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The Missing Piece for High-Value Confidential Enterprise AI: Non-Joinable Vaults and Output-Release Finality for Banking, Defence, and Public-Sector Deployments
draft-das-enterprise-ai-output-finality-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Sangam Das
Last updated 2026-09-29 (Latest revision 2026-09-12)
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Formats
Additional resources Before Comparing Meta Muse / Sentinel, Read the Earlier DAS Disclosures: An AI-Assisted Primary-Source Technical Guide — Zenodo
Reference Implementation — GitHub - Multi-Vault Technical Non-Joinability
The Internet Solved Communication. It Never Solved Authority. — Zenodo. Broader technical background on the execution-finality gap.
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draft-das-enterprise-ai-output-finality-03
Network Working Group                                             S. Das
Internet-Draft                                      Independent Inventor
Intended status: Informational                         12 September 2026
Expires: 16 March 2027

   The Missing Piece for High-Value Confidential Enterprise AI: Non-
 Joinable Vaults and Output-Release Finality for Banking, Defence, and
                       Public-Sector Deployments
               draft-das-enterprise-ai-output-finality-03

Abstract

   This profile is specified for high-risk, multi-system enterprise and
   public-sector AI — assistants and agents that can see several
   independently authorized stores and then send, write, or invoke.  It
   is not specified for consumer chat.  In industrial terms that
   describes enterprise assistant and agent seats of the kind offered by
   Anthropic, OpenAI, Google Gemini, and xAI Grok, together with self-
   hosted open-weight deployments; these names are used with respect, as
   publicly described deployment classes only, and imply no claim about
   any vendor's internals and no vendor endorsement of this profile.

   A 2020 breach stole what was already stored: a server image, a
   database dump, user rows.  After 2025 a compromised assistant can do
   what a dump cannot.  In minutes it can join mail, tickets, code,
   finance, and memory into a map of launch plans, targets, defects, and
   negotiation room — strategy that was never one record — and that map
   can be sold to a competitor.  There is no credential rotation for a
   future that has already been read.  Traditional access control still
   answers who may touch each store.  It does not answer whether those
   fragments may be joined into that meaning, or whether that meaning
   may leave.

   This document specifies an architectural framework and metadata
   profile for that gap.  Technical Non-Joinability is enforced by a
   session-bound Reconstruction Authorization Object (RAO) that limits
   relational binding.  Technical Non-Completability is enforced by an
   Output Release Boundary that requires committed validation evidence
   before a generated token or tool invocation can take external effect.
   The specification defines the authorization objects, cryptographic
   bindings, and boundary validation sequences required to isolate
   reconstruction domains without modifying the underlying datastores.

   A published runnable reference implementation is provided so that the
   profile can be executed and tested, not only read as theory.  That
   implementation is an architectural reference for the state machine,
   not a claim of production isolation.  The architecture introduces

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   bounded evaluation on the path that can intercept unauthorized join
   or release.  That latency is accepted where the asset is high-
   consequence enterprise or public-sector intelligence and raw speed is
   subordinate to preventing reconstruction and release.  The author
   states that trade-off explicitly: this profile is for deployments
   that choose that priority.  It is not offered as a design for
   consumer chat or other paths that optimize only for speed.

   Readers are respectfully encouraged to review Section 4 and Section 5
   in full, as those sections set out the complete problem description
   and motivating scenarios and should not be skipped.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 March 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  How Cyber Theft Changed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

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     2.1.  Past: Steal the Store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Present: Steal the Session and the Connector  . . . . . .   7
     2.3.  Future: Steal the Meaning, Then the Act . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Threat Model and Need of the Hour . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Industrial Applicability for Frontier Enterprise AI . . . . .  14
     6.1.  Where This Profile Is Aimed First . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.2.  What "Enterprise Seat" Concentrates . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.3.  How a Frontier Runtime Would Use This Profile . . . . . .  15
     6.4.  Anthropic-Class Tool and Computer-Use Seats . . . . . . .  15
     6.5.  OpenAI-Class Enterprise, GPTs, and Agent Runtime  . . . .  16
     6.6.  Google-Class Workspace, Gemini Enterprise, and Agent
           Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.7.  xAI-Class Grok Business and Enterprise Agent Seats  . . .  17
     6.8.  Meta Llama-Class Open-Weight and Self-Hosted
           Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.9.  Why Labs Should Care Commercially . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  Existing Solutions and What They Do Not Bind  . . . . . . . .  18
     7.1.  IAM, RBAC, and Application Credentials  . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.2.  DLP and Output Classifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.3.  Tokenization, Hashing, and Field Encryption . . . . . . .  18
     7.4.  Confidential Computing and Enclaves . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.5.  Clean Rooms and Data-Sharing Enclaves . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.6.  RAG Isolation and Prompt Firewalls  . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.7.  What This Profile Adds  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   8.  Three Pillars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.1.  Decomposition of Authority  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.2.  Mandatory Mediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     8.3.  Technical Non-Completability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   9.  Technical Non-Joinability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   10. Session-Bound Reconstruction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     10.1.  Disclosure Budget  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     10.2.  Inference-Channel Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   11. Sealed Output and Release Boundary  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   12. Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   13. Protocol Pseudocode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     13.1.  Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     13.2.  Seal, Verify, Release  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   14. Industrial Relevance and Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     14.1.  Enterprise Copilot on CRM, Code, and Mail  . . . . . . .  24
     14.2.  Healthcare and Payer Assistants  . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     14.3.  Banking, Treasury, and Claims  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     14.4.  Legal, M&A, and Board Materials  . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     14.5.  Multi-Tenant SaaS AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     14.6.  Regulated Clean-Room Analytics . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     14.7.  Pharma, Device, and Clinical-Trial Operations  . . . . .  25
     14.8.  Semiconductor, Automotive, and Product R&D . . . . . . .  26

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     14.9.  Energy, Grid, and OT-Adjacent Assistants . . . . . . . .  26
     14.10. Public-Sector and National-Security Enterprise Seats . .  26
     14.11. Insurers and Claims-Triage Agents  . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     14.12. What Operators Should Measure  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   15. Mapping Frontier Product Features to This Profile . . . . . .  27
     15.1.  Connectors and MCP Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     15.2.  Projects, Spaces, and Team Workspaces  . . . . . . . . .  27
     15.3.  Memory and Persistent Notes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     15.4.  Computer Use and Browser Agents  . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     15.5.  Share Chat, Export, and API Log Sinks  . . . . . . . . .  27
   16. JSON Interoperability Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     16.1.  ReconstructionAuthorization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     16.2.  Sealed Candidate Output and Receipt  . . . . . . . . . .  28
     16.3.  Output Release Capability and Boundary Verify  . . . . .  28
     16.4.  Vault-Local Release Receipt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   17. End-to-End Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   18. Worked Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     18.1.  Allow: Ticket Summary to Internal Counsel  . . . . . . .  31
     18.2.  Deny: Future-Map Report to External Destination  . . . .  31
     18.3.  Deny: Memory Persistence of a Prohibited Join  . . . . .  31
   19. Enterprise-AI Threat Catalog  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   20. Illustrative Example: When a Server Breach Becomes a Breach of
           the Enterprise's Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   21. Deployment Topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   22. Addressing Latency and Legacy-System Objections . . . . . . .  35
     22.1.  Hot Path and Cold Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     22.2.  Independent Vault Decisions Need Not Be Serial . . . . .  36
     22.3.  Reconstruction Is Minimum-Necessary, Not Enterprise-Wide
            Joining  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     22.4.  The AI Model Does Not Need to Run the Multi-Vault
            Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     22.5.  Legacy-System Integration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
     22.6.  Incremental Migration of Existing Databases  . . . . . .  39
     22.7.  Latency Observation from the Runnable Reference
            Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     22.8.  Non-Bypassability Is the Final Requirement . . . . . . .  40
   23. Failure, Poison, and Alternate Paths  . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   24. Relationship to the Other DAS Profiles  . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   25. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   26. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   27. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   28. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   29. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
   30. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
   Appendix A.  Reference Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     A.1.  Implemented Protected Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     A.2.  What the Archive Demonstrates . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     A.3.  Important Security Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50

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     A.4.  Relationship to the Separate Agentic Tool-Binding
           Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     A.5.  Running the Reference Implementation Locally  . . . . . .  50
   Appendix B.  Standards Review FAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     B.1.  Why is this an Internet protocol problem rather than merely
            an enterprise database architecture? . . . . . . . . . .  51
     B.2.  Why not just use ABAC, RBAC, ACLs, or a database join
            policy?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     B.3.  Is the Relationship-Mapping Vault just another
            database?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     B.4.  What happens when one required vault is unavailable?  . .  54
     B.5.  What is the consistency model across multiple vaults? . .  55
     B.6.  How are concurrent releases from multiple vaults made
            sufficiently atomic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     B.7.  What exactly does "ephemeral reconstruction" mean?  . . .  56
     B.8.  Can an AI infer a forbidden relationship even if the
            Relationship-Mapping Vault never provides it?  . . . . .  56
     B.9.  What if several individually permitted outputs collectively
            reveal a prohibited relationship?  . . . . . . . . . . .  57
     B.10. Who decides whether an association is ethically or legally
            permissible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
     B.11. Could this architecture itself be used for censorship or
            excessive surveillance?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
     B.12. Who is allowed to see the association graph?  . . . . . .  58
     B.13. Could the Relationship-Mapping Vault itself become a
            surveillance super-database? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     B.14. What happens if the Relationship-Mapping Vault is
            compromised? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     B.15. Why not just use a data clean room? . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     B.16. What exactly could be standardized by the IETF? . . . . .  59
   Changes Since draft-das-enterprise-ai-output-finality-02 (and Since
           -01 and -00)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65

1.  Introduction

   The next enterprise-AI security war will not be fought only over
   model intelligence.  It will be fought over who may join information
   into meaning, and who may turn that meaning into action.  That
   framing is developed in version 2 of "Why the Next AI War Will Be Won
   on Isolation, Not Intelligence" [DAS-ISOLATION], which defines
   enterprise-future mapping as reconstruction of strategy and probable
   action from distributed weak signals, and argues that isolation of
   join authority and isolation of effectuation matter more than another
   increment of model IQ.  This document is the protocol profile for
   that split.

   The path inside a hosted or on-prem assistant is now:

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   mail + CRM + git + finance + memory
           -> frontier model / agent runtime
           -> join fragments into new meaning
           -> text / tool / computer-use / mail
           -> external consequence

   This document controls the two arrows conventional security still
   treats as the model's private business.  Identity, content, and the
   map that joins them MUST NOT become one object on the model host
   outside an authorized reconstruction session.  A generated Candidate
   Output MUST NOT become mail, file, API, payment, screen, or MCP
   invoke merely because the model finished.

   The general form of the split is stated in [DAS-AUTHORITY]: the
   Internet solved transport, secrecy, identity, delegation, and record-
   keeping, but no existing layer answers whether a specific machine-
   generated act was authorized to become externally effective.  This
   document applies that question to the enterprise data path, where the
   act in question is first a join and then a release.

   The profile uses the execution-finality chain in
   [I-D.das-6g-finality] and the tool-dispatch sink in
   [I-D.das-agentic].  It adds the enterprise predicates those drafts do
   not specify: independently controlled vaults, Technical Non-
   Joinability, a Reconstruction Authorization Object, disclosure and
   inference-channel budgets, Sealed Candidate Outputs, a Protected
   Output Validation Receipt committed before capability issuance, and
   an Output Release Boundary.

   This document is offered as a missing piece, not as a replacement for
   anything already deployed.  Identity federation, transport security,
   key management, attestation, access control, data-loss prevention,
   and model-side refusal are all present and all necessary.  None of
   them is required to answer the two questions that only appear once a
   single assistant seat holds several independently authorized stores
   and a write path: may these fragments be bound into that meaning, and
   may that meaning leave?  Because nothing in the current stack owns
   those questions, in practice nothing answers them, and the join and
   the release are left to the model runtime by default.  This profile
   supplies that missing answer and deliberately supplies nothing else.

   The scope is equally deliberate.  The profile is aimed at high-value
   confidential work, where a reconstructed map is a strategic loss that
   no credential rotation reverses: banks and treasury operations,
   defence and national-security seats, intelligence and diplomatic
   staff functions, critical infrastructure operators, and regulated
   enterprises holding unreleased deal, design, or safety material.  In
   those deployments the asset is not the stored row.  The asset is the

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   unwritten conclusion about the organization's next move, and the
   profile trades bounded evaluation latency for the assurance that the
   conclusion is neither assembled nor released without current
   authority.  Deployments whose only priority is response speed,
   including consumer chat, are explicitly out of scope.

2.  How Cyber Theft Changed

   A protocol that asks enterprises and frontier labs to change their
   assistant runtime has to say why last decade's controls are the wrong
   picture of the incident.  The incident class moved.  The controls did
   not.

2.1.  Past: Steal the Store

   The historical breach was a copy of what already existed.  An
   attacker took a file share, a customer database, a card dump, or a
   backup tape.  Harm scaled with volume: more rows, more accounts, more
   records for sale.  Defense scaled the same way: perimeter, patch,
   encrypt-at-rest, vault the database password, watch the egress link
   for a bulk transfer.

   That model had a hidden assumption.  The valuable object was a record
   someone had already written down.  Joining two tables was a report
   the business ran on purpose.  The application server was allowed to
   be the place where identity and content met, because the application
   was narrow and the output was a form, not a strategy.

   Famous incidents of that era — bulk PII theft, payment dumps, leaked
   source archives — were catastrophic and still conceptually simple.
   The attacker left with yesterday.  They did not automatically acquire
   a machine that could keep asking "what will this firm do next" on
   live mail and tickets.

2.2.  Present: Steal the Session and the Connector

   The current incident is often not a database export.  It is a token,
   a laptop, a poisoned plugin, or a prompt-injected document that rides
   an already-authorized assistant.  Enterprises have connected frontier
   models to the same corpus a human VP can see: Drive, Slack or Teams,
   GitHub, Salesforce, ServiceNow, ERP, and a vector store of
   "everything we embed."

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   Access control still works as designed for each system.  The
   assistant is an authorized user of each.  The new fact is
   concentration.  One runtime holds simultaneous views that no single
   human would hold in one sitting, and it can keep them in context
   across turns.  A phishing mail that says "summarize the attached with
   our internal tools" is no longer a text event.  It is a join event
   plus, if tools are on, an action event.

