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PCEPS with TLS 1.3
draft-dhody-pce-pceps-tls13-01

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This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Authors Dhruv Dhody , Sean Turner , Russ Housley
Last updated 2022-10-20 (Latest revision 2022-10-06)
Replaced by draft-ietf-pce-pceps-tls13, draft-ietf-pce-pceps-tls13
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draft-dhody-pce-pceps-tls13-01
PCE                                                             D. Dhody
Internet-Draft                                       Huawei Technologies
Intended status: Standards Track                               S. Turner
Expires: 23 April 2023                                             sn3rd
                                                              R. Housley
                                                          Vigil Security
                                                         20 October 2022

                           PCEPS with TLS 1.3
                     draft-dhody-pce-pceps-tls13-01

Abstract

   RFC 8253 defines how to protect PCEP messages with TLS 1.2.  This
   document describes how to protect PCEP messages with TLS 1.3.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Path Computation
   Element Working Group mailing list (pce@ietf.org), which is archived
   at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/pce/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/dhruvdhody/draft-dhody-pce-pceps-tls13.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2023.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Early Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   [RFC8253] defines how to protect PCEP messages [RFC5440] with TLS 1.2
   [RFC5246].  This document describes defines how to protect PCEP
   messages with TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis].

   [Editor's Note: The reference to [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] could be
   changed to RFC 8446 incase the progress of the bis draft is slower
   than the progression of this document.]

   This document addresses cipher suites and the use of early data,
   which is also known as 0-RTT data.  All other provisions set forth in
   [RFC8253] are unchanged, including connection initiation, message
   framing, connection closure, certificate validation, peer identity,
   and failure handling.

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2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Early Data

   Early data (aka 0-RTT data) is a mechanism defined in TLS 1.3
   [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] that allows a client to send data ("early
   data") as part of the first flight of messages to a server.  Note
   that TLS 1.3 can be used without early data as per Appendix F.5 of
   [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis].  In fact, early data is permitted by TLS
   1.3 only when the client and server share a Pre-Shared Key (PSK),
   either obtained externally or via a previous handshake.  The client
   uses the PSK to authenticate the server and to encrypt the early
   data.

   As noted in Section 2.3 of [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis], the security
   properties for early data are weaker than those for subsequent TLS-
   protected data.  In particular, early data is not forward secret, and
   there is no protection against the replay of early data between
   connections.  Appendix E.5 of [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] requires
   applications not use early data without a profile that defines its
   use.  This document specifies that PCEPS implementations that support
   TLS 1.3 MUST NOT use early data.

4.  Cipher Suites

   Implementations that support TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] are
   REQUIRED to support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suites listed
   in Section 9.1 of [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis].

   Implementations that support TLS 1.3 MAY implement additional TLS
   cipher suites that provide mutual authentication and confidentiality,
   which are required for PCEP.

   PCEPS Implementations SHOULD follow the recommendations given in
   [I-D.ietf-uta-rfc7525bis].

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 So, this is what {{Section 9.1 of I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis}} says:

   A TLS-compliant application MUST implement the TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
   [GCM] cipher suite and SHOULD implement the TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
   [GCM] and TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 [RFC8439] cipher suites (see
   Appendix B.4).

   A TLS-compliant application MUST support digital signatures with
   rsa_pkcs1_sha256 (for certificates), rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 (for
   CertificateVerify and certificates), and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256.  A
   TLS-compliant application MUST support key exchange with secp256r1
   (NIST P-256) and SHOULD support key exchange with X25519 [RFC7748].

 Is there any reason to narrow the algorithm choices?

 My guess is not.  These ought to be available in all TLS libraries.

5.  Security Considerations

   The Security Considerations in TLS 1.3 are specified in
   [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis].

   The recommendations regarding Diffie-Hellman exponent reuse are
   specified in Section 7.4 of [I-D.ietf-uta-rfc7525bis].

   The key Security Considerations for PCEP are described in [RFC5440],
   [RFC8231], [RFC8281], and [RFC8283].

   The Path Computation Element (PCE) defined in [RFC4655] is an entity
   that is capable of computing a network path or route based on a
   network graph, and applying computational constraints.  A Path
   Computation Client (PCC) may make requests to a PCE for paths to be
   computed.  PCEP is the communication protocol between a PCC and PCE
   and is defined in [RFC5440].  Stateful PCE [RFC8231] specifies a set
   of extensions to PCEP to enable control of TE-LSPs by a PCE that
   retains the state of the LSPs provisioned in the network (a stateful
   PCE).  [RFC8281] describes the setup, maintenance, and teardown of
   LSPs initiated by a stateful PCE without the need for local
   configuration on the PCC, thus allowing for a dynamic network that is
   centrally controlled.  [RFC8283] introduces the architecture for PCE
   as a central controller

   TLS 1.3 mutual authentication is used to ensure that only authorized
   users and systems are able to send and receive PCEP messages.  To
   this end, neither the PCC nor the PCE should establish a PCEPS with
   TLS 1.3 connection with an unknown, unexpected, or incorrectly
   identified peer; see Section 3.5 of [RFC5440].  If deployments make
   use of a trusted list of Certification Authority (CA) certificates

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   [RFC5280], then the listed CAs should only issue certificates to
   parties that are authorized to access the PCE.  Doing otherwise will
   allow certificates that were issued for other purposes to be
   inappropriately accepted by a PCE.

   The recommendations regarding certificate revocation checking are
   specified in Section 7.5 of [I-D.ietf-uta-rfc7525bis].

6.  IANA Considerations

   There are no IANA considerations.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]
              Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-04, 7 March 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
              rfc8446bis-04>.

   [I-D.ietf-uta-rfc7525bis]
              Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-uta-
              rfc7525bis-11, 16 August 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-uta-
              rfc7525bis-11>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5440]  Vasseur, JP., Ed. and JL. Le Roux, Ed., "Path Computation
              Element (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 5440,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5440, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5440>.

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   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8253]  Lopez, D., Gonzalez de Dios, O., Wu, Q., and D. Dhody,
              "PCEPS: Usage of TLS to Provide a Secure Transport for the
              Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)",
              RFC 8253, DOI 10.17487/RFC8253, October 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8253>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4655]  Farrel, A., Vasseur, J.-P., and J. Ash, "A Path
              Computation Element (PCE)-Based Architecture", RFC 4655,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4655, August 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4655>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.

   [RFC8231]  Crabbe, E., Minei, I., Medved, J., and R. Varga, "Path
              Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)
              Extensions for Stateful PCE", RFC 8231,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8231, September 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8231>.

   [RFC8281]  Crabbe, E., Minei, I., Sivabalan, S., and R. Varga, "Path
              Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)
              Extensions for PCE-Initiated LSP Setup in a Stateful PCE
              Model", RFC 8281, DOI 10.17487/RFC8281, December 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8281>.

   [RFC8283]  Farrel, A., Ed., Zhao, Q., Ed., Li, Z., and C. Zhou, "An
              Architecture for Use of PCE and the PCE Communication
              Protocol (PCEP) in a Network with Central Control",
              RFC 8283, DOI 10.17487/RFC8283, December 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8283>.

Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank Adrian Farrel for their review.

Authors' Addresses

   Dhruv Dhody
   Huawei Technologies

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   Email: dhruv.ietf@gmail.com

   Sean Turner
   sn3rd
   Email: sean@sn3rd.com

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   516 Dranesville Road
   Herndon, VA,  20170
   United States of America
   Email: housley@vigilsec.com

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