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Dynamically Recreatable Keys

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Juan A. García Pardo Giménez de los Galanes , Cyrill Krähenbühl , Benjamin Rothenberger , Adrian Perrig
Last updated 2022-01-12
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PANRG                                                    J. Garcia-Pardo
Internet-Draft                                           C. Kraehenbuehl
Intended status: Informational                           B. Rothenberger
Expires: 16 July 2022                                          A. Perrig
                                                             ETH Zuerich
                                                         12 January 2022

                      Dynamically Recreatable Keys


   DRKey is a pragmatic Internet-scale key-establishment system that
   allows any host to locally obtain a symmetric key to enable a remote
   service to perform source-address authentication, and enables first-
   packet authentication.  The remote service can itself locally derive
   the same key with efficient cryptographic operations.

   DRKey was developed with path aware networks in mind, but it is also
   applicable to today's Internet.  It can be incrementally deployed and
   it offers incentives to the parties using it independently of its
   dissemination in the network.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 July 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  First Level Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Second or Third Level Key Establishment . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  Key Server Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.4.  Key Expiration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Packet Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  High-Speed DNS Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  EDNS(0) Authentication Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Deployment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.1.  Deployment Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  Key-Server Latency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.3.  Network Mobility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.4.  Lighning Filter System as a DRKey Deployment  . . . . . .  14
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.1.  DRKey and Trust in ASes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.2.  Authentication within an AS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.3.  Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   In today's Internet, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks often use
   reflection and amplification techniques enabled by connectionless
   protocols like DNS or NTP and the possibility of source-address
   spoofing.  The main goal of DRKey is to provide a highly efficient
   global first-packet authentication system.  DRKey provides packet
   authentication at the network layer based on the network address
   (i.e., the IP address in the current Internet or the combination of
   AS number and local address in SCION), and not based on a higher-

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   level identity such as a domain name or web-server identity.

   To obtain strong guarantees with high efficiency on a per-packet
   basis, an authentication system based on symmetric cryptography is
   required.  DRKey does not rely on in-band protocols to negotiate
   keys, so it is able to authenticate already the first packet received
   from a host.  DRKey also does not store the symmetric keys for all
   potential senders, as it would be infeasible in an Internet-scale

   The core property achieved by DRKey is to enable a service to rapidly
   derive a symmetric key to perform network-address authentication for
   an arbitrary source host.  This enables services such as DNS or NTP
   to instantly authenticate the first request originating from a
   client, thus providing a defense against reflection-based DoS
   attacks.  The key can also be used to authenticate the payload of the
   request and reply, which is particularly useful for DNS which by
   default does not include any authentication.

   The prototype system enables the server to derive the symmetric key
   within two AES operations, which corresponds to 18 ns on a commodity
   server platform, and authenticate the first packet within 85 ns on
   commodity hardware.  Such speeds cannot be achieved with protocols
   based on asymmetric cryptography that require multiple messages to be
   exchanged to establish a shared session key.  For example, DRKey
   outperforms RSA 1024-based source authentication by a factor of more
   than 220, even under the assumption that the service already knows
   the client's public key.  In addition to providing highly efficient
   network address verification, DRKey can also be used to authenticate
   Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys in a protocol such as TCPcrypt.

1.1.  Outline

   The main ideas behind DRKey are as follows.  Autonomous systems
   (ASes) can obtain certificates for their AS number and IP address
   range from a public-key infrastructure (PKI), i.e., SCION's control-
   plane PKI in a SCION deployment or the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) in today's Internet.  DRKey uses such a PKI to
   bootstrap its own symmetric-key infrastructure.  DRKey key servers
   are set up in all deploying ASes and contact each other on a regular
   basis to set up symmetric keys between pairs of ASes.  These
   symmetric keys are then used as a root keys to efficiently derive a
   hierarchy of symmetric per-host and per-service keys.  The hardware
   implementation of the AES block cipher on most modern CPUs (Intel,
   AMD, ARM), allows such a key derivation in about four to seven times
   faster than a single DDR4 DRAM memory fetch.  The approach described
   ensures rapid key derivation on the server side, whereas a slower key
   fetch is required by the client to a local key server.  This one-

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   sidedness makes the source authentication for the receiving side as
   efficient as possible and ensures that DRKey does not introduce new
   DoS attack vectors.  DRKey is incrementally deployable and provides
   immediate benefits to deploying entities.