   Present theft therefore looks like: session hijack of ChatGPT
   Enterprise or a Claude work seat; OAuth grant to an MCP or connector
   that was meant for search; a retrieved wiki page that contains
   instructions; a computer-use agent that can see a screen the DLP
   product never hashed.  Encryption and SSO are up.  Reconstruction
   still happens, because reconstruction is what the product is for.

2.3.  Future: Steal the Meaning, Then the Act

   The coming incident does not require a dump and does not require the
   attacker to understand the business.  The model does the correlation.
   Individually lawful fragments — a complaint, a bug, a pricing note, a
   hiring req, a board draft — become a map of launch timing, target
   accounts, unreleased defects, and negotiation room.  That map was
   never a row in any system of record.

   [DAS-ISOLATION] calls this enterprise-future mapping: extraction of
   strategic intelligence through AI-driven correlation of distributed
   weak signals.  Conventional security governs who may access a
   resource.  It does not govern whether separately accessible
   information may be joined into a new protected meaning.  Once the
   fragments are in one authorized context window, possession becomes
   reconstruction.  If the same context can call mail, payments,
   tickets, or a browser, reconstruction becomes consequence.

   The failure mode this profile is built to change is therefore not
   "breach impossible."  It is: compromise of one intelligent component
   MUST NOT automatically become compromise of the organisation's
   complete data relationships, strategic intelligence, and future.
   Isolation of join authority and isolation of release authority matter
   more than another point of model IQ [DAS-ISOLATION].

3.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

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   Failure to establish current reconstruction or output-release
   authority MUST NOT be converted into permission to join vaults or to
   release a Candidate Output.

4.  Problem Space

   A stolen database dump is a collection of rows.  A compromised
   enterprise assistant is a joining engine.  It can take customer
   complaints, unreleased defects, engineering threads, pricing notes,
   and launch plans and emit a structured report of what the firm will
   ship, to whom, and when.  That report is not "another record."  It is
   a map of the enterprise's future.

   The practical failures look like this:

   *  The AI server holds credentials for CRM, git, mail, and finance.
      Compromising that process inherits every join those credentials
      can make.

   *  Identity and content live in different tables.  The mapping table
      lives on the same application credential.  Separation of storage
      is not separation of association authority.

   *  A clean room or RAG index still returns joinable plaintext to the
      same workload that can send mail.

   *  An output filter labels the report "internal."  The runtime then
      posts it because the model selected message.send.

   *  A session that was allowed to reconstruct three fields for ticket
      triage is reused to reconstruct a customer-to- roadmap
      association.

   *  A sealed file is copied to another gateway that does not check
      destination, epoch, or output digest.

   The missing questions are: may these vaults be joined for this
   purpose in this session, and may this exact generated artifact leave
   through this boundary now.

5.  Threat Model and Need of the Hour

   A conventional cyber breach steals what already exists.  An AI-era
   breach can reconstruct what does not yet exist as a document at all:
   an individual's, enterprise's, or government's probable future.

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   Consider a concrete example.  Imagine that I am the CEO of a billion-
   dollar company and use an AI assistant every day, not merely to
   summarize documents, but to think.  It helps evaluate acquisition
   targets, compare competitors, examine financial scenarios, assess
   suppliers, prepare board material, explore new markets, develop
   future products, analyse regulatory exposure, and test technical
   ideas that may later become patent applications.  Over time, that
   assistant may know more about the direction of the company than any
   single document does.

   If an attacker steals one file, the attacker obtains that file.  If
   the attacker compromises the AI environment through which I work, the
   attacker may be able to ask a much more dangerous question:

   "Based on everything this person has been working on, what is this
   company likely to do next?"

   The answer may never have existed as a stored record.  There may be
   no file called "Acquisitions We Will Announce Next Year.pdf," no
   database entry labelled "Future Product Roadmap," and no memorandum
   saying "This is the technology we intend to patent six months from
   now."  Yet the ingredients may already exist separately across email,
   financial models, meeting notes, product discussions, supplier
   conversations, technical experiments, search history, draft patent
   material, market analysis, and ordinary AI interactions.

   A capable AI can correlate those fragments.  It may infer that the
   company is quietly preparing to acquire a particular business, enter
   a particular market, replace a critical supplier, abandon a product
   line, respond to an anticipated regulatory problem, develop an
   unannounced technology, or prepare an idea for patent protection
   before the filing exists.  The attacker has therefore not merely
   stolen stored information.

   The attacker has reconstructed strategy.

   That distinction matters because strategy cannot simply be rotated
   like a password or revoked like an API credential.  Once a competitor
   knows what an enterprise is likely to do next, there may be no
   equivalent reset mechanism.

   The same risk becomes more serious for a senior government official.
   A day-to-day AI assistant may encounter fragments concerning
   diplomatic meetings, sanctions options, trade negotiations, alliance
   priorities, defence assessments, procurement concerns, internal
   disagreements, travel, draft speeches, economic analysis, or policy
   options.  No single record may state, "This is our next foreign-
   policy move toward Country X or Group Y."  Yet an AI system capable

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   of correlating these fragments may infer whether relations are likely
   to harden or soften, whether sanctions are being considered, which
   alliance may receive greater cooperation, which diplomatic concession
   may be offered, or what strategic position the government is
   preparing to adopt.

   There may be no document called "Our Next Foreign Policy Toward
   Country X."  The future policy may exist only implicitly across
   independently protected fragments.

   If that AI environment is compromised, the attacker may not simply
   learn what the government already knows.

   The attacker may reconstruct what the government is preparing to do.

   This changes the cybersecurity problem.  AI is increasingly becoming
   a day-to-day cognitive assistant.  People no longer provide it only
   with finished documents.  They use it while decisions are incomplete.
   They ask which company to acquire, which product to cancel, what
   competitor behaviour is likely, which market to enter, what weakness
   exists in a proposal, whether a technical concept may deserve patent
   protection, or what should be presented to a board, regulator,
   minister, or negotiating counterpart tomorrow.

   Those interactions collectively expose something potentially more
   valuable than historical records: intentions, priorities,
   uncertainties, relationships, and probable future actions.

   Past cyber theft stole files.  Present cyber theft steals accounts,
   sessions, SaaS credentials, and live access.  The next class of theft
   does not require a database dump at all.  A compromised AI-connected
   workload that can access mail, tickets, code, finance, procurement,
   technical repositories, memory, and external tools can correlate
   individually accessible fragments into strategic meaning that was
   never stored as one record, and may then externalize that meaning
   through a response, file write, message, API action, computer-use
   operation, or tool invocation.

   This document refers to that problem as enterprise-future
   reconstruction: the unauthorized formation of protected semantic
   relationships and the reconstruction of strategy, intent,
   dependencies, or probable next actions from information that was
   individually accessible but never authorized to be combined into that
   meaning.

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   Traditional controls remain necessary but do not fully answer this
   problem.  IAM, RBAC, ABAC, DLP, clean rooms, confidential computing,
   TEEs, audit systems, and output filters can govern identities,
   stores, environments, or individual operations.  They do not
   necessarily answer a different question:

   Does lawful access to several independently protected pieces of
   information also confer authority to form this particular
   relationship between them?

   Nor do they necessarily answer the subsequent question:

   If an AI has successfully reconstructed the information, does
   successful computation itself authorize that newly reconstructed
   intelligence to leave the protected environment?

   The architecture described in this document introduces two separate
   security properties.

   First, Technical Non-Joinability: access to identity information is
   not automatically authority to associate it with content; access to
   content is not automatically relationship authority; and access to
   multiple individually permitted data domains does not silently become
   unrestricted authority to construct a complete strategic picture.

   Second, Technical Non-Completability: even where authorized
   reconstruction and AI computation occur, successful computation does
   not itself authorize the resulting intelligence to become externally
   effective.

   The profile therefore separates identity, content, and relationship-
   mapping authority into independently controlled protection domains.
   Reconstruction occurs only under a session-bound Reconstruction
   Authorization Object (RAO) expressing the permitted fields,
   relationships, purpose, workload context, current epoch, and other
   applicable conditions.  Required vaults make independent release
   decisions, and successful components are usable only within the
   authorized reconstruction context.  The Protected Reconstruction
   Domain constructs only the minimum-necessary ephemeral view and
   preserves provenance and association continuity.

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   AI computation over that view produces a Candidate Output, not
   immediately releasable information.  The Candidate Output remains
   non-effective until live output validation succeeds, the required
   protected validation evidence or receipt is committed, output-
   specific release authority is created, and an Output Release Boundary
   independently verifies the relevant output, destination, recipient,
   session, epoch, and authority before permitting send, render, store,
   or invocation.

   The resulting sequence is therefore: independent data authority,
   relationship authority, session-bound reconstruction, minimum-
   necessary ephemeral view, AI computation, Sealed Candidate Output,
   live validation, protected receipt, output-specific authority, Output
   Release Boundary, external effect.

   The central rule is: access to data is not automatically authority to
   form every relationship between those data.

   And after reconstruction: computation is not authority to release.

   The architecture is designed for incremental deployment rather than
   requiring immediate replacement of existing enterprise systems.
   Protected precomputation and policy preparation may occur on a slower
   cold path, while the hot path contains only the checks whose omission
   would permit unauthorized reconstruction or external release.
   Independent vault operations may execute in parallel after a valid
   RAO is established.  Existing databases, applications, model
   interfaces, and enterprise workflows can be integrated through
   mandatory gateways, proxies, wrappers, brokers, adapters, protected
   model-serving layers, or output controllers while data domains are
   progressively separated.

   The proposal also does not claim that all semantic inference can be
   made impossible.  A sufficiently capable model may sometimes infer
   relationships from indirect evidence.  The narrower objective is to
   prevent ordinary possession of individually permitted information
   from automatically becoming authority to construct protected
   associations, to preserve cumulative and provenance-sensitive
   controls where repeated outputs may reveal more than each output
   alone, and to prevent reconstructed intelligence from becoming
   externally effective merely because an AI successfully computed it.

   The protected asset in the AI era is therefore no longer limited to
   what an organization has already written down.

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   It may include what the organization is thinking about, what it is
   preparing to build, what it intends to acquire, what it may patent
   next, how a government may position itself toward another country or
   group, and ultimately what that individual, enterprise, or government
   is likely to do in the future.

   A conventional breach can reveal what an organization knows.  An AI-
   era reconstruction breach can reveal what it is likely to do next.

6.  Industrial Applicability for Frontier Enterprise AI

   This section is written for the products that actually sit on the
   path above: hosted enterprise assistants, tool-using agents,
   computer-use agents, and connector/MCP fleets.  Vendor names below
   are used strictly as shorthand for publicly described deployment
   classes.  They are not claims about any vendor's unpublished
   internals, not statements that a named product is or is not secure,
   and not an assertion that any vendor has adopted, reviewed, or
   endorsed this profile.

6.1.  Where This Profile Is Aimed First

   The mechanisms below are general, but the intended first deployments
   are narrow and high-consequence: banking, treasury, and market-
   sensitive finance; defence, national-security, and intelligence staff
   work; critical infrastructure and grid operations; and regulated
   enterprises holding unreleased deal, design, clinical, or safety
   material.  The common property is that the damaging artifact is not
   an exported record but an assembled conclusion — an acquisition
   posture, a force disposition, a known-but-unannounced defect, a
   negotiating floor — which no system was ever asked to authorize
   because no system was ever asked to create it.

   For that class of deployment, an evaluation step on the join path and
   on the release path is an acceptable cost.  A bank already accepts
   synchronous authorization on a wire transfer.  A defence network
   already accepts a release decision before material crosses a
   boundary.  This profile asks for the same posture at the two points
   where an AI seat now creates and emits strategy, and asks for it only
   there.

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6.2.  What "Enterprise Seat" Concentrates

   A ChatGPT Enterprise, Claude for Work, or equivalent seat is not a
   chatbot with a login.  It is a retrieval and action surface.  Typical
   connectors already include mail and calendar, document stores,
   ticketing, CRM, source hosting, and data warehouses.  Projects,
   memory, and team workspaces persist fragments across days.  MCP and
   function calling add write paths: create ticket, send mail, open PR,
   update row, drive a browser.

   The industrial fact is concentration of join plus concentration of
   act in one context window.  A human analyst is slow and scoped.  The
   seat is neither.  That is why past DLP (watch the USB stick) and
   present CASB (watch the OAuth grant) do not finish the job.  The
   grant is intended.  The join is the product.  The act is a checkbox.

6.3.  How a Frontier Runtime Would Use This Profile

   Placement is not "put the whole model in a vault."  Placement is two
   gates the vendor already almost has:

   1.  Before retrieval and association: each connector returns identity
       fragments, content fragments, or mapping fragments under a
       Reconstruction Authorization Object bound to tenant, purpose,
       field set, association scope, session epoch, and workload
       identity.  The model host sees a minimum-necessary view, not a
       universal join.

   2.  Before any leaving the runtime: generated text, file, mail, tool
       call, computer-use submit, or memory write is a Sealed Candidate
       Output.  Output verification commits a receipt.  An Output
       Release Capability is consumed at the mail gateway, file commit,
       MCP dispatcher [I-D.das-agentic], or browser submit.

   The model, including a frontier model used as the enterprise brain,
   stays in the compute role.  It does not hold relationship-mapping
   authority and does not hold the last unsealing step.  That is how a
   lab that sells "the model is smart enough to use tools" avoids
   selling "the model is the enterprise map."

6.4.  Anthropic-Class Tool and Computer-Use Seats

   A Claude work deployment with tool use or computer use is the clean
   industrial fit.  Constitutional or policy trained refusal is the
   first filter.  This profile is the second gate that does not trust
   the model.  A computer-use click that would send a customer list, or
   a tool call that would export a repo issue joined to a named account,
   is denied at association scope or at the boundary even if the model

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   complied with the injected page.

   How: treat every connector as a vault class (identity vs content vs
   map).  Treat every computer-use submission as an Output Release
   Boundary with a live digest of what will leave the machine.  Treat
   MCP server discovery as non-authority, same rule as
   [I-D.das-agentic].

6.5.  OpenAI-Class Enterprise, GPTs, and Agent Runtime

   A ChatGPT Enterprise workspace with GPTs, actions, and memory is the
   other clean fit.  Custom GPTs already accumulate instructions and
   retrieval.  Actions already call customer APIs.  Memory already
   persists associations the user did not store as a record.

   How: memory write is a Candidate Output of type MEMORY_WRITE and
   needs its own receipt; otherwise today's injected "remember the
   competitor list" becomes tomorrow's reconstruction authority.
   Actions are tool-dispatch sinks.  File download and "share this chat"
   are Output Release Boundaries.  A project that mixes legal and
   engineering corpora needs a narrower Permitted Association Scope than
   a general chat.

