A Compromised AI Server Must Not Become a Map of the Enterprise: Non-Joinable Vaults and Output-Release Finality
draft-das-enterprise-ai-output-finality-02
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draft-das-enterprise-ai-output-finality-02
Network Working Group S. Das
Internet-Draft Independent Inventor
Intended status: Informational 6 September 2026
Expires: 10 March 2027
A Compromised AI Server Must Not Become a Map of the Enterprise: Non-
Joinable Vaults and Output-Release Finality
draft-das-enterprise-ai-output-finality-02
Abstract
This document specifies an architectural framework and metadata
profile to mitigate "enterprise-future reconstruction" risks in
multi-system Artificial Intelligence (AI) workloads. Traditional
access controls fail when an AI environment correlates independently
authorized, disjointed data fragments to infer unrecorded strategic
intent. This profile introduces two protocol mechanisms: Technical
Non-Joinability, enforced via a session-bound Reconstruction
Authorization Object (RAO) that limits relational data binding, and
Technical Non-Completability, enforced via an Output Release Boundary
that requires verifiable validation evidence before an AI token or
tool invocation can achieve external effect. This specification
defines the token schemas, cryptographic bindings, and boundary
validation sequences required to isolate context reconstruction
domains without modifying underlying enterprise datastores.
Readers are respectfully encouraged to review Section 4 and Section 5
in full, as those sections set out the complete problem description
and motivating scenarios and should not be skipped.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 March 2027.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. How Cyber Theft Changed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Past: Steal the Store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Present: Steal the Session and the Connector . . . . . . 6
2.3. Future: Steal the Meaning, Then the Act . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Threat Model and Need of the Hour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Industrial Applicability for Frontier Enterprise AI . . . . . 12
6.1. What "Enterprise Seat" Concentrates . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2. How a Frontier Runtime Would Use This Profile . . . . . . 13
6.3. Anthropic-Class Tool and Computer-Use Seats . . . . . . . 13
6.4. OpenAI-Class Enterprise, GPTs, and Agent Runtime . . . . 14
6.5. Why Labs Should Care Commercially . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Existing Solutions and What They Do Not Bind . . . . . . . . 14
7.1. IAM, RBAC, and Application Credentials . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. DLP and Output Classifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.3. Tokenization, Hashing, and Field Encryption . . . . . . . 15
7.4. Confidential Computing and Enclaves . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.5. Clean Rooms and Data-Sharing Enclaves . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.6. RAG Isolation and Prompt Firewalls . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.7. What This Profile Adds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Three Pillars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.1. Decomposition of Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.2. Mandatory Mediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.3. Technical Non-Completability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Technical Non-Joinability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. Session-Bound Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1. Disclosure Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. Inference-Channel Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11. Sealed Output and Release Boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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13. Protocol Pseudocode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
13.1. Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
13.2. Seal, Verify, Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
14. Industrial Relevance and Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
14.1. Enterprise Copilot on CRM, Code, and Mail . . . . . . . 20
14.2. Healthcare and Payer Assistants . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
14.3. Banking, Treasury, and Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
14.4. Legal, M&A, and Board Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
14.5. Multi-Tenant SaaS AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
14.6. Regulated Clean-Room Analytics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
14.7. Pharma, Device, and Clinical-Trial Operations . . . . . 22
14.8. Semiconductor, Automotive, and Product R&D . . . . . . . 22
14.9. Energy, Grid, and OT-Adjacent Assistants . . . . . . . . 22
14.10. Public-Sector and National-Security Enterprise Seats . . 22
14.11. Insurers and Claims-Triage Agents . . . . . . . . . . . 22
14.12. What Operators Should Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
15. Mapping Frontier Product Features to This Profile . . . . . . 23
15.1. Connectors and MCP Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
15.2. Projects, Spaces, and Team Workspaces . . . . . . . . . 23
15.3. Memory and Persistent Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
15.4. Computer Use and Browser Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
15.5. Share Chat, Export, and API Log Sinks . . . . . . . . . 24
16. JSON Interoperability Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
16.1. ReconstructionAuthorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
16.2. Sealed Candidate Output and Receipt . . . . . . . . . . 24
16.3. Output Release Capability and Boundary Verify . . . . . 25
16.4. Vault-Local Release Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
17. End-to-End Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
18. Worked Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
18.1. Allow: Ticket Summary to Internal Counsel . . . . . . . 27
18.2. Deny: Future-Map Report to External Destination . . . . 27
18.3. Deny: Memory Persistence of a Prohibited Join . . . . . 27
19. Enterprise-AI Threat Catalog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
20. Illustrative Example: When a Server Breach Becomes a Breach of
the Enterprise's Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
21. Deployment Topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
22. Addressing Latency and Legacy-System Objections . . . . . . . 32
22.1. Hot Path and Cold Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
22.2. Independent Vault Decisions Need Not Be Serial . . . . . 33
22.3. Reconstruction Is Minimum-Necessary, Not Enterprise-Wide
Joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
22.4. The AI Model Does Not Need to Run the Multi-Vault
Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
22.5. Legacy-System Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
22.6. Incremental Migration of Existing Databases . . . . . . 35
22.7. Latency Observation from the Runnable Reference
Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
22.8. Non-Bypassability Is the Final Requirement . . . . . . . 36
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23. Failure, Poison, and Alternate Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
24. Relationship to the Other DAS Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . 37
25. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
26. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
27. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
28. Intellectual Property Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
29. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
30. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
31. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix A. Reference Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A.1. Implemented Protected Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.2. What the Archive Demonstrates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.3. Important Security Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.4. Relationship to the Separate Agentic Tool-Binding
Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.5. Running the Reference Implementation Locally . . . . . . 46
Appendix B. Standards Review FAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B.1. Why is this an Internet protocol problem rather than merely
an enterprise database architecture? . . . . . . . . . . 47
B.2. Why not just use ABAC, RBAC, ACLs, or a database join
policy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
B.3. Is the Relationship-Mapping Vault just another
database? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
B.4. What happens when one required vault is unavailable? . . 50
B.5. What is the consistency model across multiple vaults? . . 51
B.6. How are concurrent releases from multiple vaults made
sufficiently atomic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
B.7. What exactly does "ephemeral reconstruction" mean? . . . 52
B.8. Can an AI infer a forbidden relationship even if the
Relationship-Mapping Vault never provides it? . . . . . 52
B.9. What if several individually permitted outputs collectively
reveal a prohibited relationship? . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B.10. Who decides whether an association is ethically or legally
permissible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B.11. Could this architecture itself be used for censorship or
excessive surveillance? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B.12. Who is allowed to see the association graph? . . . . . . 54
B.13. Could the Relationship-Mapping Vault itself become a
surveillance super-database? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
B.14. What happens if the Relationship-Mapping Vault is
compromised? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
B.15. Why not just use a data clean room? . . . . . . . . . . . 55
B.16. What exactly could be standardized by the IETF? . . . . . 55
Changes Since draft-das-enterprise-ai-output-finality-01 (and Since
-00) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
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1. Introduction
The next enterprise-AI security war will not be fought only over
model intelligence. It will be fought over who may join information
into meaning, and who may turn that meaning into action. That
framing is developed in version 2 of "Why the Next AI War Will Be Won
on Isolation, Not Intelligence" [DAS-ISOLATION], which defines
enterprise-future mapping as reconstruction of strategy and probable
action from distributed weak signals, and argues that isolation of
join authority and isolation of effectuation matter more than another
increment of model IQ. This document is the protocol profile for
that split.
The path inside a hosted or on-prem assistant is now:
mail + CRM + git + finance + memory
-> frontier model / agent runtime
-> join fragments into new meaning
-> text / tool / computer-use / mail
-> external consequence
This document controls the two arrows conventional security still
treats as the model's private business. Identity, content, and the
map that joins them MUST NOT become one object on the model host
outside an authorized reconstruction session. A generated Candidate
Output MUST NOT become mail, file, API, payment, screen, or MCP
invoke merely because the model finished.
The profile uses the execution-finality chain in
[I-D.das-6g-finality] and the tool-dispatch sink in
[I-D.das-agentic]. It adds the enterprise predicates those drafts do
not specify: independently controlled vaults, Technical Non-
Joinability, a Reconstruction Authorization Object, disclosure and
inference-channel budgets, Sealed Candidate Outputs, a Protected
Output Validation Receipt committed before capability issuance, and
an Output Release Boundary.
2. How Cyber Theft Changed
A protocol that asks enterprises and frontier labs to change their
assistant runtime has to say why last decade's controls are the wrong
picture of the incident. The incident class moved. The controls did
not.
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2.1. Past: Steal the Store
The historical breach was a copy of what already existed. An
attacker took a file share, a customer database, a card dump, or a
backup tape. Harm scaled with volume: more rows, more accounts, more
records for sale. Defense scaled the same way: perimeter, patch,
encrypt-at-rest, vault the database password, watch the egress link
for a bulk transfer.
That model had a hidden assumption. The valuable object was a record
someone had already written down. Joining two tables was a report
the business ran on purpose. The application server was allowed to
be the place where identity and content met, because the application
was narrow and the output was a form, not a strategy.
Famous incidents of that era — bulk PII theft, payment dumps, leaked
source archives — were catastrophic and still conceptually simple.
The attacker left with yesterday. They did not automatically acquire
a machine that could keep asking "what will this firm do next" on
live mail and tickets.
2.2. Present: Steal the Session and the Connector
The current incident is often not a database export. It is a token,
a laptop, a poisoned plugin, or a prompt-injected document that rides
an already-authorized assistant. Enterprises have connected frontier
models to the same corpus a human VP can see: Drive, Slack or Teams,
GitHub, Salesforce, ServiceNow, ERP, and a vector store of
"everything we embed."
Access control still works as designed for each system. The
assistant is an authorized user of each. The new fact is
concentration. One runtime holds simultaneous views that no single
human would hold in one sitting, and it can keep them in context
across turns. A phishing mail that says "summarize the attached with
our internal tools" is no longer a text event. It is a join event
plus, if tools are on, an action event.
Present theft therefore looks like: session hijack of ChatGPT
Enterprise or a Claude work seat; OAuth grant to an MCP or connector
that was meant for search; a retrieved wiki page that contains
instructions; a computer-use agent that can see a screen the DLP
product never hashed. Encryption and SSO are up. Reconstruction
still happens, because reconstruction is what the product is for.
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2.3. Future: Steal the Meaning, Then the Act
The coming incident does not require a dump and does not require the
attacker to understand the business. The model does the correlation.
Individually lawful fragments — a complaint, a bug, a pricing note, a
hiring req, a board draft — become a map of launch timing, target
accounts, unreleased defects, and negotiation room. That map was
never a row in any system of record.
[DAS-ISOLATION] calls this enterprise-future mapping: extraction of
strategic intelligence through AI-driven correlation of distributed
weak signals. Conventional security governs who may access a
resource. It does not govern whether separately accessible
information may be joined into a new protected meaning. Once the
fragments are in one authorized context window, possession becomes
reconstruction. If the same context can call mail, payments,
tickets, or a browser, reconstruction becomes consequence.
The failure mode this profile is built to change is therefore not
"breach impossible." It is: compromise of one intelligent component
MUST NOT automatically become compromise of the organisation's
complete data relationships, strategic intelligence, and future.
Isolation of join authority and isolation of release authority matter
more than another point of model IQ [DAS-ISOLATION].
3. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Failure to establish current reconstruction or output-release
authority MUST NOT be converted into permission to join vaults or to
release a Candidate Output.
4. Problem Space
A stolen database dump is a collection of rows. A compromised
enterprise assistant is a joining engine. It can take customer
complaints, unreleased defects, engineering threads, pricing notes,
and launch plans and emit a structured report of what the firm will
ship, to whom, and when. That report is not "another record." It is
a map of the enterprise's future.
The practical failures look like this:
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* The AI server holds credentials for CRM, git, mail, and finance.
Compromising that process inherits every join those credentials
can make.
* Identity and content live in different tables. The mapping table
lives on the same application credential. Separation of storage
is not separation of association authority.
* A clean room or RAG index still returns joinable plaintext to the
same workload that can send mail.
* An output filter labels the report "internal." The runtime then
posts it because the model selected message.send.