   A fundamental tradeoff in DRKey is the additional trust requirements
   of end hosts in their local AS: as the key server is able to derive
   the end-to-end symmetric key, this key cannot be used directly to
   achieve secrecy between two end hosts.  However, DRKey keys can be
   used to authenticate that the source host indeed belongs to the
   claimed AS, which suffices to resolve DoS attacks.

2.  Terminology

   AS:  Autonomous System.  A one-entity managed network.

   SCION:  A Path-Aware inter-networking architecture.

   Network Node:  An entity that processes packets.

   Key Server:  An entity connected to the network, that contains
      cryptographic keys, and is able to provide such keys to their
      respective hosts, granted they have the required permissions.

   End Host:  A node in the network that executes programs in behalf of
      users.  Users usually have full control of their end hosts.

   PRF:  Pseudo Random Function.  Function that has a low time
      complexity to evaluate, but which inverse is very expensive to
      obtain, making it infeasible to compute.  PRF may have as
      parameters a key and a value to which the function is applied.

   DRKey Secret Value:  A sequence of bytes kept in secret by the AS,
      inside the Key Server.  The validity of the secret value is
      configurable per AS, and dictates the validity of other keys
      derived from it.  The secret value is either random, or derived
      via a PRF from a random or secret sequence of bytes only known by
      the AS.  Secret values are the root of the DRKey key hierarchy.  A
      secret value for AS A is denoted as SVa.  More generally, a secret
      value can be bound to a standard protocol p (denoted as SVa^p).
      Non-standard protocols do not have their own secret value.

   DRKey Key Arrow Notation:  In DRKey, level 1 and level 2 keys exist
      to allow the authentication of the communication between one
      source entity a and one destination entity b.  The key is derived
      by one side and copied to the other.  The side that derives the
      key is the source of the arrow in the DRKey key notation.  So the
      key K_{b->a} denotes a key that is derived at b's side and

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      obtained on a's side, independently of the flow of the packets.
      The source side of the arrow is also called the "fast side", and
      the destination, the "slow side".  The fast side is typically a
      server, and the slow side an end host.

   DRKey Level 1 Key:  A key derived from a protocol bound secret value,
      by specifying the source and destination AS IDs of the ASes
      involved in the communication.  The level 1 key can be derived by
      applying a PRF keyed on the secret value, to the identifiers of
      the source and destination ASes of the derivation.  A level 1 key
      between fast side AS A and slow one AS B is denoted as K_{A->B}^p
      for a standard protocol "p", of K_{A->B}^* for non-standard ones.

   DRKey Level 2 Key:  A key derived from a level 1 key, and used to
      authenticate the source of packets from end-hosts to
      infrastructure nodes, or to further derive level 3 keys.  A level
      2 key is derived by applying a PRF keyed on the level 1 key to the
      identifiers of the source and destination of the communication.
      These identifiers can be the AS ID plus the IP address for the
      slow side, and the AS ID or the AS ID plus the IP address for the
      fast side of the DRKey protected communication.  All level 2 keys
      are anchored to a protocol, identified by a string.  We
      distinguish two possible level 2 keys, depending on the fast and
      slow sides of the key. (1) A level 2 key between the fast side AS
      A and the slow side end host Hb in AS B for standard protocol "p"
      is denoted as K_{A->B:Hb}^p. (2) A level 2 key between the fast
      side endhost Ha in AS A and the slow side AS B for standard
      protocol "p" is denoted as K_{A:Ha->B}^p.  For non-standard
      protocols the notation is the same but replacing p with *,p.

   DRKey Level 3 Key:  A key derived from a level 2 host-to-AS key, used
      to authenticate the source of end-host to end-host packets.  A
      level 2 key between the fast side endhost Ha in AS A and the slow
      side end host Hb in AS B for standard protocol "p" is denoted as
      K_{A:Ha->B:Hb}^p.  For non-standard protocols the notation is the
      same but replacing p with *,p.

