We're gonna need a bigger threat model
draft-farrell-etm-03

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Network Working Group                                         S. Farrell
Internet-Draft                                    Trinity College Dublin
Intended status: Informational                              July 6, 2019
Expires: January 7, 2020

                 We're gonna need a bigger threat model
                          draft-farrell-etm-03

Abstract

   We argue that an expanded threat model is needed for Internet
   protocol development as protocol endpoints can no longer be
   considered to be generally trustworthy for any general definition of
   "trustworthy."

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2020.

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Farrell                  Expires January 7, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                     etm                         July 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Examples of deliberate adversarial behaviour in applications    4
     2.1.  Malware in curated application stores . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Virtual private networks (VPNs) . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Compromised (home) networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Web browsers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.5.  Web site policy deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.6.  Tracking bugs in mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.7.  Troll farms in online social networks . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.8.  Smart televisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.9.  So-called Internet of things  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.10. Attacks leveraging compromised high-level DNS
           infrastructure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.11. BGP hijacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Inadvertent adversarial behaviours  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Possible directions for an expanded threat model  . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Develop a BCP for privacy considerations  . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Consider the user perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  Consider ABuse-cases as well as use-cases . . . . . . . .  10
     4.4.  Re-consider protocol design "lore"  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.5.  Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.6.  Transparency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.7.  Minimise  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.8.  Same-Origin Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.9.  Greasing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.10. Generalise OAuth Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.11. One (or more) endpoint may be compromised . . . . . . . .  12
     4.12. Look again at how well we're securing infrastructure  . .  12
     4.13. Consider recovery from attack as part of protocol design   13
     4.14. Don't think in terms of hosts . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.1.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.2.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Appendix A.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     A.1.  Changes from -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19