* A session that was allowed to reconstruct three fields for ticket
triage is reused to reconstruct a customer-to- roadmap
association.
* A sealed file is copied to another gateway that does not check
destination, epoch, or output digest.
The missing questions are: may these vaults be joined for this
purpose in this session, and may this exact generated artifact leave
through this boundary now.
5. Threat Model and Need of the Hour
A conventional cyber breach steals what already exists. An AI-era
breach can reconstruct what does not yet exist as a document at all:
an individual's, enterprise's, or government's probable future.
Consider a concrete example. Imagine that I am the CEO of a billion-
dollar company and use an AI assistant every day, not merely to
summarize documents, but to think. It helps evaluate acquisition
targets, compare competitors, examine financial scenarios, assess
suppliers, prepare board material, explore new markets, develop
future products, analyse regulatory exposure, and test technical
ideas that may later become patent applications. Over time, that
assistant may know more about the direction of the company than any
single document does.
If an attacker steals one file, the attacker obtains that file. If
the attacker compromises the AI environment through which I work, the
attacker may be able to ask a much more dangerous question:
"Based on everything this person has been working on, what is this
company likely to do next?"
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The answer may never have existed as a stored record. There may be
no file called "Acquisitions We Will Announce Next Year.pdf," no
database entry labelled "Future Product Roadmap," and no memorandum
saying "This is the technology we intend to patent six months from
now." Yet the ingredients may already exist separately across email,
financial models, meeting notes, product discussions, supplier
conversations, technical experiments, search history, draft patent
material, market analysis, and ordinary AI interactions.
A capable AI can correlate those fragments. It may infer that the
company is quietly preparing to acquire a particular business, enter
a particular market, replace a critical supplier, abandon a product
line, respond to an anticipated regulatory problem, develop an
unannounced technology, or prepare an idea for patent protection
before the filing exists. The attacker has therefore not merely
stolen stored information.
The attacker has reconstructed strategy.
That distinction matters because strategy cannot simply be rotated
like a password or revoked like an API credential. Once a competitor
knows what an enterprise is likely to do next, there may be no
equivalent reset mechanism.
The same risk becomes more serious for a senior government official.
A day-to-day AI assistant may encounter fragments concerning
diplomatic meetings, sanctions options, trade negotiations, alliance
priorities, defence assessments, procurement concerns, internal
disagreements, travel, draft speeches, economic analysis, or policy
options. No single record may state, "This is our next foreign-
policy move toward Country X or Group Y." Yet an AI system capable
of correlating these fragments may infer whether relations are likely
to harden or soften, whether sanctions are being considered, which
alliance may receive greater cooperation, which diplomatic concession
may be offered, or what strategic position the government is
preparing to adopt.
There may be no document called "Our Next Foreign Policy Toward
Country X." The future policy may exist only implicitly across
independently protected fragments.
If that AI environment is compromised, the attacker may not simply
learn what the government already knows.
The attacker may reconstruct what the government is preparing to do.
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This changes the cybersecurity problem. AI is increasingly becoming
a day-to-day cognitive assistant. People no longer provide it only
with finished documents. They use it while decisions are incomplete.
They ask which company to acquire, which product to cancel, what
competitor behaviour is likely, which market to enter, what weakness
exists in a proposal, whether a technical concept may deserve patent
protection, or what should be presented to a board, regulator,
minister, or negotiating counterpart tomorrow.
Those interactions collectively expose something potentially more
valuable than historical records: intentions, priorities,
uncertainties, relationships, and probable future actions.
Past cyber theft stole files. Present cyber theft steals accounts,
sessions, SaaS credentials, and live access. The next class of theft
does not require a database dump at all. A compromised AI-connected
workload that can access mail, tickets, code, finance, procurement,
technical repositories, memory, and external tools can correlate
individually accessible fragments into strategic meaning that was
never stored as one record, and may then externalize that meaning
through a response, file write, message, API action, computer-use
operation, or tool invocation.
This document refers to that problem as enterprise-future
reconstruction: the unauthorized formation of protected semantic
relationships and the reconstruction of strategy, intent,
dependencies, or probable next actions from information that was
individually accessible but never authorized to be combined into that
meaning.
Traditional controls remain necessary but do not fully answer this
problem. IAM, RBAC, ABAC, DLP, clean rooms, confidential computing,
TEEs, audit systems, and output filters can govern identities,
stores, environments, or individual operations. They do not
necessarily answer a different question:
Does lawful access to several independently protected pieces of
information also confer authority to form this particular
relationship between them?
Nor do they necessarily answer the subsequent question:
If an AI has successfully reconstructed the information, does
successful computation itself authorize that newly reconstructed
intelligence to leave the protected environment?
The architecture described in this document introduces two separate
security properties.
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First, Technical Non-Joinability: access to identity information is
not automatically authority to associate it with content; access to
content is not automatically relationship authority; and access to
multiple individually permitted data domains does not silently become
unrestricted authority to construct a complete strategic picture.
Second, Technical Non-Completability: even where authorized
reconstruction and AI computation occur, successful computation does
not itself authorize the resulting intelligence to become externally
effective.
The profile therefore separates identity, content, and relationship-
mapping authority into independently controlled protection domains.
Reconstruction occurs only under a session-bound Reconstruction
Authorization Object (RAO) expressing the permitted fields,
relationships, purpose, workload context, current epoch, and other
applicable conditions. Required vaults make independent release
decisions, and successful components are usable only within the
authorized reconstruction context. The Protected Reconstruction
Domain constructs only the minimum-necessary ephemeral view and
preserves provenance and association continuity.
AI computation over that view produces a Candidate Output, not
immediately releasable information. The Candidate Output remains
non-effective until live output validation succeeds, the required
protected validation evidence or receipt is committed, output-
specific release authority is created, and an Output Release Boundary
independently verifies the relevant output, destination, recipient,
session, epoch, and authority before permitting send, render, store,
or invocation.
The resulting sequence is therefore: independent data authority,
relationship authority, session-bound reconstruction, minimum-
necessary ephemeral view, AI computation, Sealed Candidate Output,
live validation, protected receipt, output-specific authority, Output
Release Boundary, external effect.
The central rule is: access to data is not automatically authority to
form every relationship between those data.
And after reconstruction: computation is not authority to release.
The architecture is designed for incremental deployment rather than
requiring immediate replacement of existing enterprise systems.
Protected precomputation and policy preparation may occur on a slower
cold path, while the hot path contains only the checks whose omission
would permit unauthorized reconstruction or external release.
Independent vault operations may execute in parallel after a valid
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RAO is established. Existing databases, applications, model
interfaces, and enterprise workflows can be integrated through
mandatory gateways, proxies, wrappers, brokers, adapters, protected
model-serving layers, or output controllers while data domains are
progressively separated.
The proposal also does not claim that all semantic inference can be
made impossible. A sufficiently capable model may sometimes infer
relationships from indirect evidence. The narrower objective is to
prevent ordinary possession of individually permitted information
from automatically becoming authority to construct protected
associations, to preserve cumulative and provenance-sensitive
controls where repeated outputs may reveal more than each output
alone, and to prevent reconstructed intelligence from becoming
externally effective merely because an AI successfully computed it.
The protected asset in the AI era is therefore no longer limited to
what an organization has already written down.
It may include what the organization is thinking about, what it is
preparing to build, what it intends to acquire, what it may patent
next, how a government may position itself toward another country or
group, and ultimately what that individual, enterprise, or government
is likely to do in the future.
A conventional breach can reveal what an organization knows. An AI-
era reconstruction breach can reveal what it is likely to do next.
6. Industrial Applicability for Frontier Enterprise AI
This section is written for the products that actually sit on the
path above: hosted enterprise assistants, tool-using agents,
computer-use agents, and connector/MCP fleets. Vendor names are
deployment classes, not claims about unpublished internals.
6.1. What "Enterprise Seat" Concentrates
A ChatGPT Enterprise, Claude for Work, or equivalent seat is not a
chatbot with a login. It is a retrieval and action surface. Typical
connectors already include mail and calendar, document stores,
ticketing, CRM, source hosting, and data warehouses. Projects,
memory, and team workspaces persist fragments across days. MCP and
function calling add write paths: create ticket, send mail, open PR,
update row, drive a browser.
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The industrial fact is concentration of join plus concentration of
act in one context window. A human analyst is slow and scoped. The
seat is neither. That is why past DLP (watch the USB stick) and
present CASB (watch the OAuth grant) do not finish the job. The
grant is intended. The join is the product. The act is a checkbox.
6.2. How a Frontier Runtime Would Use This Profile
Placement is not "put the whole model in a vault." Placement is two
gates the vendor already almost has:
1. Before retrieval and association: each connector returns identity
fragments, content fragments, or mapping fragments under a
Reconstruction Authorization Object bound to tenant, purpose,
field set, association scope, session epoch, and workload
identity. The model host sees a minimum-necessary view, not a
universal join.
2. Before any leaving the runtime: generated text, file, mail, tool
call, computer-use submit, or memory write is a Sealed Candidate
Output. Output verification commits a receipt. An Output
Release Capability is consumed at the mail gateway, file commit,
MCP dispatcher [I-D.das-agentic], or browser submit.
The model, including a frontier model used as the enterprise brain,
stays in the compute role. It does not hold relationship-mapping
authority and does not hold the last unsealing step. That is how a
lab that sells "the model is smart enough to use tools" avoids
selling "the model is the enterprise map."
6.3. Anthropic-Class Tool and Computer-Use Seats
A Claude work deployment with tool use or computer use is the clean
industrial fit. Constitutional or policy trained refusal is the
first filter. This profile is the second gate that does not trust
the model. A computer-use click that would send a customer list, or
a tool call that would export a repo issue joined to a named account,
is denied at association scope or at the boundary even if the model
complied with the injected page.
How: treat every connector as a vault class (identity vs content vs
map). Treat every computer-use submission as an Output Release
Boundary with a live digest of what will leave the machine. Treat
MCP server discovery as non-authority, same rule as
[I-D.das-agentic].
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6.4. OpenAI-Class Enterprise, GPTs, and Agent Runtime
A ChatGPT Enterprise workspace with GPTs, actions, and memory is the
other clean fit. Custom GPTs already accumulate instructions and
retrieval. Actions already call customer APIs. Memory already
persists associations the user did not store as a record.
How: memory write is a Candidate Output of type MEMORY_WRITE and
needs its own receipt; otherwise today's injected "remember the
competitor list" becomes tomorrow's reconstruction authority.
Actions are tool-dispatch sinks. File download and "share this chat"
are Output Release Boundaries. A project that mixes legal and
engineering corpora needs a narrower Permitted Association Scope than
a general chat.
6.5. Why Labs Should Care Commercially
Enterprise procurement is already asking what happens when the
assistant is prompt-injected or when a contractor's seat is stolen.
An answer that is only "the model is aligned" or "we log prompts"
will lose to an answer that is "the seat cannot join identity to
unreleased defect, and cannot send the report, without a consumed
capability." That is a product differentiator for anyone selling
frontier models into banks, labs, governments, and operators. It is
also the failure-mode change argued in [DAS-ISOLATION]: isolation of
join and isolation of action, not another benchmark point of
intelligence.
7. Existing Solutions and What They Do Not Bind
7.1. IAM, RBAC, and Application Credentials
Directory and token systems decide which process may call which API.
An AI server that is "the app" typically receives a union of those
rights. Compromise of that process is then compromise of the union.
IAM does not split association authority from content authority.
7.2. DLP and Output Classifiers
DLP and safety classifiers inspect text for patterns. They are
probabilistic and sit on the same host that already has the
plaintext. A missed classification plus a send-mail tool is the
incident. A classifier ALLOW is not an output-specific, single-use
release capability.
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7.3. Tokenization, Hashing, and Field Encryption
Tokenization hides a column from some readers. If the AI server can
detokenize, or if tokens plus a mapping table reconstruct the person,
the join still lives in one place. Field encryption without
independently controlled relationship-mapping authority is storage
hygiene, not Technical Non-Joinability.