   MAC:  Message Authentication Code is a sequence of bytes that
      authenticates and protects the integrity of a message.  Modifying
      the sender identity or the content of the message is detected by
      the MAC.

3.  Key Derivation

   To convey an intuition of the operation of the DRKey system, a high-
   level overview is provided first.

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3.1.  Overview

   The basic use case of DRKey is when a host Ha in AS A desires to
   communicate with a server Hb in AS B, and Hb wants to authenticate
   the network address of Ha using a symmetric key.  ASes A and B have
   set up one DRKey key server each, KSa and KSb respectively.  Each AS
   randomly selects a local secret value, SVa and SVb, which is only
   shared with trustworthy entities (in particular the key servers) in
   the same AS.  The secret values are never shared outside the AS.  The
   secret value will serve as the root of a symmetric-key hierarchy,
   where keys of a level are derived from keys of the preceding level.
   In DRKey, the keys are derived using a CMAC with AES, which is an
   efficient pseudorandom function (PRF).  The key derivation used by
   KSb in the example is: K_{B->A} = PRF_{SVb}(A).

   Thanks to the key-secrecy property of a secure PRF, K_{B->A} can be
   shared with another entity without disclosing SVb.  The arrow
   notation indicates the secret value used to derive the key.  Thus
   K_{B->*} would typically be used if AS B is on the performance
   critical side, where * denotes the set of remote ASes.

   To continue with the example, KSa will prefetch keys K_{*->A} from
   key servers in other ASes, including K_{B->A} from KSb.  In the
   example, the server Hb is trustworthy, and can thus obtain the secret
   value SVb to derive keys quickly.  When Ha wants to authenticate to
   Hb, it contacts its local key server KSa and requests the key
   K_{B:Hb->A:Ha}, which KSa can locally derive from K_{B->A}. Ha can
   now directly use this symmetric key for authenticating to Hb.

   The important property of DRKey is that Hb can rapidly derive
   H_{B:Hb->A:Ha} by using SVb and performing two PRF operations.  The
   one-wayness of the key-derivation function allows a key server to
   delegate key derivation to specific entities.  The key derivation
   process exhibits an asymmetry, meaning that the delegated entity Hb
   can directly derive a required key, whereas host Ha is required to
   fetch the corresponding key from its local key server.  As opposed to
   other systems that rely on a dedicated server for key generation and
   distribution (such as Kerberos), this delegation mechanism allows
   entities to directly obtain a symmetric key without communication to
   the key server.

3.2.  Assumptions

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   *  There exists an AS-level PKI, that authenticates the public key of
      an asymmetric key pair for each participating AS E and certifies
      its network resources; e.g. the SCION control-plane PKI certifying
      AS numbers for a deployment in SCION and RPKI certifying AS
      numbers and IP address ranges for a deployment in today's

   *  To verify the expiration time of keys and messages, DRKey relies
      on time synchronization among ASes with a precision on the order
      of several seconds.  This can be achieved using a secure time-
      synchronization protocol such as Roughtime.

   *  There exists an authentication mechanism for end hosts within an
      AS.  This is needed for access control.

3.3.  Key Hierarchy

   The DRKey key-establishment framework uses a key hierarchy consisting
   of four levels:

   *  0th-Level (AS-internal).  On the zeroth level of the hierarchy,
      each AS A randomly generates a local AS-specific secret value SVa.
      The secret value represents the per-AS basis of the key hierarchy
      and is renewed frequently (e.g., daily).  In addition, an AS can
      generate protocol-specific secret values: SVa^p = PRF_{SVa}("p")
      for a standard protocol p, where "p" is its ASCII encoding.  The
      purpose of these values is that they can be shared with specific
      services, such as DNS servers, that cannot be trusted with SVa but
      should still be able to efficiently derive additional keys.  This
      construction introduces additional communication and storage
      overhead, so only widely used protocols such as DNS or NTP would
      have their own secret values.  Non-standard arbitrary protocols
      will not have their own independent secret value, and thus it
      won't be shareable among services.  For these protocols, their
      level 1 keys will be derived from a special secret value denoted
      as SVa^*, only used for the derivation purpose.

