Flaws in RIPv2 packet's authentication
draft-etienne-ripv2-auth-flaws-00
| Document | Type | Expired Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2001-05-01 | ||
| Stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of
the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-etienne-ripv2-auth-flaws-00.txt
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-etienne-ripv2-auth-flaws-00.txt
Abstract
The current strongest authentication method for RIPv2 (RFC2453[6]) is the MD5 authentication (RFC2082[5]) which uses shared secret key to authenticate the packets. This memo explains the different security flaws we found in the anti-replay and the MACs calculation. The second part presents practical exploitations of these weaknesses: an attacker directly connected to a link, can (i) break neighborhood, (ii) flap routes and (iii) inject obsolete routes.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)