7.4. Confidential Computing and Enclaves
A TEE can attest the workload and keep keys off the host. If the
attested workload is still given joined enterprise plaintext and a
network socket, the enclave becomes a high-assurance joining engine.
Confidential computing is a substrate for a PED or vault. It is not
by itself a reconstruction or release protocol.
7.5. Clean Rooms and Data-Sharing Enclaves
Clean rooms limit who may run a query. They do not necessarily:
split identity from association; bind reconstruction to a session
epoch; seal the model output; commit a receipt before release; or
treat render, mail, and tool invoke as the same boundary. A clean
room that returns a joinable result to an agent with tools is an
input to this profile, not a replacement for it.
7.6. RAG Isolation and Prompt Firewalls
Retriever isolation and prompt firewalls reduce how much raw corpus
the model sees. They do not stop a permitted retrieval set from
being associated beyond the Permitted Association Scope, and they do
not consume release authority at the mail or file gateway.
7.7. What This Profile Adds
* identity, content, and relationship-mapping are independently
controlled vaults;
* join occurs only under a non-bearer Reconstruction Authorization
Object inside a Protected Reconstruction Domain;
* released components are session-bound and ephemeral;
* model output is a Sealed Candidate Output the workload cannot
unseal;
* a Protected Output Validation Receipt is committed before any
release capability exists;
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* the capability is bound to output digest, destination, recipient,
session epoch, and boundary; and
* the Output Release Boundary is the only component that may
complete send, render, store, or invoke.
8. Three Pillars
8.1. Decomposition of Authority
No ordinary AI server holds complete authority over data-to-
consequence. Protected information is decomposed across an identity
vault, a content vault, a relationship-mapping vault, an optional
cryptographic-material vault, a Protected Authorization Domain, a
Protected Reconstruction Domain, an Output Verification Stage, a
Protected Receipt Store, and an Output Release Boundary.
Authority to read an identity MUST NOT, by itself, authorize
associating that identity with protected content. Authority to read
content MUST NOT, by itself, authorize identifying the person,
account, device, or commercial relationship to which that content
belongs. Authority to read both MUST NOT, by itself, authorize
establishing or disclosing the relationship.
8.2. Mandatory Mediation
Every consequence-bearing Candidate Output — text, report, image, API
request, database update, retrieval, tool call, mail, payment,
external-model prompt, memory write, or actuator command — MUST pass
a protected finality path. The workload MUST NOT receive
unrestricted authority to release what it generates.
8.3. Technical Non-Completability
The workload MAY finish generation without acquiring the keys,
capability, or path needed to make the result externally usable.
Sealing, receipt commitment, capability issuance, and boundary
verification are constitutive. Skipping any of them MUST leave the
output non-releasable.
9. Technical Non-Joinability
Tables, tenants, and disks that share one application credential are
not non-joinable. Technical Non-Joinability means identity
components, content components, and the association information
required to make them a usable enterprise record cannot be combined
outside a technically authorized reconstruction operation.
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Join MUST occur only inside a Protected Reconstruction Domain under a
current Reconstruction Authorization Object that binds purpose,
session, session epoch, permitted field set, Permitted Association
Scope, execution context, use count, and reconstruction domain
identity. A copied component, mapping fragment, or stale
authorization object MUST NOT become unrestricted join authority.
Independent control does not require four physical appliances. It
requires that credentials, keys, or state machines sufficient for one
vault are insufficient to compel release from another.
10. Session-Bound Reconstruction
A conforming reconstruction SHOULD release only the minimum fields
required for the authorized task, bind those fields to the session,
and make them unusable after session close, epoch advance, use-count
exhaustion, or poison. A Partial Session that fails mid-chain MUST
be poisoned: it MUST NOT be resumed, replayed, or completed with a
substituted purpose or destination.
Vault-local release is not a query the model host runs. Each vault
evaluates the RAO against its own policy, emits only authorized
components, and records a vault-local receipt. A content vault that
sees a valid RAO for ticket.summary MUST still refuse
ticket.internal_root_cause. A relationship vault that sees lawful
access to both sides MUST still refuse an out-of-scope association.
That refusal is the difference between two encrypted columns and
Technical Non-Joinability.
10.1. Disclosure Budget
Disclosure Budget is a protected counter over how much authorized
content may become externally usable in a session, project, or tenant
window. Units MAY be fields, records, tokens, or classified items.
The budget is decremented at the Output Release Boundary, not when
the model reads a view. A model that drafts ten reports and sends
none has not spent the budget. A model that sends one report has.
Implementations SHOULD persist budget state outside the model host so
a compromised seat cannot reset the counter. Exhaustion MUST fail
closed even if the latest turn is in-scope.
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10.2. Inference-Channel Budget
Inference-Channel Budget limits reconstructed meaning that was never
stored as a record: implied roadmaps, implied patient-to-arm links,
implied negotiation room. This is the budget DLP cannot see, because
there is no string named "strategy." OVS SHOULD score or classify
association leakage in the Candidate Output against the RAO's
Permitted Association Scope. Repeated near-misses in one session
SHOULD consume the budget faster than a single narrow summary.
When the budget is exhausted, further reconstruction and further
release MUST deny or escalate. A new chat title MUST NOT reset the
budget if the tenant, actor, and corpus are the same. That closeout
is how "just one more similar question" is stopped from becoming
future-mapping [DAS-ISOLATION].
11. Sealed Output and Release Boundary
Before a Candidate Output is exposed to an untrusted buffer, gateway,
or tool dispatcher, it MUST be converted to a Sealed Candidate Output
or another technically non-releasable representation. The workload
MUST NOT hold the unsealing key or the Output Release Capability.
The Output Verification Stage re-checks current policy, revocation,
session epoch, destination, recipient, permitted fields, association
scope, purpose, budgets, and boundary identity. On success it
commits a Protected Output Validation Receipt to a Protected Receipt
Store. Only after that commitment MAY an output-specific Output
Release Capability be issued.
The Output Release Boundary is the point at which the output would
first become externally usable or effective: network send, API
delivery, screen or printer, file commit, mail, tool invoke, payment,
or memory persist. Rendering is release. Tool invocation is
release. Storing plaintext where another process can read it is
release. The boundary MUST verify capability, receipt, output
digest, destination, recipient, session epoch, and consumption state,
then consume single-use authority.
12. Architecture
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CONVENTIONAL
AI-server compromise
-> DB + tool credentials
-> unrestricted join
-> strategy reconstruction
-> generate + send
THIS PROFILE
AI-server compromise
-> session-bound minimum view only
-> non-joinable vaults refuse free association
-> malicious Candidate Output
-> remains SEALED
-> live re-verification
-> receipt MUST be committed
-> output-specific capability
-> Output Release Boundary
-> effect only if every check passes
Figure 1: Compromise path versus finality path
13. Protocol Pseudocode
13.1. Reconstruction
function RECONSTRUCT(request, ctx):
rao = ReconstructionAuthorization{
purpose: request.purpose,
session_id: ctx.session_id,
session_epoch: current_epoch(),
field_set: request.field_set,
association_scope: request.scope,
execution_context: attest(ctx.workload),
use_count: request.use_count,
budgets: current_budgets()
}
if not PAD.validate(rao):
return DENY(RECONSTRUCTION_UNAUTHORIZED)
idc = IDENTITY_VAULT.release(rao) # session-bound
ctc = CONTENT_VAULT.release(rao) # session-bound
rel = RELATIONSHIP_VAULT.associate(rao, idc, ctc)
if rel is DENY:
poison(ctx.session_id)
return DENY(NON_JOINABLE)
view = PRD.minimum_necessary(idc, ctc, rel, rao)
HOLD_SESSION_BOUND(view)
return view
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13.2. Seal, Verify, Release
function ON_MODEL_OUTPUT(raw, ctx):
sco = SEAL(raw, ctx.session_id, ctx.epoch, intended_boundary)
# workload cannot unseal
return sco
function OUTPUT_VERIFY(sco, ctx):
opened = OVS.inspect_protected(sco)
if stale(ctx) or scope_exceeded(opened, ctx) or
budget_exceeded(opened, ctx) or dest_mismatch(ctx):
poison(ctx.session_id)
return DENY(OUTPUT_UNVERIFIED)
receipt = RECEIPT_STORE.commit(opened, ctx)
orc = ISSUE_OUTPUT_RELEASE_CAPABILITY(receipt, opened, ctx)
resealed = RESEAL_FOR_BOUNDARY(opened, orc)
return (resealed, orc, receipt)
function OUTPUT_BOUNDARY_EFFECTUATE(resealed, orc, receipt, live):
if orc missing or consumed or expired:
return DENY(NO_OR_USED_CAPABILITY)
if digest(live) != orc.output_digest:
return DENY(OUTPUT_SUBSTITUTION)
if THIS_BOUNDARY != orc.boundary_id:
return DENY(BOUNDARY_MISMATCH)
if live.destination != orc.destination or
live.recipient != orc.recipient:
return DENY(DESTINATION_MISMATCH)
if receipt not in RECEIPT_STORE:
return DENY(RECEIPT_MISSING)
ATOMICALLY:
consume(orc)
unseal_and_emit(resealed, live)
return RELEASED
unseal_and_emit() is unreachable when any check fails. Logging a
denial and then sending the report is non-conforming.
14. Industrial Relevance and Use Cases
14.1. Enterprise Copilot on CRM, Code, and Mail
The motivating attack: the seat is connected to tickets, repos, and
planning tools; injected or stolen-session text asks it to join
important customers to unreleased defects and emit a competitive-
intelligence report to an external destination. That is past theft
(steal the file) replaced by present theft (steal the seat) doing
future theft (emit the map). Non-joinability blocks the customer-to-
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defect association outside triage scope. Sealing plus boundary check
blocks the send even if the model writes the report. On a Claude or
ChatGPT Enterprise connector this is a denied association plus a
denied action, not a red banner in the transcript.
14.2. Healthcare and Payer Assistants
Chart text and patient identity must not become one object on the
model host except under a clinician-purpose reconstruction. A
summary that names a patient and a diagnosis is a Candidate Output.
Render on a ward workstation and send-to-insurer are different
boundaries and different capabilities.
14.3. Banking, Treasury, and Claims
Account identifiers and transaction narratives live in different
vaults. Reconstruction for fraud review MUST not authorize payout.
A generated payment instruction is a Candidate Output of a financial
class and follows [I-D.das-agentic] at the tool sink after this
profile's receipt commitment.
14.4. Legal, M&A, and Board Materials
Privilege and deal strategy are association problems. A model that
can read the data room and the email graph can emit the other side's
negotiation map. Permitted Association Scope and Inference-Channel
Budget are the load-bearing controls; DLP string match is not.
14.5. Multi-Tenant SaaS AI
Tenant isolation that shares one retrieval credential across tenants
is the conventional failure. Each tenant's identity, content, and
mapping vaults MUST be independently controlled. A capability issued
for tenant A MUST fail at a boundary serving tenant B.
14.6. Regulated Clean-Room Analytics
A clean-room query may run. The result remains a Sealed Candidate
Output until output-time verification checks jurisdiction, recipient,
and budget. Export to a laptop is an Output Release Boundary, not a
file copy.
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14.7. Pharma, Device, and Clinical-Trial Operations
Protocol, site, and patient-identity fragments are separately
regulated. A trial-ops assistant that can read EDC notes and
investigator mail can reconstruct enrollment weakness and unblinded
signals that no system stored as one record. Association scope MUST
exclude identity-to-arm joining except under an RAO that names that
purpose. Export to a CRO is a different boundary than render to a
medical monitor.
14.8. Semiconductor, Automotive, and Product R&D
Yield notes, mask comments, and customer-win/loss mail are the
future-mapping corpus. A seat that can join a named OEM to an
unreleased node or ADAS feature is the incident, even if no GDSII
file leaves. Inference-Channel Budget is the control that DLP cannot
replace: the model is inferring, not exfiltrating a file named
"roadmap.pdf".
14.9. Energy, Grid, and OT-Adjacent Assistants
Historian tags are content. Substation or plant identity is
identity. The map between them is association. A copilot that
writes that map into chat or into a ticket is creating a targeting
aid. Tool calls that change setpoints follow [I-D.das-agentic] after
this profile's receipt. Reconstruction for "explain this alarm" MUST
NOT authorize "change this breaker."