   *  1st-Level (AS-to-AS).  By using key derivation, an AS A can derive
      different symmetric keys using a PRF from the special local secret
      value SVa^* or a protocol-specific secret value SVa^p.  These
      derived keys, which are shared between AS A and a second AS B,
      form the first level of the key hierarchy and are called first-
      level keys: K_{A->B}^x = PRF_{SVa^x}(B).  The input to the PRF is
      the (globally unique) AS number of AS B.  The value of x will be
      either p for standard protocols or * for arbitrary ones.  The
      first-level keys are periodically exchanged between key servers of
      different ASes.

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   *  2nd-Level (AS-to-host, host-to-AS).  Using the symmetric keys of
      the first level of the hierarchy, second-level keys are derived to
      provide symmetric keys for authentication (AS-to-host cases) or
      further derivation (host-to-AS cases) into the third level keys.
      Second-level keys can be established between:

      -  An AS as fast side, and an end-host as slow, for a standard
         protocol p: K_{A->B:Hb}^p = PRF_{K_{A->B}^p}(0||Hb)

      -  An end-host as fast side, and an AS as slow, for a standard
         protocol p: K_{A:Ha->B}^p = PRF_{K_{A->B}^p}(1||Ha)

      -  An AS as fast side, and an end-host as slow, for a non-
         standard, arbitrary protocol p: K_{A->B:Hb}^{*,p} =

      -  An end-host as fast side, and an AS as slow, for a non-
         standard, arbitrary protocol p: K_{A:Ha->B}^{*,p} =

   *  3rd-Level (host-to-host).  These keys are derived from the second
      level host-to-AS, DRKeys.  Depending on the protocol type, we
      observe two cases:

      -  Standard protocol p: the PRF is keyed on the level 2 host-to-AS
         drkey: K_{A:Ha->B:Hb}^p = PRF_{K_{A:Ha->B}^p}(Hb)

      -  Non-standard, arbitrary protocol p: the PRF is keyed on the
         level 2 host-to-AS drkey: K_{A:Ha->B:Hb}^{*,p} =

4.  Key Establishment

   There are two types of key establishment: first level, and second or
   third level key establishment, depending on the level of the key in
   the hierarchy.

4.1.  First Level Key Establishment

   Key exchange is offloaded to the key servers deployed in each AS.
   The key servers are not only responsible for first-level key
   establishment, they also derive second-level keys and provide them to
   hosts within the same AS.  To exchange a first-level key, the key
   servers of corresponding ASes perform the key exchange protocol.  The
   key exchange is initialized by key server KSb by sending the request:

     req = A || B || val_time || TS || [p]

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   Where TS denotes a timestamp of the current time and val_time
   specifies a point in time at which the requested key is valid.  If an
   optional protocol p is supplied, the protocol-specific first-level
   key K'_{A->B}^p is requested, otherwise the general K_{A->B} is.  The
   requested key may not be valid at the time of request, either because
   it already expired or because it will become valid in the future.
   For example, prefetching future keys allows for seamless transition
   to the new key.  The request token is signed with B's private key to
   prove authenticity of the request.

   Upon receiving the initial request, KSa checks the signature for
   authenticity and the timestamp for expiration.  If the request has
   not yet expired, the key server KSa will reply with an encrypted and
   signed first-level key derived from the local secret value SVa or, if
   an optional protocol p was supplied in the request, SVa^p:

     key = PRF_{SVa}(B)
     key = PRF_{SVa^p}(B)

     repl = {A || key}_{PK_B} || exp_time || TS

   The term {A || key}_{PK_B} indicates that the concatenation of A with
   the key is encrypted with asymmetric cryptography using B's public
   key.  The reply token is signed with A's private key.

   Once the requesting key server KSb has received the key, it shares it
   among other local key servers to ensure a consistent view.  Each key
   server can now respond to queries by entities within the same AS
   requesting second-level keys.  Alternatively, the proposed first-
   level key exchange protocol could also make use of TLS 1.3 with
   client certificates to secure the key exchange.