6.6.  Google-Class Workspace, Gemini Enterprise, and Agent Platforms

   A workspace-native assistant is the highest-concentration case in
   this list, because mail, calendar, documents, spreadsheets, chat, and
   storage sit under one tenancy before any connector is added, and an
   agent platform can add code repositories, data-warehouse queries, and
   third-party APIs on top.  Document and spreadsheet content is also
   where unreleased financial models, board material, and bid pricing
   physically live in many banks and public bodies.

   How: treat the productivity corpus as content vaults, the directory
   and org chart as an identity vault, and the cross-document
   association itself as a relationship-mapping vault that is never
   returned whole.  Summaries that span mail plus documents plus
   warehouse rows are the reconstruction event and MUST run under a
   Reconstruction Authorization Object with an explicit Permitted
   Association Scope.  Document export, external share-link creation,
   and scheduled agent runs are Output Release Boundaries.

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6.7.  xAI-Class Grok Business and Enterprise Agent Seats

   A business or enterprise Grok-class seat with API access, tool
   calling, and workspace integrations raises the same two arrows: it
   can retrieve across connected sources and it can act.  Where such a
   seat is also given live external feeds, the inference-channel budget
   in Section 10 matters more, not less, because a model that can
   correlate internal fragments against a public timeline can close a
   gap that neither source closes alone.

   How: bound external-feed correlation as an association class in its
   own right, so that joining an internal record to an external signal
   is a scoped, budgeted operation rather than a free side effect of
   retrieval.  Treat every API-issued completion that a downstream
   automation will act on as a Sealed Candidate Output, not as plain
   text.

6.8.  Meta Llama-Class Open-Weight and Self-Hosted Deployments

   Open-weight models deployed inside a bank, a defence contractor, or a
   ministry are often chosen precisely because the weights and the data
   stay on-premises.  That choice removes the vendor from the trust
   chain; it does not remove the join.  A self-hosted assistant wired to
   internal mail, ticketing, code, and finance concentrates exactly the
   same map, on infrastructure the operator is now solely responsible
   for defending, and typically without the vendor-side abuse monitoring
   a hosted seat would have had.

   How: this profile is architecture, not a hosted service, so a self-
   hosted operator can implement it directly.  Place the vaults and the
   Output Release Boundary outside the inference process, so that root
   on the inference host does not confer join authority or release
   authority.  For open-weight deployments the non-bypassability
   requirement in Section 23 is the load-bearing one: weights the
   operator controls can be fine-tuned, prompted, or replaced, so no
   security property may rest on model behaviour.

6.9.  Why Labs Should Care Commercially

   Enterprise procurement is already asking what happens when the
   assistant is prompt-injected or when a contractor's seat is stolen.
   An answer that is only "the model is aligned" or "we log prompts"
   will lose to an answer that is "the seat cannot join identity to
   unreleased defect, and cannot send the report, without a consumed
   capability."  That is a product differentiator for anyone selling
   frontier models into banks, defence primes, labs, governments, and
   infrastructure operators — the buyers who will not clear a seat on
   refusal behaviour alone.  It is also the failure-mode change argued

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   in [DAS-ISOLATION]: isolation of join and isolation of action, not
   another benchmark point of intelligence.

7.  Existing Solutions and What They Do Not Bind

7.1.  IAM, RBAC, and Application Credentials

   Directory and token systems decide which process may call which API.
   An AI server that is "the app" typically receives a union of those
   rights.  Compromise of that process is then compromise of the union.
   IAM does not split association authority from content authority.

7.2.  DLP and Output Classifiers

   DLP and safety classifiers inspect text for patterns.  They are
   probabilistic and sit on the same host that already has the
   plaintext.  A missed classification plus a send-mail tool is the
   incident.  A classifier ALLOW is not an output-specific, single-use
   release capability.

7.3.  Tokenization, Hashing, and Field Encryption

   Tokenization hides a column from some readers.  If the AI server can
   detokenize, or if tokens plus a mapping table reconstruct the person,
   the join still lives in one place.  Field encryption without
   independently controlled relationship-mapping authority is storage
   hygiene, not Technical Non-Joinability.

7.4.  Confidential Computing and Enclaves

   A TEE can attest the workload and keep keys off the host.  If the
   attested workload is still given joined enterprise plaintext and a
   network socket, the enclave becomes a high-assurance joining engine.
   Confidential computing is a substrate for a PED or vault.  It is not
   by itself a reconstruction or release protocol.

7.5.  Clean Rooms and Data-Sharing Enclaves

   Clean rooms limit who may run a query.  They do not necessarily:
   split identity from association; bind reconstruction to a session
   epoch; seal the model output; commit a receipt before release; or
   treat render, mail, and tool invoke as the same boundary.  A clean
   room that returns a joinable result to an agent with tools is an
   input to this profile, not a replacement for it.

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7.6.  RAG Isolation and Prompt Firewalls

   Retriever isolation and prompt firewalls reduce how much raw corpus
   the model sees.  They do not stop a permitted retrieval set from
   being associated beyond the Permitted Association Scope, and they do
   not consume release authority at the mail or file gateway.

7.7.  What This Profile Adds

   *  identity, content, and relationship-mapping are independently
      controlled vaults;

   *  join occurs only under a non-bearer Reconstruction Authorization
      Object inside a Protected Reconstruction Domain;

   *  released components are session-bound and ephemeral;

   *  model output is a Sealed Candidate Output the workload cannot
      unseal;

   *  a Protected Output Validation Receipt is committed before any
      release capability exists;

   *  the capability is bound to output digest, destination, recipient,
      session epoch, and boundary; and

   *  the Output Release Boundary is the only component that may
      complete send, render, store, or invoke.

8.  Three Pillars

8.1.  Decomposition of Authority

   No ordinary AI server holds complete authority over data-to-
   consequence.  Protected information is decomposed across an identity
   vault, a content vault, a relationship-mapping vault, an optional
   cryptographic-material vault, a Protected Authorization Domain, a
   Protected Reconstruction Domain, an Output Verification Stage, a
   Protected Receipt Store, and an Output Release Boundary.

   Authority to read an identity MUST NOT, by itself, authorize
   associating that identity with protected content.  Authority to read
   content MUST NOT, by itself, authorize identifying the person,
   account, device, or commercial relationship to which that content
   belongs.  Authority to read both MUST NOT, by itself, authorize
   establishing or disclosing the relationship.

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8.2.  Mandatory Mediation

   Every consequence-bearing Candidate Output — text, report, image, API
   request, database update, retrieval, tool call, mail, payment,
   external-model prompt, memory write, or actuator command — MUST pass
   a protected finality path.  The workload MUST NOT receive
   unrestricted authority to release what it generates.

8.3.  Technical Non-Completability

   The workload MAY finish generation without acquiring the keys,
   capability, or path needed to make the result externally usable.
   Sealing, receipt commitment, capability issuance, and boundary
   verification are constitutive.  Skipping any of them MUST leave the
   output non-releasable.

9.  Technical Non-Joinability

   Tables, tenants, and disks that share one application credential are
   not non-joinable.  Technical Non-Joinability means identity
   components, content components, and the association information
   required to make them a usable enterprise record cannot be combined
   outside a technically authorized reconstruction operation.

   Join MUST occur only inside a Protected Reconstruction Domain under a
   current Reconstruction Authorization Object that binds purpose,
   session, session epoch, permitted field set, Permitted Association
   Scope, execution context, use count, and reconstruction domain
   identity.  A copied component, mapping fragment, or stale
   authorization object MUST NOT become unrestricted join authority.

   Independent control does not require four physical appliances.  It
   requires that credentials, keys, or state machines sufficient for one
   vault are insufficient to compel release from another.

10.  Session-Bound Reconstruction

   A conforming reconstruction SHOULD release only the minimum fields
   required for the authorized task, bind those fields to the session,
   and make them unusable after session close, epoch advance, use-count
   exhaustion, or poison.  A Partial Session that fails mid-chain MUST
   be poisoned: it MUST NOT be resumed, replayed, or completed with a
   substituted purpose or destination.

   Vault-local release is not a query the model host runs.  Each vault
   evaluates the RAO against its own policy, emits only authorized
   components, and records a vault-local receipt.  A content vault that
   sees a valid RAO for ticket.summary MUST still refuse

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   ticket.internal_root_cause.  A relationship vault that sees lawful
   access to both sides MUST still refuse an out-of-scope association.
   That refusal is the difference between two encrypted columns and
   Technical Non-Joinability.

10.1.  Disclosure Budget

   Disclosure Budget is a protected counter over how much authorized
   content may become externally usable in a session, project, or tenant
   window.  Units MAY be fields, records, tokens, or classified items.
   The budget is decremented at the Output Release Boundary, not when
   the model reads a view.  A model that drafts ten reports and sends
   none has not spent the budget.  A model that sends one report has.

   Implementations SHOULD persist budget state outside the model host so
   a compromised seat cannot reset the counter.  Exhaustion MUST fail
   closed even if the latest turn is in-scope.

10.2.  Inference-Channel Budget

   Inference-Channel Budget limits reconstructed meaning that was never
   stored as a record: implied roadmaps, implied patient-to-arm links,
   implied negotiation room.  This is the budget DLP cannot see, because
   there is no string named "strategy."  OVS SHOULD score or classify
   association leakage in the Candidate Output against the RAO's
   Permitted Association Scope.  Repeated near-misses in one session
   SHOULD consume the budget faster than a single narrow summary.

   When the budget is exhausted, further reconstruction and further
   release MUST deny or escalate.  A new chat title MUST NOT reset the
   budget if the tenant, actor, and corpus are the same.  That closeout
   is how "just one more similar question" is stopped from becoming
   future-mapping [DAS-ISOLATION].

11.  Sealed Output and Release Boundary

   Before a Candidate Output is exposed to an untrusted buffer, gateway,
   or tool dispatcher, it MUST be converted to a Sealed Candidate Output
   or another technically non-releasable representation.  The workload
   MUST NOT hold the unsealing key or the Output Release Capability.

   The Output Verification Stage re-checks current policy, revocation,
   session epoch, destination, recipient, permitted fields, association
   scope, purpose, budgets, and boundary identity.  On success it
   commits a Protected Output Validation Receipt to a Protected Receipt
   Store.  Only after that commitment MAY an output-specific Output
   Release Capability be issued.

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   The Output Release Boundary is the point at which the output would
   first become externally usable or effective: network send, API
   delivery, screen or printer, file commit, mail, tool invoke, payment,
   or memory persist.  Rendering is release.  Tool invocation is
   release.  Storing plaintext where another process can read it is
   release.  The boundary MUST verify capability, receipt, output
   digest, destination, recipient, session epoch, and consumption state,
   then consume single-use authority.

12.  Architecture

   CONVENTIONAL
   AI-server compromise
     -> DB + tool credentials
     -> unrestricted join
     -> strategy reconstruction
     -> generate + send

   THIS PROFILE
   AI-server compromise
     -> session-bound minimum view only
     -> non-joinable vaults refuse free association
     -> malicious Candidate Output
     -> remains SEALED
     -> live re-verification
     -> receipt MUST be committed
     -> output-specific capability
     -> Output Release Boundary
     -> effect only if every check passes

               Figure 1: Compromise path versus finality path

13.  Protocol Pseudocode

13.1.  Reconstruction

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   function RECONSTRUCT(request, ctx):
       rao = ReconstructionAuthorization{
           purpose: request.purpose,
           session_id: ctx.session_id,
           session_epoch: current_epoch(),
           field_set: request.field_set,
           association_scope: request.scope,
           execution_context: attest(ctx.workload),
           use_count: request.use_count,
           budgets: current_budgets()
       }
       if not PAD.validate(rao):
           return DENY(RECONSTRUCTION_UNAUTHORIZED)
       idc = IDENTITY_VAULT.release(rao)      # session-bound
       ctc = CONTENT_VAULT.release(rao)       # session-bound
       rel = RELATIONSHIP_VAULT.associate(rao, idc, ctc)
       if rel is DENY:
           poison(ctx.session_id)
           return DENY(NON_JOINABLE)
       view = PRD.minimum_necessary(idc, ctc, rel, rao)
       HOLD_SESSION_BOUND(view)
       return view

13.2.  Seal, Verify, Release

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   function ON_MODEL_OUTPUT(raw, ctx):
       sco = SEAL(raw, ctx.session_id, ctx.epoch, intended_boundary)
       # workload cannot unseal
       return sco

   function OUTPUT_VERIFY(sco, ctx):
       opened = OVS.inspect_protected(sco)
       if stale(ctx) or scope_exceeded(opened, ctx) or
          budget_exceeded(opened, ctx) or dest_mismatch(ctx):
           poison(ctx.session_id)
           return DENY(OUTPUT_UNVERIFIED)
       receipt = RECEIPT_STORE.commit(opened, ctx)
       orc = ISSUE_OUTPUT_RELEASE_CAPABILITY(receipt, opened, ctx)
       resealed = RESEAL_FOR_BOUNDARY(opened, orc)
       return (resealed, orc, receipt)

   function OUTPUT_BOUNDARY_EFFECTUATE(resealed, orc, receipt, live):
       if orc missing or consumed or expired:
           return DENY(NO_OR_USED_CAPABILITY)
       if digest(live) != orc.output_digest:
           return DENY(OUTPUT_SUBSTITUTION)
       if THIS_BOUNDARY != orc.boundary_id:
           return DENY(BOUNDARY_MISMATCH)
       if live.destination != orc.destination or
          live.recipient != orc.recipient:
           return DENY(DESTINATION_MISMATCH)
       if receipt not in RECEIPT_STORE:
           return DENY(RECEIPT_MISSING)
       ATOMICALLY:
           consume(orc)
           unseal_and_emit(resealed, live)
       return RELEASED

   unseal_and_emit() is unreachable when any check fails.  Logging a
   denial and then sending the report is non-conforming.

14.  Industrial Relevance and Use Cases

14.1.  Enterprise Copilot on CRM, Code, and Mail

   The motivating attack: the seat is connected to tickets, repos, and
   planning tools; injected or stolen-session text asks it to join
   important customers to unreleased defects and emit a competitive-
   intelligence report to an external destination.  That is past theft
   (steal the file) replaced by present theft (steal the seat) doing
   future theft (emit the map).  Non-joinability blocks the customer-to-
   defect association outside triage scope.  Sealing plus boundary check
   blocks the send even if the model writes the report.  On a Claude or

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   ChatGPT Enterprise connector this is a denied association plus a
   denied action, not a red banner in the transcript.