14.10. Public-Sector and National-Security Enterprise Seats
Classification markings are not association control. Two SECRET
fragments can still form a meaning nobody stored. Permitted
Association Scope and destination binding matter more than the
model's willingness to refuse. Cross-domain transfer is an Output
Release Boundary with a jurisdiction epoch, analogous to overflight
epoch in the NTN profile.
14.11. Insurers and Claims-Triage Agents
Policyholder identity and claim narrative join into fraud or health
inference. A generative summary that names both is release. Sharing
with a reinsurer or a body shop is a new destination and a new
capability. Cumulative disclosure across a week's of "just one more
similar claim" is a budget event.
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14.12. What Operators Should Measure
The profile is live when: (1) the AI host cannot produce a joined
identity-content record without a current Reconstruction
Authorization Object; (2) every external send, render, or tool invoke
of model output has a consumed capability_id and a receipt in the
store; (3) destination or digest mismatch is a deny; (4) a poisoned
session cannot be completed on another path. Those four tests
distinguish this profile from "we put the model in a VPC."
15. Mapping Frontier Product Features to This Profile
The following mapping is informative. It exists so a lab or
enterprise architect can put objects on the product they already
ship.
15.1. Connectors and MCP Servers
Each connector is a vault-class interface, not a universal database
handle. Mail identity headers and mail bodies SHOULD not share a
mapping key the model host can reuse outside the RAO. An MCP tool
list is discovery. Discovery MUST NOT issue reconstruction or
release authority.
15.2. Projects, Spaces, and Team Workspaces
A project that mixes legal and engineering corpora is an association-
scope decision at project create, not at send time only. Changing
project membership MUST bump session or policy epoch so stale RAOs
fail.
15.3. Memory and Persistent Notes
Memory is reconstructed meaning stored for later turns. A memory
write MUST be a Candidate Output. Unscoped memory is how present
theft becomes future mapping without another breach: the seat
remembers the join the attacker asked for yesterday.
15.4. Computer Use and Browser Agents
A click-submit is an Output Release Boundary. The live digest is
over the form values that will leave the machine, not over the
model's narration of what it thinks it clicked. Origin change
invalidates prior capability, same rule as the agentic profile's
destination bind.
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15.5. Share Chat, Export, and API Log Sinks
Transcript export, SIEM mirroring, and "share this conversation" are
release paths. If they can carry a joined view, they MUST consume an
Output Release Capability or they MUST only receive already-redacted
non-joinable fragments.
16. JSON Interoperability Profile
16.1. ReconstructionAuthorization
{
"version": "1.0",
"object_type": "reconstruction_authorization",
"authorization_id": "rao-9c21",
"session_id": "sess-441",
"session_epoch": 17,
"purpose_id": "ticket-triage",
"field_set": ["ticket.summary", "customer.tier"],
"association_scope": "customer-to-open-ticket",
"execution_context": { "workload_id": "copilot-prod", "attestation": "ok" },
"use_count": 1,
"budgets": { "disclosure_remaining": 3, "inference_remaining": 1 },
"reconstruction_domain_id": "prd-east-1"
}
16.2. Sealed Candidate Output and Receipt
{
"version": "1.0",
"object_type": "sealed_candidate_output",
"candidate_output_id": "co-77ab",
"session_id": "sess-441",
"session_epoch": 17,
"output_type": "REPORT",
"output_digest": { "algorithm": "SHA-256", "value": "base64url-out" },
"intended_boundary": "mail-gw-02",
"sealed": true,
"seal": { "type": "AES-GCM", "key_id": "ovs-key-4" }
}
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{
"version": "1.0",
"object_type": "protected_output_validation_receipt",
"receipt_id": "povr-1204",
"candidate_output_id": "co-77ab",
"decision": "ALLOW",
"committed_at": "2026-08-27T01:40:00Z",
"binds": {
"output_digest": "base64url-out",
"destination": "internal-counsel",
"recipient": "legal-box",
"session_epoch": 17,
"boundary_id": "mail-gw-02"
}
}
16.3. Output Release Capability and Boundary Verify
{
"version": "1.0",
"object_type": "output_release_capability",
"capability_id": "orc-55de",
"receipt_id": "povr-1204",
"candidate_output_id": "co-77ab",
"output_digest": "base64url-out",
"destination": "internal-counsel",
"recipient": "legal-box",
"session_id": "sess-441",
"session_epoch": 17,
"boundary_id": "mail-gw-02",
"single_use": true,
"expires_at": "2026-08-27T01:40:15Z"
}
{
"operation": "OutputBoundaryVerify",
"decision": "DENY",
"error": {
"code": "EF_ASSOCIATION_SCOPE",
"message": "Report joins customer identity to unreleased defect.",
"retryable": false
},
"effectuation": { "permitted": false }
}
16.4. Vault-Local Release Receipt
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{
"version": "1.0",
"object_type": "vault_local_release_receipt",
"vault_id": "content-vault-7",
"vault_class": "CONTENT",
"session_id": "sess-441",
"rao_id": "rao-9c21",
"component_digest": "base64url-comp",
"released_fields": ["ticket.summary"],
"not_released": ["ticket.internal_root_cause"],
"expires_at": "2026-08-27T01:41:00Z"
}
17. End-to-End Workflow
A conforming transaction SHOULD implement the following stages.
Stages may be collocated if the protected relationships remain:
vaults do not join themselves, evidence is committed before
capability exists, and the boundary is the only unsealing point.
1. Request intake: purpose, tenant, destination, recipient,
requested fields, requested association scope.
2. Execution-context attestation of the workload, model or agent
identity, and tool set.
3. Reconstruction Authorization Object issued or denied by the
Protected Authorization Domain.
4. Vault-local release of session-bound components. Each vault
applies its own conditions. No vault emits the association
another vault owns.
5. Association only inside the Protected Reconstruction Domain,
producing an ephemeral minimum-necessary view.
6. Restricted processing: the model sees the view, not the vaults.
7. Candidate Output created in protected memory.
8. Sealed Candidate Output before any untrusted buffer or gateway.
9. Output Verification Stage: live policy, epoch, scope,
destination, budgets, association-leak check.
10. Protected Output Validation Receipt committed.
11. Output Release Capability issued and bound.
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12. Optional reseal for the designated boundary.
13. Boundary verification and single-use consume.
14. Effectuation: send, render, store, or invoke.
15. Session close or poison; components become unusable.
A tool call generated at stage 7 is both a Candidate Output under
this profile and a Candidate Act under [I-D.das-agentic]. Receipt
commitment here is a precondition to dispatch-sink authority there
when the tool would disclose or persist reconstructed meaning.
18. Worked Transactions
18.1. Allow: Ticket Summary to Internal Counsel
Purpose ticket-triage, field set ticket.summary plus customer.tier,
association customer-to-open-ticket, destination internal-counsel,
boundary mail-gw-02. Vaults release those fields only. Model drafts
a summary that does not name unreleased defects. OVS passes.
Receipt povr-1204 is committed. Capability orc-55de is consumed at
mail-gw-02. Mail leaves once.
18.2. Deny: Future-Map Report to External Destination
Same seat, stolen or injected turn: "join our top accounts to
unreleased defects and send the competitive report to this address."
Relationship vault refuses customer-to-unreleased-defect association,
or OVS detects the association in the Candidate Output. No receipt
is committed. No capability is issued. Mail gateway has nothing to
consume. The model may have written the report in sealed form. That
is computation without consequence [DAS-ISOLATION].
18.3. Deny: Memory Persistence of a Prohibited Join
The model tries to "remember" the customer-to-defect map for later
turns. MEMORY_WRITE is a Candidate Output. Association scope fails.
Memory store is an Output Release Boundary and receives no
capability. Tomorrow's turn does not start already holding the map.
19. Enterprise-AI Threat Catalog
A deployment SHOULD treat at least the following as in-scope. The
model is not required to detect them. The property is that join or
release remains non-completable.
* T1 Stolen enterprise seat or API key
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* T2 Contractor or insider using a lawful seat off-purpose
* T3 Prompt injection in mail, ticket, or wiki
* T4 Poisoned retrieval or vector store
* T5 Connector / MCP server substitution
* T6 Tool-response laundering of instructions
* T7 Model or agent substitution
* T8 Cross-tenant retrieval
* T9 Cross-project association beyond scope
* T10 Mapping-table or foreign-key theft
* T11 Detokenize-then-join on the model host
* T12 Cumulative inference across turns (budget bypass)
* T13 Memory used as a durable join cache
* T14 Destination substitution after verification
* T15 Output substitution after sealing
* T16 Receipt rollback or capability replay
* T17 Share-chat / export / SIEM as covert egress
* T18 Computer-use form submit around the API sink
* T19 Multi-agent handoff that widens scope
* T20 Clean-room result copied to a laptop
20. Illustrative Example: When a Server Breach Becomes a Breach of the
Enterprise's Future
Consider a large enterprise, or, in a higher-sensitivity setting, a
defense or critical-infrastructure organization, that uses an
artificial-intelligence assistant across research, engineering,
logistics, procurement, maintenance, internal communications,
financial systems, operational databases, and decision-support
platforms.
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In a conventional information system, a cross-border or other
attacker who compromises a server may obtain a defined collection of
existing information: customer names, telephone numbers, email
addresses, documents, account records, or previously stored
communications. The breach may be serious, but the attacker
generally obtains what was already stored.
The threat changes substantially when the compromised server hosts,
or provides execution context for, an artificial-intelligence
workload that can retrieve and reason across many organizational
systems. The attacker no longer needs to find a document explicitly
titled "Future Product Strategy," "Next Deployment Plan," "Critical
Supplier Dependency," or "Operational Weaknesses." Such a document
may not exist. Instead, the compromised AI may be instructed to
reconstruct that knowledge from fragments that were each,
individually, lawfully accessible:
customer or operational reports
+ engineering discussions
+ research documents
+ source-code changes
+ procurement activity
+ financial allocations
+ supplier relationships
+ maintenance information
+ internal communications
-> AI correlation and inference
-> reconstructed future strategy
In an ordinary commercial enterprise, this reconstruction may reveal
which products are likely to be launched next, which customers are
strategically important, which defects remain unresolved, which
suppliers are critical, where investment is being concentrated, what
pricing changes may be planned, or which markets the enterprise is
preparing to enter. Such information could allow another party to
anticipate decisions, imitate development direction, target
customers, undermine negotiations, or exploit operational weaknesses
before the enterprise receives the intended benefit of its
investment.
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For a defense or critical-infrastructure environment, the same
structural problem can be more consequential. Individually permitted
fragments might concern equipment status, maintenance schedules,
geographic information, supplier dependencies, personnel roles,
logistics, sensor information, or operational planning. No single
dataset need contain a complete sensitive picture. A sufficiently
connected AI system may nevertheless correlate those fragments and
infer relationships, dependencies, likely future activity, or points
of operational sensitivity.
The security question therefore stops being only "can the attacker
steal this database?" It becomes: can compromise of one AI workload
give the attacker enough authority to join information from multiple
protected domains, reconstruct relationships that were never
explicitly stored, infer what the organization is likely to do next,
and then externalize that intelligence. Under DAS Protocols VII,
possession of identity information does not by itself provide
authority to associate it with protected content; possession of
protected content does not by itself provide authority to determine
the person, organization, asset, or relationship to which it belongs;
and possession of both does not necessarily provide authority to
establish their semantic relationship. The relationship-mapping
function operates as an independently controlled source of
association authority, so that compromise of the AI workload is
intended to encounter multiple independent technical barriers before
reconstruction, let alone release, can complete:
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AI workload compromised
|
v
identity component available? maybe
content component available? maybe
relationship authority available? independently controlled
|
v
authorized association scope? required
|
v
protected reconstruction permitted? required
|
v
minimum-necessary ephemeral view only
|
v
AI computes a result
|
v
Candidate Output remains non-releasable
|
v
output / association verification
|
v
protected receipt + output-specific authority
|
v
Output Release Boundary
|
v
external effect
The objective of this profile is therefore not an assumption that the
AI server can never be compromised. It is to prevent one compromised
AI server from automatically becoming the authority to reconstruct
the organization and disclose its future. In the AI era, protecting
stored records is no longer sufficient. The protected asset
increasingly includes the relationships between those records, the
inferences that can be reconstructed from them, and the
organization's probable future itself.