   All first-level keys for other ASes are prefetched such that second-
   level keys can be derived without delay.  However, on-demand key
   exchange between ASes is also possible.  For example, in case a key
   server is missing a first-level key that is required for the
   derivation of a second-level key, the key server initiates a key
   exchange.  ASes that contain a large number of end hosts benefit from
   prefetching most first-level keys, as they are likely to communicate
   with a large set of destination ASes.  In today's Internet there
   exist around 68000 active ASes.  Thus, setting up symmetric keys
   between all entities requires minor effort and state.  To avoid
   explicit revocation, the shared keys are short-lived and new keys are
   established frequently (e.g., daily).  Subsequent key exchanges to
   establish a new first-level key can use the current key as a first
   line of defense to avoid signature-flooding attacks.

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4.2.  Second or Third Level Key Establishment

   End hosts request a second-level key from their local key server with
   the following request format:

   format = {type, requestID, protocol, source, destination}

   An end host Ha in AS A uses this format for issuing the following
   request to its local key server KSa:

     format || val_time || TS

   It is assumed that this request and the reply are sent over a secure
   channel.  Similar to the first-level key exchange, val_time specifies
   a point in time at which the requested key is valid.  The key server
   only replies with a key to requests with a valid timestamp and only
   if the querying host is authorized to use the key.  An authorized
   host must either be an end point of the communication that is
   authenticated using the second-level key or authorized separately by
   the AS.

   If the end host requested a third level key, it must now be derived.
   It is done so from the obtained second level key.

4.3.  Key Server Discovery

   When a key server wants to contact another key server in a remote AS,
   it needs to know the IP address of the remote server.

   In the SCION architecture, the concept of service addresses can be
   used to anycast to a key server in a specific AS.

   For the regular Internet, RPKI can be used, which connects Internet
   resource information to a trust anchor.  As the deployment numbers of
   RPKI are growing, the RPKI certificate can be extended with the IP
   address of the key server (e.g., by encoding it into the common name
   field or creating a separate extension).  Using this mechanism, each
   AS publishes a list of IP addresses (or an IP anycast address) that
   is publicly accessible and shared by all key servers.  The routing
   infrastructure will direct the packets to the topologically nearest
   key server.  This mapping from an AS identifier to an IP address is
   verifiable through RPKI to prevent unauthorized announcements of key
   servers.  In case RPKI has not been fully deployed, key-server
   discovery could also work using a DNS entry that maps a domain to IP
   addresses of key servers.

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4.4.  Key Expiration

   Shared symmetric keys are short-lived (i.e., up to one day lifetime)
   to avoid the additional complication of explicit key revocation.
   However, letting all keys expire at the same time would lead to peaks
   in key requests.  Such peaks are avoided by spreading out key
   expiration, which in turn leads to spreading out the fetching
   requests.  To this end, a deterministic mapping offset (A, B) -> [0,
   t) is introduced.  This function uniformly maps the AS identifiers of
   the source in AS A and the destination in AS B to a range between 0
   and the maximum lifetime t of SVa.  This mapping is computed using a
   (non-cryptographic) hash function:

     offset(A,B) = H(A || B) mod t

   The offset is then used to determine the validity period of a key by
   determining the secret value SVa^j that is used to derive K_{A->B} at
   the current sequence j as follows:

     [ start(SVa^j) + offset(A, B) , start(SVa^j+1) + offset(A, B) )

   I.e., depending on the destination B, the secret value SVa can be
   different, even when chosen for the same point in time.

5.  Packet Authentication

   The DRKey keys enable source authentication of every packet.  To send
   DRKey source authenticated packets from end host Ha located in AS A
   to endhost Hb located in AS B, end host Ha first obtains the second
   level key K_{B:Hb->A}^p from the key server located in its AS A, KSa.
   With it derives the third level key K_{B:Hb->A:Ha}^p, which is used
   to authenticate.  For a packet pkt, the source Ha then calculates the
   authentication tag by computing the MAC keyed on the third level key
   K_{B:Hb->A:Ha}^p, over an immutable part of the packet pkt.  This
   immutable part of pkt can include parts of the layer-3 and layer-4
   headers, and optionally the layer-4 payload.  It is important to only
   include immutable fields as the verification would otherwise fail at
   the destination.

