Using Attestation in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
draft-fossati-tls-attestation-03
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Hannes Tschofenig , Yaron Sheffer , Paul Howard , Ionuț Mihalcea , Yogesh Deshpande | ||
| Last updated | 2023-09-14 (Latest revision 2023-03-13) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Attestation is the process by which an entity produces evidence about itself that another party can use to evaluate the trustworthiness of that entity. In use cases that require the use of remote attestation, such as confidential computing or device onboarding, an attester has to convey evidence or attestation results to a relying party. This information exchange may happen at different layers in the protocol stack. This specification provides a generic way of passing evidence and attestation results in the TLS handshake. Functionality-wise this is accomplished with the help of key attestation.
Authors
Hannes Tschofenig
Yaron Sheffer
Paul Howard
Ionuț Mihalcea
Yogesh Deshpande
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)