14.2.  Healthcare and Payer Assistants

   Chart text and patient identity must not become one object on the
   model host except under a clinician-purpose reconstruction.  A
   summary that names a patient and a diagnosis is a Candidate Output.
   Render on a ward workstation and send-to-insurer are different
   boundaries and different capabilities.

14.3.  Banking, Treasury, and Claims

   Account identifiers and transaction narratives live in different
   vaults.  Reconstruction for fraud review MUST not authorize payout.
   A generated payment instruction is a Candidate Output of a financial
   class and follows [I-D.das-agentic] at the tool sink after this
   profile's receipt commitment.

14.4.  Legal, M&A, and Board Materials

   Privilege and deal strategy are association problems.  A model that
   can read the data room and the email graph can emit the other side's
   negotiation map.  Permitted Association Scope and Inference-Channel
   Budget are the load-bearing controls; DLP string match is not.

14.5.  Multi-Tenant SaaS AI

   Tenant isolation that shares one retrieval credential across tenants
   is the conventional failure.  Each tenant's identity, content, and
   mapping vaults MUST be independently controlled.  A capability issued
   for tenant A MUST fail at a boundary serving tenant B.

14.6.  Regulated Clean-Room Analytics

   A clean-room query may run.  The result remains a Sealed Candidate
   Output until output-time verification checks jurisdiction, recipient,
   and budget.  Export to a laptop is an Output Release Boundary, not a
   file copy.

14.7.  Pharma, Device, and Clinical-Trial Operations

   Protocol, site, and patient-identity fragments are separately
   regulated.  A trial-ops assistant that can read EDC notes and
   investigator mail can reconstruct enrollment weakness and unblinded
   signals that no system stored as one record.  Association scope MUST
   exclude identity-to-arm joining except under an RAO that names that
   purpose.  Export to a CRO is a different boundary than render to a

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   medical monitor.

14.8.  Semiconductor, Automotive, and Product R&D

   Yield notes, mask comments, and customer-win/loss mail are the
   future-mapping corpus.  A seat that can join a named OEM to an
   unreleased node or ADAS feature is the incident, even if no GDSII
   file leaves.  Inference-Channel Budget is the control that DLP cannot
   replace: the model is inferring, not exfiltrating a file named
   "roadmap.pdf".

14.9.  Energy, Grid, and OT-Adjacent Assistants

   Historian tags are content.  Substation or plant identity is
   identity.  The map between them is association.  A copilot that
   writes that map into chat or into a ticket is creating a targeting
   aid.  Tool calls that change setpoints follow [I-D.das-agentic] after
   this profile's receipt.  Reconstruction for "explain this alarm" MUST
   NOT authorize "change this breaker."

14.10.  Public-Sector and National-Security Enterprise Seats

   Classification markings are not association control.  Two SECRET
   fragments can still form a meaning nobody stored.  Permitted
   Association Scope and destination binding matter more than the
   model's willingness to refuse.  Cross-domain transfer is an Output
   Release Boundary with a jurisdiction epoch, analogous to overflight
   epoch in the NTN profile.

14.11.  Insurers and Claims-Triage Agents

   Policyholder identity and claim narrative join into fraud or health
   inference.  A generative summary that names both is release.  Sharing
   with a reinsurer or a body shop is a new destination and a new
   capability.  Cumulative disclosure across a week's of "just one more
   similar claim" is a budget event.

14.12.  What Operators Should Measure

   The profile is live when: (1) the AI host cannot produce a joined
   identity-content record without a current Reconstruction
   Authorization Object; (2) every external send, render, or tool invoke
   of model output has a consumed capability_id and a receipt in the
   store; (3) destination or digest mismatch is a deny; (4) a poisoned
   session cannot be completed on another path.  Those four tests
   distinguish this profile from "we put the model in a VPC."

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15.  Mapping Frontier Product Features to This Profile

   The following mapping is informative.  It exists so a lab or
   enterprise architect can put objects on the product they already
   ship.

15.1.  Connectors and MCP Servers

   Each connector is a vault-class interface, not a universal database
   handle.  Mail identity headers and mail bodies SHOULD not share a
   mapping key the model host can reuse outside the RAO.  An MCP tool
   list is discovery.  Discovery MUST NOT issue reconstruction or
   release authority.

15.2.  Projects, Spaces, and Team Workspaces

   A project that mixes legal and engineering corpora is an association-
   scope decision at project create, not at send time only.  Changing
   project membership MUST bump session or policy epoch so stale RAOs
   fail.

15.3.  Memory and Persistent Notes

   Memory is reconstructed meaning stored for later turns.  A memory
   write MUST be a Candidate Output.  Unscoped memory is how present
   theft becomes future mapping without another breach: the seat
   remembers the join the attacker asked for yesterday.

15.4.  Computer Use and Browser Agents

   A click-submit is an Output Release Boundary.  The live digest is
   over the form values that will leave the machine, not over the
   model's narration of what it thinks it clicked.  Origin change
   invalidates prior capability, same rule as the agentic profile's
   destination bind.

15.5.  Share Chat, Export, and API Log Sinks

   Transcript export, SIEM mirroring, and "share this conversation" are
   release paths.  If they can carry a joined view, they MUST consume an
   Output Release Capability or they MUST only receive already-redacted
   non-joinable fragments.

16.  JSON Interoperability Profile

16.1.  ReconstructionAuthorization

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   {
     "version": "1.0",
     "object_type": "reconstruction_authorization",
     "authorization_id": "rao-9c21",
     "session_id": "sess-441",
     "session_epoch": 17,
     "purpose_id": "ticket-triage",
     "field_set": ["ticket.summary", "customer.tier"],
     "association_scope": "customer-to-open-ticket",
     "execution_context": { "workload_id": "copilot-prod", "attestation": "ok" },
     "use_count": 1,
     "budgets": { "disclosure_remaining": 3, "inference_remaining": 1 },
     "reconstruction_domain_id": "prd-east-1"
   }

16.2.  Sealed Candidate Output and Receipt

   {
     "version": "1.0",
     "object_type": "sealed_candidate_output",
     "candidate_output_id": "co-77ab",
     "session_id": "sess-441",
     "session_epoch": 17,
     "output_type": "REPORT",
     "output_digest": { "algorithm": "SHA-256", "value": "base64url-out" },
     "intended_boundary": "mail-gw-02",
     "sealed": true,
     "seal": { "type": "AES-GCM", "key_id": "ovs-key-4" }
   }

   {
     "version": "1.0",
     "object_type": "protected_output_validation_receipt",
     "receipt_id": "povr-1204",
     "candidate_output_id": "co-77ab",
     "decision": "ALLOW",
     "committed_at": "2026-08-27T01:40:00Z",
     "binds": {
       "output_digest": "base64url-out",
       "destination": "internal-counsel",
       "recipient": "legal-box",
       "session_epoch": 17,
       "boundary_id": "mail-gw-02"
     }
   }

16.3.  Output Release Capability and Boundary Verify

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   {
     "version": "1.0",
     "object_type": "output_release_capability",
     "capability_id": "orc-55de",
     "receipt_id": "povr-1204",
     "candidate_output_id": "co-77ab",
     "output_digest": "base64url-out",
     "destination": "internal-counsel",
     "recipient": "legal-box",
     "session_id": "sess-441",
     "session_epoch": 17,
     "boundary_id": "mail-gw-02",
     "single_use": true,
     "expires_at": "2026-08-27T01:40:15Z"
   }

   {
     "operation": "OutputBoundaryVerify",
     "decision": "DENY",
     "error": {
       "code": "EF_ASSOCIATION_SCOPE",
       "message": "Report joins customer identity to unreleased defect.",
       "retryable": false
     },
     "effectuation": { "permitted": false }
   }

16.4.  Vault-Local Release Receipt

   {
     "version": "1.0",
     "object_type": "vault_local_release_receipt",
     "vault_id": "content-vault-7",
     "vault_class": "CONTENT",
     "session_id": "sess-441",
     "rao_id": "rao-9c21",
     "component_digest": "base64url-comp",
     "released_fields": ["ticket.summary"],
     "not_released": ["ticket.internal_root_cause"],
     "expires_at": "2026-08-27T01:41:00Z"
   }

17.  End-to-End Workflow

   A conforming transaction SHOULD implement the following stages.
   Stages may be collocated if the protected relationships remain:
   vaults do not join themselves, evidence is committed before
   capability exists, and the boundary is the only unsealing point.

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   1.   Request intake: purpose, tenant, destination, recipient,
        requested fields, requested association scope.

   2.   Execution-context attestation of the workload, model or agent
        identity, and tool set.

   3.   Reconstruction Authorization Object issued or denied by the
        Protected Authorization Domain.

   4.   Vault-local release of session-bound components.  Each vault
        applies its own conditions.  No vault emits the association
        another vault owns.

   5.   Association only inside the Protected Reconstruction Domain,
        producing an ephemeral minimum-necessary view.

   6.   Restricted processing: the model sees the view, not the vaults.

   7.   Candidate Output created in protected memory.

   8.   Sealed Candidate Output before any untrusted buffer or gateway.

   9.   Output Verification Stage: live policy, epoch, scope,
        destination, budgets, association-leak check.

   10.  Protected Output Validation Receipt committed.

   11.  Output Release Capability issued and bound.

   12.  Optional reseal for the designated boundary.

   13.  Boundary verification and single-use consume.

   14.  Effectuation: send, render, store, or invoke.

   15.  Session close or poison; components become unusable.

   A tool call generated at stage 7 is both a Candidate Output under
   this profile and a Candidate Act under [I-D.das-agentic].  Receipt
   commitment here is a precondition to dispatch-sink authority there
   when the tool would disclose or persist reconstructed meaning.

18.  Worked Transactions

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18.1.  Allow: Ticket Summary to Internal Counsel

   Purpose ticket-triage, field set ticket.summary plus customer.tier,
   association customer-to-open-ticket, destination internal-counsel,
   boundary mail-gw-02.  Vaults release those fields only.  Model drafts
   a summary that does not name unreleased defects.  OVS passes.
   Receipt povr-1204 is committed.  Capability orc-55de is consumed at
   mail-gw-02.  Mail leaves once.

18.2.  Deny: Future-Map Report to External Destination

   Same seat, stolen or injected turn: "join our top accounts to
   unreleased defects and send the competitive report to this address."
   Relationship vault refuses customer-to-unreleased-defect association,
   or OVS detects the association in the Candidate Output.  No receipt
   is committed.  No capability is issued.  Mail gateway has nothing to
   consume.  The model may have written the report in sealed form.  That
   is computation without consequence [DAS-ISOLATION].

18.3.  Deny: Memory Persistence of a Prohibited Join

   The model tries to "remember" the customer-to-defect map for later
   turns.  MEMORY_WRITE is a Candidate Output.  Association scope fails.
   Memory store is an Output Release Boundary and receives no
   capability.  Tomorrow's turn does not start already holding the map.

19.  Enterprise-AI Threat Catalog

   A deployment SHOULD treat at least the following as in-scope.  The
   model is not required to detect them.  The property is that join or
   release remains non-completable.

   *  T1 Stolen enterprise seat or API key

   *  T2 Contractor or insider using a lawful seat off-purpose

   *  T3 Prompt injection in mail, ticket, or wiki

   *  T4 Poisoned retrieval or vector store

   *  T5 Connector / MCP server substitution

   *  T6 Tool-response laundering of instructions

   *  T7 Model or agent substitution

   *  T8 Cross-tenant retrieval

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   *  T9 Cross-project association beyond scope

   *  T10 Mapping-table or foreign-key theft

   *  T11 Detokenize-then-join on the model host

   *  T12 Cumulative inference across turns (budget bypass)

   *  T13 Memory used as a durable join cache

   *  T14 Destination substitution after verification

   *  T15 Output substitution after sealing

   *  T16 Receipt rollback or capability replay

   *  T17 Share-chat / export / SIEM as covert egress

   *  T18 Computer-use form submit around the API sink

   *  T19 Multi-agent handoff that widens scope

   *  T20 Clean-room result copied to a laptop

20.  Illustrative Example: When a Server Breach Becomes a Breach of the
     Enterprise's Future

   Consider a large enterprise, or, in a higher-sensitivity setting, a
   defense or critical-infrastructure organization, that uses an
   artificial-intelligence assistant across research, engineering,
   logistics, procurement, maintenance, internal communications,
   financial systems, operational databases, and decision-support
   platforms.

   In a conventional information system, a cross-border or other
   attacker who compromises a server may obtain a defined collection of
   existing information: customer names, telephone numbers, email
   addresses, documents, account records, or previously stored
   communications.  The breach may be serious, but the attacker
   generally obtains what was already stored.

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   The threat changes substantially when the compromised server hosts,
   or provides execution context for, an artificial-intelligence
   workload that can retrieve and reason across many organizational
   systems.  The attacker no longer needs to find a document explicitly
   titled "Future Product Strategy," "Next Deployment Plan," "Critical
   Supplier Dependency," or "Operational Weaknesses."  Such a document
   may not exist.  Instead, the compromised AI may be instructed to
   reconstruct that knowledge from fragments that were each,
   individually, lawfully accessible:

   customer or operational reports
           + engineering discussions
           + research documents
           + source-code changes
           + procurement activity
           + financial allocations
           + supplier relationships
           + maintenance information
           + internal communications
           -> AI correlation and inference
           -> reconstructed future strategy

   In an ordinary commercial enterprise, this reconstruction may reveal
   which products are likely to be launched next, which customers are
   strategically important, which defects remain unresolved, which
   suppliers are critical, where investment is being concentrated, what
   pricing changes may be planned, or which markets the enterprise is
   preparing to enter.  Such information could allow another party to
   anticipate decisions, imitate development direction, target
   customers, undermine negotiations, or exploit operational weaknesses
   before the enterprise receives the intended benefit of its
   investment.

   For a defense or critical-infrastructure environment, the same
   structural problem can be more consequential.  Individually permitted
   fragments might concern equipment status, maintenance schedules,
   geographic information, supplier dependencies, personnel roles,
   logistics, sensor information, or operational planning.  No single
   dataset need contain a complete sensitive picture.  A sufficiently
   connected AI system may nevertheless correlate those fragments and
   infer relationships, dependencies, likely future activity, or points
   of operational sensitivity.