   The packet received at the destination is used to determine the
   source address Ha and source AS.

   *  In SCION these are part of the regular header, thus no extra
      information is needed other than the tag itself.

   *  In the current internet, 4 bytes containing the AS ID, plus the
      tag are added to the packet.

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   The destination Hb then derives or obtains the key K_{B:Hb->A:Ha}^p
   and uses it with the same MAC function to recalculate the
   authentication tag.  The tag is then compared to the one present in
   the packet.

5.1.  High-Speed DNS Authentication

   A protocol specific secret value is used SVb^p, with p = "DNS".  The
   level 1 key for a slow side A is derived directly in the DNS server:

     K_{B->A}^p = PRF_{SVb^p}(A)

   This first level key is exchanged with other AS via the level 1 key
   requests, as described in Section 4.1.  For a DNS query from a end
   host Ha, located in AS A, to a DNS server located in AS B, the first
   level key is derived as described above, and then the second level
   key is derived:

     K_{B->A:Ha}^p = PRF_{K_{B->A}^p}(0 || Ha)

   How to compute the authentication tag and obtain the AS ID is
   described in Section 5.

5.2.  EDNS(0) Authentication Option

   DRKey can use EDNS(0) to avoid breaking the existing DNS resolvers
   and authoritative servers.  With a DRKey custom extension that
   includes the total query/response length, the source AS number, a
   timestamp, and the per packet MAC.  The per-packet MAC for DNS
   queries and responses is computed the DNS header and all fields
   contained in the extension.  Using the DRKey EDNS(0) option, packet
   authentication for every DNS packet introduces 28 bytes of header

6.  Deployment

   DRKey allows incremental deployment, as key servers could be
   gradually deployed in each AS.  Already in the incremental deployment
   phase, DRKey prevents the addresses of upgraded ASes from being
   spoofed at other upgraded destination ASes.  Early adopters can
   immediately profit from DRKey's security properties.  Authenticating
   a packet requires packet modification either at the end host, or at a
   network appliance such as a middlebox or border router.  Adding the
   MAC at the end host does not increase the request size en-route.

   When updating end hosts is not possible in the short-term, DRKey can
   be implemented on a middlebox that computes a per-packet MAC and
   modifies applicable bypassing packets.

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   Packet verification at the destination AS can be performed by a
   middlebox as well.  If a destination does not understand DRKey
   traffic, it could fail to process this traffic.  In this case, the
   sending host contacts its local key server and asks if the
   destination AS supports DRKey.  The key server might have previously
   derived second-level keys for an end host in the corresponding AS or
   might forward the query to a key server in the destination AS.  If an
   AS supports DRKey, then it may deploy a middlebox that performs the
   DRKey operations in case the end host does not support it.  This will
   prevent sending authenticated traffic to a destination host that does
   not support DRKey.  In the worst case, the end host could fall back
   to legacy traffic.

   In case of operational failures (e.g., a single key server fails),
   the end entity will try to contact another key server in the same AS.
   If all key servers fail, the system could fall back to the current
   system with unauthenticated traffic.

6.1.  Deployment Incentives

   Since DRKey can be deployed on commodity hardware and integrates well
   with the current Internet infrastructure, the deployment obstacle for
   DRKey is low.  DRKey traffic can be recognized outside of ASes that
   have deployed DRKey and can thus be prioritized by servers.  This
   means that even when relatively few companies deploy DRKey to
   authenticate packets at their services (e.g., popular open DNS
   resolvers of Google or Cloudflare), there are strong incentives for
   ISPs to deploy DRKey and provide its services to their customers.

6.2.  Key-Server Latency

   The initial connection setup depends on the latency of the connection
   between the client and the key server.  To lower latency, DRKey's key
   servers should be positioned in an AS at a similar location as local
   DNS resolvers.  As even public resolvers have an average query
   latency of less than 20 ms traversing the Internet, it is expected
   that the latency of a local key derivation will be in the order of a
   few ms.  In most cases locally fetching a key will result in a lower
   latency than a full round-trip between client and server.  For ASes
   that are geographically dispersed, multiple key servers may be
   deployed (e.g., co-located with an access router or per point-of-

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6.3.  Network Mobility

   Network mobility allows entities to move from one AS to another while
   maintaining communication sessions.  In DRKey, key derivations are
   based on the current location of the entity in the Internet.
   Therefore, as soon as an entity moves to another AS, it needs to
   contact the key server of the new AS and fetch new second-level keys.
   Because local key derivation is fast and the latency of obtaining a
   key is small, the overhead is minimal.