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21. Deployment Topologies
Vaults MAY be separate HSMs, separate accounts, separate enclaves, or
privilege-separated processes with distinct keys. Collocation on one
host is allowed only where compromise of the model process does not
yield relationship-mapping authority or unsealing keys.
A hosted frontier lab MAY run the model in its cloud and still keep
customer relationship-mapping and output unsealing in the customer's
KMS or a customer-held enclave. That split is the commercial form of
"isolation not intelligence" [DAS-ISOLATION]: the lab sells
inference; the customer keeps join and release.
Hot path: repeated turns inside a fixed RAO envelope (same tenant,
purpose, field set, scope, destination class). Sink and boundary
checks remain mandatory. Cold path: new destination, new project
mix, financial or legal class, unknown connector, budget near
exhaustion, attestation fail. Timeout is not release.
22. Addressing Latency and Legacy-System Objections
A multi-vault architecture immediately raises two practical
engineering objections: latency and compatibility with existing
enterprise infrastructure. These objections are significant because
the disclosed architecture is not merely a logical division of one
database into several tables. Identity information, substantive
content, relationship- mapping information, authorization state,
reconstruction- enablement material, provenance, and output authority
may be placed under independently controlled protection domains. If
implemented naively as a long sequence of remote calls, repeated
policy evaluations, attestations, decryptions, and joins, the
architecture could introduce unacceptable latency for enterprise AI
workloads.
The architecture therefore does not require every protected operation
to be performed synchronously or serially for every AI inference
step. The security invariant is independent authority and mandatory
mediation, not unnecessary serialization.
22.1. Hot Path and Cold Path
Operations may be divided between a cold path, where protected
information can be prepared in advance, and a hot path, containing
only those current checks whose omission would permit unauthorized
reconstruction or external effectuation.
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The cold path may prepare or maintain: compiled policy predicates;
permitted-association graphs; protected identity indices; registered
workload measurements; destination manifests; attestation collateral;
bounded-freshness revocation state; provenance schemas; disclosure
rules; and other protected precomputation artifacts.
Such preparation does not itself authorize reconstruction or output
release. At the time of the consequential operation, current
session, Session Epoch, policy, workload correspondence, revocation
state, association scope, provenance, destination, recipient,
protected-receipt state, and release-boundary conditions remain load-
bearing. A cached policy decision, identity result, mapping result,
or attestation value cannot independently authorize a later
reconstruction merely because it was valid when originally
calculated.
22.2. Independent Vault Decisions Need Not Be Serial
Technical Non-Joinability requires that the identity vault, content
vault, and relationship-mapping authority independently control their
respective releases. It does NOT require those decisions to occur
one after another. After a valid Reconstruction Authorization Object
has been established, independent Vault-Local Release decisions MAY
be requested concurrently, so identity, content, and relationship-
mapping domains can operate as a parallel fan-out operation:
+- Identity Vault -------+
| |
RAO + protected session -+- Content Vault --------+-> Protected
| | Reconstruction
+- Relationship Vault ---+
In a distributed deployment, the latency of the vault-release stage
can therefore approach the latency of the slowest required protected
domain plus orchestration overhead, rather than the arithmetic sum of
every independent vault round trip. This optimization does not
weaken fail-closed behavior: if any required vault denies release,
returns stale state, fails verification, or becomes unavailable where
its participation is mandatory, protected reconstruction MUST NOT
proceed. Release by one domain does not compel release by another,
and a single centrally presented credential cannot substitute for
independent vault-local authority.
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22.3. Reconstruction Is Minimum-Necessary, Not Enterprise-Wide Joining
The Protected Reconstruction Domain does not reconstruct a permanent
universal enterprise record merely because an AI workload requires
several pieces of information. Approved Session-Bound Components are
brought together only within the authorized reconstruction context.
The system applies the permitted field set and Permitted Association
Scope, excludes unauthorized fields and relationships, maintains
provenance state, and constructs an Ephemeral Reconstructed Data View
containing only the information required for the authorized purpose.
This reduces both security exposure and computational overhead:
instead of repeatedly transferring, decrypting, joining, parsing, and
placing complete enterprise records into model context, the workload
receives only a small purpose-specific derivative, such as selected
fields, a redacted record, a structured query result, a protected
graph, a feature representation, an embedding, or a permitted
aggregate. Successful reconstruction does not itself create
authority to export the view or any AI-generated result derived from
it.
22.4. The AI Model Does Not Need to Run the Multi-Vault Protocol
A practical deployment does not require an existing AI model to
understand identity vaults, relationship-mapping vaults,
Reconstruction Authorization Objects, Session-Bound Components,
provenance receipts, or Output Release Capabilities. A protected
intermediary may expose the ordinary interface expected by the
existing model while performing the multi-vault operations in a
separate protected control plane:
authorized minimum-necessary input
-> ordinary model processing
-> Candidate Output
while, in parallel, the surrounding control plane performs:
vault authorization -> protected reconstruction
-> provenance continuity -> output capture
-> output verification -> protected receipt commitment
-> release authority -> Output Release Boundary
The specification expressly permits deployment through API proxies,
gateways, brokers, retrieval gateways, model-access gateways,
protected services, and compatibility adapters without retraining the
underlying model, changing model weights, replacing its internal
inference architecture, or requiring access to proprietary model
internals.
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22.5. Legacy-System Integration
The architecture may be introduced incrementally into existing
enterprise systems rather than requiring an immediate replacement of
databases, applications, models, APIs, or communication
infrastructure. Representative mandatory mediation points include
database proxies, data-access gateways, service-mesh sidecars, API
gateways, retrieval proxies, model-serving wrappers, secure output
adapters, database-commit interceptors, file-system filters, message
brokers, operating-system brokers, and network-egress controllers.
A legacy application need not understand the full multi-vault
protocol. An intermediary may translate existing requests into
reconstruction requests, protected component requests, authorization-
object references, provenance-labelled values, sealed Candidate
Outputs, and output-release requests. The critical requirement is
that this mediation be technically mandatory rather than advisory.
No legacy application path may continue to reach the protected data
or an external-effect boundary using an old credential, direct
database connection, debugging interface, cached secret, alternate
API, retrieval channel, file output, or network route that bypasses
the protected control path.
22.6. Incremental Migration of Existing Databases
A legacy database containing complete joined records need not be
decomposed in one disruptive migration. Migration may proceed
incrementally: new records may be placed directly into separate
semantic domains; existing records may be decomposed when they are
first accessed; sensitive relationship mappings may be separated
before other fields; identity attributes may initially be tokenized
while substantive content remains in an existing database; and a
protected Relationship-Mapping Vault may resolve opaque legacy
references while a gateway prevents unrestricted joining. Over time,
the legacy system may retain only opaque references or permitted
derivatives rather than the complete relationship required to
reconstruct the semantic record.
During this transition, migration state MUST resolve conservatively.
A record that is only partially decomposed, whose status is
ambiguous, or whose required protection cannot be verified MUST NOT
receive greater authority merely because migration is incomplete.
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22.7. Latency Observation from the Runnable Reference Implementation
The accompanying runnable Python reference implementation includes a
local microbenchmark for the principal protected stages. In one
500-iteration reference run using warm components and three
sequential local vault calls, the observed medians were:
RAO generation 112.40 us
three vault-local releases 622.19 us
protected reconstruction 521.33 us
seal + POVR + capability + release 1085.32 us
------------------------------------------------
complete protected path 2378.18 us
These numbers are reference-code observations, not protocol latency
guarantees. The measurement excludes AI-model inference, real
network or RPC latency, geographically separated vaults, remote
attestation, HSM/KMS operations, distributed consensus, human
approval, production logging, remote database access, and atomicity
with an arbitrary external system.
The reference implementation also supports concurrent vault fan-out,
but a local Python thread benchmark cannot establish the performance
benefit of parallel remote vault calls. Production latency depends
on deployment topology, protected-domain placement, attestation
design, cryptographic primitives, cache/freshness policy, and the
consequence boundary being protected.
The important architectural proposition is therefore not that
independent vaults impose zero cost. It is that Technical Non-
Joinability can be implemented without placing the entire multi-vault
process serially on every model-inference step, while preserving the
rule that no required current authorization, association,
reconstruction, receipt, or output-finality condition can be skipped
for latency reasons.
22.8. Non-Bypassability Is the Final Requirement
Legacy compatibility is not achieved merely by adding a sidecar while
leaving the old path intact. If a compromised workload can still use
a direct database credential to reconstruct the full identity-content
relationship, Technical Non-Joinability has failed. If it can bypass
the protected output path and transmit the generated result through
another file, message, API, network, tool, or debugging channel,
Technical Non-Completability has failed. The architectural invariant
therefore remains: an enterprise may preserve its existing databases,
AI models, and application interfaces, but no protected semantic
reconstruction or externally consequential output may remain
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reachable through an unmediated alternative path.
23. Failure, Poison, and Alternate Paths
Timeout, uncertain association, missing receipt, or faded vault MUST
fail closed. A Partial Session MUST be poisoned so it cannot be
completed with a new destination. Mail, chat, file sync, printer,
browser download, tool dispatch, and memory write that can make the
same output usable MUST enforce this profile or be unable to complete
the effect.
Illustrative codes: EF-RECONSTRUCTION_UNAUTHORIZED, EF-NON_JOINABLE,
EF-OUTPUT_UNVERIFIED, EF-RECEIPT_MISSING, EF-OUTPUT_SUBSTITUTION, EF-
DESTINATION_MISMATCH, EF-BOUNDARY_MISMATCH, EF-BUDGET_EXCEEDED, EF-
SESSION_POISONED, EF-080 FAIL_CLOSED.
24. Relationship to the Other DAS Profiles
This document is the enterprise data-and-output profile within a
wider execution-finality series
[I-D.das-execution-finality-protocol-layer], all sharing the same
core invariant that computation does not itself confer authority for
a consequence, and a companion technical architecture for governing
consequential AI agent actions [ZENODO-CANDIDATE-ACT].
[I-D.das-agentic] is the tool-dispatch profile, and
[I-D.das-agentic-tool-binding] binds that profile onto Anthropic
tool_use/computer_use, OpenAI function calling, and MCP tools/call
specifically. A generated tool call that would disclose a
reconstructed view MUST satisfy both: a receipt and output capability
here, then act-bound dispatch authority there.
Sibling sinks and jurisdiction-facing profiles in the same series
include, without limitation: precision-bounded geolocation egress
[I-D.das-precision-bounded-egress]; RF transmit authority for LEO/NTN
and inter-satellite control [I-D.das-ntn-rf] and AI-native 5G/6G and
O-RAN [I-D.das-6g-finality]; query-scoped communication handles and
discovery [I-D.das-6g-query-scoped] and [I-D.das-map-discovery];
payment and OT/ industrial-actuation sinks [I-D.das-payment] and
[I-D.das-ot-actuation]; child-safe rendering finality
[I-D.das-child-safe-rendering]; hardware-rooted national control for
critical infrastructure [I-D.das-hardware-enforced]; digital
sovereignty [I-D.das-digital-sovereignty]; third-party AI
interoperability under EU DMA Article 6(7)
[I-D.das-execution-finality-ai-interoperability]; EU AI Act and
global AI-law technical enforcement [I-D.das-eu-ai-act] and global
privacy execution enforcement [I-D.das-global-privacy]; RATS-based
attestation binding and frontier-model or vendor-specific extraction
control [I-D.das-rats-attestation-bnd],
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[I-D.das-rats-frontier-model], and [I-D.das-rats-openai-anthropic];
and umbrella candidate-act and enterprise-AI protocol framing
[I-D.das-protocols-candidate-act], [I-D.das-protocols-enterprise-ai],
and [I-D.agentic-ai-tool-execution-finality]. They are not
substitutes for vault non-joinability, but share its Candidate Act /
Non-Effective State / Finality Sink vocabulary so that a deployment
spanning several of these domains can compose them rather than build
a redundant, incompatible enforcement path for each.
