HTTPS Token Binding and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
draft-campbell-tokbind-tls-term-00

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Internet Engineering Task Force                              B. Campbell
Internet-Draft                                             Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track                        January 11, 2017
Expires: July 15, 2017

        HTTPS Token Binding and TLS Terminating Reverse Proxies
                   draft-campbell-tokbind-tls-term-00

Abstract

   This document defines an HTTP header field that enables a TLS
   terminating reverse proxy to convey the information a backend server
   needs in order for it to process and validate a Token Binding Message
   sent by the client.

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   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Campbell                  Expires July 15, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft      Token Binding and TLS Termination       January 2017

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  The Token-Binding-Context HTTP Header Field . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix B.  Open Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix C.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   Token Binding over HTTP [I-D.ietf-tokbind-https] provides a mechanism
   that enables HTTP servers to cryptographically bind cookies and other
   security tokens to TLS [RFC5246] connections.  When Token Binding is
   negotiated in the TLS handshake [I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation] the
   client sends an encoded Token Binding Message
   [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] as a header in each HTTP request, which
   proves possession of one or more private keys held by the client.
   The public portion of the keys are represented in the Token Binding
   IDs of the Token Binding Message and for each one there is a
   signature over some data, which includes the exported keying material
   [RFC5705] of the TLS connection.  An HTTP server issuing cookies or
   other security tokens can associate them with the Token Binding ID,
   which ensures those tokens cannot be used successfully over a
   different TLS connection or by a different client than the one to
   which they were issued.

   A fairly common deployment architecture for HTTPS applications is to
   have the backend HTTP application servers sit behind a reverse proxy
   that terminates TLS.  The proxy is accessible to the internet and
   dispatches client requests to the appropriate backend server within a
   private network.  The backend servers are not directly accessible
   outside the private network and are only reachable through the
   reverse proxy.  The details of such deployments are typically opaque
   to clients who make requests to the proxy server and see responses as
   though they originated from the proxy server itself.  TLS connections
   for HTTPS are established between each client and the reverse proxy
   server.

   Token Binding facilitates a binding of security tokens to a key held
   by the client by way of the TLS connection between that client and
   the sever.  In a TLS terminating reverse proxy deployment, however,
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