Dynamically Recreatable Keys
draft-garciapardo-panrg-drkey-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Juan de los Galanes  , Cyrill Krähenbühl  , Benjamin Rothenberger  , Adrian Perrig 
Last updated 2021-02-22
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PANRG                                                    J. Garcia-Pardo
Internet-Draft                                           C. Kraehenbuehl
Intended status: Informational                           B. Rothenberger
Expires: August 26, 2021                                       A. Perrig
                                                             ETH Zuerich
                                                       February 22, 2021

                      Dynamically Recreatable Keys
                    draft-garciapardo-panrg-drkey-00

Abstract

   DRKey is a pragmatic Internet-scale key-establishment system that
   allows any host to locally obtain a symmetric key to enable a remote
   service to perform source-address authentication, and enables first-
   packet authentication.  The remote service can itself locally derive
   the same key with efficient cryptographic operations.

   DRKey was developed with path aware networks in mind, but it is also
   applicable to today's Internet.  It can be incrementally deployed and
   it offers incentives to the parties using it independently of its
   dissemination in the network.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 26, 2021.

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   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Garcia-Pardo, et al.     Expires August 26, 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                     I-D                     February 2021

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  First Level Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Second Level Key Establishment  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.3.  Key Server Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.4.  Key Expiration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Packet Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  High-Speed DNS Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  EDNS(0) Authentication Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Deployment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Deployment Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.2.  Key-Server Latency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.3.  Network Mobility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.1.  DRKey and Trust in ASes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.2.  Authentication within an AS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.3.  Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   In today's Internet, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks often use
   reflection and amplification techniques enabled by connectionless
   protocols like DNS or NTP and the possibility of source-address
   spoofing.  The main goal of DRKey is to provide a highly efficient
   global first-packet authentication system.  DRKey provides packet
   authentication at the network layer based on the network address
   (i.e., the IP address in the current Internet or the combination of
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