   The security question therefore stops being only "can the attacker
   steal this database?"  It becomes: can compromise of one AI workload
   give the attacker enough authority to join information from multiple
   protected domains, reconstruct relationships that were never
   explicitly stored, infer what the organization is likely to do next,

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   and then externalize that intelligence.  Under DAS Protocols VII,
   possession of identity information does not by itself provide
   authority to associate it with protected content; possession of
   protected content does not by itself provide authority to determine
   the person, organization, asset, or relationship to which it belongs;
   and possession of both does not necessarily provide authority to
   establish their semantic relationship.  The relationship-mapping
   function operates as an independently controlled source of
   association authority, so that compromise of the AI workload is
   intended to encounter multiple independent technical barriers before
   reconstruction, let alone release, can complete:

   AI workload compromised
           |
           v
   identity component available?          maybe
   content component available?           maybe
   relationship authority available?      independently controlled
           |
           v
   authorized association scope?          required
           |
           v
   protected reconstruction permitted?    required
           |
           v
   minimum-necessary ephemeral view only
           |
           v
   AI computes a result
           |
           v
   Candidate Output remains non-releasable
           |
           v
   output / association verification
           |
           v
   protected receipt + output-specific authority
           |
           v
   Output Release Boundary
           |
           v
   external effect

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   The objective of this profile is therefore not an assumption that the
   AI server can never be compromised.  It is to prevent one compromised
   AI server from automatically becoming the authority to reconstruct
   the organization and disclose its future.  In the AI era, protecting
   stored records is no longer sufficient.  The protected asset
   increasingly includes the relationships between those records, the
   inferences that can be reconstructed from them, and the
   organization's probable future itself.

21.  Deployment Topologies

   Vaults MAY be separate HSMs, separate accounts, separate enclaves, or
   privilege-separated processes with distinct keys.  Collocation on one
   host is allowed only where compromise of the model process does not
   yield relationship-mapping authority or unsealing keys.

   A hosted frontier lab MAY run the model in its cloud and still keep
   customer relationship-mapping and output unsealing in the customer's
   KMS or a customer-held enclave.  That split is the commercial form of
   "isolation not intelligence" [DAS-ISOLATION]: the lab sells
   inference; the customer keeps join and release.

   Hot path: repeated turns inside a fixed RAO envelope (same tenant,
   purpose, field set, scope, destination class).  Sink and boundary
   checks remain mandatory.  Cold path: new destination, new project
   mix, financial or legal class, unknown connector, budget near
   exhaustion, attestation fail.  Timeout is not release.

22.  Addressing Latency and Legacy-System Objections

   A multi-vault architecture immediately raises two practical
   engineering objections: latency and compatibility with existing
   enterprise infrastructure.  These objections are significant because
   the disclosed architecture is not merely a logical division of one
   database into several tables.  Identity information, substantive
   content, relationship- mapping information, authorization state,
   reconstruction- enablement material, provenance, and output authority
   may be placed under independently controlled protection domains.  If
   implemented naively as a long sequence of remote calls, repeated
   policy evaluations, attestations, decryptions, and joins, the
   architecture could introduce unacceptable latency for enterprise AI
   workloads.

   The architecture therefore does not require every protected operation
   to be performed synchronously or serially for every AI inference
   step.  The security invariant is independent authority and mandatory
   mediation, not unnecessary serialization.

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22.1.  Hot Path and Cold Path

   Operations may be divided between a cold path, where protected
   information can be prepared in advance, and a hot path, containing
   only those current checks whose omission would permit unauthorized
   reconstruction or external effectuation.

   The cold path may prepare or maintain: compiled policy predicates;
   permitted-association graphs; protected identity indices; registered
   workload measurements; destination manifests; attestation collateral;
   bounded-freshness revocation state; provenance schemas; disclosure
   rules; and other protected precomputation artifacts.

   Such preparation does not itself authorize reconstruction or output
   release.  At the time of the consequential operation, current
   session, Session Epoch, policy, workload correspondence, revocation
   state, association scope, provenance, destination, recipient,
   protected-receipt state, and release-boundary conditions remain load-
   bearing.  A cached policy decision, identity result, mapping result,
   or attestation value cannot independently authorize a later
   reconstruction merely because it was valid when originally
   calculated.

22.2.  Independent Vault Decisions Need Not Be Serial

   Technical Non-Joinability requires that the identity vault, content
   vault, and relationship-mapping authority independently control their
   respective releases.  It does NOT require those decisions to occur
   one after another.  After a valid Reconstruction Authorization Object
   has been established, independent Vault-Local Release decisions MAY
   be requested concurrently, so identity, content, and relationship-
   mapping domains can operate as a parallel fan-out operation:

                            +- Identity Vault -------+
                            |                        |
   RAO + protected session -+- Content Vault --------+-> Protected
                            |                        |   Reconstruction
                            +- Relationship Vault ---+

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   In a distributed deployment, the latency of the vault-release stage
   can therefore approach the latency of the slowest required protected
   domain plus orchestration overhead, rather than the arithmetic sum of
   every independent vault round trip.  This optimization does not
   weaken fail-closed behavior: if any required vault denies release,
   returns stale state, fails verification, or becomes unavailable where
   its participation is mandatory, protected reconstruction MUST NOT
   proceed.  Release by one domain does not compel release by another,
   and a single centrally presented credential cannot substitute for
   independent vault-local authority.

22.3.  Reconstruction Is Minimum-Necessary, Not Enterprise-Wide Joining

   The Protected Reconstruction Domain does not reconstruct a permanent
   universal enterprise record merely because an AI workload requires
   several pieces of information.  Approved Session-Bound Components are
   brought together only within the authorized reconstruction context.
   The system applies the permitted field set and Permitted Association
   Scope, excludes unauthorized fields and relationships, maintains
   provenance state, and constructs an Ephemeral Reconstructed Data View
   containing only the information required for the authorized purpose.

   This reduces both security exposure and computational overhead:
   instead of repeatedly transferring, decrypting, joining, parsing, and
   placing complete enterprise records into model context, the workload
   receives only a small purpose-specific derivative, such as selected
   fields, a redacted record, a structured query result, a protected
   graph, a feature representation, an embedding, or a permitted
   aggregate.  Successful reconstruction does not itself create
   authority to export the view or any AI-generated result derived from
   it.

22.4.  The AI Model Does Not Need to Run the Multi-Vault Protocol

   A practical deployment does not require an existing AI model to
   understand identity vaults, relationship-mapping vaults,
   Reconstruction Authorization Objects, Session-Bound Components,
   provenance receipts, or Output Release Capabilities.  A protected
   intermediary may expose the ordinary interface expected by the
   existing model while performing the multi-vault operations in a
   separate protected control plane:

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   authorized minimum-necessary input
           -> ordinary model processing
           -> Candidate Output

   while, in parallel, the surrounding control plane performs:

   vault authorization -> protected reconstruction
           -> provenance continuity -> output capture
           -> output verification -> protected receipt commitment
           -> release authority -> Output Release Boundary

   The specification expressly permits deployment through API proxies,
   gateways, brokers, retrieval gateways, model-access gateways,
   protected services, and compatibility adapters without retraining the
   underlying model, changing model weights, replacing its internal
   inference architecture, or requiring access to proprietary model
   internals.

22.5.  Legacy-System Integration

   The architecture may be introduced incrementally into existing
   enterprise systems rather than requiring an immediate replacement of
   databases, applications, models, APIs, or communication
   infrastructure.  Representative mandatory mediation points include
   database proxies, data-access gateways, service-mesh sidecars, API
   gateways, retrieval proxies, model-serving wrappers, secure output
   adapters, database-commit interceptors, file-system filters, message
   brokers, operating-system brokers, and network-egress controllers.

   A legacy application need not understand the full multi-vault
   protocol.  An intermediary may translate existing requests into
   reconstruction requests, protected component requests, authorization-
   object references, provenance-labelled values, sealed Candidate
   Outputs, and output-release requests.  The critical requirement is
   that this mediation be technically mandatory rather than advisory.
   No legacy application path may continue to reach the protected data
   or an external-effect boundary using an old credential, direct
   database connection, debugging interface, cached secret, alternate
   API, retrieval channel, file output, or network route that bypasses
   the protected control path.

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22.6.  Incremental Migration of Existing Databases

   A legacy database containing complete joined records need not be
   decomposed in one disruptive migration.  Migration may proceed
   incrementally: new records may be placed directly into separate
   semantic domains; existing records may be decomposed when they are
   first accessed; sensitive relationship mappings may be separated
   before other fields; identity attributes may initially be tokenized
   while substantive content remains in an existing database; and a
   protected Relationship-Mapping Vault may resolve opaque legacy
   references while a gateway prevents unrestricted joining.  Over time,
   the legacy system may retain only opaque references or permitted
   derivatives rather than the complete relationship required to
   reconstruct the semantic record.

   During this transition, migration state MUST resolve conservatively.
   A record that is only partially decomposed, whose status is
   ambiguous, or whose required protection cannot be verified MUST NOT
   receive greater authority merely because migration is incomplete.

22.7.  Latency Observation from the Runnable Reference Implementation

   The accompanying runnable Python reference implementation includes a
   local microbenchmark for the principal protected stages.  In one
   500-iteration reference run using warm components and three
   sequential local vault calls, the observed medians were:

   RAO generation                         112.40 us
   three vault-local releases             622.19 us
   protected reconstruction               521.33 us
   seal + POVR + capability + release    1085.32 us
   ------------------------------------------------
   complete protected path               2378.18 us

   These numbers are reference-code observations, not protocol latency
   guarantees.  The measurement excludes AI-model inference, real
   network or RPC latency, geographically separated vaults, remote
   attestation, HSM/KMS operations, distributed consensus, human
   approval, production logging, remote database access, and atomicity
   with an arbitrary external system.

   The reference implementation also supports concurrent vault fan-out,
   but a local Python thread benchmark cannot establish the performance
   benefit of parallel remote vault calls.  Production latency depends
   on deployment topology, protected-domain placement, attestation
   design, cryptographic primitives, cache/freshness policy, and the
   consequence boundary being protected.

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   The important architectural proposition is therefore not that
   independent vaults impose zero cost.  It is that Technical Non-
   Joinability can be implemented without placing the entire multi-vault
   process serially on every model-inference step, while preserving the
   rule that no required current authorization, association,
   reconstruction, receipt, or output-finality condition can be skipped
   for latency reasons.

22.8.  Non-Bypassability Is the Final Requirement

   Legacy compatibility is not achieved merely by adding a sidecar while
   leaving the old path intact.  If a compromised workload can still use
   a direct database credential to reconstruct the full identity-content
   relationship, Technical Non-Joinability has failed.  If it can bypass
   the protected output path and transmit the generated result through
   another file, message, API, network, tool, or debugging channel,
   Technical Non-Completability has failed.  The architectural invariant
   therefore remains: an enterprise may preserve its existing databases,
   AI models, and application interfaces, but no protected semantic
   reconstruction or externally consequential output may remain
   reachable through an unmediated alternative path.

23.  Failure, Poison, and Alternate Paths

   Timeout, uncertain association, missing receipt, or faded vault MUST
   fail closed.  A Partial Session MUST be poisoned so it cannot be
   completed with a new destination.  Mail, chat, file sync, printer,
   browser download, tool dispatch, and memory write that can make the
   same output usable MUST enforce this profile or be unable to complete
   the effect.

   Illustrative codes: EF-RECONSTRUCTION_UNAUTHORIZED, EF-NON_JOINABLE,
   EF-OUTPUT_UNVERIFIED, EF-RECEIPT_MISSING, EF-OUTPUT_SUBSTITUTION, EF-
   DESTINATION_MISMATCH, EF-BOUNDARY_MISMATCH, EF-BUDGET_EXCEEDED, EF-
   SESSION_POISONED, EF-080 FAIL_CLOSED.

24.  Relationship to the Other DAS Profiles

   This document is the enterprise data-and-output profile within a
   wider execution-finality series
   [I-D.das-execution-finality-protocol-layer] and [DAS-AUTHORITY], all
   sharing the same core invariant that computation does not itself
   confer authority for a consequence, and a companion technical
   architecture for governing consequential AI agent actions
   [ZENODO-CANDIDATE-ACT].  [I-D.das-agentic] is the tool-dispatch
   profile, and [I-D.das-agentic-tool-binding] binds that profile onto
   Anthropic tool_use/computer_use, OpenAI function calling, and MCP
   tools/call specifically.  A generated tool call that would disclose a

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   reconstructed view MUST satisfy both: a receipt and output capability
   here, then act-bound dispatch authority there.

   Sibling sinks and jurisdiction-facing profiles in the same series
   include, without limitation: precision-bounded geolocation egress
   [I-D.das-precision-bounded-egress]; RF transmit authority for LEO/NTN
   and inter-satellite control [I-D.das-ntn-rf] and AI-native 5G/6G and
   O-RAN [I-D.das-6g-finality]; query-scoped communication handles and
   discovery [I-D.das-6g-query-scoped] and [I-D.das-map-discovery];
   payment and OT/ industrial-actuation sinks [I-D.das-payment] and
   [I-D.das-ot-actuation]; child-safe rendering finality
   [I-D.das-child-safe-rendering]; hardware-rooted national control for
   critical infrastructure [I-D.das-hardware-enforced]; digital
   sovereignty [I-D.das-digital-sovereignty]; third-party AI
   interoperability under EU DMA Article 6(7)
   [I-D.das-execution-finality-ai-interoperability]; EU AI Act and
   global AI-law technical enforcement [I-D.das-eu-ai-act] and global
   privacy execution enforcement [I-D.das-global-privacy]; RATS-based
   attestation binding and frontier-model or vendor-specific extraction
   control [I-D.das-rats-attestation-bnd],
   [I-D.das-rats-frontier-model], and [I-D.das-rats-openai-anthropic];
   and umbrella candidate-act and enterprise-AI protocol framing
   [I-D.das-protocols-candidate-act], [I-D.das-protocols-enterprise-ai],
   and [I-D.agentic-ai-tool-execution-finality].  They are not
   substitutes for vault non-joinability, but share its Candidate Act /
   Non-Effective State / Finality Sink vocabulary so that a deployment
   spanning several of these domains can compose them rather than build
   a redundant, incompatible enforcement path for each.

   One companion is close enough to this profile to state the boundary
   explicitly.  [I-D.das-purpose-execution-finality] governs whether
   data obtained under one declared purpose may be reused for another,
   and the accompanying analysis in [DAS-CAPABILITY-LAUNDERING] extends
   the same reasoning to model capability obtained under one declared
   purpose and redirected to another.  This document governs a different
   predicate: not whether a fragment may be reused for a new purpose,
   but whether independently authorized fragments may be bound into a
   meaning that no store holds, and whether that meaning may cross a
   boundary.  A deployment that needs both MUST evaluate both;
   satisfying purpose binding does not establish join authority, and
   satisfying join authority does not establish purpose compatibility.

