BRSKI over IEEE 802.11
draft-friel-anima-brski-over-802dot11-00

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Last updated 2018-10-18
Replaces draft-friel-brski-over-802dot11
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Network Working Group                                           O. Friel
Internet-Draft                                                   E. Lear
Intended status: Informational                                  J. Henry
Expires: April 21, 2019                                            Cisco
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                        October 18, 2018

                         BRSKI over IEEE 802.11
                draft-friel-anima-brski-over-802dot11-00

Abstract

   This document outlines the challenges associated with implementing
   Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures over IEEE 802.11 and
   IEEE 802.1x networks.  Multiple options are presented for discovering
   and authenticating to the correct IEEE 802.11 SSID.  This draft is a
   discussion document and no final recommendations are made on the
   recommended approaches to take.  However, the advantages and
   downsides of each possible method are evaluated.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

Friel, et al.            Expires April 21, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 BRSKI-WIFI                   October 2018

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Discovery and Authentication Design Considerations  . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Incorrect SSID Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.1.  Leveraging BRSKI MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.2.  Relying on the Network Administrator  . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.3.  Requiring the Network to Demonstrate Knowledge of
               Device  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  IEEE 802.11 Authentication Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.2.1.  Authentication Signaling Considerations . . . . . . .   8
       2.2.2.  IP Address Assignment Considerations  . . . . . . . .   8
     2.3.  Client and Server Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Potential SSID Discovery and Validation Mechanisms  . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Well-known BRSKI SSID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.2.  IEEE 802.11aq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.3.  IEEE 802.11 Vendor Specific Information Element . . . . .  12
     3.4.  Reusing Existing IEEE 802.11u Elements  . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.5.  IEEE 802.11u Interworking Information - Internet  . . . .  13
     3.6.  Define New IEEE 802.11u Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.7.  Wi-Fi Protected Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.8.  Define and Advertise a BRSKI-specific AKM in RSNE . . . .  14
     3.9.  Wi-Fi Device Provisioning Profile . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.  Potential Mutual Validation Options . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.1.  MAC Address Validation method . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.2.  Vendor Token Validation method  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.3.  Device Token Validation method  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.4.  Infrastructure Response Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.5.  Infrastructure Validation Method  . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   5.  Potential Authentication Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.1.  Unauthenticated and Unencrypted or OWE Pre-BRSKI and EAP-
           TLS Post-BRSKI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.2.  DPP Pre-BRSKI and EAP-TLS post-BRSKI  . . . . . . . . . .  19
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