6.4.  Lighning Filter System as a DRKey Deployment

   The Lightning Filter (LF) mechanism is a novel system that is
   intended to complement traditional firewalls by enabling
   cryptographically authenticated traffic shaping, based on the
   autonomous system of the source host of the traffic.  This reduces
   significantly the load on the traditional firewall during denial-of-
   service attacks, and even allows LF to be the only network defense
   mechanism for a specific sub-network, e.g. by securing a DMZ that
   exposes external services to untrusted networks.

   The core principle of the LF system relies on DRKey, using the high
   speed source authentication that DRKey enables.  This way, the system
   can authenticate each packet, assuring that it came from the host it
   claimed to.

   In case a breach is detected, the network administrators can
   immediately add the host and/or the origin AS to a blacklist,
   preventing packets originating there from reaching past the Lightning

7.  Security Considerations

7.1.  DRKey and Trust in ASes

   The keys provided by DRKey do not provide full end-to-end
   authenticity or secrecy properties: The source and destination ASes
   are able to derive the keys and could thus perform an active attack.
   This attack is limited to these two ASes; active attacks by
   intermediate ASes are not possible.  DRKey always enables AS-level
   source authentication and host-level source authentication under the
   additional assumption of an honest source AS.

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7.2.  Authentication within an AS

   To achieve secrecy as well as end-host authentication for
   communication between end hosts and key servers, an AS needs an
   intra-domain end-host and/or user-authentication system.  Different
   authentication mechanisms based on the operational environment are

   *  Authentication using TLS.  In order to securely exchange second-
      level DRKey keys between end hosts and key server, the end host
      can establish a secure TLS channel to the key server.  The
      identity of the communicating parties is authenticated using
      public-key cryptography for both the key server and the end host.
      Thus, the key server can uniquely identify the end host and verify
      its legitimacy to obtain a second-level key.

   *  Deployment in ISPs.  If the corresponding AS is an ISP, we assume
      that they can identify their customers (e.g., terminal connection
      number or router that has been deployed by the ISP).  In this
      case, only an attacker that is present at the customers local
      network can gain access to learn keys.

   *  Company / University.  For ASes that are under the control of
      companies or universities, login credentials or other local
      authentication mechanisms can be used to identify the user.  This
      gives companies the ability to run their own web servers and have
      full control over their key material.

   *  Mobile Devices.  For mobile devices such as smart phones that are
      connected to the Internet through a mobile telecommunication
      network, clients could be authenticated by the telecom provider,
      for example using the International Mobile Equipment Identity

7.3.  Adversary Model

   The adversary can deviate from the protocol and attempt to violate
   its security goals.  The Dolev-Yao model is assumed, where the
   adversary can reside at arbitrary locations within the network.  The
   adversary can passively eavesdrop on messages and also actively
   tamper with the communication by injecting, dropping, delaying, or
   altering packets.  However, the adversary has no efficient way of
   breaking cryptographic primitives such as signatures, pseudorandom
   functions (PRFs), and message authentication codes (MACs).  It is
   assumed that there exists a secure channel between end hosts and a
   key server within the same AS.

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   Assuming the mentioned capabilities, the goal of the adversary is to
   obtain cryptographic keys of other parties to forge authenticated
   messages.  By compromising an entity, the adversary learns all
   cryptographic keys and settings stored.  The adversary can also
   control how the entity behaves, including fabrication, replay, and
   modification of packets.  Both end hosts and network nodes
   compromises are considered.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

Authors' Addresses

   Juan A. Garcia-Pardo
   ETH Zuerich


   Cyrill Kraehenbuehl
   ETH Zuerich


   Benjamin Rothenberger
   ETH Zuerich


   Adrian Perrig
   ETH Zuerich


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