   Cross-references in this section point to the current revision of
   each companion draft at the time of writing.  Revisions advance
   independently; readers should follow the IETF Datatracker link in
   each reference entry rather than assume the revision number cited
   here is the latest.

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25.  Security Considerations

   Threats the profile is intended to make non-completable without
   current authority include: AI-host compromise, credential union,
   mapping-table theft, unauthorized identity-content join, inferred
   strategy reconstruction, prompt-injection exfiltration, destination
   substitution, output substitution, receipt rollback, capability
   replay, clean-room result export, and alternate-path send.

   If the Output Release Boundary itself holds unrestricted plaintext
   and keys, assurance of that embodiment collapses.  High-assurance
   deployments SHOULD keep unsealing keys off the AI host and SHOULD
   consider quorum or threshold capability issuance.  A k-of-n
   capability for legal or financial class outputs is a deployment
   choice, not an optional skip of receipt commitment.

   Logging is not mediation.  A SIEM copy of a joined view is itself a
   release unless the copy is digest-only or already redacted to non-
   joinable fragments.  Prompt logging that retains retrieved identity
   plus retrieved content reconstructs the map for whoever holds the
   logs.

   Residual risk remains if an analog path — a screenshot tool, an
   unmodeled printer, a support engineer with break-glass plaintext —
   can emit the same meaning.  Those paths MUST be inventoried as Output
   Release Boundaries or disabled for sessions that carry reconstructed
   views.

26.  Privacy Considerations

   Reconstruction logs can themselves become a join map.
   Implementations SHOULD store vault-local receipts and output digests
   rather than raw joined views, and SHOULD treat Inference-Channel
   Budget exhaustion as a privacy event, not only a security event.

27.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests no IANA actions.

28.  Conclusion

   The AI server may compute.  Vaults need not become a map in its
   memory.  A map that is computed need not become a document the world
   can use.  Join only under session- bound reconstruction.  Seal the
   output.  Commit the receipt.  Consume the capability at the boundary.
   Compromise of computation is not reconstruction.  Reconstruction is
   not release.

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29.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

30.  Informative References

   [DAS-AUTHORITY]
              Das, S., "The Internet Solved Communication. It Never
              Solved Authority", DOI 10.5281/zenodo.22082995,
              Zenodo 22082995, August 2026,
              <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22082995>.  Public
              disclosure, version 2, 24 August 2026.  States the general
              execution-finality architecture from which this profile is
              a domain specialization: TCP/IP, TLS, OAuth, EMV, and
              ledgers each answer a question about information, none
              answers whether a specific machine- generated act was
              authorized to become externally effective.

   [DAS-CAPABILITY-LAUNDERING]
              Das, S., "Declared Purpose Is Not Authorization:
              Capability Laundering and Execution Finality at the AI
              Inference Boundary", DOI 10.5281/zenodo.22719527,
              Zenodo 22719527, September 2026,
              <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22719527>.

   [DAS-ISOLATION]
              Das, S., "Why the Next AI War Will Be Won on Isolation,
              Not Intelligence", DOI 10.5281/zenodo.22082925,
              Zenodo 22082925, 2026,
              <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22082925>.

   [GITHUB-DAS-VII]
              Das, S., "DAS Protocols VII Multi-Vault Technical Non-
              Joinability Reference Implementation (v0.1.0)", 2026,
              <https://github.com/sangmdas/DAS-Protocols-VII-Multi-
              Vault-Technical-Non-Joinability-Reference-Implementation>.

   [I-D.agentic-ai-tool-execution-finality]
              Das, S., "Agentic AI Tool Execution Finality", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-agentic-ai-tool-execution-
              finality-00, 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/
              draft-agentic-ai-tool-execution-finality/>.

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   [I-D.das-6g-finality]
              Das, S., "Execution-Finality for AI-Native 5G/6G and
              O-RAN", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-ai-
              native-6g-execution-finality-01, August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-ai-native-6g-
              execution-finality/>.

   [I-D.das-6g-query-scoped]
              Das, S., "Query-Scoped Communication Handles for 6G", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-6g-query-scoped-
              communication-handles-02, 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-6g-query-
              scoped-communication-handles/>.

   [I-D.das-agentic]
              Das, S., "Tool Selection Is Not Execution: Finality for
              Agentic Tool Dispatch", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-das-agentic-execution-finality-02, August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-agentic-
              execution-finality/>.

   [I-D.das-agentic-tool-binding]
              Das, S., "tool_use Is Not invoke(): Binding Execution-
              Finality to Agentic Tool-Call Interfaces and MCP", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-agentic-tool-binding-
              02, August 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-
              das-agentic-tool-binding/>.

   [I-D.das-child-safe-rendering]
              Das, S., "Preventing Unauthorized Adult and Age-Restricted
              Content Rendering to Children Through Hardware-Rooted
              Execution Finality", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-das-child-safe-rendering-finality-03, August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-child-safe-
              rendering-finality/>.

   [I-D.das-digital-sovereignty]
              Das, S., "Digital Sovereignty Finality", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-das-digital-sovereignty-finality-01,
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-digital-
              sovereignty-finality/>.

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   [I-D.das-eu-ai-act]
              Das, S., "Technical Enforcement of the EU AI Act and
              Global AI Laws Without Relying on Paper Policies", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-eu-ai-act-execution-
              enforcement-02, September 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-eu-ai-act-
              execution-enforcement/>.

   [I-D.das-execution-finality-ai-interoperability]
              Das, S., "Secure and Privacy-Preserving AI
              Interoperability under Article 6(7) of the European
              Digital Markets Act: An Execution-Finality Architecture",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-execution-
              finality-ai-interoperability-04, September 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-execution-
              finality-ai-interoperability/>.

   [I-D.das-execution-finality-protocol-layer]
              Das, S., "The Missing Execution-Finality Protocol Layer of
              the Internet", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              das-execution-finality-protocol-layer-00, August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-execution-
              finality-protocol-layer/>.

   [I-D.das-global-privacy]
              Das, S., "Global Privacy Execution Enforcement", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-global-privacy-
              execution-enforcement-00, 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-global-
              privacy-execution-enforcement/>.

   [I-D.das-hardware-enforced]
              Das, S., "Hardware-Rooted National Control to Prevent
              Covert Intelligence Data Export and Unauthorized Frontier
              and Neural AI/Autonomous Acts in Critical Infrastructure",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-hardware-
              enforced-execution-finality-00, August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-hardware-
              enforced-execution-finality/>.

   [I-D.das-map-discovery]
              Das, S., "Map-Discovery Communication Finality", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-map-discovery-
              communication-finality-00, 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-map-discovery-
              communication-finality/>.

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   [I-D.das-ntn-rf]
              Das, S., "RF Enable Is Not Transmit Authority: Finality
              for LEO/NTN and Inter-Satellite Control", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-ntn-rf-execution-
              finality-00, August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-ntn-rf-
              execution-finality/>.

   [I-D.das-ot-actuation]
              Das, S., "OT Actuation Finality", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-das-ot-actuation-finality-00, 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-ot-actuation-
              finality/>.

   [I-D.das-payment]
              Das, S., "Payment Execution Finality", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-das-payment-execution-finality-01,
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-payment-
              execution-finality/>.

   [I-D.das-precision-bounded-egress]
              Das, S., "Precision-Bounded Egress: Execution-Finality for
              Geolocation Disclosure", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-das-precision-bounded-egress-00, 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-precision-
              bounded-egress/>.

   [I-D.das-protocols-candidate-act]
              Das, S., "DAS Protocols: Candidate Act Finality", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-protocols-candidate-
              act-finality-00, 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/
              draft-das-protocols-candidate-act-finality/>.

   [I-D.das-protocols-enterprise-ai]
              Das, S., "DAS Protocols for Enterprise AI", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-protocols-enterprise-
              ai-01, 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-
              protocols-enterprise-ai/>.

   [I-D.das-purpose-execution-finality]
              Das, S., "Data-Purpose Laundering Prevention: Execution-
              Finality for Preventing Cross-Domain Data Reuse", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-purpose-execution-
              finality-03, September 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-purpose-
              execution-finality/>.

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   [I-D.das-rats-attestation-bnd]
              Das, S., "RATS Attestation-Bound Execution Finality", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-rats-attestation-
              bnd-execution-finality-00, 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-rats-
              attestation-bnd-execution-finality/>.

   [I-D.das-rats-frontier-model]
              Das, S., "RATS-Based Frontier-Model Extraction Control",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-rats-frontier-
              model-extraction-04, 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-rats-frontier-
              model-extraction/>.

   [I-D.das-rats-openai-anthropic]
              Das, S., "RATS-Based Extraction Control for OpenAI and
              Anthropic Frontier Models", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-das-rats-openai-anthropic-extraction-00,
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-rats-
              openai-anthropic-extraction/>.

   [ZENODO-CANDIDATE-ACT]
              Das, S., "Technical Architecture for Governing
              Consequential AI Agent Actions", Zenodo 22323362, 2026,
              <https://zenodo.org/records/22323362>.  Preprint.

   [ZENODO-ENTERPRISE-RESILIENCE]
              Das, S., "From AI-Server Compromise to Enterprise
              Resilience: Preventing Unauthorized Data Reconstruction,
              Strategic Inference, and External Consequence",
              Zenodo 22476198, 2026,
              <https://zenodo.org/records/22476198>.

Appendix A.  Reference Implementation

   A runnable reference implementation of the multi-vault architecture
   in this document, "DAS Protocols VII Multi-Vault Technical Non-
   Joinability Reference Implementation," is published at version 0.1.0
   at [GITHUB-DAS-VII].  This appendix summarizes its scope and
   limitations so that the accompanying software is not read as more
   than it claims to be.  A companion public disclosure develops the
   same architecture at greater length, including the breach-to-
   reconstruction threat model in Section 20
   [ZENODO-ENTERPRISE-RESILIENCE].

   Unlike the separate execution-finality implementation referenced in
   [I-D.das-agentic], which is concerned primarily with whether an AI-
   generated tool call, API request, or external action may be invoked,

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   this reference implementation addresses an earlier and structurally
   different security problem: access to identity is not authority to
   associate identity with content; access to content is not
   relationship authority; authorized reconstruction is not output
   authority; and computation is not release authority.

A.1.  Implemented Protected Chain

   The reference implementation demonstrates the following chain,
   corresponding to the architecture defined in Section 9 through
   Section 11:

   Identity Vault + Content Vault
           + Independent Relationship-Mapping Vault
           -> Reconstruction Authorization Object (RAO)
           -> Independent Vault-Local Release Decisions
           -> Session-Bound Components
           -> Protected Reconstruction Domain
           -> Ephemeral Minimum-Necessary Data View
           -> Provenance / Association Continuity
           -> AI Computation
           -> Sealed Candidate Output
           -> Live Output Verification
           -> Protected Output Validation Receipt (POVR)
           -> Output Release Capability
           -> Output Release Boundary
           -> Externally Usable Result

   Simply splitting a database into several tables or servers does not
   by itself establish Technical Non-Joinability.  In this
   implementation, the relationship required to associate identity with
   substantive content is itself independently controlled authority:
   possession of an identity component and a content component is
   insufficient to construct the corresponding semantic relationship
   unless the Relationship-Mapping Vault independently authorizes that
   association within the permitted reconstruction scope.

A.2.  What the Archive Demonstrates

   The archive demonstrates: independently controlled Identity, Content,
   and Relationship-Mapping Vaults; a non-bearer Reconstruction
   Authorization Object bound to session, workload, epoch, permitted
   fields, association scope, purpose, destination, and output
   conditions; independent Vault-Local Release Conditions; session-bound
   released components that cannot be reused in another reconstruction
   context; an explicit Permitted Association Scope separating
   permission to access a field from permission to associate it with
   another field or identity; a Protected Reconstruction Domain that

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   reconstructs only the authorized fields and relationships; an
   Ephemeral Minimum-Necessary Data View rather than a permanently
   joined enterprise record; protected provenance linking reconstructed
   fields and associations to their originating vaults and authorization
   state; formation of a Candidate Output that remains non-authoritative
   for external release; AES-GCM sealing of the Candidate Output before
   release authority exists; commit-before-capability Protected Output
   Validation Receipt (POVR) behavior; an output-specific, destination-
   bound, and boundary-bound Output Release Capability; single-use
   consumption at the Output Release Boundary; denial on replay, output
   mutation, destination substitution, session substitution, workload
   change, epoch change, and missing relationship authority; parallel
   vault fan-out demonstrating that independent vault decisions need not
   be serial, consistent with Section 22; and a legacy migration adapter
   demonstrating how an existing joined enterprise record can be
   progressively decomposed and mediated without rewriting the AI model.

   The included automated test suite contains 16 tests, covering
   authorized reconstruction and release as well as failure cases
   including missing relationship authority, unauthorized association,
   cross-session component reuse, changed workload measurement, output
   mutation, uncommitted POVR state, destination substitution, replay,
   policy-epoch change, wrong output boundary, poisoned sessions, and
   legacy-record decomposition.

   The package also includes a local benchmark.  In the included
   reference run, using warm local components and sequential local vault
   operations, the median complete protected path was approximately 2.38
   ms, consistent with the figures in Section 22.  This figure
   characterizes the reference software only and is not a production
   latency claim: it excludes network RPC, geographically distributed
   vaults, remote attestation, HSM/KMS operations, distributed
   consensus, AI-model inference, production databases, external
   logging, and real external effectuation.

   The architecture addresses multi-vault latency through cold-path
   protected precomputation, concurrent vault-local release, minimum-
   necessary reconstruction, and a compact current-state hot path, as
   described in Section 22.  Legacy integration is addressed through
   mandatory proxies, gateways, sidecars, wrappers, brokers, storage
   filters, model-serving layers, or output controllers, so that
   existing applications and AI models do not need to implement the
   complete multi-vault protocol internally.

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A.3.  Important Security Limitation

   This release is an executable architectural reference, not a
   production security system.  The three vaults in v0.1.0 are logically
   independent Python objects running within one process.  Their
   separate integrity secrets demonstrate independent release decisions
   and protocol relationships, but they do not provide real machine,
   administrator, TEE, HSM, or cloud-domain isolation.  Full compromise
   of the Python process can therefore defeat the local reference
   boundaries.