25. Security Considerations
Threats the profile is intended to make non-completable without
current authority include: AI-host compromise, credential union,
mapping-table theft, unauthorized identity-content join, inferred
strategy reconstruction, prompt-injection exfiltration, destination
substitution, output substitution, receipt rollback, capability
replay, clean-room result export, and alternate-path send.
If the Output Release Boundary itself holds unrestricted plaintext
and keys, assurance of that embodiment collapses. High-assurance
deployments SHOULD keep unsealing keys off the AI host and SHOULD
consider quorum or threshold capability issuance. A k-of-n
capability for legal or financial class outputs is a deployment
choice, not an optional skip of receipt commitment.
Logging is not mediation. A SIEM copy of a joined view is itself a
release unless the copy is digest-only or already redacted to non-
joinable fragments. Prompt logging that retains retrieved identity
plus retrieved content reconstructs the map for whoever holds the
logs.
Residual risk remains if an analog path — a screenshot tool, an
unmodeled printer, a support engineer with break-glass plaintext —
can emit the same meaning. Those paths MUST be inventoried as Output
Release Boundaries or disabled for sessions that carry reconstructed
views.
26. Privacy Considerations
Reconstruction logs can themselves become a join map.
Implementations SHOULD store vault-local receipts and output digests
rather than raw joined views, and SHOULD treat Inference-Channel
Budget exhaustion as a privacy event, not only a security event.
27. IANA Considerations
This document requests no IANA actions.
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28. Intellectual Property Note
Concepts in this profile are associated with DAS Protocols Part VII
and International Application PCT/IB2026/055615. IETF disclosure
should follow BCP 79 [RFC8179].
29. Conclusion
The AI server may compute. Vaults need not become a map in its
memory. A map that is computed need not become a document the world
can use. Join only under session- bound reconstruction. Seal the
output. Commit the receipt. Consume the capability at the boundary.
Compromise of computation is not reconstruction. Reconstruction is
not release.
30. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8179] Bradner, S. and J. Contreras, "Intellectual Property
Rights in IETF Technology", BCP 79, RFC 8179, May 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8179>.
31. Informative References
[DAS-ISOLATION]
Das, S., "Why the Next AI War Will Be Won on Isolation,
Not Intelligence", DOI 10.5281/zenodo.22082925,
Zenodo 22082925, 2026,
<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22082925>.
[GITHUB-DAS-VII]
Das, S., "DAS Protocols VII Multi-Vault Technical Non-
Joinability Reference Implementation (v0.1.0)", 2026,
<https://github.com/sangmdas/DAS-Protocols-VII-Multi-
Vault-Technical-Non-Joinability-Reference-Implementation>.
[I-D.agentic-ai-tool-execution-finality]
Das, S., "Agentic AI Tool Execution Finality", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-agentic-ai-tool-execution-
finality, 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-agentic-ai-tool-execution-finality>.
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[I-D.das-6g-finality]
Das, S., "Execution-Finality for AI-Native 5G/6G and
O-RAN", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-ai-
native-6g-execution-finality-01, August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-ai-
native-6g-execution-finality-01>.
[I-D.das-6g-query-scoped]
Das, S., "Query-Scoped Communication Handles for 6G", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-6g-query-scoped-
communication-handles-02, 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-6g-query-
scoped-communication-handles-02>.
[I-D.das-agentic]
Das, S., "Tool Selection Is Not Execution: Finality for
Agentic Tool Dispatch", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-das-agentic-execution-finality-01, August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-agentic-
execution-finality-01>.
[I-D.das-agentic-tool-binding]
Das, S., "tool_use Is Not invoke(): Binding Execution-
Finality to Agentic Tool-Call Interfaces and MCP", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-agentic-tool-binding-
02, August 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-das-agentic-tool-binding-02>.
[I-D.das-child-safe-rendering]
Das, S., "Preventing Unauthorized Adult and Age-Restricted
Content Rendering to Children Through Hardware-Rooted
Execution Finality", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-das-child-safe-rendering-finality-03, August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-child-
safe-rendering-finality-03>.
[I-D.das-digital-sovereignty]
Das, S., "Digital Sovereignty Finality", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-das-digital-sovereignty-finality,
2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-
digital-sovereignty-finality>.
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[I-D.das-eu-ai-act]
Das, S., "Technical Enforcement of the EU AI Act and
Global AI Laws Without Relying on Paper Policies", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-eu-ai-act-execution-
enforcement-00, September 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-eu-ai-
act-execution-enforcement-00>.
[I-D.das-execution-finality-ai-interoperability]
Das, S., "Secure and Privacy-Preserving AI
Interoperability under Article 6(7) of the European
Digital Markets Act: An Execution-Finality Architecture",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-execution-
finality-ai-interoperability-03, September 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-
execution-finality-ai-interoperability-03>.
[I-D.das-execution-finality-protocol-layer]
Das, S., "The Missing Execution-Finality Protocol Layer of
the Internet", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
das-execution-finality-protocol-layer-00, August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-
execution-finality-protocol-layer-00>.
[I-D.das-global-privacy]
Das, S., "Global Privacy Execution Enforcement", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-global-privacy-
execution-enforcement, 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-global-
privacy-execution-enforcement>.
[I-D.das-hardware-enforced]
Das, S., "Hardware-Rooted National Control to Prevent
Covert Intelligence Data Export and Unauthorized Frontier
and Neural AI/Autonomous Acts in Critical Infrastructure",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-hardware-
enforced-execution-finality-00, August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-hardware-
enforced-execution-finality-00>.
[I-D.das-map-discovery]
Das, S., "Map-Discovery Communication Finality", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-map-discovery-
communication-finality, 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-map-
discovery-communication-finality>.
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[I-D.das-ntn-rf]
Das, S., "RF Enable Is Not Transmit Authority: Finality
for LEO/NTN and Inter-Satellite Control", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-ntn-rf-execution-
finality-00, August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-ntn-rf-
execution-finality-00>.
[I-D.das-ot-actuation]
Das, S., "OT Actuation Finality", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-das-ot-actuation-finality, 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-ot-
actuation-finality>.
[I-D.das-payment]
Das, S., "Payment Execution Finality", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-das-payment-execution-finality,
2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-
payment-execution-finality>.
[I-D.das-precision-bounded-egress]
Das, S., "Precision-Bounded Egress: Execution-Finality for
Geolocation Disclosure", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-das-precision-bounded-egress, 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-
precision-bounded-egress>.
[I-D.das-protocols-candidate-act]
Das, S., "DAS Protocols: Candidate Act Finality", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-protocols-candidate-
act-finality, 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-
protocols-candidate-act-finality>.
[I-D.das-protocols-enterprise-ai]
Das, S., "DAS Protocols for Enterprise AI", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-protocols-enterprise-
ai, 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
das-protocols-enterprise-ai>.
[I-D.das-rats-attestation-bnd]
Das, S., "RATS Attestation-Bound Execution Finality", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-rats-attestation-
bnd-execution-finality, 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-rats-
attestation-bnd-execution-finality>.
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[I-D.das-rats-frontier-model]
Das, S., "RATS-Based Frontier-Model Extraction Control",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-rats-frontier-
model-extraction-02, 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-rats-
frontier-model-extraction-02>.
[I-D.das-rats-openai-anthropic]
Das, S., "RATS-Based Extraction Control for OpenAI and
Anthropic Frontier Models", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-das-rats-openai-anthropic-extraction-00,
2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-
rats-openai-anthropic-extraction-00>.
[ZENODO-CANDIDATE-ACT]
Das, S., "Technical Architecture for Governing
Consequential AI Agent Actions", Zenodo 22323362, 2026,
<https://zenodo.org/records/22323362>. Preprint.
[ZENODO-ENTERPRISE-RESILIENCE]
Das, S., "From AI-Server Compromise to Enterprise
Resilience: Preventing Unauthorized Data Reconstruction,
Strategic Inference, and External Consequence",
Zenodo 22476198, 2026,
<https://zenodo.org/records/22476198>.
Appendix A. Reference Implementation
A runnable reference implementation of the multi-vault architecture
in this document, "DAS Protocols VII Multi-Vault Technical Non-
Joinability Reference Implementation," is published at version 0.1.0
at [GITHUB-DAS-VII]. This appendix summarizes its scope and
limitations so that the accompanying software is not read as more
than it claims to be. A companion public disclosure develops the
same architecture at greater length, including the breach-to-
reconstruction threat model in Section 20
[ZENODO-ENTERPRISE-RESILIENCE].
Unlike the separate execution-finality implementation referenced in
[I-D.das-agentic], which is concerned primarily with whether an AI-
generated tool call, API request, or external action may be invoked,
this reference implementation addresses an earlier and structurally
different security problem: access to identity is not authority to
associate identity with content; access to content is not
relationship authority; authorized reconstruction is not output
authority; and computation is not release authority.
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A.1. Implemented Protected Chain
The reference implementation demonstrates the following chain,
corresponding to the architecture defined in Section 9 through
Section 11:
Identity Vault + Content Vault
+ Independent Relationship-Mapping Vault
-> Reconstruction Authorization Object (RAO)
-> Independent Vault-Local Release Decisions
-> Session-Bound Components
-> Protected Reconstruction Domain
-> Ephemeral Minimum-Necessary Data View
-> Provenance / Association Continuity
-> AI Computation
-> Sealed Candidate Output
-> Live Output Verification
-> Protected Output Validation Receipt (POVR)
-> Output Release Capability
-> Output Release Boundary
-> Externally Usable Result
Simply splitting a database into several tables or servers does not
by itself establish Technical Non-Joinability. In this
implementation, the relationship required to associate identity with
substantive content is itself independently controlled authority:
possession of an identity component and a content component is
insufficient to construct the corresponding semantic relationship
unless the Relationship-Mapping Vault independently authorizes that
association within the permitted reconstruction scope.
A.2. What the Archive Demonstrates
The archive demonstrates: independently controlled Identity, Content,
and Relationship-Mapping Vaults; a non-bearer Reconstruction
Authorization Object bound to session, workload, epoch, permitted
fields, association scope, purpose, destination, and output
conditions; independent Vault-Local Release Conditions; session-bound
released components that cannot be reused in another reconstruction
context; an explicit Permitted Association Scope separating
permission to access a field from permission to associate it with
another field or identity; a Protected Reconstruction Domain that
reconstructs only the authorized fields and relationships; an
Ephemeral Minimum-Necessary Data View rather than a permanently
joined enterprise record; protected provenance linking reconstructed
fields and associations to their originating vaults and authorization
state; formation of a Candidate Output that remains non-authoritative
for external release; AES-GCM sealing of the Candidate Output before
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release authority exists; commit-before-capability Protected Output
Validation Receipt (POVR) behavior; an output-specific, destination-
bound, and boundary-bound Output Release Capability; single-use
consumption at the Output Release Boundary; denial on replay, output
mutation, destination substitution, session substitution, workload
change, epoch change, and missing relationship authority; parallel
vault fan-out demonstrating that independent vault decisions need not
be serial, consistent with Section 22; and a legacy migration adapter
demonstrating how an existing joined enterprise record can be
progressively decomposed and mediated without rewriting the AI model.
The included automated test suite contains 16 tests, covering
authorized reconstruction and release as well as failure cases
including missing relationship authority, unauthorized association,
cross-session component reuse, changed workload measurement, output
mutation, uncommitted POVR state, destination substitution, replay,
policy-epoch change, wrong output boundary, poisoned sessions, and
legacy-record decomposition.
The package also includes a local benchmark. In the included
reference run, using warm local components and sequential local vault
operations, the median complete protected path was approximately 2.38
ms, consistent with the figures in Section 22. This figure
characterizes the reference software only and is not a production
latency claim: it excludes network RPC, geographically distributed
vaults, remote attestation, HSM/KMS operations, distributed
consensus, AI-model inference, production databases, external
logging, and real external effectuation.
