Certificate Pinning Extension for HSTS
draft-evans-palmer-hsts-pinning-00

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2011-11-15 (latest revision 2011-09-21)
Replaced by draft-evans-palmer-key-pinning
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-evans-palmer-hsts-pinning-00.txt

Abstract

This memo describes an extension to the HTTP Strict Transport Security specification allowing web host operators to instruct UAs to remember ("pin") hosts' cryptographic identities for a given period of time. During that time, UAs will require that the host present a certificate chain including at least one public key whose fingerprint matches one or more of the pinned fingerprints for that host. By effectively reducing the scope of authorities who can authenticate the domain during the lifetime of the pin, we hope pinning reduces the incidence of man-in-the-middle attacks due to compromised Certification Authorities and other authentication errors and attacks.

Authors

Chris Evans (cevans@google.com)
Chris Palmer (palmer@google.com)
Chris Evans (cevans@google.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)