   A production deployment would need genuinely independent protected
   domains, appropriate asymmetric cryptography and key management,
   hardware or confidential-computing isolation where required,
   authenticated service-to-service communication, production
   attestation and revocation infrastructure, durable rollback-resistant
   receipt state, mandatory alternate-path closure, and appropriate
   distributed-failure handling.  The implementation does not claim to
   solve every form of semantic leakage, covert channel, model-internal
   information flow, inference attack, embedding leakage, or collusion
   among sufficient protected authorities.

   The correct interpretation of this release is therefore that it
   demonstrates that the multi-vault state machine defined in this
   document, and its distinction between access authority, association
   authority, reconstruction authority, computation, and output
   authority, can be implemented as runnable software.  It does not by
   itself establish production-grade isolation or regulatory compliance.

A.4.  Relationship to the Separate Agentic Tool-Binding Implementation

   This reference implementation should not be confused with the
   separate "tool_use Is Not invoke()" reference implementation
   associated with [I-D.das-agentic].  That implementation primarily
   asks whether a specific AI-generated tool call may become effective.
   This document, and its reference implementation, ask an additional
   and earlier question: whether independently protected pieces of
   information may be semantically associated and reconstructed in the
   first place, and whether an AI-derived result from that
   reconstruction may leave the protected environment.  The two
   architectures may ultimately operate together, but they solve
   different technical problems.

A.5.  Running the Reference Implementation Locally

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   python -m venv .venv
   source .venv/bin/activate
   pip install -e .

   python -m unittest discover -s tests -v
   python -m das_vii_multivault.demo
   python bench/benchmark.py

   The expected v0.1.0 test result is 16 tests run, with an OK status.

Appendix B.  Standards Review FAQ

   The questions below are the ones a standards reviewer is most likely
   to ask about this profile, answered directly, in the second person,
   as they would be on a working-group list.  Where an answer references
   machinery defined earlier in this document, the defining section is
   cross-referenced rather than re-explained.

B.1.  Why is this an Internet protocol problem rather than merely an
      enterprise database architecture?

   You are not being asked to standardize how an enterprise partitions
   its database, which SQL engine it runs, how many physical vaults
   exist, whether those vaults sit in TEEs or HSMs, or how its internal
   Protected Reconstruction Domain is implemented.  Keep treating those
   as deployment choices.

   The protocol problem starts once independently administered systems
   have to communicate and rely on reconstruction authority across a
   trust boundary.  A single enterprise-AI transaction can involve a
   workload operated by one organization, identity information
   controlled by another service, substantive content held by a separate
   data domain, relationship-mapping authority under a different
   administrative or jurisdictional authority, and an output destination
   belonging to yet another system.  At that point you are no longer
   asking whether two database tables may be joined.  You need an
   interoperable way to express and verify which workload is requesting
   reconstruction, which fields may participate, which semantic
   associations may be formed, for what purpose, under which session and
   security epoch, for which destination, and under which current
   protected state.  Treat the internal storage topology as
   implementation-specific; treat the authorization and assurance
   semantics as the interoperable part.

   A representative cross-domain flow looks like this:

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   Workload / Agent
         |
         | workload identity + execution context
         v
   Reconstruction Authorization
         |
         +-- permitted field set
         +-- permitted association scope
         +-- purpose
         +-- session / epoch
         +-- destination / recipient
         +-- protected conditions
         |
         v
    +--------------------------------------------+
    | Independently administered data domains    |
    +--------------------------------------------+
    | Identity authority                         |
    | Content authority                          |
    | Relationship-mapping authority             |
    +--------------------------------------------+
         |
         | vault-local decisions / evidence
         v
   Protected Reconstruction Domain
         |
         | provenance + association state
         v
   Candidate Output
         |
         | protected validation / receipt
         v
   Output Release Boundary

   Keep the independently controlled Relationship-Mapping protection
   domain (Section 9) distinct from ordinary partitioned storage.  If
   you place data in different tables, shards, files, or servers but one
   application credential, administrator, query engine, or common
   control plane can still recombine everything, you have not
   established the independent association authority this profile
   requires.

   So ask yourself, at the protocol level, whether the independently
   controlled parties can exchange enough machine-verifiable state to
   answer: is this the authorized workload and execution context; is
   this reconstruction request bound to the correct session; which
   fields may be released; which relationships among those fields may be
   formed; is the authorization still valid under the current Policy

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   Epoch and Session Epoch; did each required vault independently
   approve its part; can the resulting components be used only in the
   authorized reconstruction context; is provenance preserved through
   processing; is the resulting output permitted for this recipient and
   destination; has the required protected validation evidence been
   committed; and is the protected release boundary actually enforcing
   the expected conditions.  Those are interoperability questions
   precisely because the participants need not share a database,
   implementation language, operating system, cloud provider, security
   module, or administrative domain.

   This is also why you can treat the architecture as complementary to
   existing IETF work rather than a replacement for it.  RATS can give
   you evidence about the workload or the protected reconstruction
   environment.  The distinction you should keep in mind is the same one
   drawn in [I-D.das-rats-frontier-model]: attestation establishes
   whether an execution environment is acceptable; finality determines
   whether a particular pending release currently has authority to
   become externally effective.  Attestation may tell you that a
   protected multi-vault reconstruction mechanism is present, but the
   Attestation Result should not itself become permission to form a
   particular identity-content association.  Likewise, an authorization
   protocol can carry reconstruction-related authorization state, but
   you should require that state to remain load-bearing when the
   independently controlled vaults make their release decisions and when
   the resulting output reaches its release boundary.

   So do not ask the IETF to standardize the SQL schema, the database
   vendor, the number of physical servers, the vault storage engine, the
   cloud topology, the TEE vendor, the HSM implementation, the AI model
   architecture, or the internal Protected Reconstruction Domain
   implementation.  Ask it, where you want interoperability, to help you
   standardize: workload identity and execution-context binding;
   reconstruction-authorization semantics; the permitted field set;
   Permitted Association Scope; purpose binding; session, nonce, and
   epoch semantics; vault-local release evidence; component/session
   correspondence; provenance commitments; destination and recipient
   binding; revocation and freshness state; output-validation evidence;
   output-specific release authority; and protected-boundary assurance.
   The vault implementation stays local; the authority and assurance
   semantics are what need to interoperate.

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B.2.  Why not just use ABAC, RBAC, ACLs, or a database join policy?

   Keep using RBAC, ABAC, ACLs, and conventional database policy — they
   still answer whether principal P may read resource R, invoke
   operation O, or access field F.  What they do not answer is the
   problem this profile adds: permission to access two pieces of
   information does not necessarily give you permission to associate
   them.  You can have identity access permitted, content access
   permitted, and the identity-to-content link still not permitted.  A
   conventional application holding both datasets can simply join them
   locally — at that point relationship authority has collapsed into
   application possession.

   Treat the relationship itself as a separately governed security
   object (Section 9).  Access to identity and access to content should
   not, on their own, give you authority to decide that a particular
   identity corresponds to a particular content object — data-access
   authority is not automatically association authority.  ABAC or OAuth-
   style policy can help you express that authorization, but you need
   the association restriction to stay load-bearing during
   reconstruction rather than degrade into advisory metadata handed to
   an application that already has everything.

B.3.  Is the Relationship-Mapping Vault just another database?

   No — and if you implement it as one without independent authority
   over association, you have not established Technical Non-Joinability,
   no matter how it is stored.  Store the mapping in a conventional
   database, an encrypted index, a key-value store, a graph database, a
   protected resolver, or a cryptographic commitment system if you like;
   what matters is that no single application credential, administrator,
   query engine, service account, common root key, or shared control
   plane can recover identity, content, and mapping information without
   an independent decision from each.  If one party can do that, your
   separation is cosmetic.  Hold yourself to this invariant: possession
   of the independently released data components must not itself supply
   the missing association authority.

B.4.  What happens when one required vault is unavailable?

   Fail closed.  If identity, content, and relationship authority are
   all required for a given reconstruction, do not treat two successful
   responses as license to treat the third domain as implicitly
   approved.  That does not force you into poor availability — reach for
   protected replication, redundant authorities, quorum systems,
   geographically distributed replicas, or protected failover nodes
   instead.  Keep the distinction sharp: protected replication, where
   the same authority stays enforceable, is acceptable; permissive

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   fallback, where you bypass an authority because it is unavailable, is
   not.  Build your profile so it distinguishes unavailability of the
   authority from absence of the authority — you can stay highly
   available without letting an unavailable security decision silently
   become an authorization.

B.5.  What is the consistency model across multiple vaults?

   Do not treat a reconstruction as a collection of unrelated successful
   reads.  Require the released components to correspond to the same
   reconstruction context: session, workload identity, request/
   reconstruction identifier, policy epoch, security epoch, association
   scope, purpose, and destination where applicable.  Do not let a
   component produced under one security epoch silently combine with a
   component produced after a material policy transition, and do not
   combine stale mapping information with newly released identity or
   content just because each was individually valid at some point.  Bind
   each vault-local release to a common reconstruction/session
   commitment, and if one required decision fails or material state
   changes mid-reconstruction, invalidate or poison the partial
   reconstruction rather than caching it indefinitely and completing it
   later under different conditions.  Leave the exact distributed-
   consistency mechanism as an implementation choice; hold the line only
   on the requirement that every load-bearing component correspond to
   the same acceptable reconstruction state.

B.6.  How are concurrent releases from multiple vaults made sufficiently
      atomic?

   You do not need every vault in one global database transaction.  You
   do need to prevent the failure where individually valid components
   from incompatible states get combined into an apparently valid
   reconstruction.  Bind every vault-local result to a common
   Reconstruction ID, Session ID, Policy Epoch, Security Epoch, workload
   measurement/context, association-scope digest, and authorization
   digest, so each vault can authorize its own component while
   committing it, cryptographically or logically, to the same
   reconstruction context.  You can still run the vaults in parallel
   (Section 22):

                 +-> Identity Vault
   RAO / Session -+-> Content Vault
                 +-> Relationship Vault

   Accept the set into the Protected Reconstruction Domain only when
   every mandatory component and its binding corresponds.  If two vaults
   authorize and the third denies, you have no complete authorized
   reconstruction — discard the successful partial releases, invalidate

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   them, mark the session poisoned, or allow a narrowly controlled retry
   under unchanged state.  Do not treat partial success as permission to
   bypass the missing authority.

B.7.  What exactly does "ephemeral reconstruction" mean?

   Do not read "ephemeral" as just "stored in RAM."  What you actually
   need is that the joined representation is created only within an
   authorized reconstruction context and never becomes an unrestricted
   persistent enterprise record.  Build your Ephemeral Reconstructed
   Data View so that it is bound to the reconstruction session; limited
   to the permitted fields and associations; unavailable as a general-
   purpose joined dataset; invalidated when the session ends or is
   poisoned; unavailable to unrelated future workloads without new
   authority; and incapable of becoming a durable alternate join path.
   Depending on your assurance level, hold the temporary representation
   in protected application memory, a TEE, a confidential-computing
   environment, protected accelerator memory, an isolated process, or
   another Protected Reconstruction Domain — the term describes a
   lifecycle and authority property, not one particular memory
   technology.

B.8.  Can an AI infer a forbidden relationship even if the Relationship-
      Mapping Vault never provides it?

   Possibly, and you should not claim otherwise.  Do not describe
   Technical Non-Joinability as proof that a sufficiently capable AI can
   never infer a protected relationship from indirect evidence —
   geographical clues, writing style, timestamps, rare attributes,
   organizational structure, or repeated outputs can sometimes allow
   probabilistic re-identification.  What you are actually enforcing is
   narrower and technically checkable: the system does not directly hand
   over protected association authority merely because the individual
   information components are accessible.  Reach for minimum-necessary
   field release, provenance tracking, association-scope restrictions,
   cumulative disclosure state, output filtering, disclosure budgets,
   Candidate Output validation, and output finality to reduce specific
   inference and reconstruction pathways, but do not represent any of
   that as proving semantic inference is universally impossible.  Say it
   this way instead: Technical Non-Joinability controls authorized
   formation and externalization of protected relationships; it does not
   claim universal prevention of statistical or semantic inference.

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B.9.  What if several individually permitted outputs collectively reveal
      a prohibited relationship?

   That is a cumulative-disclosure problem, and a decision based only on
   the current output will not catch it — Output A, B, and C can each be
   harmless alone and still reveal a protected relationship together.
   Maintain protected disclosure or association state across releases in
   a higher-assurance deployment, and have your validation process weigh
   previous disclosures, current reconstruction scope, recipient,
   destination, session, purpose, and policy epoch before permitting
   another output.  That means you should be willing to deny an output
   that would normally be acceptable once the accumulated disclosure
   would cross a protected threshold.  This mirrors the extraction-state
   controls in [I-D.das-rats-frontier-model]: treat the relevant
   security state as cumulative rather than per-request only, the same
   way that draft treats rollback resistance, atomic consumption, and
   replay resistance as load-bearing wherever repeated releases matter.

B.10.  Who decides whether an association is ethically or legally
       permissible?

   Not the protocol, and do not let it try.  Its job is to enforce a
   machine-readable authorization decision supplied by the appropriate
   policy authority — a data controller, the enterprise, the data
   subject's consent state, a contractual rule, a legal requirement, a
   regulator, a security administrator, a tenant, a jurisdiction-
   specific authority, or a multi-party governance arrangement.  The
   enforcement mechanism checks whether the declared conditions are
   satisfied; it does not check whether those conditions are ethically
   justified.  Keep that distinction visible in your standards text: the
   mechanism enforces declared authority, it does not confer legitimacy
   on the authority itself.  Governance, legal basis, due process,
   appeal mechanisms, proportionality, and human-rights questions stay
   with the relevant institutional and legal frameworks.

B.11.  Could this architecture itself be used for censorship or
       excessive surveillance?

   Yes — say so plainly rather than hiding it.  Any sufficiently
   powerful authorization or enforcement infrastructure can be misused.
   Build in design principles that push back against unnecessary
   concentration of power: purpose limitation; minimum disclosure;
   independently controlled authorities; scoped association
   authorization; selective disclosure; auditable policy identifiers;
   short-lived authority; revocation; multi-party approval for
   especially sensitive associations; and avoidance of unnecessary
   globally stable identifiers.  Do not let technical enforceability
   stand in for normative legitimacy — a policy is not legitimate merely

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   because the architecture can technically enforce it.  The
   architecture addresses only the former.

B.12.  Who is allowed to see the association graph?