The architecture addresses multi-vault latency through cold-path
protected precomputation, concurrent vault-local release, minimum-
necessary reconstruction, and a compact current-state hot path, as
described in Section 22. Legacy integration is addressed through
mandatory proxies, gateways, sidecars, wrappers, brokers, storage
filters, model-serving layers, or output controllers, so that
existing applications and AI models do not need to implement the
complete multi-vault protocol internally.
A.3. Important Security Limitation
This release is an executable architectural reference, not a
production security system. The three vaults in v0.1.0 are logically
independent Python objects running within one process. Their
separate integrity secrets demonstrate independent release decisions
and protocol relationships, but they do not provide real machine,
administrator, TEE, HSM, or cloud-domain isolation. Full compromise
of the Python process can therefore defeat the local reference
boundaries.
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A production deployment would need genuinely independent protected
domains, appropriate asymmetric cryptography and key management,
hardware or confidential-computing isolation where required,
authenticated service-to-service communication, production
attestation and revocation infrastructure, durable rollback-resistant
receipt state, mandatory alternate-path closure, and appropriate
distributed-failure handling. The implementation does not claim to
solve every form of semantic leakage, covert channel, model-internal
information flow, inference attack, embedding leakage, or collusion
among sufficient protected authorities.
The correct interpretation of this release is therefore that it
demonstrates that the multi-vault state machine defined in this
document, and its distinction between access authority, association
authority, reconstruction authority, computation, and output
authority, can be implemented as runnable software. It does not by
itself establish production-grade isolation or regulatory compliance.
A.4. Relationship to the Separate Agentic Tool-Binding Implementation
This reference implementation should not be confused with the
separate "tool_use Is Not invoke()" reference implementation
associated with [I-D.das-agentic]. That implementation primarily
asks whether a specific AI-generated tool call may become effective.
This document, and its reference implementation, ask an additional
and earlier question: whether independently protected pieces of
information may be semantically associated and reconstructed in the
first place, and whether an AI-derived result from that
reconstruction may leave the protected environment. The two
architectures may ultimately operate together, but they solve
different technical problems.
A.5. Running the Reference Implementation Locally
python -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e .
python -m unittest discover -s tests -v
python -m das_vii_multivault.demo
python bench/benchmark.py
The expected v0.1.0 test result is 16 tests run, with an OK status.
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Appendix B. Standards Review FAQ
The questions below are the ones a standards reviewer is most likely
to ask about this profile, answered directly, in the second person,
as they would be on a working-group list. Where an answer references
machinery defined earlier in this document, the defining section is
cross-referenced rather than re-explained.
B.1. Why is this an Internet protocol problem rather than merely an
enterprise database architecture?
You are not being asked to standardize how an enterprise partitions
its database, which SQL engine it runs, how many physical vaults
exist, whether those vaults sit in TEEs or HSMs, or how its internal
Protected Reconstruction Domain is implemented. Keep treating those
as deployment choices.
The protocol problem starts once independently administered systems
have to communicate and rely on reconstruction authority across a
trust boundary. A single enterprise-AI transaction can involve a
workload operated by one organization, identity information
controlled by another service, substantive content held by a separate
data domain, relationship-mapping authority under a different
administrative or jurisdictional authority, and an output destination
belonging to yet another system. At that point you are no longer
asking whether two database tables may be joined. You need an
interoperable way to express and verify which workload is requesting
reconstruction, which fields may participate, which semantic
associations may be formed, for what purpose, under which session and
security epoch, for which destination, and under which current
protected state. Treat the internal storage topology as
implementation-specific; treat the authorization and assurance
semantics as the interoperable part.
A representative cross-domain flow looks like this:
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Workload / Agent
|
| workload identity + execution context
v
Reconstruction Authorization
|
+-- permitted field set
+-- permitted association scope
+-- purpose
+-- session / epoch
+-- destination / recipient
+-- protected conditions
|
v
+--------------------------------------------+
| Independently administered data domains |
+--------------------------------------------+
| Identity authority |
| Content authority |
| Relationship-mapping authority |
+--------------------------------------------+
|
| vault-local decisions / evidence
v
Protected Reconstruction Domain
|
| provenance + association state
v
Candidate Output
|
| protected validation / receipt
v
Output Release Boundary
Keep the independently controlled Relationship-Mapping protection
domain (Section 9) distinct from ordinary partitioned storage. If
you place data in different tables, shards, files, or servers but one
application credential, administrator, query engine, or common
control plane can still recombine everything, you have not
established the independent association authority this profile
requires.
So ask yourself, at the protocol level, whether the independently
controlled parties can exchange enough machine-verifiable state to
answer: is this the authorized workload and execution context; is
this reconstruction request bound to the correct session; which
fields may be released; which relationships among those fields may be
formed; is the authorization still valid under the current Policy
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Epoch and Session Epoch; did each required vault independently
approve its part; can the resulting components be used only in the
authorized reconstruction context; is provenance preserved through
processing; is the resulting output permitted for this recipient and
destination; has the required protected validation evidence been
committed; and is the protected release boundary actually enforcing
the expected conditions. Those are interoperability questions
precisely because the participants need not share a database,
implementation language, operating system, cloud provider, security
module, or administrative domain.
This is also why you can treat the architecture as complementary to
existing IETF work rather than a replacement for it. RATS can give
you evidence about the workload or the protected reconstruction
environment. The distinction you should keep in mind is the same one
drawn in [I-D.das-rats-frontier-model]: attestation establishes
whether an execution environment is acceptable; finality determines
whether a particular pending release currently has authority to
become externally effective. Attestation may tell you that a
protected multi-vault reconstruction mechanism is present, but the
Attestation Result should not itself become permission to form a
particular identity-content association. Likewise, an authorization
protocol can carry reconstruction-related authorization state, but
you should require that state to remain load-bearing when the
independently controlled vaults make their release decisions and when
the resulting output reaches its release boundary.
So do not ask the IETF to standardize the SQL schema, the database
vendor, the number of physical servers, the vault storage engine, the
cloud topology, the TEE vendor, the HSM implementation, the AI model
architecture, or the internal Protected Reconstruction Domain
implementation. Ask it, where you want interoperability, to help you
standardize: workload identity and execution-context binding;
reconstruction-authorization semantics; the permitted field set;
Permitted Association Scope; purpose binding; session, nonce, and
epoch semantics; vault-local release evidence; component/session
correspondence; provenance commitments; destination and recipient
binding; revocation and freshness state; output-validation evidence;
output-specific release authority; and protected-boundary assurance.
The vault implementation stays local; the authority and assurance
semantics are what need to interoperate.
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B.2. Why not just use ABAC, RBAC, ACLs, or a database join policy?
Keep using RBAC, ABAC, ACLs, and conventional database policy — they
still answer whether principal P may read resource R, invoke
operation O, or access field F. What they do not answer is the
problem this profile adds: permission to access two pieces of
information does not necessarily give you permission to associate
them. You can have identity access permitted, content access
permitted, and the identity-to-content link still not permitted. A
conventional application holding both datasets can simply join them
locally — at that point relationship authority has collapsed into
application possession.
Treat the relationship itself as a separately governed security
object (Section 9). Access to identity and access to content should
not, on their own, give you authority to decide that a particular
identity corresponds to a particular content object — data-access
authority is not automatically association authority. ABAC or OAuth-
style policy can help you express that authorization, but you need
the association restriction to stay load-bearing during
reconstruction rather than degrade into advisory metadata handed to
an application that already has everything.
B.3. Is the Relationship-Mapping Vault just another database?
No — and if you implement it as one without independent authority
over association, you have not established Technical Non-Joinability,
no matter how it is stored. Store the mapping in a conventional
database, an encrypted index, a key-value store, a graph database, a
protected resolver, or a cryptographic commitment system if you like;
what matters is that no single application credential, administrator,
query engine, service account, common root key, or shared control
plane can recover identity, content, and mapping information without
an independent decision from each. If one party can do that, your
separation is cosmetic. Hold yourself to this invariant: possession
of the independently released data components must not itself supply
the missing association authority.
B.4. What happens when one required vault is unavailable?
Fail closed. If identity, content, and relationship authority are
all required for a given reconstruction, do not treat two successful
responses as license to treat the third domain as implicitly
approved. That does not force you into poor availability — reach for
protected replication, redundant authorities, quorum systems,
geographically distributed replicas, or protected failover nodes
instead. Keep the distinction sharp: protected replication, where
the same authority stays enforceable, is acceptable; permissive
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fallback, where you bypass an authority because it is unavailable, is
not. Build your profile so it distinguishes unavailability of the
authority from absence of the authority — you can stay highly
available without letting an unavailable security decision silently
become an authorization.
B.5. What is the consistency model across multiple vaults?
Do not treat a reconstruction as a collection of unrelated successful
reads. Require the released components to correspond to the same
reconstruction context: session, workload identity, request/
reconstruction identifier, policy epoch, security epoch, association
scope, purpose, and destination where applicable. Do not let a
component produced under one security epoch silently combine with a
component produced after a material policy transition, and do not
combine stale mapping information with newly released identity or
content just because each was individually valid at some point. Bind
each vault-local release to a common reconstruction/session
commitment, and if one required decision fails or material state
changes mid-reconstruction, invalidate or poison the partial
reconstruction rather than caching it indefinitely and completing it
later under different conditions. Leave the exact distributed-
consistency mechanism as an implementation choice; hold the line only
on the requirement that every load-bearing component correspond to
the same acceptable reconstruction state.
B.6. How are concurrent releases from multiple vaults made sufficiently
atomic?
You do not need every vault in one global database transaction. You
do need to prevent the failure where individually valid components
from incompatible states get combined into an apparently valid
reconstruction. Bind every vault-local result to a common
Reconstruction ID, Session ID, Policy Epoch, Security Epoch, workload
measurement/context, association-scope digest, and authorization
digest, so each vault can authorize its own component while
committing it, cryptographically or logically, to the same
reconstruction context. You can still run the vaults in parallel
(Section 22):
+-> Identity Vault
RAO / Session -+-> Content Vault
+-> Relationship Vault
Accept the set into the Protected Reconstruction Domain only when
every mandatory component and its binding corresponds. If two vaults
authorize and the third denies, you have no complete authorized
reconstruction — discard the successful partial releases, invalidate
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them, mark the session poisoned, or allow a narrowly controlled retry
under unchanged state. Do not treat partial success as permission to
bypass the missing authority.
B.7. What exactly does "ephemeral reconstruction" mean?
Do not read "ephemeral" as just "stored in RAM." What you actually
need is that the joined representation is created only within an
authorized reconstruction context and never becomes an unrestricted
persistent enterprise record. Build your Ephemeral Reconstructed
Data View so that it is bound to the reconstruction session; limited
to the permitted fields and associations; unavailable as a general-
purpose joined dataset; invalidated when the session ends or is
poisoned; unavailable to unrelated future workloads without new
authority; and incapable of becoming a durable alternate join path.
Depending on your assurance level, hold the temporary representation
in protected application memory, a TEE, a confidential-computing
environment, protected accelerator memory, an isolated process, or
another Protected Reconstruction Domain — the term describes a
lifecycle and authority property, not one particular memory
technology.
B.8. Can an AI infer a forbidden relationship even if the Relationship-
Mapping Vault never provides it?
Possibly, and you should not claim otherwise. Do not describe
Technical Non-Joinability as proof that a sufficiently capable AI can
never infer a protected relationship from indirect evidence —
geographical clues, writing style, timestamps, rare attributes,
organizational structure, or repeated outputs can sometimes allow
probabilistic re-identification. What you are actually enforcing is
narrower and technically checkable: the system does not directly hand
over protected association authority merely because the individual
information components are accessible. Reach for minimum-necessary
field release, provenance tracking, association-scope restrictions,
cumulative disclosure state, output filtering, disclosure budgets,
Candidate Output validation, and output finality to reduce specific
inference and reconstruction pathways, but do not represent any of
that as proving semantic inference is universally impossible. Say it
this way instead: Technical Non-Joinability controls authorized
formation and externalization of protected relationships; it does not
claim universal prevention of statistical or semantic inference.
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B.9. What if several individually permitted outputs collectively reveal
a prohibited relationship?
