Enhancing Security and Privacy with In-Network Computing
draft-fink-coin-sec-priv-01

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COINRG                                                           I. Fink
Internet-Draft                                                 K. Wehrle
Intended status: Informational                    RWTH Aachen University
Expires: March 12, 2021                                September 8, 2020

        Enhancing Security and Privacy with In-Network Computing
                      draft-fink-coin-sec-priv-01

Abstract

   With the growing interconnection of devices, cyber-security and data
   protection are of increasing importance.  This is especially the case
   regarding cyber-physical systems due to their close entanglement with
   the physical world.  Misbehavior and information leakage can lead to
   financial and physical damage and endanger human lives and well-
   being.  Thus, hard security and privacy requirements are necessary to
   be met.  Furthermore, a thorough investigation of incidents is
   essential for ultimate protection.  In-network computing allows the
   processing of traffic and data directly in the network and at line-
   rate.  Thus, the in-network computing paradigm presents a promising
   solution for efficiently providing security and privacy mechanisms as
   well as event analysis.  This document discusses select mechanisms to
   demonstrate how in-network computing concepts can be applied to
   counter existing shortcomings of cyber-security and data privacy.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 12, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Fink & Wehrle            Expires March 12, 2021                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       Enhancing Security and Privacy       September 2020

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Protection Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Encryption and Integrity Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Authorization and Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Behavioral and Enterprise Policies  . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  In-Network Vulnerability Patches  . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.5.  Anonymization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Intrusion and Anomaly Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Intrusion Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Dead Man's Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Incident Investigation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Several deficiencies emerge from cyber-physical systems (CPS) such as
   the (Industrial) Internet of Things (IoT).  Everyday things are
   equipped with sensors and CPUs to allow for automatization and make
   life more comfortable.  The deployment of additional sensors supports
   the processing efficiency in Industrial Control Systems (ICS).  The
   entanglement of the sensors with the physical world leads to high
   sensitivity of the transmitted and collected data.  At the same time,
   devices are increasingly connected to the Internet to enable, e.g.,
   processing of data on cloud servers or exchange with other systems.

   Devices in CPS are often resource-constrained and do not offer the
   possibility to implement elaborate security mechanisms.  Furthermore,
   legacy devices and communication protocols are often still used in