Impact of TLS 1.3 to Operational Network Security Practices
draft-camwinget-tls-proxy-impact-00

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TODO Working Group                                         N. Cam-Winget
Internet-Draft                                                   E. Wang
Intended status: Informational                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Expires: May 7, 2020                                          R. Danyliw
                                          Software Engineering Institute
                                                               R. DuToit
                                                                Symantec
                                                       November 04, 2019

      Impact of TLS 1.3 to Operational Network Security Practices
                  draft-camwinget-tls-proxy-impact-00

Abstract

   Network-based security solutions are used by enterprises, the public
   sector, internet-service providers, and cloud-service providers to
   both complement and enhance host-based security solutions.  As the
   most widely deployed protocol to secure communication, these network-
   based security solutions must necessarily interact with TLS.  This
   document describes this interaction for current operational security
   practices and notes the impact of TLS 1.3 on them.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

Cam-Winget, et al.         Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               tls-1-3-impact                November 2019

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  How TLS is used to enable Network-Based Security Solutions  .   4
     3.1.  Passive TLS Inspection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.1.  OP-1. Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) Enforcement (via
               header inspection). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.2.  OP-2. Network Behavior Analytics  . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.1.3.  OP-3. Crypto and Security Policy Compliance (server)    6
       3.1.4.  OP-4. Crypto and Security Policy Compliance (client)    7
     3.2.  Outbound TLS Proxy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.1.  OP-5: Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) Enforcement (via
               payload inspection) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.2.  OP-6: Data Loss Prevention Compliance . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.3.  OP-7: Granular Network Segmentation . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.4.  OP-8: Network-based Threat Protection (client)  . . .   9
       3.2.5.  OP-9: Protecting Challenging End Points . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.6.  OP-10: Content Injection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.3.  Inbound TLS Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.3.1.  OP-11: TLS offloading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.3.2.  OP-12. Content distribution and application load
               balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.3.3.  OP-13: Network-based Threat Protection (server) . . .  12
       3.3.4.  OP-14: Full Packet Capture  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.3.5.  OP-15: Application Layer Gateway (ALG)  . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Changes in TLS v1.3 Relevant to Security Operations . . . . .  13
     4.1.  Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  Encrypted Server Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Appendix A: Summary Impact to Operational Practices with TLS
       1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
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