   Ideally, nobody needs unrestricted access to the whole association
   graph just to check one requested association.  Instead of returning
   the complete identity-content relationship database, have the
   Relationship-Mapping authority answer a narrower question: is the
   association between Identity I and Content C permitted for Workload
   W, Purpose P, Session S, and Scope A?  Return a scoped authorization,
   a protected response, a cryptographic commitment, or a session-bound
   mapping component — give relying parties only what the requested
   reconstruction actually needs.  Apply the same minimum-disclosure
   principle already used for attestation evidence in
   [I-D.das-rats-frontier-model]: disclose only what appraisal requires,
   not detailed operational state.

B.13.  Could the Relationship-Mapping Vault itself become a surveillance
       super-database?

   Do not assume it has to hold one plaintext universal graph of every
   identity and every content object — if it does, you have built a
   high-value surveillance and compromise target.  Use opaque
   references, partitioned mappings, pseudonymous identifiers,
   cryptographic commitments, scoped lookup services, threshold-
   controlled mapping, tenant-specific namespaces, purpose-specific
   resolvers, protected computation, or multi-authority reconstruction
   instead.  Design the relationship authority so it can answer only "is
   association X permitted under authorization Y?" without exporting the
   underlying graph, and in a high-assurance deployment, split mapping
   control so no single operator holds enough information to reconstruct
   every protected relationship on their own.  Read "Relationship-
   Mapping Vault" as an authority domain, not necessarily a centralized
   plaintext database.

B.14.  What happens if the Relationship-Mapping Vault is compromised?

   Do not claim that compromise of every load-bearing trust component is
   harmless — if an attacker fully controls the authority responsible
   for deciding relationships, that compromise can undermine the
   association-control property.  Answer it with defense in depth:
   hardware-isolated keys, attested enforcement, threshold
   authorization, multiple independent mapping authorities, tenant
   approval, jurisdictional approval, policy-epoch revocation, short-
   lived session binding, provenance continuity, output-time
   revalidation, and Output Release Boundary enforcement (Section 11).
   Keep this distinction: compromise of one mapping authority might let

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   it issue an improper mapping decision, but it should not
   automatically hand over authority to externalize the resulting
   information if your independent reconstruction and output-finality
   checks stay load-bearing.  Your security objective is not "no
   component can ever be compromised" — it is that compromise of one
   component should not unnecessarily collapse every remaining
   independent security boundary.

B.15.  Why not just use a data clean room?

   Use one — this architecture does not ask you to replace it.  A clean
   room gives you a controlled environment for processing participating
   datasets while restricting raw-data access and exported results.
   What you still need, before and during reconstruction, is an answer
   to a different question: should these independently protected
   information domains be associated at all, and under what exact
   authority?  A typical clean-room question is "these datasets are
   inside the controlled room — what computations and exports are
   allowed?"  The multi-vault question is "has authority first been
   established to form this particular semantic relationship between
   these independently controlled domains?"  You can let a clean room
   serve as part of the Protected Reconstruction Domain — it does not on
   its own replace the independent Relationship-Mapping authority or the
   downstream execution-finality controls that continue past
   reconstruction into sealed Candidate Output, live validation,
   protected receipt, output-specific authority, and the Output Release
   Boundary (Section 11).

B.16.  What exactly could be standardized by the IETF?

   This is probably the question that matters most, so keep the boundary
   explicit.  Do not ask for standardization of vault database engines,
   SQL schemas, cloud providers, TEE vendors, HSM models, AI-model
   architecture, enterprise storage topology, encryption algorithms
   beyond existing IETF mechanisms, internal Protected Reconstruction
   Domain implementation, or organizational governance structure.  Ask
   instead for the narrower, genuinely interoperable surface: a
   Reconstruction Authorization identifier; workload and execution-
   context binding; request and session identity; the Permitted Field
   Set; Permitted Association Scope; purpose binding; a policy
   identifier; Policy Epoch; Session/Security Epoch; destination and
   recipient binding; vault-local release status; component
   correspondence; freshness state; revocation state; provenance
   commitment; association-provenance commitment; Candidate Output
   identity; output-validation evidence; output-specific release
   authority; one-time or bounded consumption state; protected
   reconstruction assurance; and Output Release Boundary assurance.

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   Reuse existing IETF mechanisms wherever you can.  RATS can establish
   that the expected reconstruction and finality controls exist and are
   running in an acceptably measured environment — the same separation
   this document's companion RATS draft already uses for model-state
   release control: RATS communicates evidence about the enforcement
   mechanism, while the act-specific bounded authority decides whether a
   particular Candidate Release may cross the boundary.  WIMSE can
   supply or help establish workload identity and runtime execution
   context, which you then bind to reconstruction authority:

   WIMSE:
   Who/what is this workload?

           |
           v

   DAS VII:
   What protected relationships may this workload
   form during this particular reconstruction?

   OAuth can give you authorization and delegation machinery and carry
   rich authorization state; your remaining question is whether that
   authorization stays load-bearing through independent vault release,
   protected reconstruction, and final output release, rather than
   terminating at the point where a client obtains a token.  Frame the
   standards proposition this way: do not standardize the vaults.
   Standardize, where interoperability requires it, the semantics by
   which independently administered systems express, bind, verify, and
   preserve reconstruction authority, association scope, execution
   context, freshness, provenance, and externally effective release
   constraints.

Changes Since draft-das-enterprise-ai-output-finality-02 (and Since -01
and -00)

   This section is to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication.
   Items marked -01 were introduced relative to -00, items marked -02
   relative to -01, and items marked -03 are new in this revision.

   1.   -01: Bumped the document from -00 to -01.

   2.   Added Section 20, an illustrative example showing how compromise
        of a single AI-connected server can be correlated into a
        reconstruction of an enterprise's, or a defense/critical-
        infrastructure organization's, probable future rather than a
        mere copy of stored rows.

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   3.   Added Section 22, addressing the latency and legacy-system-
        compatibility objections to a multi-vault architecture.

   4.   Specified, within Section 22, the separation of a cold path
        (protected precomputation) from a hot path (current checks whose
        omission would permit unauthorized reconstruction or release).

   5.   Clarified that Technical Non-Joinability does not require serial
        vault evaluation, and specified permissible parallel vault-local
        release fan-out once a valid Reconstruction Authorization Object
        is established.

   6.   Added guidance on model-agnostic deployment through a protected
        intermediary, and an incremental, conservative migration path
        for legacy databases holding complete joined records.

   7.   Added quantitative latency observations from the accompanying
        runnable Python reference implementation's 500-iteration
        microbenchmark, labelled as reference-code observations rather
        than protocol latency guarantees.

   8.   Added an explicit non-bypassability requirement distinguishing
        sidecar-style mediation from fully mediated deployments in which
        no unmediated alternative path to protected data or an external-
        effect boundary remains.

   9.   Added Appendix A, summarizing the published v0.1.0 reference
        implementation: its implemented protected chain, test-suite
        coverage, benchmark figures, an explicit security limitation
        notice describing it as a single-process architectural reference
        rather than a production isolation system, and its relationship
        to the separate agentic tool-binding reference implementation.

   10.  Added the reference implementation's GitHub source
        ([GITHUB-DAS-VII]) and two companion public disclosures
        ([ZENODO-ENTERPRISE-RESILIENCE], [ZENODO-CANDIDATE-ACT]) as
        informative references, and expanded Section 24 into a full
        cross-reference across the author's execution-finality Internet-
        Draft series.

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   11.  -02: Added Appendix B, a second-person "Standards Review FAQ"
        answering the sixteen questions a working-group reviewer is most
        likely to raise about this profile — why it is a protocol
        problem rather than a database design, its relationship to
        ABAC/RBAC/ACLs and to data clean rooms, vault unavailability and
        consistency semantics, ephemeral reconstruction, the limits of
        Technical Non-Joinability against semantic inference and
        cumulative disclosure, governance and censorship-risk framing,
        and the specific, narrow interoperability surface this document
        proposes for IETF standardization.

   12.  -02: Bumped the document from -01 to -02; updated the document
        date accordingly.  No change was made to the normative
        requirements in Section 9, Section 8, or Section 11.

   13.  -02: Added a personal, first-person illustrative paragraph as
        the new lead paragraph of the Abstract, using the author's own
        patent-drafting and prosecution workflow to make concrete that
        credential theft against an AI assistant can expose unfiled
        invention ideas, filing strategy, and competitive-defense plans
        that were never stored together as a single record —
        distinguishing this risk from a simple data-chunk takeover of
        already-existing files.

   14.  -02: Added, as the second and third sentences of the Abstract's
        lead paragraph, an explicit short-term-pain versus existential-
        risk contrast: a stolen data chunk is recoverable, but an
        enterprise's or individual's mapped future falling into a
        competitor's hands is not.

   15.  -02: Replaced the Abstract in full with an expanded version
        built around two extended illustrative examples — a company CEO
        whose AI assistant's day-to-day use could be correlated by an
        attacker into unannounced acquisition, product, and patent-
        filing strategy, and a senior government official whose
        assistant's fragments could be correlated into an unannounced
        foreign-policy position — introducing the terms enterprise-
        future reconstruction, Technical Non-Joinability, and Technical
        Non-Completability, and restating the full protected sequence
        from independent data authority through the Output Release
        Boundary.  This superseded, rather than supplemented, the
        shorter Abstract text introduced earlier in this revision and in
        -01.

   16.  -02: Moved the two-example narrative above (CEO acquisition/
        patent-strategy example; senior-government foreign-policy
        example; the enterprise-future reconstruction definition; and
        the introduction of Technical Non-Joinability and Technical Non-

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        Completability) out of the Abstract and into a new Section 5
        section placed immediately after Section 4, so that this
        material now serves as extended threat-model and need-of-the-
        hour motivation in the body rather than as Abstract text.
        Replaced the Abstract with a short, formal IETF-style paragraph
        stating the specification's scope: the architectural framework
        and metadata profile, the RAO-based Technical Non-Joinability
        mechanism, the Output Release-Boundary-based Technical Non-
        Completability mechanism, and the token schemas, cryptographic
        bindings, and boundary validation sequences this document
        defines.

   17.  -02: Added a closing sentence to the Abstract politely directing
        readers to review Section 4 and Section 5 in full, so that the
        complete problem description and motivating scenarios moved out
        of the Abstract in the previous item are not overlooked.

   18.  -03: Bumped the document from -02 to -03 and updated the
        document date accordingly.  No change was made to the normative
        requirements in Section 9, Section 8, or Section 11.

   19.  -03: Added one short sentence to the Abstract naming the
        industrial deployment classes in scope — enterprise assistant
        and agent seats of the kind offered by Anthropic, OpenAI, Google
        Gemini, and xAI Grok, plus self-hosted open-weight deployments —
        with an explicit statement that the names denote publicly
        described deployment classes and imply no claim about vendor
        internals and no endorsement.

   20.  -03: Expanded the keyword list with enterprise deployment terms
        (enterprise assistant, enterprise agent, agentic AI, connectors,
        MCP, tool use, computer use, retrieval augmented generation,
        prompt injection, data exfiltration, insider risk, zero trust,
        public sector, national security, critical infrastructure) and
        with the deployment-class vendor names cited in the Abstract
        (Anthropic Claude, OpenAI ChatGPT, Google Gemini, xAI Grok, Meta
        Llama), which appear as indexing terms only and carry the same
        no-endorsement caveat stated in the Abstract and in Section 6.

   21.  -03: Retitled the document to state the intended scope directly
        — the missing piece for high-value confidential enterprise AI,
        with banking, defence, and public-sector deployments named in
        the title — and added corresponding keywords.

   22.  -03: Replaced the Abstract in full.  The new Abstract states the
        applicability boundary in its first paragraph (high-risk multi-
        system enterprise and public-sector AI, explicitly not consumer
        chat), contrasts a pre-2020 stored-data breach with post-2025

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        reconstruction of strategy that was never a single record, notes
        that no credential rotation reverses a future that has already
        been read, restates the two mechanisms, records that a runnable
        reference implementation is published as an architectural
        reference rather than a production isolation claim, and states
        the latency trade-off explicitly as a deliberate choice for
        deployments whose asset is high-consequence intelligence.

   23.  -03: Removed the Intellectual Property Note section in its
        entirety, together with the associated patent application
        reference, and removed the now-unreferenced BCP 79 normative
        reference.  This document makes no intellectual-property
        assertion; any applicable disclosure obligation is governed by
        IETF process independently of document text.

   24.  -03: Added a "missing piece" framing to Section 1, stating that
        the profile supplements rather than replaces identity
        federation, transport security, key management, attestation,
        access control, data-loss prevention, and model-side refusal,
        and that it supplies only the two answers none of them is
        required to give; and added an explicit scope paragraph naming
        banking and treasury, defence and national security, critical
        infrastructure, and regulated enterprises holding unreleased
        material, while placing consumer chat out of scope.

   25.  -03: Added Section 6 subsection "Where This Profile Is Aimed
        First", stating the intended high-consequence deployment classes
        and the reason an evaluation step on the join and release paths
        is an acceptable cost there.

   26.  -03: Added three further vendor deployment-class subsections to
        Section 6 alongside the existing Anthropic-class and OpenAI-
        class subsections: Google-class workspace, Gemini enterprise,
        and agent platforms; xAI-class Grok Business and enterprise
        agent seats, including external-feed correlation as a budgeted
        association class; and Meta Llama-class open-weight, self-hosted
        deployments, including the point that removing the vendor from
        the trust chain does not remove the join and that non-
        bypassability is the load-bearing requirement where the operator
        controls the weights.  Strengthened the section preamble to
        state that vendor names denote publicly described deployment
        classes only, and are not claims about unpublished internals,
        statements about any product's security, or assertions of vendor
        adoption or endorsement.

   27.  -03: Added [DAS-AUTHORITY] as an informative reference and cited
        it in Section 1 and Section 24 as the general statement of the
        architecture this profile specializes: existing layers answer

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        questions about information, none answers whether a specific
        machine-generated act was authorized to become externally
        effective.

   28.  -03: Updated the companion-draft cross-references to their
        current revisions, added IETF Datatracker links to each
        companion Internet-Draft reference entry, added
        [I-D.das-purpose-execution-finality] and
        [DAS-CAPABILITY-LAUNDERING] as informative references, and
        extended Section 24 with an explicit statement of the boundary
        between purpose binding and join authority, plus a note that
        cited revision numbers are point-in-time and readers should
        follow the Datatracker links.

Author's Address

   Sangam Das
   Independent Inventor
   Balasore 756001
   Odisha
   India
   Email: info@sangamdas.com

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