That is a cumulative-disclosure problem, and a decision based only on
the current output will not catch it — Output A, B, and C can each be
harmless alone and still reveal a protected relationship together.
Maintain protected disclosure or association state across releases in
a higher-assurance deployment, and have your validation process weigh
previous disclosures, current reconstruction scope, recipient,
destination, session, purpose, and policy epoch before permitting
another output. That means you should be willing to deny an output
that would normally be acceptable once the accumulated disclosure
would cross a protected threshold. This mirrors the extraction-state
controls in [I-D.das-rats-frontier-model]: treat the relevant
security state as cumulative rather than per-request only, the same
way that draft treats rollback resistance, atomic consumption, and
replay resistance as load-bearing wherever repeated releases matter.
B.10. Who decides whether an association is ethically or legally
permissible?
Not the protocol, and do not let it try. Its job is to enforce a
machine-readable authorization decision supplied by the appropriate
policy authority — a data controller, the enterprise, the data
subject's consent state, a contractual rule, a legal requirement, a
regulator, a security administrator, a tenant, a jurisdiction-
specific authority, or a multi-party governance arrangement. The
enforcement mechanism checks whether the declared conditions are
satisfied; it does not check whether those conditions are ethically
justified. Keep that distinction visible in your standards text: the
mechanism enforces declared authority, it does not confer legitimacy
on the authority itself. Governance, legal basis, due process,
appeal mechanisms, proportionality, and human-rights questions stay
with the relevant institutional and legal frameworks.
B.11. Could this architecture itself be used for censorship or
excessive surveillance?
Yes — say so plainly rather than hiding it. Any sufficiently
powerful authorization or enforcement infrastructure can be misused.
Build in design principles that push back against unnecessary
concentration of power: purpose limitation; minimum disclosure;
independently controlled authorities; scoped association
authorization; selective disclosure; auditable policy identifiers;
short-lived authority; revocation; multi-party approval for
especially sensitive associations; and avoidance of unnecessary
globally stable identifiers. Do not let technical enforceability
stand in for normative legitimacy — a policy is not legitimate merely
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because the architecture can technically enforce it. The
architecture addresses only the former.
B.12. Who is allowed to see the association graph?
Ideally, nobody needs unrestricted access to the whole association
graph just to check one requested association. Instead of returning
the complete identity-content relationship database, have the
Relationship-Mapping authority answer a narrower question: is the
association between Identity I and Content C permitted for Workload
W, Purpose P, Session S, and Scope A? Return a scoped authorization,
a protected response, a cryptographic commitment, or a session-bound
mapping component — give relying parties only what the requested
reconstruction actually needs. Apply the same minimum-disclosure
principle already used for attestation evidence in
[I-D.das-rats-frontier-model]: disclose only what appraisal requires,
not detailed operational state.
B.13. Could the Relationship-Mapping Vault itself become a surveillance
super-database?
Do not assume it has to hold one plaintext universal graph of every
identity and every content object — if it does, you have built a
high-value surveillance and compromise target. Use opaque
references, partitioned mappings, pseudonymous identifiers,
cryptographic commitments, scoped lookup services, threshold-
controlled mapping, tenant-specific namespaces, purpose-specific
resolvers, protected computation, or multi-authority reconstruction
instead. Design the relationship authority so it can answer only "is
association X permitted under authorization Y?" without exporting the
underlying graph, and in a high-assurance deployment, split mapping
control so no single operator holds enough information to reconstruct
every protected relationship on their own. Read "Relationship-
Mapping Vault" as an authority domain, not necessarily a centralized
plaintext database.
B.14. What happens if the Relationship-Mapping Vault is compromised?
Do not claim that compromise of every load-bearing trust component is
harmless — if an attacker fully controls the authority responsible
for deciding relationships, that compromise can undermine the
association-control property. Answer it with defense in depth:
hardware-isolated keys, attested enforcement, threshold
authorization, multiple independent mapping authorities, tenant
approval, jurisdictional approval, policy-epoch revocation, short-
lived session binding, provenance continuity, output-time
revalidation, and Output Release Boundary enforcement (Section 11).
Keep this distinction: compromise of one mapping authority might let
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it issue an improper mapping decision, but it should not
automatically hand over authority to externalize the resulting
information if your independent reconstruction and output-finality
checks stay load-bearing. Your security objective is not "no
component can ever be compromised" — it is that compromise of one
component should not unnecessarily collapse every remaining
independent security boundary.
B.15. Why not just use a data clean room?
Use one — this architecture does not ask you to replace it. A clean
room gives you a controlled environment for processing participating
datasets while restricting raw-data access and exported results.
What you still need, before and during reconstruction, is an answer
to a different question: should these independently protected
information domains be associated at all, and under what exact
authority? A typical clean-room question is "these datasets are
inside the controlled room — what computations and exports are
allowed?" The multi-vault question is "has authority first been
established to form this particular semantic relationship between
these independently controlled domains?" You can let a clean room
serve as part of the Protected Reconstruction Domain — it does not on
its own replace the independent Relationship-Mapping authority or the
downstream execution-finality controls that continue past
reconstruction into sealed Candidate Output, live validation,
protected receipt, output-specific authority, and the Output Release
Boundary (Section 11).
B.16. What exactly could be standardized by the IETF?
This is probably the question that matters most, so keep the boundary
explicit. Do not ask for standardization of vault database engines,
SQL schemas, cloud providers, TEE vendors, HSM models, AI-model
architecture, enterprise storage topology, encryption algorithms
beyond existing IETF mechanisms, internal Protected Reconstruction
Domain implementation, or organizational governance structure. Ask
instead for the narrower, genuinely interoperable surface: a
Reconstruction Authorization identifier; workload and execution-
context binding; request and session identity; the Permitted Field
Set; Permitted Association Scope; purpose binding; a policy
identifier; Policy Epoch; Session/Security Epoch; destination and
recipient binding; vault-local release status; component
correspondence; freshness state; revocation state; provenance
commitment; association-provenance commitment; Candidate Output
identity; output-validation evidence; output-specific release
authority; one-time or bounded consumption state; protected
reconstruction assurance; and Output Release Boundary assurance.
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Reuse existing IETF mechanisms wherever you can. RATS can establish
that the expected reconstruction and finality controls exist and are
running in an acceptably measured environment — the same separation
this document's companion RATS draft already uses for model-state
release control: RATS communicates evidence about the enforcement
mechanism, while the act-specific bounded authority decides whether a
particular Candidate Release may cross the boundary. WIMSE can
supply or help establish workload identity and runtime execution
context, which you then bind to reconstruction authority:
WIMSE:
Who/what is this workload?
|
v
DAS VII:
What protected relationships may this workload
form during this particular reconstruction?
OAuth can give you authorization and delegation machinery and carry
rich authorization state; your remaining question is whether that
authorization stays load-bearing through independent vault release,
protected reconstruction, and final output release, rather than
terminating at the point where a client obtains a token. Frame the
standards proposition this way: do not standardize the vaults.
Standardize, where interoperability requires it, the semantics by
which independently administered systems express, bind, verify, and
preserve reconstruction authority, association scope, execution
context, freshness, provenance, and externally effective release
constraints.
Changes Since draft-das-enterprise-ai-output-finality-01 (and Since -00)
This section is to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication.
Items 1 through 10 below were introduced in -01 (relative to -00);
item 11 is new in this revision (-02, relative to -01).
1. -01: Bumped the document from -00 to -01.
2. Added Section 20, an illustrative example showing how compromise
of a single AI-connected server can be correlated into a
reconstruction of an enterprise's, or a defense/critical-
infrastructure organization's, probable future rather than a
mere copy of stored rows.
3. Added Section 22, addressing the latency and legacy-system-
compatibility objections to a multi-vault architecture.
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4. Specified, within Section 22, the separation of a cold path
(protected precomputation) from a hot path (current checks whose
omission would permit unauthorized reconstruction or release).
5. Clarified that Technical Non-Joinability does not require serial
vault evaluation, and specified permissible parallel vault-local
release fan-out once a valid Reconstruction Authorization Object
is established.
6. Added guidance on model-agnostic deployment through a protected
intermediary, and an incremental, conservative migration path
for legacy databases holding complete joined records.
7. Added quantitative latency observations from the accompanying
runnable Python reference implementation's 500-iteration
microbenchmark, labelled as reference-code observations rather
than protocol latency guarantees.
8. Added an explicit non-bypassability requirement distinguishing
sidecar-style mediation from fully mediated deployments in which
no unmediated alternative path to protected data or an external-
effect boundary remains.
9. Added Appendix A, summarizing the published v0.1.0 reference
implementation: its implemented protected chain, test-suite
coverage, benchmark figures, an explicit security limitation
notice describing it as a single-process architectural reference
rather than a production isolation system, and its relationship
to the separate agentic tool-binding reference implementation.
10. Added the reference implementation's GitHub source
([GITHUB-DAS-VII]) and two companion public disclosures
([ZENODO-ENTERPRISE-RESILIENCE], [ZENODO-CANDIDATE-ACT]) as
informative references, and expanded Section 24 into a full
cross-reference across the author's execution-finality Internet-
Draft series.
11. -02: Added Appendix B, a second-person "Standards Review FAQ"
answering the sixteen questions a working-group reviewer is most
likely to raise about this profile — why it is a protocol
problem rather than a database design, its relationship to
ABAC/RBAC/ACLs and to data clean rooms, vault unavailability and
consistency semantics, ephemeral reconstruction, the limits of
Technical Non-Joinability against semantic inference and
cumulative disclosure, governance and censorship-risk framing,
and the specific, narrow interoperability surface this document
proposes for IETF standardization.
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12. -02: Bumped the document from -01 to -02; updated the document
date accordingly. No change was made to the normative
requirements in Section 9, Section 8, or Section 11.
13. -02: Added a personal, first-person illustrative paragraph as
the new lead paragraph of the Abstract, using the author's own
patent-drafting and prosecution workflow to make concrete that
credential theft against an AI assistant can expose unfiled
invention ideas, filing strategy, and competitive-defense plans
that were never stored together as a single record —
distinguishing this risk from a simple data-chunk takeover of
already-existing files.
14. -02: Added, as the second and third sentences of the Abstract's
lead paragraph, an explicit short-term-pain versus existential-
risk contrast: a stolen data chunk is recoverable, but an
enterprise's or individual's mapped future falling into a
competitor's hands is not.
15. -02: Replaced the Abstract in full with an expanded version
built around two extended illustrative examples — a company CEO
whose AI assistant's day-to-day use could be correlated by an
attacker into unannounced acquisition, product, and patent-
filing strategy, and a senior government official whose
assistant's fragments could be correlated into an unannounced
foreign-policy position — introducing the terms enterprise-
future reconstruction, Technical Non-Joinability, and Technical
Non-Completability, and restating the full protected sequence
from independent data authority through the Output Release
Boundary. This superseded, rather than supplemented, the
shorter Abstract text introduced earlier in this revision and in
-01.
16. -02: Moved the two-example narrative above (CEO acquisition/
patent-strategy example; senior-government foreign-policy
example; the enterprise-future reconstruction definition; and
the introduction of Technical Non-Joinability and Technical Non-
Completability) out of the Abstract and into a new Section 5
section placed immediately after Section 4, so that this
material now serves as extended threat-model and need-of-the-
hour motivation in the body rather than as Abstract text.
Replaced the Abstract with a short, formal IETF-style paragraph
stating the specification's scope: the architectural framework
and metadata profile, the RAO-based Technical Non-Joinability
mechanism, the Output Release-Boundary-based Technical Non-
Completability mechanism, and the token schemas, cryptographic
bindings, and boundary validation sequences this document
defines.
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Internet-Draft Enterprise Output Finality September 2026
17. -02: Added a closing sentence to the Abstract politely directing
readers to review Section 4 and Section 5 in full, so that the
complete problem description and motivating scenarios moved out
of the Abstract in the previous item are not overlooked.
Author's Address
Sangam Das
Independent Inventor
Balasore 756001
Odisha
India
Email: info@sangamdas.com
Das Expires 10 March 2027 [Page 59]