token Binding and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
draft-campbell-tokbind-tls-term-00
Abstract
This document defines an HTTP header field that enables a TLS
terminating reverse proxy to convey the information a backend server
needs in order for it to process and validate a Token Binding Message
sent by the client.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 15, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Campbell Expires July 15, 2017 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Token Binding and TLS Termination January 2017
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The Token-Binding-Context HTTP Header Field . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix B. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix C. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
Token Binding over HTTP [I-D.ietf-tokbind-https] provides a mechanism
that enables HTTP servers to cryptographically bind cookies and other
security tokens to TLS [RFC5246] connections. When Token Binding is
negotiated in the TLS handshake [I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation] the
client sends an encoded Token Binding Message
[I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] as a header in each HTTP request, which
proves possession of one or more private keys held by the client.
The public portion of the keys are represented in the Token Binding
IDs of the Token Binding Message and for each one there is a
signature over some data, which includes the exported keying material
[RFC5705] of the TLS connection. An HTTP server issuing cookies or
other security tokens can associate them with the Token Binding ID,
which ensures those tokens cannot be used successfully over a
different TLS connection or by a different client than the one to
which they were issued.
A fairly common deployment architecture for HTTPS applications is to
have the backend HTTP application servers sit behind a reverse proxy
that terminates TLS. The proxy is accessible to the internet and
dispatches client requests to the appropriate backend server within a
private network. The backend servers are not directly accessible
outside the private network and are only reachable through the
reverse proxy. The details of such deployments are typically opaque
to clients who make requests to the proxy server and see responses as
though they originated from the proxy server itself. TLS connections
for HTTPS are established between each client and the reverse proxy
server.
Token Binding facilitates a binding of security tokens to a key held
by the client by way of the TLS connection between that client and
the sever. In a TLS terminating reverse proxy deployment, however,
Show full document text